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ABSTRACT 
The central argument of this thesis is that the very same laws that purport to prohibit cruelty 
towards nonhuman animals in Australia are responsible for facilitating it. Australian animal 
welfare statutes, regulations and Codes of Practice all state the prevention of cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals as their objective. They contain provisions which not only prohibit cruel 
conduct, but they also place positive duties on those who have a nonhuman animal within 
their custody and control to do certain things to ensure their basic welfare needs are met.  Yet, 
nonhuman animals in Australia are lawfully treated with cruelty on a routine basis. They are 
confined to cages so small they cannot turn around, they have surgical procedures performed 
on their bodies without anaesthetic or pain relief, and they may be slaughtered without being 
rendered unconscious or insensible to pain. In all such cases, I argue that Australian animal 
welfare legislation not only fails to meet its stated objective of prohibiting cruelty, but that it 
actively permits it.  
This thesis departs from existing literature on the topic of lawful animal cruelty by seeking to 
understand precisely how animal cruelty is lawful in Australia. Existing literature has established 
that Australian animal welfare provisions are inadequate, and fail to protect nonhuman animals 
from some of the worst cruelties. Yet, little has been said about precisely what legal mechanisms 
are operating to permit such cruelty. A critical understanding of not only what the law allows, but 
how it allows it is essential to future attempts at reforming the law to better protect the interests of 
nonhuman animals in law. This thesis lays new groundwork for thinking about and understanding 
the complex problem of lawful animal cruelty in Australia. 
Through technical legal analysis and a critical assessment of the provisions of animal welfare 
legislation, regulations and Codes of Practice, I identify six ways in which Australian law 
permits cruelty towards nonhuman animals: (1) through the legal classification of nonhuman 
animals as legal property, (2) through inadequate legal provisions which prohibit only 
‘unnecessary’ cruelty, and which give force to Codes of Practice that permit cruel acts, (3) 
through the commodification of nonhuman animals which characterises them as having only 
exchange value in the capitalist marketplace, (4) through the use of definitions, legal fictions 
and express exclusions to declare inaction with respect to some forms of cruelty, (5) through 
the propagation of the myth that animal welfare laws are protecting nonhuman animals from 
cruelty, and (6) through an implicit reliance on other laws which prohibit the public from 
observing the lawful cruelty that occurs against nonhuman animals in private industry. 
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I. THESIS 
‘Someone who does not see a pane of glass does not know that he does not see it. 




Australian animal welfare laws and Codes of Practice are facilitating cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals. In this thesis, I demonstrate that the laws we have in place to protect 
nonhuman animals from harm are, in many instances, doing the precise opposite. I contend 
that the law is facilitating cruelty towards nonhuman animals at various levels. Cruelty is 
permitted not only by the explicit words of the law, but it is also legitimated by the 
unspoken premises upon which the law is built. I perform a close, critical reading of the 
provisions of the law to reveal this. 
To illustrate that Australian animal welfare laws and Codes of Practice are harming 
(instead of protecting) nonhuman animals, I not only investigate the practical operation of 
these laws, but also critically evaluate the implications of the premises and preconditions 
on which they are based. It is these less obvious features of the law that guide its 
construction, give it context, and sustain its application. Yet, many of these features remain 
unspoken, unidentified or even actively concealed.
2
 A close consideration of these 
underlying conditions is fundamental to my task of illuminating precisely what Australian 
animal welfare law is doing with respect to nonhuman animals, and how and why it is 
doing it.  
A. Defining Key Terms: ‘Cruelty’ and ‘Nonhuman Animal’ 
The concept of ‘cruelty’ that this thesis relies upon is taken from the Macquarie 
Dictionary: to be cruel to a nonhuman animal is to be ‘disposed to inflict suffering; 
indifferent to, or taking pleasure in, the pain or distress of another; hard-hearted; pitiless’.
3
 
                                                 
 
1
 Simone Weil as quoted in Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University 
Press, 2011) 39. 
2
 Peter Burdon defines critique as an ‘attempt to evaluate critically the premises, the preconditions and the 
implications of something that may not be obvious or reveal itself in everyday self-description’: Peter 
Burdon, 'A Constructive Critique' in Douglas Fisher (ed), Research Handbook on Fundamental Concepts 
of Environmental Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 205. 
3
 Susan Butler (ed) Macquarie Dictionary (online ed, at 21 November 2017) ‘Cruelty’.  
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The primary way in which I use the term ‘cruelty’ in this thesis relates to an indifference 
towards nonhuman animal suffering.  
My use of the term ‘nonhuman animal’ is intended to interrupt the binary opposition that 
exists in our everyday language between ‘human’ and ‘animal’. As Mary Midgley 
explains, the term ‘animal’ is most commonly used as a point of contrast against the 
human.
4
 This is so even despite the fact that humans are animals. In everyday usage, the 
term ‘animal’ ‘stands for the inhuman, the anti-human’,
5
 and therefore plays an important 
role in ‘forming our communal self-image – our notion of the kind of being that we 
ourselves are’.
6
 In seeking to define who we are, we typically contrast ourselves with 
nonhuman animals, and in doing so provide a false account of our nature.  
My use of the term ‘nonhuman animal’ throughout this thesis therefore serves two 
functions. First, it serves as a reminder of the biological fact that humans are animals, and 
therefore that human interests are not prima facie more important than nonhuman interests, 
simply because of the human/nonhuman divide. Second, and more importantly, it serves to 
indicate how important language is in conveying meaning. The use of the term ‘animal’, to 
mean nonhuman animal, serves to legitimate an ‘us versus them’ mentality, in which 
humans are viewed not only as separate from nonhuman animals, but also as more 
important than them. This type of thinking is routinely relied upon to justify some of the 
worst cruelties towards nonhuman animals. Whilst it is not within the scope of this thesis 
to consider the divide between human and nonhuman animals, my usage of the term 
‘nonhuman animal’ throughout this thesis interrupts the binary opposition between ‘us’ 
(humans) and ‘them’ (nonhumans). I use the terms ‘who’ and ‘he/she’ to refer to 
nonhuman animals throughout this thesis for the same reasons. Nonhuman animals are 
sentient creatures who should be recognised as individuals that possess morally relevant 
interests. Given that our language conveys how we value them, they should not be 
described as ‘that’ or ‘it’ since such terms are typically reserved for objects. 
For practical purposes, there are some instances throughout this thesis where the term 
‘animal’ is used synonymously with the term ‘nonhuman animal’. Peter Singer, who uses 
                                                 
 
4
 Mary Midgley, The Myths We Live By (Taylor and Francis, 2003) 135. 
5
 Ibid 136. 
6
 Ibid 135. 
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the term ‘nonhuman animal’ throughout his book Animal Liberation, describes the 
challenge of language thus: 
The English language…reflects the prejudices of its users. So authors who wish to 
challenge these prejudices are in a well-known type of bind: either they use the language 




My use of both terms throughout this thesis therefore reflects my desire to communicate 
clearly with the reader, and to interrupt the powerful linguistic binary between ‘humans’ 
and ‘animals’.  
B. Underlying Premises of the Thesis  
The central argument contained in this thesis challenges the notion that Australian animal 
welfare laws are meeting their stated objective of prohibiting cruelty towards nonhuman 
animals, and reveals that there is an ambivalence regarding their true objective. In making 
this argument, I accept and rely upon the premises that nonhuman animals feel pain, and 
can suffer in numerous, complex ways. The existence of animal ‘welfare’ legislation in 
Australia is indicative of a general acceptance of the fact that nonhuman animals have the 
capacity to suffer, since the purported purpose of these laws is to minimize their suffering. 
Scientific literature also supports the contention that most nonhuman animals are sentient.
8
 
Though some literature critiques this position,
9
  in this thesis I accept the proposition that 
                                                 
 
7
 See: Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (2nd ed, Pimlico, 1990) xiv. 
8
 For some scientific perspectives on this, see: Donald Broom, 'The Scientific Assessment of Animal 
Welfare' (1988) 20 Applied Animal Behaviour Science 5, Donald Broom, 'Cognitive Ability and 
Sentience: Which Aquatic Animals Should Be Protected?' (2007) 75 Diseases of Aquatic Oragnisms 99, 
Jennifer Mather and Roland Anderson, 'Ethics and Invertebrates: A Cephalopod Perspective' (2007) 75(2) 
Diseases of Aquatic Oragnisms 119. Note that this scientific position marks a departure from historical 
views about nonhuman animals as mere ‘automatons’, a view which is typically associated with Rene 
Descartes. For a critical assessment of Descartes position, see: John Cottingham, 'A Brute to the Brutes? : 
Descartes' Treatment of Animals' (1978) 53 Philosophy 551. See also Ian House, 'Harrison on Animal 
Pain' (1991) 66 Philosophy 376. 
9
 For some critical perspectives see Peter Harrison, 'Do Animals Feel Pain?' (1991) 66(255) Philosophy 25 
and Marian Dawkins, 'Through Animal Eyes: What Behaviour Tells Us' (2006) 100 Applied Animal 
Behaviour Science 4. 
Page 15 of 305 
 
nonhuman animals are sentient. Moreover, I adopt the view that sentient nonhuman 
animals have morally relevant interests that should be protected by law.
10
 
Whilst I acknowledge the existence of debates with respect to the sentience of some 
nonhuman animals (oysters are one example),
11
 those debates do not constitute a challenge 
to the arguments contained in this thesis, because this thesis is not concerned with such 
cases. Rather, it is concerned with instances in Australian animal welfare laws do fail to 
protect nonhuman animals that we know are sentient. It is a natural response to any attempt 
to expand moral or legal protections for any group of beings or entities to ask  where we 
should draw the line. In asking such questions, cases often emerge, which do not appear to 
fit neatly within our existing categories of thought. These cases are difficult to respond to, 
because they are generally surrounded by numerous other questions that require our 
consideration before we can know how to deal with them. For example: can oysters suffer? 
If so, what is their suffering like? Is their suffering restricted to feelings of physical pain, 
or can they suffer in more complex ways too?  
In this thesis, I contend that Australian animal welfare laws are facilitating cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals. I point to numerous examples that illustrate precisely how and why 
this is the case. The existence of cases which require our further consideration, do not 
provide a compelling reason to refuse to inspect and examine the examples where the law 
is most clearly failing to protect a sentient nonhuman animal. On the contrary, the 
existence of these cases should be viewed as an imperative to continue to build our 
analysis of Australian animal welfare laws, and to continue to broaden our understanding 
of the nonhuman animal world. Only by doing this can we continue to expand and adapt 
our thinking so as to be able to better accommodate the cases that challenge our existing 
categories of thought.  
                                                 
 
10
This is a common starting point for works of this type: Gary Francione, 'Animal Welfare and the Moral 
Value of Nonhuman Animals' (2010) 6(1) Law, Culture and Humanities 24, 24. For additional 
philosophical perspectives see Mark Rowlands, Animals Like Us (Verso, 2002) pp3-25, Steven Wise, 
Rattling the Cage (Cambridge Press, 2000)119-162, Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and 
Legislation (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1823) 311; Singer, Above n 7, 1-23. 
11
 There is a lack of scientific clarity surrounding the sentience of oysters. Peter Singer contends such ‘doubts 
about a capacity for pain are considerable…But while one cannot with any confidence say that these 
creatures do feel pain, so one can equally have little confidence in saying that they do not feel pain’. 
Since it is easy to avoid treating them cruelly, ‘[t]hey should receive the benefit of the doubt’. See Singer, 
above n 7, 174.   
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II. BACKGROUND TO THE INVESTIGATION 
A. The Legislative Framework 
Each state and territory of Australia has animal welfare legislation that purports to exist to 
protect nonhuman animals from cruelty. Though the content of each statute in each 
jurisdiction varies, the key provisions in each create criminal offences that appear to 
explicitly prohibit cruelty towards nonhuman animals. For example, in New South Wales, 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) provides: ‘[a] person shall not 
commit an act of cruelty upon an animal’.
12
 Some acts also purport to directly promote 
welfare. In South Australia, a 2008 legislative title amendment from the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals Act 1985 (SA) to the Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) was symbolic of 
this desire for the law to be seen to be doing more for nonhuman animals than simply 
prohibit their cruel treatment.
13
 The South Australian legislative subtitle now reads that it 
is: ‘[a]n Act for the promotion of animal welfare…’.
14
 In Victoria, the legislation also 
states that its purpose is not only to prohibit cruelty towards nonhuman animals, but to 
encourage their considerate treatment, and additionally ‘improve community awareness 
about the prevention of cruelty to animals’.
15
 Similarly, in the Northern Territory, the 
Animal Welfare Act explicitly creates a positive duty of care for those in charge of a 
nonhuman animal.  It is an offence under this Act to breach this duty through an 
unreasonable failure to provide an animal with the ‘minimum level of care’ outlined in the 
Act.
16
 Australian animal welfare legislation of this kind is thus not only concerned with 
telling people what they must not do to animals, but also telling them what they must do to 
meet their welfare needs.  
The provisions which ostensibly prohibit cruelty towards nonhuman animals in each 
Australian jurisdiction offer a great deal of information as to what constitutes cruelty. For 
example, in Queensland, the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 states that ‘[a] person 
                                                 
 
12
 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) s5(1). 
13
 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Animal Welfare) Amendment Act 2008 (SA). 
14
 Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA). 
15
 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic) ss1(a),(b),(c). 
16
 Animal Welfare Act (NT) s8. 
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must not be cruel to an animal’.
17
 The same Act also states that cruelty includes (among 
other things) causing an animal pain that is ‘unjustifiable, unnecessary, or unreasonable’ in 
the circumstances.
18
 Further, a person is considered to be cruel to a nonhuman animal 
where they: abuse it, terrify it, torment it, worry it, overdrive, override or overwork it, 
‘transport it in a way that is inappropriate for the animal’s welfare’, kill it ‘in a way that is 
inhumane’, or ‘overcrowd or overload’ it ‘unjustifiably, unnecessarily or unreasonably’.
19
 
The Queensland legislation thus proscribes a wide range of activities that may result in 
cruelty to a nonhuman animal. In addition to these types of general anti-cruelty provisions, 
legislation in some states of Australia also prohibits very specific acts of cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals which I address in chapter four.  
At first instance, these broad, sweeping legislative provisions appear to provide nonhuman 
animals protection from a wide range of harms. They purport not only to prohibit overt 
acts of cruelty, but they also dictate what must be done to ensure nonhuman animal 
welfare is not compromised. On their face, these laws appear to amount to vast and strong 
protections for nonhuman animals in Australia. Yet, as I reveal throughout this thesis, 
these laws do not prohibit all forms of cruelty towards all nonhuman animals. On the 
contrary: they explicitly facilitate cruelty towards them.  
B. Lawful Cruelty 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an account of every way in which nonhuman 
animals in Australia experience lawful cruelty.  However, I offer some powerful, 
representative examples which demonstrate the types of cruelty that are positively 
permitted by Australian animal welfare legislation and Codes of Practice. Whilst these 
examples merely scratch the surface of lawful cruelty towards nonhuman animals in 
Australia, they demonstrate the sharp contrast between what the law says it is doing, and 
what it is actually doing that inspired the writing of this thesis. In each of the following 
examples, the very same laws which purport to prohibit cruelty towards nonhuman 
animals, actively permit their cruel mistreatment.  
                                                 
 
17
 Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s18. 
18
 Ibid s18(2)(a). 
19
 Ibid s18(2)(b)-(h). 
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Hens who are kept for their egg production may lawfully be confined to cages so small 
they cannot even stretch their wings.
20
 They may have their beaks removed with a hot 
blade to prevent them from pecking at others with whom they share a cage.
21
 Selectively 
bred ‘meat’ chickens grow at abnormally fast rates. In 1960, their maximum daily weight 
gain was 22 grams. By the end of the 1990s, that had almost tripled to 65 grams.
22 
The 
result of this lawful, intensive selective breeding which has manufactured an unnatural 
growth rate,
23
 is that meat chickens now routinely experience poor bone quality, resulting 
in a ‘high incidence’ of painful leg problems, including bone deformities and fractures.
24
 
Sows (female pigs) may lawfully be confined to crates so small they cannot even turn 
around.
25
 Piglets may be castrated, have their tails cut short, and have their eye teeth 
removed without anaesthetic.
26
 Cattle under the age of 6 months may have their horns 
removed without anaesthetic or pain relief.
27 
Calves born to female cows milked for dairy 
products may be taken away from their mother following birth so that her milk may be 
harvested for human consumption.
28
 Her calf may lawfully be slaughtered because he is 
considered a ‘by-product’.
29
 Nonhuman animals killed for meat may have their throats cut 
whilst fully conscious to serve religious preferences.
30
 Greyhounds and horses used in 
racing may be bred and then killed if they are deemed to be too slow on the race track.
31
 
Monkeys may be confined to laboratories and exposed to cruel experiments for the 
purposes of scientific research.
32
 The orphaned joeys of kangaroos killed in Australia for 
                                                 
 
20
 For cages constructed post January 2001, the minimum legal stocking density for Australian laying hens is 
550cm
2
 per bird, for cages containing three or more birds of 2.4kgs or less. The surface area of a piece of 
A4 paper is 623.6cm
2
. See: Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: Domestic Poultry (4th 
Edition), Appendix 1.  
21
 Ibid s13.2. 
22
 Colin Whitehead et al, 'Skeletal Problems Associated with Selection for Increased Production' in W Muir 
and S Aggrey (eds), Poultry Genetics, Breeding, and Biotechnology (CABI Publishing, 2003) 29. 
23
 Ibid : The modern ‘broiler’ is now ‘18 genetic standard deviations from its origin in terms of growth 
capacity’.  
24
 M. Y. Shim et al, 'The Effects of Growth Rate on Leg Mophology and Tibia Breaking Strength, Mineral 
Density, Mineral Content, and Bone Ash in Broilers' (2012) 91(8) Poultry Science 1790. 
25
 For example: Model Code for the Welfare of Animals: Pigs (3rd Edition), appendix 3. 
26
 Ibid ss 5.6.6, 5.6.8, 5.6.11. 
27
 For example: Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: Cattle s5.8. 
28




 Australian Standard for the Hygienic Production of Meat for Human Consumptions s7.12. 
31
 No code of practice exists but the killing of nonhuman animals is not unlawful per se. Section 85 Animal 
Welfare Act 2002 (WA) provides explicitly that the ‘death of animal not sufficient to prove cruelty’. 
32
For example see Australian Code for the Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes (2013) 
s2.7.4(v)(b). 
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commercial purposes may be ‘euthanized’ by a ‘blow to the head…delivered with force 
sufficient to crush the skull and destroy the brain’.
33
 Cattle may be ‘roped’, wrested, ridden 
and tormented in rodeos for entertainment.
34
   
The examples above, whilst providing only an illustrative list of the types of animal cruelty 
that Australian animal welfare laws positively allow, prompt the question that is at the core 
of this thesis: how can Australian animal welfare laws, which purport most explicitly to 
protect nonhuman animals from cruelty, simultaneously permit it?  
III. APPROACH TO THE INVESTIGATION 
A. Scope of Thesis 
In seeking to explain how the law facilitates such cruelty, there are five limitations placed 
on the scope of this thesis that require articulation. First, this thesis is limited to a critique 
of laws that operate within the Australian jurisdiction. This restriction serves several 
purposes. It serves to illustrate how Australia, a country that typically prides itself on 
having a rigorous animal protection framework (a point which I explore in chapter six), 
still fundamentally fails to protect nonhuman animals from cruelty. My focus on the laws 
of a single country also enables sustained investigation into the detailed provisions of 
Australian animal welfare laws that has not taken place in existing literature.  
Whilst my focus in this thesis is on the laws of Australia, international sources from legal 
systems that govern animals in a similar manner (such as the United States) assist my 
critique. Academic inquiry into the laws that govern and regulate nonhuman animals has 
only emerged in Australia, as a discrete discipline, within the last decade. The first 
Australian scholarly animal law issues book was published in 2009,
35
 and the first 
Australian animal law textbook was published in 2010.
36
 Given that there is such a small 
collection of Australian resources on animal law matters, international sources are pivotal 
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to my inquiry as they support and inform my local focus. In chapter three for example, I 
detail some American case law in which there has been an attempt to extend legal 
‘personhood’ to nonhuman animals. Such test cases have not yet been tried in Australia, 
and it is thus informative to observe how these cases have run in other countries. 
Second, the laws that form the primary focus of this thesis are limited to state and territory 
based animal welfare statutes, regulations and accompanying Codes of Practice in 
Australia. I do not extend my analysis to Australian federal laws that touch on the welfare 
of nonhuman animals (such as the federal laws that govern the live export of nonhuman 
animals). I restrict myself to state-based legislation primarily because these are the 
documents that expressly purport to protect animal welfare. It is also within these Acts, 
Regulations and Codes that I suggest the law simultaneously prohibits and approves 
cruelty. In chapter eight, I critique examples of ‘ag-gag’ legislation that stifle the work of 
animal activists engaging in civil disobedience. Whilst these statutes do not neatly fit 
within the category of Australian animal welfare laws, they complement and facilitate 
these laws in important ways. Specifically, the enforcement of Australian animal welfare 
laws implicitly rely upon unlawful acts of trespass. Thus, an exploration of the relationship 
between Australian animal welfare legislation and other laws which prohibit trespass as 
civil disobedience on behalf of nonhuman animals is essential to a critical assessment of 
precisely how Australian animal welfare laws continue to permit cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals. 
Third, this thesis is restricted in scope to identifying the ways in which Australian law fails 
to protect nonhuman animals from cruelty. I am thus concerned only with identifying 
problems for nonhuman animals within the existing Australian liberal legal system. Law 
reform proposals to generate change for nonhuman animals mark an important area for 
future research (some of which I point to in my concluding chapter). It is my hope that the 
arguments contained within this thesis may lay some important groundwork for thinking 
about what legal reforms may be needed to better protect nonhuman animals from cruelty 
in Australia. However, I do not articulate what those reforms may look like in this thesis.  
Fourth, this thesis is restricted predominantly to an assessment of animal welfare matters 
and laws as they relate to domestic nonhuman animals. My usage of the term ‘domestic’ 
mirrors that used in Australian animal welfare legislation, and refers to any species of 
nonhuman animal that is kept in a tame state (or which is being tamed), and which is under 
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human care and control.
37
 Domestic nonhuman animals can be contrasted with those that 
are living in a wild state. I focus on domestic nonhuman animals in this thesis because they 
are exposed to the greatest number of lawful cruelties, but are also ironically the subject of 
the greatest number of legal protections. Considerations of wild animal welfare matters 
and wild animal welfare regulations present a potential future research direction, but do 
not form part of my considerations within this thesis.
38
 
Fifth, this thesis is restricted in scope to providing an animal welfare perspective, rather 
than that of human welfare or interests. This thesis is concerned with identifying instances 
in which the law permits cruelty towards nonhuman animals, whilst simultaneously 
purporting to protect them from harm. It is acknowledged that the arguments contained 
within this thesis confront many powerful, vested human interests in continuing to be cruel 
to nonhuman animals. Humans are cruel to nonhuman animals for many reasons: because 
it is cheaper than being kind, because it satisfies a particular religious teaching or because 
we are more powerful than they are.
39
 Further, we are crueller to some species than we are 
to others. We typically adore our pets, and loathe other creatures that we find frightening, 
disgusting or annoying. In providing an animal welfare perspective, this thesis confronts 
the many deeply held ideas that human beings have about how we ought to treat nonhuman 
animals. I critique the laws that legitimate many of the practices that routinely harm 
nonhuman animals and have been historically viewed as acceptable (and even 
‘necessary’). However, I do not critique the many important arguments in favour of 
continuing to use nonhuman animals for human benefit, even where such use involves 
cruelty. Perhaps the most widely accepted usage of nonhuman animals is in research 
settings to generate medical advances for humans. Jeremy Garrett summarises the crux of 
the moral question in research settings in the following way: 
Supposing that it were uniquely necessary for obtaining genuine medical or scientific 
benefit, is it morally permissible to use animals in research that is (1) harmful, (2) 
nontherapeutic, and (3) non-consensual that that would be judged unethical if done with 
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Many people definitively answer ‘yes’ to this question. Their exact reasons may be varied, 
but are generally framed in terms of the greater importance of human needs.
41
 Many 
humans will give preference to human interests over nonhuman interests in this context, 
simply because human interests are deemed to be more significant. Peter Singer calls this 
view ‘speciesism’, because he reasons that (like other forms of discrimination such as 
racism and sexism) it is premised on giving preference to the moral interests of one species 
(namely humans), over others (namely nonhumans), purely based on species 
membership.
42
 For Singer, species membership is not a morally relevant characteristic that 
justifies such discrimination. Yet, for many human beings it is.
43
 
This thesis does not consider wider debates about when (if at all) the use of nonhuman 
animals to serve human purposes is morally justified.
44
 Although this thesis is implicitly 
critical of cruelty towards nonhuman animals, the goal of my inquiry within these pages is 
restricted to a more focused and perhaps more modest task. I am concerned, first and 
foremost, with making a basic case for clarity and honesty within Australian law by 
examining it against its own stated premise. At present, Australian animal welfare laws 
condone cruelty towards nonhuman animals, despite the fact they explicitly purport to 
protect them. It is this internal contradiction in Australian law, and not the human use of 
nonhuman animals in principle, that this thesis exposes and condemns. 
B. Method of Analysis 
My method in this thesis is shaped by the juxtaposition between what the law says it is 
doing, and what it is actually doing. My approach is to unpack and evaluate the provisions 
of Australian animal welfare law and Codes of Practice to understand precisely which 
mechanisms are operating to permit cruelty towards nonhuman animals. This approach is 
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informed by critical legal studies. Critical legal studies, in the broad sense in which I 
employ the term here,
45
 refers to a vast array of critical scholarship that includes, for 
example feminist legal theory, critical race theory and queer legal theory.
46
 These 
approaches share in common a concern with vulnerable groups, and thus inform my 
discussions in this thesis surrounding nonhuman animals. Moreover, as Robert Cryer, 
Tamara Hervey and Bal Sokhi-Bulley suggest, a critical approach ‘really wants to know 
how things work and why, not simply how we are told they are supposed to work’.
47
 The 
critical approach I adopt in this thesis reads the law as it relates to the vulnerable group of 
nonhuman animals within the context in which the law is both constructed and applied.  
To answer the question of how the law facilitates cruelty to nonhuman animals the method 
of analysis I use in this thesis is necessarily mixed. It is mixed because the law permits 
cruelty in various ways and on various levels. It is contained not only within the explicit 
provisions of Australian animal welfare law, but it is also inherent within the values that, 
despite remaining unarticulated, construct and sustain its operation. In revealing precisely 
what the law allows, I use traditional methods of doctrinal legal analysis. For example, in 
chapter four, I perform a close reading of the provisions of Australian animal welfare law, 
to identify the ways in which the provisions, which purport to prohibit cruelty to 
nonhuman animals, actually enable it. I examine defences to a charge of animal cruelty, 
and I consider the operation of supplementary legislative instruments, such as regulations 
and codes of practice. I consider how they are given legal force, and what forms of cruelty 
they allow. I also draw on existing Australian case law to substantiate my analysis of 
legislative terms such as ‘necessary’ and ‘reasonable’. In chapter seven I apply the 
traditional legal principle of ‘fair labelling’ to animal welfare law to demonstrate that 
Australian animal welfare legislation uses the term ‘cruelty’ in a misleading manner, and 
in doing so positively misinforms the public.  
In identifying and critiquing the values that underpin and sustain these legal provisions, I 
perform a more critical analysis of the provisions of Australian animal welfare law. I look 
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beneath the surface level of the law, to identify the presumptions that underpin and shape 
it. I do this not only by looking at Hansard but also by evaluating the implications of the 
law. By looking at what the law achieves, it is possible to ask questions about who the law 
is serving, and why it is serving them. The critical approach I draw on throughout this 
thesis draws upon other disciplines. For example, in chapter four, I draw on psychology to 
inform my discussion about what values are represented in the law, and why. In chapter 
five, I draw on feminist thinking to reveal the way in which the language used in the law 
contains prejudices that are routinely unarticulated yet serve to convey meanings and 
values with powerful implications for the welfare of nonhuman animals.  
The cross-disciplinary approach that I adopt in parts of this thesis adds richness and depth 
to the more traditional legal analysis offered in the other parts of this thesis. This approach 
enables the consideration of questions about not only what cruelty the law permits, but also 
what values it reflects and how it reflects them in permitting that cruelty. A mere surface 
analysis of the legal provisions would fail to identify the powerful nature of the forces that 
construct and sustain the law. Cormac Cullinan’s words are pertinent: 
Constitutions, laws and the judgments that interpret them also express and reflect our idea 
of what law is and ought to be, and what societies believe in and aspire to. This is the 
tricky bit, because it is far less visible. If one imagines the legal and political system as a 
painting hanging on a wall, then our idea of law and society would be like the frame of the 
painting. Usually when we look at the painting we don’t see the frame or the wall on which 
it hangs. Yet they are vital. The frame marks the boundary of our vision and understanding 
of society. When we look at the painting or society we don’t think about, let alone 
question, whether the painting should be bigger or smaller, or whether it should be hanging 
on that wall or painted on it. When we look at our governance systems, the limits of our 
vision and the questions that we consider are defined by the frame.
48
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IV. STRUCTURE OF THESIS  
This thesis is structured to reveal six ways in which Australian law is facilitating the 
cruelty towards nonhuman animals. Following this introduction and the literature review 
(chapter two), each substantive chapter focuses on one of these six ways.  
Chapter Three: Legal Persons, Legal Things and Somewhere In-Between  
In chapter three, I reveal that the legal characterisation of nonhuman animals as legal 
property facilitates cruelty towards them. It does so because it classes them as legal 
‘things’. They are the ‘object’ of a private property relationship with humans. This legal 
characterisation facilitates cruelty towards nonhuman animals because it restricts the 
extent to which their interests may be protected by law (I show this in chapter four). 
Moreover, I suggest that a lack of clarity surrounding what the legal person is, and how it 
operates, means that key commentators on the legal status of nonhuman animal 
unwittingly rely upon a construction of the legal person as being tied to the human. The 
result is that commentators in animal law who argue for the alleviation of nonhuman 
animals from the status of property unwittingly rely upon a conception of the person that 
cannot extend to nonhuman animals.  
I first explain the difference between legal ‘persons’ and legal ‘things’ to explain the legal 
status of nonhuman animals. My argument is that strictly speaking, only legal persons 
count in law. Legal ‘things’ cannot. Nonhuman animals therefore provide a sui generis 
case. They are property, but the law also attempts to protect their interests. This is a 
privilege normally reserved for legal persons. I then provide a critical overview of the 
concept of the legal ‘person’, with a view to explaining who can be a legal person. My 
argument is that even though there are several competing conceptions of the legal ‘person’, 
they are all shaped by human interests. By critically analysing the work of key theorists on 
the legal status of nonhuman animals, Gary Francione and Steven Wise, I argue that the 
category of legal personhood in animal law literature remains tightly bound to humanness, 
with the result that nonhuman animals are consistently disqualified from its reach. The 
result is that nonhuman animals are not only excluded from the legal category of persons, 
but that the way the category of the person itself is defined – even by those who advocate 
that animals should be included within it – necessitates their exclusion.  
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Chapter Four: Australian Animal Welfare Laws 
In chapter four I argue that the key provisions of existing animal welfare law explicitly 
permit cruelty towards nonhuman animals. Having established in chapter three that 
nonhuman animals are legal property, and that the category of the person is constructed so 
as excluded nonhuman animals, here I illustrate how their property status results in 
inadequate legal protections for their welfare. Although Australian animal welfare laws 
purport to provide nonhuman animals with legal protections from nonhuman animals, 
those protections are consistently undermined to serve human interests. This is made 
possible by their legal characterisation as ‘things’ that may be legitimately used for human 
purposes.  
To establish my argument in this chapter, I first outline the key animal welfare provisions 
in Australian law. I then identify two legal mechanisms by which the meaningful content 
of these provisions is eroded. The first is the use of ‘qualifying’ terms that limit the ambit 
of cruelty prohibitions. These words, such as ‘reasonable’ and ‘necessary’, accompany 
anti-cruelty provisions with the problematic result that cruelty towards nonhuman animals 
is prohibited by law in principle, but only where it is not seen as a human ‘necessity’. The 
law therefore reflects the view that there exist acts of ‘necessary’ or ‘reasonable’ cruelty 
towards nonhuman animals.
49
 Further, the test of what constitutes ‘necessity’ or 
‘reasonableness’ is one that consistently favours human interests. Thus, cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals is explicitly permitted by law, where that cruelty is seen to serve a 
legitimate human interest.  
The second legal mechanism that I identify that undermines the law’s general prohibition 
on animal cruelty is the operation of Codes of Practice. Codes of practice dictate separate 
legal standards for industries that use nonhuman animals for human purposes. I argue that 
these Codes, which supplement Australian animal welfare provisions, operate to 
effectively exempt the most vulnerable nonhuman animals from the protective reach of 
Australian animal welfare provisions. I develop this theme further in chapter seven, where 
I suggest that a myth of animal protection is sustained by Codes which operate in tandem 
with animal welfare legislation to erode much of its meaningful content.  
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Chapter Five : The Commodification of Nonhuman Animals 
Having explained that Australian animal welfare laws prohibit ‘unnecessary’ or 
‘unreasonable’ cruelty, in chapter five I turn to consider how the interests of nonhuman 
animals are reflected in law. The prohibition of ‘unnecessary suffering’ seeks to balance 
nonhuman animal interests against human interests. Yet, in this chapter I argue that in 
many instances, nonhuman animals are constructed in law as mere objects that have no 
interests at all. The result is that cruelty towards them becomes most readily justified with 
respect to human interests. 
To sustain my argument, I demonstrate that some nonhuman animals are positively 
commodified by law, with the result that they are constructed as ‘things’ that have no 
morally relevant interests. Using Karl Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism, I suggest 
that commodities in capitalist society have value attributed to them at the point of 
exchange. The value of a commodity is therefore perceived as being synonymous with the 
price for which it can be exchanged at market. The commodification of nonhuman animals 
therefore has the troubling effect of equating their value with the price which can be 
obtained from the use or sale of their bodies. As commodities, the interests of nonhuman 
animals do not count. The sentient creature is made ‘absent’. Having established how the 
commodification of nonhuman animals facilitates cruelty toward them, I then explain how 
they are commodified by Codes of Practice. 
Chapter Six: The Policy of Inaction 
In this chapter, I shift my focus. Instead of looking at where the law actively prohibits 
cruelty, I look at where it is silent with respect to it. My contention is that Australian 
animal welfare laws ‘declare inaction’ with respect to some of the worst types of cruelty. 
Animal protection statutes therefore contain specific provisions which reflect a deliberate, 
intentional decision by lawmakers to ignore certain types of cruelty inflicted upon certain 
species of nonhuman animals. I argue that such instances do not constitute a ‘gap’ in the 
law, but rather that the law is actively complicit in permitting such cruelty. The law is thus 
complicit in the infliction of suffering of some nonhuman animals, because it fails to 
prohibit types of conduct that constitute cruelty towards them.  
To establish my argument, I explain first how the law is always ‘active’, even where it 
fails to prohibit cruel conduct. I then identify three legal mechanisms operating within 
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Australian animal welfare legislation that reflect declared inaction towards specific types 
of cruelty. First, I show that the consciously inadequate definition of ‘animal’ excludes 
many sentient creatures from the protective provisions of Australian animal welfare law. 
Second, I explain how legal fictions operate to deem acts of cruelty to be ‘non-cruelty’. 
Third, I demonstrate that express exclusions work to exempt a wide range of ‘elective 
husbandry procedures’ from the reach of animal welfare law. In each instance, Australian 
animal welfare law explicitly states that certain types of cruelty are exempted from the 
protective reach of Australian animal welfare legislation. In doing so, it is complicit in that 
cruelty. 
Chapter Seven: The Myth of Animal Protection 
Having argued from several perspectives that Australian animal welfare laws consistently 
fail in meeting their stated objective, in this chapter I theorize how these laws generate and 
sustain a ‘myth’ of animal protection, while permitting cruelty to nonhuman animals. I 
argue that this myth facilitates cruelty to nonhuman animals by legitimating the status quo. 
It communicates to the public that nonhuman animals are being protected from cruelty. 
Moreover, it serves to legitimate cruel conduct by approving it within the context of a 
statute that ostensibly exists for the purposes of animal protection.  
To make my argument in this chapter, I first explain how the myth of animal protection 
facilitates cruelty to animals. Then, I identify three ways in which this myth is generated 
and sustained by animal welfare legislation. First, I examine the physical 
compartmentalisation of the provisions which approve cruelty from those that prohibit it. 
My suggestion is that as it stands alone, animal welfare legislation falsely appears to 
prohibit cruelty. At the same time, Codes of Practice operate at a different level to erode 
these protections for many species. Second, I assess what animal welfare legislation and 
Codes of Practice communicate to the public, and how they communicate it. I argue that 
they communicate unclearly and misleadingly, with the result that they communicate a 
false message about what the law allows. Third, I turn to consider the enforcement 
mechanisms contained with Australian animal welfare statutes. Focusing specifically on 
the role of the RSPCA in enforcing animal welfare provisions, I argue that it is given 
inadequate powers and therefore must necessarily rely upon animal activists who 
unlawfully trespass to gather evidence of animal cruelty. Moreover, the RSPCA is 
chronically underfunded and has conflicts of interest. The result is not only that Australian 
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animal welfare legislation is poorly enforced, but it is set up to necessitate poor 
enforcement. Absent the mechanisms necessary for adequate enforcement, the notion that 
Australian animal welfare laws protect nonhuman animals remains a myth. 
Chapter Eight: Keeping Cruelty Invisible: Laws that Punish Civil Disobedience  
In the final chapter of this thesis, I examine legislation that seeks to stifle or deter unlawful 
acts of activism on behalf of nonhuman animals. Having established in chapter seven that 
the enforcement of Australian animal welfare laws implicitly rely upon unlawful acts of 
trespass, here I suggest that other legislation has the potential to silence and deter these 
activists. Such silencing not only precludes the enforcement of Australian animal welfare 
legislation, but also facilitates cruelty by keeping it invisible and by preventing public 
discourse on animal welfare matters.  Cruelty that is kept ‘out of sight’ is cruelty that is 
kept ‘out of mind’.  
To establish my argument, I first explain how the act of trespass is justified when it is 
necessary to expose cruelty towards nonhuman animals. Even though trespass invades an 
individual’s interest in privacy, I argue that that interest may be legitimately infringed in 
the name of the greater good. Moreover, I argue that trespass constitutes an act of civil 
disobedience which is morally justified in a democratic society. I then turn to explain how 
acts of unlawful activism have generated change for nonhuman animals by stimulating the 
types of public debate that are essential to law reform, and by facilitating the enforcement 
of animal welfare legislation. Finally, I examine three examples of ‘ag-gag’
50
 legislation 
that may operate to stifle activists who trespass to expose cruelty: The Surveillance 
Devices Act 2016 (SA), The Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW) and the proposed Criminal Code 
(Animal Welfare) Amendment Bill 2015 (Cth). These laws may be used to punish and deter 
the acts of activism that are essential not only to enforcing Australian animal welfare laws, 
but to reforming them. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
My six substantive chapters reveal six ways in which Australian animal welfare laws are 
harming nonhuman animals instead of protecting them. Having identified these 
mechanisms by which the law facilitates instead of prohibits cruelty, I then turn to 
consider some future research questions that result from the arguments contained herein. It 
is my hope that the arguments in this thesis will provide a platform for thinking about law 
reform directions, and how nonhuman animals may be better protected by Australian law.  
In the literature review that follows, I provide a brief overview of existing literature that is 
critical of Australian animal welfare law which serves to highlight the unique contribution 
that is offered by this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2 : THE INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT: LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
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I. THE INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT 
This chapter provides a summary of existing literature within the academic discipline of 
animal law. This summary does two things. First, it provides context for the argument and 
analysis performed within this thesis. Second, it demonstrates both how and why the 
arguments contained in this thesis either build on, or depart from thinking within existing 
animal law literature.  
The term ‘animal law’ refers to growing area of academic inquiry, which focuses on the legal 
regulation of the relationship between human and nonhuman animals. In 2007, there were 90 
animal law courses available for study across nine different countries. 74 of those were in the 
United States of America.
1
 In Australia, Animal law was only offered as an area of study in 
Australian Universities for the first time in 2005, as a Postgraduate elective at the University 
of New South Wales. Fourteen universities in Australia have since offered, or continue to 
offer animal law as an area of elective legal study. Whilst philosophical discourse regarding 
the rights of nonhuman animals has existed for decades,
2
 legal discourse on the topic 
(particularly in the Australian context) is relatively new. As such, there is considerable scope 
to contribute to legal discourse regarding how Australian law treats nonhuman animals.  
Animal law issues arise in a wide range of legal disciplines. For example, the principles of 
administrative law are relevant to animals in the context of council determinations to seize 
and/or destroy dangerous dogs.
3
 Similarly, constitutional principles indirectly implicate 
nonhuman animals in the context of challenges to the federal live animal export scheme 
where the constitution provides federal powers to make laws with respect to trade and 
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commerce that involve nonhuman animals.
4
 Family law implicates nonhuman animals where 
there are disputes over pet ownership and custody.
5
 In addition, International law is relevant 
where Australia has signed international treaties pertaining to animals and their welfare, 
which may also inform and guide local Australian law making.
6
  All of these disciplines 
constitute part of the focus of animal law. Animal law is also necessarily concerned with 
broader jurisprudential issues, such as the legal construction of nonhuman animals as 
‘property’, how legal standing operates to exclude or enable nonhuman animals to be 
represented in Court, issues regarding the enforcement of law and the funding of animal law 
enforcement agencies such as the RSPCA, and the effect of political pressures on proposed 
statutory reform. 
The study of animal law is also interdisciplinary in nature. This is because animal law, much 
like all areas of law, ‘involves the study of power relationships’.
7
 Philosophical and political 
perspectives are key to understanding how these relationships are created and sustained. 
Further, since animal law is connected to the goal of strengthening the legal mechanisms that 
seek to protect nonhuman animals from harm, the study of animal law necessarily involves 
analysis of the political and philosophical context in which our law is constructed. Though 
animal law is interdisciplinary in nature, this thesis seeks to contribute only to legal 
conversations. The breadth of philosophical materials that exist on the moral standing of 
nonhuman animals, thus does not form part of the focus of this literature review.
8
  
The existing literature in animal law tends to share a concern for the lack of genuine 
protections provided to nonhuman animals by law. Graeme McEwan suggests Australia’s 
state-based welfare laws provide merely a bandaid solution for animal welfare, ‘when radical 
surgery is required’.
9
 Elizabeth Ellis has described nonhuman animals as being ‘objectified’ 
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both in and by law,
10
 and Deborah Cao remarks that ‘the bulk of animal cruelty in Australia is 
institutionalised and not actionable in law’.
11
 Further, former Australian democrat senator 
Andrew Bartlett contends Australia’s animal law system is marked by ‘weaknesses and 
omissions’.
12
 Key texts in the field of animal law can therefore be said to do one of two 
things. Some identify the weakness of the existing framework and make a case for animal 
welfare law reform. Others campaign for the complete abolition of the existing legal 
paradigm, to create a space for completely re-thinking how nonhuman animals are treated by 
law. This thesis commences the different task of explaining and describing precisely how 
nonhuman animals are treated cruelly by law. I explain this distinction further below. 
This review of animal welfare literature is divided into three key themes: (1) The legal status 
of nonhuman animals, (2) Failing Welfare Laws and Codes of Cruelty (3) Practical Issues in 
Animal Law. Though I make this division for the purposes of clarity, these themes are all 
interconnected and thus literature that covers one of these themes almost always touches 
upon others. In the final section of this chapter, I explain the unique contribution of this thesis 
to the discipline of animal law. 
 II. LEGAL STATUS OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS 
The legal status of nonhuman animals is a key focus of many animal law texts because it is 
precisely the legal status of nonhuman animals as objects that characterises their treatment in 
law. It is a starting point that I share, as I discuss their legal status in the first substantive 
chapter (chapter three). Existing commentaries on the legal status of nonhuman animals are 
generally concerned with the way in which the characterisation of nonhuman animals as 
property affects their welfare. Leading commentators on the legal status of nonhuman 
animals, Gary Francione and Steven Wise, contend that nonhuman animals are classified as 
legal ‘things’. Because of this legal status, both Francione and Wise contend that nonhuman 
animals can be used, exploited and disposed of at the whim of their human owner with 
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minimal legal restrictions. 
13
 Though both Wise and Francione write in the American context, 
their thinking is applicable to Australia and other jurisdictions where nonhuman animals are 
defined as property. In Australia, animal welfare provisions purport to temper the rights of 
human owners in how they may treat their nonhuman animal property. However, as Wise and 
Francione contend, there exists a great power imbalance that is generated by the classification 
of nonhuman animal as property, which has a great effect on how their interests are reflected 
in law. Nonhuman animals are protected only insofar as that protection does not impinge 
greatly on the human interest and property right to treat their nonhuman animal (property) 
however they please.
 14
 This problematic nature of the characterisations of nonhuman animals 
as ‘property’ has been well established by the arguments of Wise and Francione that I 
describe in the following section. 
Animal law literature to date has provided less attention to critically evaluating the existing 
legal categories of the ‘person’ and ‘property’ in law. In chapter three of my thesis, I offer a 
critical explanation of these concepts to reveal that nonhuman animals are not only excluded 
from the category of the ‘person’, but the very construction of the ‘person’ by lawyers, 
commentators and jurists necessitates their exclusion. My argument is that the ‘person’ in law 
is reserved for either human beings, or for entities who, by virtue of being legal persons, can 
better serve human interests. Wise and Francione, who passionately campaign for the 
inclusion of nonhuman animals in the category of the legal person, are not attuned to this 
problem. Thus, though I am sympathetic to the motivation behind their arguments, they 
unwittingly compound the problem faced by nonhuman animals. In demanding that 
nonhuman animals be included within the category of the legal person, they appeal to the 
‘humanness’ of nonhuman animals. Nonhuman animals, they reason, are like humans in 
important ways – and should therefore be afforded the same legal characterisation as human 
persons. The problem with this argument, is that it affirms a problematic conception of the 
legal person that consistently excludes nonhuman animals from its reach. For as long as the 
legal person is constructed to reflect humanness, it remains a category that necessarily 
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excludes nonhuman animals. In the sections that follow, I offer a brief overview of Francione 
and Wise’s key writings on the topic (and return to them again in chapter three). 
In Animals, Property, and the Law, Gary Francione argues for a complete re-thinking of the 
legal treatment of nonhuman animals. At the centre of Francione’s argument is his view that 
the legal characterisation of nonhuman animals as legal ‘things’ casts them as the objects of a 
property relationship, such that they can be legitimately used and exploited by their human 
owners.
15
 Francione suggests that the role of existing animal welfare law is to regulate and 
legitimate animal cruelty, rather than eradicate it.
16
 Francione defines a welfarist legal system 
as one which reflects the moral view that ‘there is no animal interest that cannot be 
overridden if the consequences of the overriding are sufficiently “beneficial” to human 
beings’.
17
 A welfarist system is thus concerned with balancing human and nonhuman animal 
interests to reach a ‘compromise’ position in which nonhuman animals are protected from 
some forms of cruelty, but in which humans may also still legitimately use and exploit them.  
According to Francione, the compromise approach taken by welfare laws is necessarily 
underpinned by the assumption that the interests of nonhuman animals can always 
theoretically be sacrificed, provided a legitimate human reason exists.
18
 I consider what 
constitutes a ‘legitimate’ human interest in the fourth chapter. According to Francione, the 
view that nonhuman animals may be legitimately used for human purposes is inconsistent 
with his view that sentient nonhuman animals should have legal rights.
19
 I expand on this 
argument in chapter three. For Francione, the welfarist system is problematic because it does 
not inherently reject the use of nonhuman animals for human gain. Rather, by regulating the 




According to Francione, if animals were legal persons, and could possess legal rights, they 
would enjoy legal protection from harm, irrespective of any human benefits that may be lost 
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as a result. Francione contends that this is the purpose of a legal right: ‘it stands as a barrier of 
sorts between the rightholder and everyone else’.
21
 Francione demands nonhuman animals 
should be attributed ‘respect based rights’ – that is, rights that are attributed to nonhuman 
animals in recognition of their fundamental moral value, rather than their utility.
22
 The first 
step, he reasons, in granting nonhuman animals these respect-based rights, is to abolish their 
property status. As legal ‘things’, Francione contends the interests of nonhuman animals can 
only ever by protected insofar as their protection does not impinge upon the legal rights of 
their owners to use them as they see fit. Thus, until nonhuman animals are removed from 
property status, they will remain objects who can be used for instrumental goals that fulfil a 
certain human need, desire or whim.
23
 I return to Francione’s argument in chapter three of 
this thesis.  
Steven Wise makes a similar argument for regarding some nonhuman animals as legal 
persons in his books Rattling the Cage, and Unlocking the Cage. Wise claims there exists a 
‘thick and impenetrable legal wall’ which has separated humans from nonhuman animals in 
law.
24
 This wall, he suggests, has protected the interests of the human species – no matter 
how trivial. Simultaneously, the wall has cast the entire nonhuman animal kingdom to the 
side of ‘legal refuse’, where their lives and basic freedoms, are ‘intentionally ignored and 
often maliciously trampled and routinely abused’.
25
 Wise uses scientific information to 
illustrate the complex capacities of nonhuman animals, which are in many instances 
analogous to those possessed by humans. He suggests that by analogy to the human case, the 
legal classification of nonhuman animals as ‘property’ is arbitrary, given that we attribute 
legal rights to humans who possess more limited capacities than some nonhuman animal 
species.
26
 I critique this assertion in chapter three, and suggest that Wise fails to identify the 
problem he faces if he insists on human measures of value. Human measures of value, I 
argue, explicitly exclude the nonhuman.   
In Rattling the Cage, Wise argues for the legal personhood of two specific species: 
Chimpanzees and Bonobos. He does so not only because they are routinely used in cruel 
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ways for human purposes, but also because scientific evidence reveals that they possess 
capabilities similar to humans. Wise contends that Chimpanzees and Bonobos are profoundly 
like human beings in morally relevant ways, and that they are therefore entitled to the legal 
personhood that we grant to human beings. If we grant legal personhood to humans who lack 
certain mental capacities, such as infants, or those suffering from a profound intellectually 
disability, on what basis ought we refuse the personhood of nonhuman animals? To fail to do 
so, Wise contends, amounts to arbitrary discrimination based on species membership.
27
 As 
Peter Singer puts it, it is ‘speciesist’.
28
 In making his argument, Wise can be seen to invoke 
the principle of equality: ‘the essence of equality under law is that individuals with similar 
cognitive capacities should be treated alike regardless of their species’.
29
 
In Unlocking the Cage, Wise conducts an analysis of scientific information about a range of 
nonhuman animal species, to show which nonhuman animals can meet the criteria for legal 
personhood, and why. Wise adopts two principles to conduct his analysis: the principles of 
liberty and equality. Equality, he writes, requires that ‘likes be treated alike’.
30
 Liberty, 
according to Wise, is a right that attaches to one’s autonomy, and that ‘entitles one to be 
treated in a certain way because of facts about how one is made’.
31
 For Wise, an assessment 
of scientific facts about nonhuman animals, read in conjunction with these two principles, 
(which he contends are the ‘first principles of Western law’),
32
 compels us to invite other 
species into the category of legal persons, requiring the attribution of certain legal rights to 
them.  
Though I am most sympathetic to Wise’s argument, I also contend that he overstates the 
simplicity of the task before him. My argument in chapter three is that the category of the 
legal ‘person’ is not the empty slot that Wise seems to think it is. Both Wise and Francione 
offer compelling arguments in favour of granting legal rights to nonhuman animals, but are 
limited by a lack of precision in explaining precisely what the category of the legal person is 
and how it operates. By adding more clarity to the concept of the legal ‘person’, I offer a 
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more critical starting point for conversations about the legal status of nonhuman animals than 
that which has been offered in existing literature. My hope is that this revised starting point 
may generate new ideas with respect to how the law should classify nonhuman animals which 
may see nonhuman animals removed from the status of property. 
Other thinkers have thought differently about how we might provide nonhuman animals legal 
rights, without inviting nonhuman animals into the category of legal personhood. Whilst I 
offer a brief overview of David Favre’s approach in the following paragraphs, I do not return 
to his writing throughout this thesis. This is because Favre’s work is concerned 
predominantly with solving the legal problem that nonhuman animals face. As I stated in the 
introduction to this thesis, my task in this thesis is concerned not with identifying solutions to 
lawful animal cruelty, but with clarifying, explaining and reconceptualising the problem in 
the first place. Favre is scathing of perspectives that demand the immediate abolition of the 
property status of nonhuman animals as Francione does. He polemically envisions the 
potentially chaotic consequences of such a move: 15,000,000 chickens released from cages 
and shooed into the wild; 1,000,000 dogs fleeing their homes following a court finding that 
they could not lawfully be held against their will; animals being left property in wills - 
leaving a large percentage of the wealth tied up in ‘animal trusts’; and pets taking ownership 
of homes through the concept of ‘adverse possession’.
33
 Favre contends that to abolish the 
property paradigm as it relates to nonhuman animals would lead to the elimination of 




Favre instead promotes an incremental approach to law reform, contending that movements 
motivated by ‘only the purest philosophical position[s]’ are politically unrealistic and 
therefore practically impossible.
35
 Favre conceptualises a new property paradigm: equitable 
self-ownership. He summarises it as follows: ‘unless a human has affirmatively asserted 
lawful dominion and control so as to obtain title to a living entity, then a living entity will be 
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considered to have self-ownership’.
36
 When a human does take title over a nonhuman animal 
as property, Favre envisions a severance of the legal and equitable components of property 
ownership. The human owner takes only the legal title, leaving the equitable title in the 
possession of the nonhuman animal themselves.
37
 Favre likens this legal framework to that of 
parent and child: the parent is the primary person responsible for the child, but must act in the 
interests of the child. Thus, in the human-animal context, Favre contends the human would 
enjoy exclusive possession of the nonhuman animal, but would be bound by certain terms in 
how that animal is treated.  
According to Favre, equitable self-ownership would provide nonhuman animals not with 
legally enforceable rights (which he contends they already have), but with the ability to act in 
law through a guardian. Nonhuman animals will, he suggests, become ‘juristic persons’.
38
 
Under this model, Favre suggests human guardians could initiate legal action on behalf of 
their animals where their rights have been unlawfully impinged upon, without relying upon 
action by the State. Further, a remedy would be made available which is capable of directly 
benefiting the animal that has been harmed, instead of the animal’s human owner. In the 
Australian context, Tony Bogdanoski contends that family law practice provides an 
opportunity for Favre’s theory of self-ownership to be applied in practice.
39
 Bogdanoski 
points specifically to the context of custody disputes over pets, as one area of law in which 
the property paradigm is already being challenged, and in which the law is giving weight to 
the interests of a nonhuman animal.  
In other writing, Favre proposes the introduction of a tort law, which can be used by a 
guardian on behalf of a nonhuman animal against humans. This tort, he suggests, would be 
available as a cause of action where a nonhuman animal has had their fundamental interests 
interfered with, and such interference was not for the purposes of the assertion of a ‘more 
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 Whilst Favre’s suggestion for a new tort law arguably does not 
establish standards much greater than existing anti-cruelty standards, he contends this tort law 
would bring nonhuman animals into focus in law: the obligation would be owed to them 
personally (not their owners), and not to the State under criminal law, as is currently the 
case.
41
 As such, nonhuman animals (via a human representative) could take action for wrongs 
committed against them. 
III. FAILING WELFARE LAWS AND CODES OF CRUELTY 
Another focus of scholarship in the discipline of animal law is on the failings of animal 
welfare laws. Peter Sankoff is an important contributor to this area. In Animal Law in 
Australasia Sankoff critiques the animal welfare legal paradigm. He begins by noting that 
prosecuting a person under Australian animal welfare law involves establishing two things. 
First, it must be proved that a person inflicted pain or suffering on a nonhuman animal. This 
is a factual question, which can generally be answered with respect to expert veterinary 
evidence. Second, it must be proved that the pain or suffering that was inflicted can be 
deemed ‘unreasonable’, or ‘unnecessary’ in the circumstances.
42
 This is a question of 
proportionality, and involves a determination of whether the harm inflicted upon a nonhuman 
animal is acceptable given the potential benefits it has provided to humans.  
Sankoff examines this proportionality test and argues that it is effective only in addressing 
clear-cut cases of intentional animal cruelty, for no reason other than sadistic enjoyment.
43
 
Steven White describes the test as reflecting a surreptitious acceptance that cruelty can indeed 
be necessary.
44
 Though the balancing act may purport to be a neutral test of proportionality in 
which the interests of humans are weighed against the interests of nonhumans, the practical 
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[i]nstead of a neutral balance, whereby human need is balanced against animal suffering, we 
are presented with a balance tilted heavily from the outset in favour of justification of harm. 





The result is that many cases of severe animal suffering are accepted because they provide 
some comparatively minor human gain. As Michael Fox describes it, the law serves to 
‘negate animals’ basic interests and keep them in permanent servitude to human desire’.
47
 
‘Necessity’ therefore becomes largely synonymous with ‘reasonable desire’.
48
 Sankoff points 
to the example of battery hens, who are deprived of any quality of life, and suffer long-term 
health consequences due to their mistreatment. The law does not classify their mistreatment 
as criminal, because the suffering of those chickens provides humans with the benefit of 
cheap eggs. Commenting on the same example, Cao argues that the law proclaims to protect 





In determining whether human needs or desires should be given preference in the welfare 
calculus, Sankoff points to two other questions that need to be answered: whether the purpose 
of the harm is legitimate, and whether the harm is inflicted is reasonable. Sankoff suggests 
that the ‘legitimate purpose’ test turns on a consideration of human needs and desires. I return 
to this point in chapter four, where I link the concept of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘necessity’ to 
empirical research by Dan Kahan, to demonstrate that human interests are always paramount 
in determining when cruelty is justified.  
 
Despite the fact that human interests predominate in the calculus of ‘necessary’ cruelty, in 
chapter four I also explain that the prohibition on unnecessary cruelty performs very limited 
protective work, and that its legal function has been overstated in animal law literature. In 
chapter six, I also offer a new perspective on Australian animal welfare laws, and argue that 
they fail to protect nonhuman animals not only in virtue of what they prohibit, but also in 
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virtue of what they don’t prohibit. As part of this discussion I also explain how Australian 
animal welfares declare ‘inaction’ with respect to some of the worst forms of cruelty. Such an 
argument has not been made in existing literature. My argument is not only that Australian 
animal welfare laws are ‘inadequate’ or contain ‘gaps’, but that they also contain a very 
deliberate and conscious ‘declaration of inaction’ with respect to some egregious forms of 
cruelty. 
 
Sankoff has also written on several discrete animal law issues. In The Animal Rights Debate 
and the Expansion of Public Discourse, Sankoff suggests that public discourse is essential to 
encouraging democratic law reform in animal welfare law, and that law should therefore be 
structured so as to promote ‘vibrant and ongoing discourse’.
50
 Law that is vague, or law 
whose application rests on a number of unspoken premises, does little to promote guidance 
for meaningful debate.
51
 Sankoff criticizes Canadian animal welfare law on this basis, 
arguing that it consists primarily of only two provisions buried within the Criminal Code. 
These provisions give little content to the term ‘cruelty’, and thus operate based on a ‘simple 
binary equation’: an act is either ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Yet, as Sankoff illustrates, the law is not 
this black and white. Rather, it is ‘almost entirely gray – albeit a shade of gray that is rarely 
discussed in public’.
52
 He argues that ‘[b]y creating a standard that notionally governs the 
treatment of all animals the law operates a mile wide and an inch deep with an approach so 
vague that it fails to provide any guidance for meaningful public debate’.
53
 In Chapter seven, 
I make a similar case in the context of Australian animal welfare laws, and argue that they 
fail to accurately communicate their standards to the Australian public. I conceptualise 
Australian animal welfare laws as generating a ‘myth’ of animal protection, with the result 
that cruelty is made invisible.  
A. Critique of Australian Codes of Practice 
Graeme McEwan observes that Australian animal welfare Codes of Practice are riddled with 
problems. Firstly, they purport to be constructed by an ‘Animal Welfare Committee’, yet the 
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committee membership reveals that the group has no representative on the topic of animal 
welfare.
54
 Steven White and Arjna Dale have also assessed the process by which Codes of 





Further, the Codes purport to be a ‘set of guidelines’, detailing ‘minimum standards’, whilst 
also claiming to assist people in understanding what is expected of them to meet the 
standards of care outlined in state-based welfare legislation. Yet, under these Codes, we see 
the facilitation of cruel factory farming methods,
56
 through provisions that purport to exist for 
the purposes of animal welfare.
57
 Codes adopt vague terminology that legitimate virtually any 
practice that is considered necessary within industry for the purposes of animal husbandry.
58
   
 
Deborah Cao echoes McEwan’s concerns, noting that welfare codes authorize ‘accepted 
animal husbandry practice’, and thus permit acts that would be unlawful if they were to be 
inflicted upon a nonhuman animal who was not within the relevant industry.
59
 It is in this 
way that we see the cosmetic tail docking of dogs (even performed by a trained vet under 
anesthesia) outlawed, while the cutting of piglets tails without anesthetic remains acceptable 
and lawful practice. Katrina Sharman also points to the ‘corporatization of animal 
production’,
60
 which has given rise to the prioritisation of business interests over nonhuman 
animal welfare. In many instances, this means that routine industry practices are 
automatically permitted by law, regardless of how cruel they are.  I discuss Codes of Practice 
throughout this thesis, and address them in particular detail in chapter four. In addition, I 
explain and analyse the significant of the current transition away from state based Codes of 
Practice, towards national Standards and Guidelines. Whilst the adoption of consistent 
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Standards and Guidelines across all Australian jurisdictions offers greater uniformity than 
state-based Codes of Practice, I will argue that they their development is unduly influenced 
by those who have a positive interest in the continuation of cruel practices, with the result 
that in many instances, they operate to permit cruelty in the same way that Codes of Practice 
do. Throughout this thesis I offer a more critical assessment of both Codes of Practice and 
Standards and Guidelines than that which has been offered in existing animal law literature. 
In chapter five, I conceptualise Codes of Practice and Standards and Guidelines as 
commodifying nonhuman animals. In chapter seven, I explain how they facilitate a myth of 
animal protection.  
IV. PRACTICAL ISSUES IN ANIMAL LAW 
There are several other practical issues in Animal Law which receive particular attention in 
the current literature. They are  legal standing, poor enforcement of welfare laws, and lenient 
judicial sentencing. I outline each in turn. 
A. Animals and Legal Standing 
The legal status of nonhuman animals has been given a great deal of attention in the 
literature. This is because how a ‘thing’ is characterized by law has grave implications for 
how they are treated and what protections they are accorded. In brief, only a legal person has 
the capacity to act in law. Legal things do not. Since nonhuman animals are characterized as 
legal things, enforcing the laws which purport to protect their interests is difficult. Cass 
Sunstein suggests that absent adequate mechanisms to enforce existing laws, ‘they are worth 
little more than the paper on which they are written’.
61
 Favre made a similar point, stating 





Sunstein identifies three major impediments to enforcement of animal welfare law in the 
United States context that are relevant also to the Australian jurisdiction. Firstly, enforcement 
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of animal welfare laws can only occur through public prosecution. It is therefore, only 
possible to prosecute animal welfare law where the state initiates the action.
63
 Secondly, 
duties to animals only tend to exist where an identifiable ownership relationship exists. 
Sunstein therefore reasons that humans do not have duties towards nonhuman animals that 
are not within one’s care or under one’s control. There is no duty of mandatory reporting for 
the observation of cruelty towards nonhuman animals (or human beings in most 
circumstances for that matter). I discuss this point in chapter eight, in the context of 
legislation that seeks to stifle acts of activism on behalf of nonhuman animals. Thirdly, legal 
protections for nonhuman animals explicitly exempt a great deal of nonhuman animals from 
their reach. Animals used for human purposes, such as food or research, therefore do not 




Graeme McEwan makes a similar observation in the Australian context, noting that Codes of 
Practice effectively exempt millions of nonhuman animals from the reach of animal welfare 
laws, making enforcement of laws prohibiting cruelty against them practically impossible. 
Due to weak laws and chronic underfunding, McEwan also highlights the importance of 
‘strategic litigation’, which seeks to advance the interests of nonhuman animals using legal 
avenues other than those provided by welfare laws.
65
 The use of consumer law to mandate 
fair labeling of nonhuman animal food products provides an example of this. I return to this 
discussion in chapter seven. 
 B. Enforcement 
Enforcement of animal welfare laws in Australia is on a state-by-state basis. There exists no 
national body responsible for enforcing welfare laws.
66
 For the most part, the responsibility 
for the enforcement of Animal Welfare laws is predominately with the Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (‘RSPCA) in each state.
67
 White argues that ‘the 
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effectiveness of animal welfare legislation is critically dependent on enforcement’.
68
 Yet, the 
powers of RSPCA animal welfare inspectors are extremely limited.
69
 Not only do they lack 
legal power, but they are also chronically underfunded and charged with the responsibility of 
policing and enforcing animal welfare laws across Australia (with the exception of the 
Northern Territory).
70
 Although the police and some government departments have the power 
to enforce welfare legislation, the RSPCA remains the primary actor. I discuss the role of the 
RSPCA as law enforcers in detail in chapter seven. In the New Zealand context, Peter 
Sankoff notes that enforcement in the area of animal welfare law is marked also by other 
struggles: animals (‘the victims’) cannot speak or testify, those who enforce animal welfare 
laws are generally involved in battles on numerous fronts, and, ‘without a shift in 
consciousness, it is difficult to imagine crimes against animals ever being one of law 




As a result of these factors, animal cruelty is rarely prosecuted. In 2010, Cao provided that 
Brayshaw v Liosatos
72
 was the only farm-animal related prosecution to take place in the 
Australian Capital Territory in recent years.
73
 Due to funding limitations, only those cases 
which involve clear-cut egregious cruelty proceed to prosecution. In chapter seven, I also 
extend these critiques on the enforcement of Australian animal welfare laws to suggest that it 
is not only inadequate, but that Australian animal welfare laws necessitate its inadequacy. 
C. Sentencing 
Sentencing is another area of concern in existing animal law literature. Katrina Sharman 
details the leniency given to those who are convicted of cruelty to nonhuman animals.
74
 One 
example occurred in 2001 when a man appeared before Ryde Court and pleaded guilty to 
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putting his sister’s kitten in a freezer for up to 40 minutes, attempting to set the kitten’s 
whiskers alight, spraying it with an aerosol and throwing steak knives at it before killing it by 
stoning. Under the applicable New South Wales Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979, 
this man faced a maximum penalty of $11,000 or two years’ imprisonment. Yet, he was 
released on a good behavior bond. Sharman contends that lenient sentencing in cases of 
animal cruelty are the status quo, citing the fact that between 1996 and 2000, only 3% of 
those who were convicted of animal cruelty were imprisoned.
75
   
 
Jed Goodfellow contrasts two approaches to regulation of animal welfare which he claims are 
both used in the Australian animal law context which help explain the inadequate sentencing 
that Sharman is concerned with. Namely, a deterrence approach and a compliance 
approach.
76
  In general, a deterrence-oriented approach to regulation punishes those who fail 
to adhere to a legal rule. Such an approach also aims to deter an unwanted behavior by threat 
of punishment for non-compliance. Goodfellow contends this is the approach adopted by 
animal welfare legislation, which criminalizes cruelty towards nonhuman animals and is 
applied in a ‘top-down’ manner.
77
 A compliance approach, in contrast, facilitates 
cooperation, through the provision of advice and education. This approach is evident in the 
application of Codes of Practice and regulations that govern the treatment of nonhuman 
animals in industry. As such, industry effectively polices itself, and the approach to non-
compliance is generally dialogic in nature.
78
 According to Goodfellow, such an approach 
seeks to manage animal mistreatment, rather than eradicate it – and it thus represents an 
unacceptable failure in animal welfare regulation.
79
 I do not return to consider sentencing 
issues in further detail in this thesis. 
                                                 
 
75
 Ibid, 333. 
76
 Jed Goodfellow, 'Animal Welfare Law Enforcement: To Punish or Pursuade?' in Peter Sankoff, Steven White 
and Celeste Black (eds), Animal Law in Australasia: Continuing the Dialogue (2nd ed, The Federation 
Press, 2013) 183. 
77
 Ibid 189. 
78
 Ibid 196. 
79
 Ibid 206. 
Page 49 of 305 
 
V. THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION OFFERED BY THIS THESIS  
Whilst this thesis is informed and influenced greatly by the aforementioned literature, I offer 
a unique approach to analysing Australian animal welfare law. I conceptualise the problem of 
lawful animal cruelty as one that is inadequately understood, and thus difficult to solve. My 
unique contribution to the problem of lawful animal cruelty in Australia is thus to identify the 
multiple and complex ways in which Australian nonhuman animals are treated cruelly. 
Rather than simply identifying the problematic results of the law’s inadequate animal welfare 
provisions, this thesis offers a new, sustained and detailed analysis of how and why these 
provisions enable cruelty. The approach I adopt is therefore concerned not with solving the 
problem of lawful animal cruelty, but with identifying and articulating what the problem is in 
the first place. Put another way, I explain the role of animal welfare laws in creating and 
perpetuating this problem. 
The sustained analysis of Australian animal welfare legislation offered in this thesis is the 
first of its kind. My aim is to reveal the complex and multifaceted ways that our law not only 
fails to prohibit cruelty – but facilitates cruelty. My hope is that the unique contribution 
offered by this thesis will generate new and different future research questions that may build 
towards meaningful law reform options to better protect nonhuman animals in law. By 
establishing precisely what the legal problem is for nonhuman animals, I lay new groundwork 
for theorizing different ways for thinking about and solving the problem in future research.  
This thesis also builds upon existing literature with a cross-disciplinary approach that 
examines and applies knowledge from other disciplines to gain a deeper and more critical 
understanding of precisely how the law is failing to protect nonhuman animals. I also offer a 
novel application of existing legal principles to the area of Australian animal welfare law. In 
chapter seven for example, I consider the traditional criminal law principle of ‘fair labelling’, 
and apply it to Australian animal welfare legislation. In chapter six, I identify the operation of 
‘legal fictions’ within Australian animal welfare legislation, which has not been done before. 
In chapter five, I also theorize Codes of Practice as commodifying nonhuman animals. 
Though I draw on existing literature to sustain my arguments in this chapter, my application 
of these theories to Australian Codes of Practice is new. In chapter eight, I also expand upon 
existing literature which seeks to define civil disobedience in the context of trespass on behalf 
of animal activists.  
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CHAPTER 3: LEGAL PERSONS, LEGAL THINGS AND SOMETHING IN 
BETWEEN 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
‘Legally, persons count, things don’t’.
1
 




A common starting point for discussions around the law’s failure to protect nonhuman 
animals from harm is the legal status of nonhuman animals as property.
3
 I share this starting 
point, because the legal status of nonhuman animals is central to wider discussions in this 
thesis about how Australian animal welfare legislation and Codes of Practice facilitates 
cruelty. It is the legal characterisation of nonhuman animals as legal property that 
fundamentally shapes the protections they are provided with by Australian animal welfare 
legislation. An assessment of the legal status of nonhuman animals is thus fundamental to 
considering how and why Australian animal welfare laws allow nonhuman animals to be 
treated cruelly. We will see this clearly in chapter four, where I analyse the anti-cruelty 
provisions of Australian animal welfare legislation to reveal that they are shaped by the view 
that nonhuman animals are ‘property’, and are thus nonhuman animals are only entitled to 
protections insofar as those protections do not too greatly impinge upon the interests of a 
human property owner.  
The legal status of nonhuman animals as property is central to their cruel treatment by law 
because as property, nonhuman animals are classified as objects.
4
 Though they receive some 
important legal protections for their interests, these protections are limited in scope by the 
owner/property relationship, in which the property interests of humans are almost always 
given precedence over the interests of nonhuman animals. It is for this reason that Steven 
Wise says that ‘[u]ntil, and unless, a nonhuman animal attains legal personhood, she will not 
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 Gary Francione makes a similar claim, surmising that ‘[a]nimals are things that we 
own that have only extrinsic or conditional value as means to our ends….as far as the law is 
concerned…animals are nothing more than commodities’.
6
  
In this chapter, I offer a definition of the terms ‘property’ and ‘persons’ to reveal precisely 
how the property status of nonhuman animals facilitates cruelty against them. This discussion 
takes place within the confines of the liberal, positivist law tradition, and thus does not extend 
to consider competing conceptions of personhood or property that challenge existing legal 
paradigms.
7
 Wise and Francione, who are considered key thinkers on the legal status of 
nonhuman animals,
8
 do not provide such a definition and I contend that this has problematic 
implications for their work. Thus, an elucidation of the central concepts of ‘property’ and 
‘person’ is central to my critique of Wise and Francione, and also forms the foundation for 
the remainder of my discussions in this thesis.  Moreover, I make a unique contribution to 
discourse surrounding the legal status of nonhuman animals by suggesting not only that they 
suffer cruelty as legal ‘property’, but that the key thinkers who seek to alleviate them from 
this category implicitly affirm a definition of the legal ‘person’ that necessarily excludes 
nonhuman animals from its reach. 
Drawing on the work of Ngaire Naffine, I suggest that the construct of the legal person can be 
broadly conceptualised in two different ways. First, on the Legalist view, personhood is 
viewed as legal ‘fiction’. It is an ‘empty slot’ that bears no resemblance to human life. On 
this view, anything may be a person: it theoretically excludes nobody. Alternatively, on the 
Realist view, the person is conceptualised as reflecting some important aspect of human life. 
Though this view may take various forms, all statements of the realist view agree on one 
point: it is by virtue only of your humanness that you may be a person.  The Legalist view of 
the person is typically relied upon as grounds to extend the construct of the person to 
nonhuman animals. It is thought to offer promise to nonhuman animals, because one need not 
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be human to use it. Corporations are one example of a nonhuman entity that has been 
personified in law on this view. My suggestion in this chapter however, is that the Legalist 
view is consistently conflated with the Realist view – such that measures of human value are 
referred to in order to establish an argument for entry into the legal fiction of the person. I 
suggest that both Wise and Francione also conflate these views, and thus implicitly affirm the 
Realist conception of the person which systematically excludes nonhuman animals from its 
reach. 
II. THE PERSON / PROPERTY DIVIDE 
Even though our Earth is home to a vast continuum of living and non-living matter, Anglo-
Australian law has constructed a division between two fundamental legal categories: ‘persons 
and things’.
9
 This distinction is fundamental to the operation of law, so much so, that Ngaire 
Naffine suggests that ‘these are the two major concepts employed by law to classify the 
world’.
10
 Yet, the two concepts are notoriously difficult to define. And, in many instances, it 
is possible to point to examples where the distinction between legal things and legal persons 
is complicated and blurred. Naffine, for example, points to the case of corporations – which 
simultaneously have both property and personhood status. They are akin to legal property 
when they are bought and sold, and they are akin to legal persons when they enforce their 
legal rights in the court.
11
 It is also common to observe legal theorists conflating several 
conceptions of the legal person, with the result that they are ‘talking at cross purposes but 
may not be aware of this fact’.
12
 The lack of certainty that exists around the definitions of 
legal personhood and legal property is problematic, given that this binary is so fundamental 
to the characterisation of nonhuman animals in law and shapes the type of protections that 
they are afforded.  
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 Ngaire Naffine, 'Legal Persons as Abstractions: The Extrapolation of Persons from the Male Case' in Visa 
Kurki and Tomasz Pietrzykowski (eds), Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn 
(Springer, 2017) 119, 15. 
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The legal characterisation of nonhuman animals is an important illustration of just how 
nuanced the definitions of legal ‘persons’ and legal ‘things’ can be. Naffine suggests that the 
two categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but rather ‘there can be a blending of 
the two concepts of personality and property; and a continuum may even be observed, from 
one to the other’.
13
  At common law, domestic (as opposed to wild) nonhuman animals in 
Australia are legally classified as property.
14
 The existence of pet shops and the Australian 
live export trade are illustrative of this fact – since they are evidence of the legal 
classification of nonhuman animals as merely a ‘tradable asset’.
15
 As a result of this 
classification, humans that own nonhuman animals are endowed with the power associated 
with the liberal trifecta of ownership. In the absence of regulation, property rights entitle a 
human owner to exclusively possess, use and dispose of nonhuman animals ‘property’.
16
  
With respect to the ownership of nonhuman animals, human property rights are qualified to 
some extent by Australian animal welfare legislation. Animal welfare legislation recognises 
that nonhuman animals are capable of possessing interests – and, further, it requires that we 
take those interests into account. Interestingly, this is a characteristic normally reserved for 
those who enjoy legal personhood. Thus, whilst nonhuman animals are property that is 
legally owned by human owners – they are also protected by law in some important ways. 
A. What is Legal Personhood? 
In everyday language, the word ‘person’ refers exclusively to a human being. The Macquarie 
Dictionary expresses this common view – suggesting that a human ‘person’ can be 
‘distinguished from an animal or thing’.
17
 In law however, the term ‘person’ can attract a 
very different meaning with profoundly different implications. A legal person is not 
necessarily a human being (although in Anglo-English world, all human beings are now legal 
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 Deriving originally from the Latin persona – traditionally meaning the mask worn 
by an actor in a play – personhood in Australian law pertains to the creation of a particular 
legal identity with legal rights and obligations.
19
 Legal personality can thus be understood not 
as a way of describing one’s characteristics, but as a vehicle for attributing legal rights and 
duties to certain entities.  
The exact content of the rights and duties that are attributed to different legal personalities 
varies.
20
 As a result, no one criterion may be described as either necessary or sufficient to 
establish legal personhood. Richard Tur notes that in many cases, the rights and obligations 
of one legal personality may mirror those of another. Conversely Tur notes, ‘it is conceivable 
that two entities, both of which are legal persons, might have no rights or duties in common 
at all’.
21
 For example, whilst corporations are legal persons – they do not enjoy all the same 
rights of human persons. Christopher Stone humorously observes in the American context, 
that although corporations are persons, ‘they cannot plead the Fifth Amendment’.
22
  
This point is of great significance in the context of nonhuman animals, since thinkers such as 
Richard Epstein misleadingly argue that we cannot grant legal rights to nonhuman animals 
because it would not make sense to enable them to vote or enter contracts.
23
 In making this 
argument, Epstein assimilates legal personhood with human personhood. Of course, as the 
case of the corporation clearly illustrates, legal persons may bear different legal rights and 
duties to other legal persons. It is merely the capacity to bear any legal rights at all that is 
unique to legal persons. As such, if we were to grant legal rights to nonhuman animals, it 
would not necessarily follow that they would share identical legal rights to those enjoyed by 
human persons.  
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Although legal persons may enjoy different legal rights and responsibilities, one thing that 
they have in common is the ability to enforce their legal rights.
24
 The ability to enforce a right 
is fundamental to what it means to have that right in the first place. For this reason, Jeremy 
Bentham describes rights as ‘fruits of the law, and of the law alone’.
25
 Christopher Stone 
similarly argues ‘an entity cannot be said to hold a legal right unless and until some public 
authoritative body is prepared to give some amount of review to actions that are colourably 
inconsistent with that “right”’.
26 
Cass Sunstein contends that ‘the foundation for a legal right 
is an enforceable claim’.
27
 Legal rights thus stand in stark contrast to the other varieties of 
norms that govern human behaviour, such as religious and moral norms. Legal norms are the 
only ones can be enforced by law.  
Wesley Hohfeld went further in describing what it means to have a right, suggesting that a 
right was characterised by a legal advantage and a corresponding legal disadvantage.
28
 He 
reasoned that the legal advantage could not exist without the relevant legal disadvantage. 
Thus, Hohfeld suggested that the holder of a legal right possesses a legally enforceable claim 
over somebody else who has the reciprocal duty to respect that claim. Hohfeld explains: ‘if X 
has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent) 
is that Y is under a duty towards X to stay off the place’.
29
 Thus, Hohfeld’s analysis confirms 
that a legal person has the potential for a legally enforceable claim against any other legal 
person who intrudes upon their rights through the failure to fulfil the corresponding legal 
duty.  
The ability of a legal person to enforce their legal rights gives them a special kind of 
‘visibility’ in law.
30
 They are said to be visible because the law acknowledges their rights, 
and provides an avenue for those rights to be enforced. In other words, the law ‘sees’ them 
and protects them. Thus, legal persons have the ability to protect the rights which are legally 
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 They have legal standing to seek a Court hearing where their legal rights have 
been unlawfully interfered with, and further, such interference is acknowledged through the 
provision of legal remedies such as damages.
 32
  
B. What is a Legal Thing? 
Legal persons stand in stark contrast to legal things in virtue of the legally visible rights and 
duties that they hold. Generally, while legal persons have legal rights and duties, legal things 
do not. However, regulations can operate to provide some protections for certain types of 
legal property in certain circumstances. These protections however remain bound by a 
characterisation of property that deems it a ‘tradable asset – one that can be bartered, used, 
and abused as an owner sees fit’.
33
 Thus, where regulation attempts to protect property, it 
generally does so against the background view that legal property is something that an owner 
possesses rights over and in relation to another person, and not something that possesses 
legal rights in and of itself. It is for this reason that property rights are best described in 
relational terms:  
The word ‘property’ is often used to refer to something that belongs to another. But…in the 
law, ‘property’ does not refer to a thing; it is a description of a legal relationship with that 




Radin’s conception of a ‘triad’ of rights associated with property ownership
35
 has also been 
described as a ‘bundle of rights’.
36
 The rights are said to exist in a ‘bundle’ because they can 
be separated from each other without fundamentally disturbing the property relationship. The 
metaphor is thus that each right is like a stick in the bundle – one can maintain a hold over the 
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bundle but still lend out or dispose of individual sticks. Thus, while the bundle of property 
rights may include the right to exclusive possession, the right to destroy or dispose of 
property, the right to enjoy and control property, in some instances, one of those sticks may 
be given up without disrupting ownership. For example, where a real property owner decides 
to lease their property– they may lend out the stick for the right to exclusive possession and 
enjoyment of the land – whilst still maintaining legal ownership over the land. 
Legal property thus exists predominantly at the whim of the legal owner who is entitled to 
deal with that property as he or she sees fit (though some legal restrictions will always apply). 
For this reason, Margaret Davies and Naffine contend that the categories of legal person and 
legal thing are often thought to be mutually exclusive: ‘that which is a person cannot be 
property; that which is property is stripped of personality’.
37
 Legal things are ‘invisible’ in 
the eyes of the law because they do not have rights or interests that are legally recognised or 
protected. 
It is not strictly true however, to say that that humans have unqualified rights over all kinds of 
property. The argument for unqualified rights is usually traced to William Blackstone’s 
commentaries, where he wrote that the ‘right of property’ was the source of mankind’s 
‘despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe’.
38
 Blackstone’s position was not 
absolute, but reflected the language of dominion and the view that the world was a divine 
grant from God that is usually associated with the Christian tradition.  
However, a variety of laws operate to protect human property interests, which effectively 
qualify ownership rights. For example, council by-laws can place restrictions on how one can 
deal with their real property. Such restrictions may govern the positioning of fences, the 
colours of roofs and the position of windows, for example. We are also, for example, legally 
forbidden to use our property in such a way as to harm others or interfere with their legal 
rights. Thus, a property owner does not have an unqualified right to treat their house and land 
however they please. The rationale behind laws that qualify property rights is not to protect 
the property in and of itself. Rather they are designed to protect a human interest, such as the 
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interest in maintaining one’s property value, and the right to enjoy their own surrounding 
homes without undue interference. Laws that appear to limit the use of property in some way 
are therefore not generally directed at protecting some interest supposedly possessed by that 
property. It is for this reason that I contend nonhuman animals present a sui generis case. The 
law seems to attempt to balance their interests against human ownership rights.  As Catharine 
MacKinnon characterises it from a feminist perspective, nonhuman animals are ‘more than 
things, less than people’.
39
  The same holds true in how the law characterises them. I explore 
the ‘balancing act’ between human and nonhuman interests in detail in chapter four.  
C. Status of Wild Nonhuman Animals 
As noted in the introductory chapter, it is necessary to note that ‘wild’ nonhuman animals are 
dealt with differently in law than ‘domestic’ nonhuman animals. In part, this is because wild 
nonhuman animals are not wholly owned in the same way as other nonhuman animals. The 
legal status of nonhuman animals is shaped by the question of whether they are possessed or 
controlled by a human owner.
40
 For this reason, Justice Brennan of the High Court of 
Australia affirmed that wild nonhuman animals are not the property of humans ‘in their wild 
state’.
41
 This position reflects the triad of property rights articulated by Radin, one of which is 




Importantly though, when nonhuman animals are removed from the wild and taken under 
human control, they do become the property of humans. Thus, a hunter who lawfully kills a 
wild animal takes absolute ownership over that nonhuman animal.
43
 Further, a person who 
captures or otherwise lawfully confines a wild nonhuman animal is entitled to ‘qualified’ 
property rights.
44
 Those property rights remain contingent on whether the nonhuman animal 
is living in a captive or wild state. In terms of their legislative protections, wild nonhuman 
animals are not expressly excluded from animal welfare statutes except where they are 
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governed by a Code of Practice.
45
 Consequently, key anti-cruelty provisions generally apply 
to wild nonhuman animals. As I have already explained, the further discussions in this thesis 
apply only to domestic nonhuman animals, except where otherwise expressly indicated.  
III. WHO CAN BE A LEGAL PERSON? 
So far, I have suggested that legal persons are legal actors that possess legal rights and duties. 
Legal things, by contrast do not have rights and duties. However, I have not yet said anything 
about the most controversial element of legal personhood, and that is who can be a legal 
person? The answer to this question is necessarily determined by philosophical, political and 
economic considerations. As I have stated, through the creation of legal rights and duties, law 
‘personifies’, and therefore provides the basis upon which we some can act and relate in 
law.
46
 Those who are not granted such rights, are simultaneously ‘unpersoned’, and are 
categorically ‘disabled at law’.
47
 Determinations surrounding who can be a person are 
important given that legal personhood carries with it the ability to possess legal rights. Mary 
Midgley states that the question of who is a person is ‘actually a very complex one, much 
more like ‘who is important?’ than ‘who has got two legs?’.
48
 
Given the complexity of the question, the definition of a legal person is one that is 
surrounded by much debate. Naffine suggests that not only are there several competing 
accounts of who can be a legal person, but that there is a tendency by jurists to draw on 
different views at different times. Sometimes, the legal person is constructed as a formal legal 
device. It is possible to see this in its application to corporations. In this application, we can 
see the legal fiction of the person. You need not be a living, breathing entity to be a legal 
person. And yet, at other times, the legal person is equated with human persons. Debates 
around the legality of abortion provide an example of this, where the question of when a 
rights bearing person begins to exist is answered through a determination of when human life 
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can officially be said to begin.
49
 Naffine describes the conflation of these views in the 
following way:  
[L]awyers are alert to the fact that the legal person is a construct and a fiction; but they also 
have a tendency to anthropomorphize the legal person and endow him with the characteristics 
of the rational human agent…Formally, they recognize the array of legal persons, and their 
attributed natures, especially when that person is a corporation, but then they frequently 
collapse these distinctions into the concept of the standard, paradigmatic human person.
 50
 
A central question we must ask in determining how the legal person operates therefore 
requires us to articulate precisely what the law does when it personifies. Is it ‘trying to match 
or capture the nature of quality of life…or is it engaged in a quite distinct legal pursuit, 
coining its own basis conceptual unit – the person – for its own legal purpose’?
51
 
A. Competing Conceptions of the Legal Person 
In answering this question, Naffine outlines two conceptions of who can be a legal person: 
the (1) Legalist view, and the Realist view (which she divides further into two variants). I 
now describe each of these views in turn. Following this description, I use Naffine’s analysis 
as a basis to critique the writings of Wise and Francione, to reveal that they rely upon a blend 
of these conceptions, and so implicitly affirm a conception of the legal person that is linked to 
the human. 
1. The Legalist View 
According to the Legalist position, the legal person is a legal fiction, and nothing more. Legal 
personhood is a legal tool created to serve a legal purpose. It is not, therefore, an attempt to 
mirror the human person. As Naffine suggests, ‘[l]egal persons, in this view, are therefore 
only virtual persons: they exist in virtue of law, only in law, they are fully legal 
constructions, and there is no legal requirement that they bear any resemblance to natural 
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 Legal persons on this view need not bear any particular 
characteristics or traits, ‘he has no substantive nature’.
53
 Alexander Nekam articulates a 
similar view, stating 
‘[e]verything…can become a subject – a potential carrier – of rights, whether a plant or an 
animal, a human being or an imagined spirit…[t]here is nothing in the notion of the subject of 
rights which in itself would, necessarily, connected it with the human personality.
54
 
Legal personhood on this view is a legal fiction. Lon Fuller describes a fiction as an 
intentional ‘false idea’ that lacks ‘a physical counterpart’.
55
 The legal fiction of the person is 
a device for confronting new problems,
56
 and a means of classifying the external world.
57
 A 
Legalistic account of law’s persons is therefore instrumental, because the use of the fiction 
can depend entirely on the outcome one is trying to achieve, rather than focusing on the 
characteristics of the entity being considered.
58
 Entities may thus become legal persons 
because the law deems them so. As Midgley explains, the law ‘can, if it chooses, create 
persons; it is not merely a recorder of their presence’.
59
 The Legalist view may offer promise 
to nonhuman animals, since on this view, ‘whatever law finds convenient to include in its 
community of persons’ can theoretically be so included.
60
 We need not establish, as Wise and 
Francione attempt to do, that nonhuman animals share fundamental human qualities that 
mandate they be included in the category of legal persons. 
The Legalist account of the legal person however may not be as neutral as it appears to be. 
Richard Tur has described the Legalist conception of personhood as an ‘empty slot’ that may 
theoretically be occupied by any entity that is capable of fitting in it.
61
 Tur therefore suggests 
that legal personhood can be possessed by any entity to whom we wish to ascribe legal rights 
or duties. As Naffine contends, on this view, the slot ‘does not have any particular contour 
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and so can…fit anyone’.
62
 On this view, the ‘empty slot’ of legal personhood, could 
theoretically include nonhuman animals. A nonhuman animal need not prove it has any 
particular characteristics to be included as a person. 
However, the personhood ‘slot’ should not be viewed as a ‘one size fits all’ legal category. 
Rather, the slot must be viewed in connection to its intended purpose: to serve human needs 
and interests. Nekam encapsulates this view when he says that ‘everything…that the 
community chooses’ may be a holder of rights, and that similarly, ‘nothing, if the community 
does not choose to regard it so, will become a subject of rights’.
63
 To this end, human 
interests necessarily and always shape the legal personhood ‘slot’, and limit the ways in 
which personhood may be extended to other entities to serve particular human purposes. The 
inclusion of nonhuman animals within the category of ‘persons’ could interrupt the human 
use (and cruel treatment) of nonhuman animals that is thought to serve certain human 
interests. As legal persons, nonhuman animals could theoretically possess legal rights that 
could prevent humans from using them the ways that they currently do. To this end, the 
incorporation of nonhuman animals within the category of persons may seem contrary to 
human interests. As such, nonhuman animals are consistently excluded from the personhood 
slot. 
The personification of the corporation provides a prime example of the way in which the 
category of the person can serve human interests. The corporation is an example of the 
operation of the fiction of legal personhood, because it is a nonhuman entity that has been 
personified in law. The grant of personhood enables a corporation to act in law. In the 
American context for example, it has an ‘independent legal existence which permits it to act 
in many significant ways, such as entering into contracts, suing those who have wronged it, 
and even exercising its free speech rights in political referenda’.
64
 The personification of the 
corporation however, did not seek to reflect some inherent value in the corporate form. 
Rather, it served to further human economic interests. As Fox describes it, the personification 
of the corporation was ‘crucial to corporate expansion’, and the resultant capitalist 
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 The move to include corporations within the legal ‘slot’ of personhood has thus 
served human interests and sustained an economic system manufactured by humans to serve 
humans.
66
 Given the centrality of human interests in determining whether an entity should be 
granted legal personhood, personification is an inherently political decision. Naffine 
contends:  
The legal demography of persons depends on the sort of world that the influential who 
manipulate the levers of power wish to create and how they wish to position themselves. If 
they want a world in which other animals and natural objects have directly enforceable and 
defensible interests, then they will extend rights to them. They will not insist on a human 
middleman to demonstrate a human interest first.
67
 
2. The Realist View  
According to the Realist view, a legal person can be objectively discovered because they 
possess certain characteristics that make them a ‘person’.
68
 These objective conditions may 
vary depending on the particular Realist account of personhood that one subscribes to, which 
further turn on one’s beliefs about who matters. Naffine articulates two variations of the 
Realist account.  
One Realist account of the law of persons holds that it is human life that is to be the ultimate 
measure of legal personhood. On this view, legal personhood and human persons are 
effectively synonymous.
69
 It is therefore membership of the human species homo sapiens that 
is thought to be enough to generate legal personality. It does not matter on this view, what 
capacities one has, because ‘intelligence is not the issue; being human is’.
70
 On this view, 
nonhuman animals cannot be legal persons, regardless of their capacities. The fact that they 
are not human beings is enough to reject them from the class of legal persons. 
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An alternative Realist account rests on the view that only certain types of human life matter. 
The paradigmatic case of law’s person on this view, tends to be the rational, autonomous 
actor.
71
 Arguments about who should count as a legal person on this view thus turn on 
discussions about the possession of certain capacities and characteristics in comparison to the 
paradigmatic case. This view therefore proceeds on the basis that only those who possess the 
named characteristics can be considered legally competent, and therefore can be classed as 
legal persons. Therefore, the irrational, or the dependent – even if they are human - may still 
be refused entry into the class of legal persons. On this view, nonhuman animals are also 
unlikely to be granted legal personhood, because they will be unlikely to measure up to the 
paradigmatic case of law’s persons: the rational, autonomous, human actor. 
IV.  MAKING ANIMALS PERSONS AND CONFLATING CONCEPTIONS OF THE LEGAL 
PERSON 
Thus far, I have made two key suggestions. First, that the category of the legal person is a 
method for ascribing rights that may be enforced in law. Second, that the category of the legal 
person may be conceptualised in two competing ways. On the Legalist view, the legal person 
is a fiction that bears no resemblance to human persons. According the Legalist account, any 
entity may theoretically be a legal person. I have suggested however, that the grant of 
personhood remains fundamentally tied to human interests, and thus a grant of personhood 
will only take place where it serves human interests for such a grant to be made. On the 
Realist view, by contrast, legal personhood reflects objectively discoverable facts about 
human beings. On this view, only those who possess these objectively discoverable 
conditions may qualify for legal personhood.  
Steven Wise and Gary Francione make strong arguments for the inclusion of nonhuman 
animals within the category of legal person. Such a move is necessary, they contend, to 
ensure that nonhuman animals are not treated cruelly by law. Francione contends for 
example, that  ‘[t]o label something property, is, for all intents and purposes, to conclude that 
the entity so labelled possesses no interests that merit protection and that the entity is solely a 
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means to the end determined by the property owner’.
72
 For Francione, the legal 
characterisation of nonhuman animals as property is therefore problematic, since it prevents 
nonhuman animals from possessing legal rights that can be legally enforced to protect their 
interests. Wise makes a similar claim, arguing that the property status of nonhuman animals 
means that ‘[t]heir most basic and fundamental interests – their pains, their lives, their 
freedoms – are intentionally ignored, often maliciously trampled, and routinely abused’.
73
 For 
Wise, like Francione, a grant of legal personhood is a ‘legal shield that protects against 
human tyranny; without it, one is helpless’.
74
 
In arguing for the inclusion of nonhuman animals within the category of legal persons, 
Francione and Wise dedicate little time to explaining precisely who the legal ‘person’ is, and 
how nonhuman animals may be included within the category. As I suggest in the final section 
of this chapter, a failure to clearly explain the construct of the legal ‘person’ is problematic 
for both authors, because they rely upon a blend of conceptions – both Legalist and Realist. 
In blending these conceptions of the legal person, Wise and Francione invoke an 
anthropocentric construction of the legal ‘person’ which, through its construction, excludes 
nonhuman animals.  
A. Gary Francione’s Approach 
Gary Francione seeks to abolish the property status of nonhuman animals in law.
75
 In making 
this claim, Francione calls for the introduction of a vegan lifestyle as the moral ‘baseline’,
76
 
which he contends must follow logically from the complete abolition and rejection of all 
industries in which nonhuman animals are routinely exploited and used for human benefit.
77
 
Francione argues that the property status of nonhuman animals is detrimental to them, 
because it prevents them from obtaining basic rights that protect their interests. As such, he 
contends their property status must be abolished and replaced with the status of legal 
personhood, such that their interests may be protected in law in the same way as human 
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interests. Such a move, he suggests, would endow nonhuman animals with basic legal rights, 
such as ‘protection against torture, battery and even confinement’.
78
  
Francione’s argument for the extension of personhood to nonhuman animals is based on an 
application of what he calls the ‘the principle of equal consideration’.
79
 That is, ‘the moral 
rule that we treat similar cases similarly – and ask whether there is a good reason to accord 
the right not to be treated as property to nonhumans as well’.
80
 For Francione, no such 
‘rational justification’ exists, and thus he argues we must extend legal personhood to 
nonhuman animals. Francione argues that no such justification exists because nonhuman 
animals are sentient, and thus capable of possessing interests of equal moral weight to those 
of human beings. The sentience of nonhuman animals mandates their immediate inclusion 
within our ‘moral community’.
81
 According to Francione, there is no rational reason why the 
sentience of a nonhuman animal should be less morally relevant than the sentience of a 
human being. To draw such an artificial divide, he reasons, is ‘speciesist’,
82
 a form of 
arbitrary discrimination based only on species membership.
83
 Importantly, for Francione, 
inclusion within the moral community mandates the grant of what he contends is the most 
basic right: the right ‘not to be treated as the property of others’.
84
  
Francione thus contends that we must abolish the property status of nonhuman animals. He 
argues that improvements to animal welfare that maintain the property status of nonhuman 
animals, amount merely to the regulation of exploitation. This approach, which Australian 
law currently adopts, and which he labels the ‘humane treatment’ approach, is concerned 
only with improving the welfare of nonhuman animals that humans use and exploit. It is not 
ever concerned with eradicating the use and exploitation of nonhuman animals altogether. 
According to Francione, even where we are more generous towards nonhuman animals in our 
interest balancing calculations (which I detail in chapter four), nonhuman animal interests 
will be unavoidably devalued because they are legally classified as human property. 
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Francione therefore reasons that the ‘humane treatment’ approach does not ‘establish any 
rights for animals or impose any duties on humans that are directed ultimately to the well-
being of the animal’.
85
 He goes further, suggesting that the property status of nonhuman 
animals 
stops us from perceiving animal interests as similar to ours in the first instance and 
subordinates animal interests to human interests even when human and animal interests are 




For Francione, animal welfare legislation exists to regulate, and thus legitimate the animal 
exploitation that he demands we abolish. Controversially, he likens it to the case of human 
slavery:
 87
 ‘It may have been better to beat slaves three rather than five times a week, but this 
better treatment would not have removed slaves from the category of things’.
88
  
B. Steven Wise and Nonhuman Animal ‘Persons’ 
Like Francione, Wise contends that certain nonhuman animals should be granted legal 
personhood. Wise puts forward his case with relation to specific animals only. As I explained 
in chapter two, the key principles that guide Wise’s argument are ‘liberty and equality’,
89
 and 
that ‘like be treated alike’.
90
 Further, Wise suggests ‘liberty entitles one to be treated a certain 
way because of how one is made…liberty rights turn on a being’s qualities and because a 
certain degree of autonomy will suffice to entitle one to rights’.
91
  
Wise’s argument however, requires that a certain level of autonomy, ‘not just the ability to 
suffer’ be the basis for establishing legal rights for nonhuman animals.
 92
 Wise suggests it is 
this practical autonomy that is legally required for nonhuman animals to be granted legal 
personhood. Indeed, he concedes that if he were ‘[c]hief Justice of the universe’, sentience 
would be a necessary condition for legal personhood and the associated legal rights 
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 The capacity to suffer however, he contends, has been proven to be 
largely ‘irrelevant’ to judicial considerations regarding who should be entitled to legal 
rights.
94
 Wise therefore appears to adopt a tactical approach, which gives weight to both 
sentience and practical autonomy, in the hope it will be more legally persuasive.
95
  
Commenting on this approach, Wise notes ‘[t]he more exactly the behaviour of any 
nonhuman resembles ours and the taxonomically closer she is, the more confident we can be’ 
in attributing certain characteristics to that nonhuman animal.
96
 He also refers to an 
‘autonomy value’ which he suggests can act as a measure of the extent to which a nonhuman 
animal possesses the characteristics he deems necessary for legal personhood and legal 
rights.
97
 He ascribes autonomy values (between 0.00 and 1.00) to reflect the extent to which a 
particular species displays behaviour that resembles human behaviour. The closer a 
nonhuman animal is to a human being, the higher their autonomy value. 
In Unlocking the Cage, Wise sets out four possible categories which beings can be placed 
into, based on their autonomy values. Category one animals, which Wise attributes an 
autonomy value between 0.90 and 1.00, are those that are clear examples of creatures who 
possess the characteristics required for legal rights. Wise places his human son Christopher 
(1.00), Koko the gorilla (0.95), Chantek the orang-utan (0.93), and Atlantic bottle nosed 
dolphins, Ake and Phoenix (0.90) in this category. The second category comprises nonhuman 
animals in possession of an autonomy value between 0.51 to 0.89. Wise places Alex the 
African grey parrot (0.78), Echo the African elephant (0.75), Marbury the dog (0.68), and the 
average honeybee (0.59) into this category. 
Category two animals, Wise reasons, may vary greatly in terms of their capacities and 
capabilities.
98
 In response to this variation, Wise contends that an ‘intermediate’ application 
of the precautionary principle should see all nonhuman animals within this category whom 
score higher than 0.70 be granted legal rights.
99
 Those animals within the category who fall 
below this cut-off, should be granted ‘proportional’ rights that accord with the degree to 
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which one has practical autonomy.
100
 He writes: ‘if you have it, you acquire rights in full; if 
you don’t, the degree to which you approach autonomy might make you eligible to receive 
some proportion of liberty rights’.
101
 Wise contends this proportional approach to granting 
rights is one that Judges already participate in. He provides the example of a severely 
mentally disabled human, whom he reasons ‘might have a claim to bodily integrity but lack 
the power to waive it, thus being unable to consent to a risky medical procedure or the 
withdrawal of life-saving medical treatment’.
102
 
Category three animals are those which are given an autonomy value of 0.50, whilst category 
four animals receive a rating of 0.50 or below. Nonhuman animals that fall into these 
categories, according to Wise, ‘may not be entitled to basic liberty rights, simply because we 
don’t value their brand of intelligence, their style of learning, their sense of self’.
103
 In other 
words, they fail to ‘measure up…to human standards’, unlike those in Category one, and 
some in category two.
104
 
To determine how to classify each nonhuman animal species, Wise considers scientific 
knowledge surrounding several species of animal, to place each of them into one of these 
categories. To do this, Wise notes that he will ‘act the judge, review the evidence, and make 
[his] own judgments about whether practical autonomy exists, how strong a scientific 
argument has been made, and how valid the data are’.
105
 To make a determination, Wise 
adopts the precautionary principle in the face of uncertainties, thereby granting rights to 
nonhuman animals of a certain autonomy value (namely, 0.70 or higher), even where the 
evidence may not clearly support the contention that they possess all the necessary 
characteristics to make them worthy of such rights.
106
 
He notes that in some instances, judges and legislators may opt to provide rights to a being 
who is ‘completely nonautonomous’.
107
  Such an application of rights is, according to Wise, 
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 He refers for example to the case of human beings who clearly lack practical 
autonomy due to, for example, being born into a permanent vegetative state, but who still 
possess legal rights.
109
 Wise writes that such a person ‘is neither conscious nor 
sentient…cannot think or feel…is so utterly devoid of any higher brain functions…[and] has 
no mind’.
110
 Yet, this person possesses the legal right to bodily integrity, even though a 
guardian must exercise that right on their behalf. He goes further, and suggests that humans 
in this position are protected from the suggestion that they be eaten, or used in terminal 
medical research, in a way that nonhuman animals are not.
111
   
In making this argument, Wise compares the case of a human in a vegetative state who is 
granted legal rights, to a nonhuman animal who is stripped of legal rights, even though they 
might possess complex cognitive capacities. For Wise, the grant of rights to a human in such 
a state merely strengthens his argument that category one and some category two nonhuman 
animals must be granted legal rights. Indeed, he suggests that it would be arbitrary for a judge 
to grant legal rights to a human in a vegetative state yet deny them to an orang-utan, without 
violating the principle of equality.
112
 He states: ‘only a radical speciesist could accept a baby 
girl who lacks consciousness, sentience, even a brain, as having legal rights just because 




C. Wise’s and Francione’s Blended Conceptions of the Legal Person 
Both Wise and Francione contend that nonhuman animals should be granted legal rights, and 
thus made into legal persons. A central premise of their arguments is that nonhuman animal 
interests cannot adequately be protected by law unless they take the form of legal rights of the 
type associated with legal personhood. As I illustrate in chapter four, the property status of 
nonhuman animals does have problematic implications for their welfare that arguably cannot 
be remedied by welfare reforms alone. 
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However, neither Wise nor Francione explain precisely how they understand the construct of 
the legal person. As such, their arguments tend to blend competing conceptions of the legal 
person. The result is that they attempt to detach the Realist conception of the person from its 
human mooring. They insist that we include nonhuman animals in the category of legal 
persons using a legal category that has consistently excluded them. 
Consider first Francione’s argument. Francione demands that since nonhuman animals share 
the capacity for sentience with humans, they must be entitled to the same types of legal rights 
as humans. In similar terms, Wise argues that nonhuman animals whose sentience and 
autonomy measures up to the human standard should be granted legal personhood. Both 
arguments implicitly insist upon the Realist view of the legal person, that is, that humanness, 
or more specifically, human attributes, are what counts in thinking about the legal person.  
Wise and Francione insist upon equality, and suggest that nonhuman animals who share these 
attributes (sentience in Francione’s case, and sentience and autonomy in Wise’s) must, as a 
matter of consistency, be granted legal personhood. In making these arguments, Wise and 
Francione are seemingly attempting to perform an impossible task. They are seeking to 
remove the ‘human’ from the Realist account.   
Yet, as we have seen, the Realist account of the legal person is inherently tied to the human. 
As Naffine provides, ‘there is no real disagreement about the pre-eminence of the human and 
of the human measure of the legal person’.
114
 Naffine offers Australian case law examples to 
illustrate her point. One of those cases is Cattanach v Melchior
115
 which was heard in the 
High Court of Australia. The plaintiff in that case fell pregnant following surgical 
sterilisation, and alleged that the doctor who performed the sterilisation procedure had 
negligently failed to inform her of the possibility of falling pregnant. The question before the 
court was whether the plaintiff could receive damages from the doctor in recognition of the 
‘harm’ caused by the doctor’s negligence. In the course of its judgment, the court affirmed 
what Naffine describes as the ‘blessing of all human life and the centrality of human value in 
legal thought’. Naffine points to the assertions Gleeson CJ:
116
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[t]he common law has always attached a fundamental value to human life; a value originally 
based upon religious ideas which, in a secular society, no longer command universal assent. 
Blackstone, in his commentaries, referred to human life as ‘the immediate gift of God, a right 
inherent by nature in every individual’.
117
 
The insistence upon the centrality of human value has also been evidenced by case law in the 
United States of America. There, the Nonhuman Rights Project (‘NHRP’), run by Steven 
Wise, has directly asked the courts to extend legal personhood to chimpanzees, through writ 
of habeas corpus, which provides a means to challenging a person’s detainment or 
imprisonment. Though the NHRP operates within the American legal context, the decisions 
made by the American courts are illustrative of a continued deference to the Realist account 
of ‘personhood’ by lawyers and jurists. One case of interest actioned by the NHRP pertained 
to Tommy, a chimpanzee who was found living isolated and caged in a shed on a used trailer 
lot in New York city. Tommy appeared in films and was allegedly beaten during ‘training’.
118
 
After Tommy’s original owner died, ownership of Tommy passed to the Lavery family, who 
provided Tommy with living arrangements that, whilst, though lawful, were deemed 
unacceptable by the NHRP. 
In response to Tommy’s isolated confinement, the NHRP in 2013 filed a petition for a 
common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Supreme Court, demanding 
recognition that Tommy was a legal person who had a right to bodily integrity. The NHRP 
petition sought for Tommy to be released immediately and transferred to an appropriate 
sanctuary for the remainder of his life.  In the memorandum of legal precedent accompanying 
their petition, the NHRP stated that ‘legal person has never been a synonym for human 
being’.
119
 Rather, they reasoned it is a category that ‘determines who counts, who lives, who 
dies, who is enslaved, and who is free’.
120
 Here, they seemingly invoke the Legalist view. 
The NHRP then argued that Tommy’s classification as a legal ‘thing’ served only the ‘sole, 
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illegitimate, and odious purpose of enslaving him’ for human benefit.
121
 Slavery, they argued, 
is something that the courts of New York have ‘openly loathed’ for more than a century and a 
half.
122
  This implication that nonhuman animals may aptly be described as ‘slaves’ (a term 
reserved to describe a specific type of oppression experienced by humans), begins to call 
upon the Realist account of the person. If we reject human slavery, the argument goes, we 
should also reject nonhuman (chimpanzee) slavery, because chimpanzees bare many of the 
characteristics of legal human persons. 
The NHRP offered the court a vast array of expert evidence pertaining to the extent to which 
humans and chimpanzees share physical attributes fundamental to claims of liberty and 
autonomy. For example, they pointed to the fact that chimpanzees and humans share ‘almost 
99% of their DNA’, and have brains that are ‘similar’.
123
 Further, the NHRP suggested 
chimpanzees have the capacity for learning, sophisticated communications, humour, 




The argument put forward by the NHRP therefore, was that since chimpanzees share 
fundamental attributes with human beings, it was a matter of equality, that chimpanzees be 
entitled to be viewed as legal persons, just as human beings have been. The NHRP 
acknowledged that while being member of the species homo sapiens is now recognised as a 
sufficient condition for legal personhood, it is not the only sufficient condition, indicated by 
the extension of legal personhood to other nonhuman entities such as corporations. In making 
this argument, the NHRP reverted back to invoke the Legalist conception of person. 
During the first hearing in the Fulton County Supreme Court, during an order to show cause, 
Justice Josphe M. Side illustrated the extent to which humanness is consistently intertwined 
with the construct of the legal person. The NHRP’s petition was made under Article 70 of the 
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules and states under Article 70, rule 7002, that a petition 
may be made by a ‘person illegally imprisoned or otherwise restrained in his liberty within 
the state…’.
125
 The centrality of human measures of value was evidenced at the outset, as the 
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Judge explicitly conflated the legal ‘person’ directly with a ‘human being’, asking the NHRP 
whether they were asking the Supreme Court to ‘enlarge the definition of human-being under 
Article 70 to include an animal, a chimpanzee’.
126
  
Later in the case, asking the NHRP whether any precedent existed for extending legal 
personhood to nonhuman animals, the Judge again conflated the two, asking : ‘[i]n what type 
of case has a nonhuman been held as a human-being?’.
127
 When the NHRP attempted to 
develop their argument, drawing analogies between the gradual inclusions of some groups of 
human beings (such as black slaves) within the category of legal persons, they were met with 
strong resistance from the court: ‘the Court will reject that argument, the argument that cases 
involving human-beings who were slaves in the 1800s as synonymous with a chimpanzee. I 
reject it’.
128
 No substantive reasons for such a rejection were given. 
In making his final determination, the Judge simply stated, without reason:  
 Your impassioned representations to the court are quite impressive. The court will not 
 entertain the application, will not recognize a chimpanzee as a human or as a person 
 as a person [sic] who can seek a writ of habeas corpus under Article 70…You make a 
 very strong argument. However, I do not agree with the argument only insofar as 
 Article 70 applies to chimpanzees’.
129
 
The NHRP filed a notice of appeal in January 2014. The appellate brief filed stated that the 
court had erred in making the ruling that Tommy was not entitled to seek a common law writ 
of habeas corps. Specifically, the NHRP reasoned that the court committed a legal error in 
failing to determine whether Tommy was a ‘person’ under the common law of habeas corpus. 
The common law of habeas corpus, they suggested, should have been read with a view to 
interpreting the term ‘person’ as it was used in Article 70 of the New York Civil Practice 
Law and Rules under which the original action commenced. Further, the NHRP argued that 
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In May 2014, the NHRP sought a preliminary injunction against the Lavery family to prevent 
them from moving Tommy from New York State, pending their final appeal. The Third 
Judicial Department granted the NHRP’s motion for the injunction. At the hearing, and to 
obtain the injunction, the NHRP had to demonstrate that they were likely to succeed in the 
appeal. The decision of the Third Judicial Department again re-iterated the centrality of 
human value in the construct of the legal person, though somewhat less explicitly than the 
first Judge had.  The Third Judicial Department’s decision was that Tommy was not a legal 
person, because: 
[U]nlike human beings, chimpanzees cannot bear any legal duties, submit to societal 
responsibilities, or be held legally accountable for their actions. In our view, it is this 
incapability to bear any legal responsibilities and societal duties that renders it 




Though the NHRP appealed this decision on the basis that it constituted an error of law (with 
the judgment still pending), the fascinating part of this particular Judgement is found in a 
footnote in the decision which states: ‘nothing in this decision should be read as limiting the 
rights of human beings in the context of habeas corpus proceedings or otherwise’.
132
 Such a 
disclaimer was considered necessary by virtue of the fact that all human beings, some of 
whom are incapable of bearing legal duties (for example children, or the severely disabled) 
are still afforded the rights associated with legal personhood. They are legal persons not 
because they bear legal rights and duties, but because they are humans. In an amicus curiae 
submitted to the Court, Laurence Tribe of Harvard University stated that but for that 
disclaimer, the conception of ‘personhood’  relied upon to make the decision, ‘would appear 
on its face to exclude third-trimester foetuses, children, and comatose adults (among other 
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It is thus clear that there exists a continued insistence upon measures of human value in 
determining precisely who or what can be a legal person. The Legalist account of personhood 
provides that anything, at least in theory, can be a legal person. On this view, the legal 
personhood is a legal fiction: a mere legal device. It bears no necessary connection to reality, 
nor does it try to capture any facts about human life in its application. It is a purely legal tool 
used to serve a purely legal purpose. The potential promise provided by the Legalist 
conception of the legal person is that one need not prove membership to a certain species, or 
the existence of certain capacities, to be accorded with legal personhood. It is on this basis 
that ‘lifeless’ entities such as corporations and ships have been granted legal personhood.  
In utilising the Realist account of personhood, both Francione and Wise implicitly insist that 
legal person should mirror human values and attributes. For Francione, the legal person is 
necessarily sentient. For Wise, the legal person has both autonomy and sentience. Yet case 
law illustrates the Realist account is more than this: it is fundamentally human. Wise and 
Francione thus attempt to dismantle the paradigmatic person that is central to the Realist 
account, as they attempt to strip it of its human element. Wise and Francione thus seek to 
expand the Realist construct of the legal person to nonhuman animals, even though it is a 
construct that has consistently enabled their exclusion. To do so without acknowledging the 
extent to which this category is fundamentally tied to the human, Wise and Francione risk 
legitimating the construction of a category that is not an empty vessel but instead is marked 
by its application to human persons. Put another way, Wise and Francione seek to include 
nonhuman animals by reference to science that proves how ‘human’ they are in morally 
important ways. But in making this argument both writers implicitly legitimate the 
humanness of this construct.  
In attempting to dismantle the paradigmatic person that is central to the Realist account of 
legal personhood, my contention is that Wise and Francione understate the difficulty of their 
task. This is well illustrated by an example in Wise’s writing. Wise argues that the attribution 
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of legal rights to human persons who lack autonomy, only strengthens his own argument that 
nonhumans who possess autonomy must logically be granted the same rights.
134
 He refers to 
the case of Joseph Saikewicz, a ‘sixty-seven year old man with an IQ of ten’, and Beth, ‘a 
ten-month-old girl born into a permanent vegetative state’.
135
 According to Wise, the 
attribution of legal rights to both Joseph and Beth, human beings who lack autonomy, 
strengthens his argument that we must grant legal rights to nonhuman animals who possess 
autonomy. To fail to do so, Wise argues, would be utterly arbitrary, and therefore violates the 
basic notion of equality.
136
  
Arguably however, the precise opposite is true. Wise rightly observes that the law grants 
rights to human persons simply because they are human. Wise even refers to the existence of 
a law in Louisiana (USA) that ‘designates a fertilized in vitro ovum a legal person before it is 
implanted in the womb’.
137
 It seems clear that it is therefore humanness, and not autonomy, 
that matters in designating human persons as legal persons. Yet, Wise supposes that this same 
fact supports his argument that nonhuman animals should similarly be granted rights, because 
they are equally (if not more) autonomous than the human persons that we grant personhood 
to. The human element is something that Wise seemingly brushes aside. Yet, as we have 
seen, it is precisely the human element that remains central to the paradigmatic case of law’s 
person on the Realist view. Beth and Joseph are legal persons not because they bare certain 
attributes, but because they are human. The distinction between human and nonhuman is 
paramount and cannot be so easily pushed aside. 
Cora Diamond suggests that there are culturally embedded views about the relationship 
between humans and nonhuman animals that have become key facts in our understanding of 
animals and humans. Talking about the animals that humans eat, she writes: ‘we [humans] 
are around the table and they [animals] are on it. The difference between human beings and 
animals is not to be discovered by studies….the difference is…a central concept for human 
life’.
138
 Wise and Francione appear to ignore the fundamental importance of this divide. The 
law does not fail to include nonhuman animals within the category of persons because it fails 
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to appreciate their sentience or their capabilities (as they assume it does). There has long been 
little scientific doubt that nonhuman animals feel a wealth of emotions that are, in many 
instances, not dissimilar to the emotions felt by human beings.  Wise and Francione establish 
this convincingly. We are left in little doubt that some nonhuman animals may possess 
greater mental capabilities than many humans do in the first years of their life. Yet, we offer 
an undisputed grant of personhood to human persons, whilst simultaneously refusing the 
same to nonhuman animals. The issue is something that Wise and Francione do not 
appreciate:  the problem is not that the law is yet to appreciate scientific truths about 
nonhuman animals. The problem is that nonhuman animals are precisely that: nonhuman.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have suggested that the legal characterisation of nonhuman animals as legal 
property is central to the way in which the law treats them cruelly. Characterised as legal 
property, I have suggested that nonhuman animals are viewed as legitimate objects of human 
property rights. As property, the interests of nonhuman animals do not count in law. In 
understanding precisely how nonhuman animals are excluded from ‘counting’ in law, I 
explained two competing conceptions of the legal ‘person’. The purpose of examining these 
competing conceptions was to reveal an important point. Namely, that nonhuman animals are 
not only excluded from the category of the legal person, but the category is constructed so as 
to necessitate their exclusion. I considered the argument of two key thinkers on the legal 
status of nonhuman animals, Gary Francione and Steven Wise. A critical assessment of their 
premises reveals that they share a tendency to recapitulate the human-centric nature of the 
construct of the legal person. In doing so, they unwittingly legitimate a construction of the 
person as something which remains tightly bound to the human. As long as the person 
remains tightly bound to the human, nonhuman animals will not, and cannot count in law. My 
critique of Wise and Francione in this chapter offers a unique contribution to discourse on the 
legal status of nonhuman animals. Though I am sympathetic to their desire to remove 
nonhuman animals from the legal status of ‘property’, I have suggested that their arguments 
implicitly affirm a human-centric concept of the legal ‘person’. As such, Wise and Francione,  
unwittingly recapitulate the essence of the problem. Nonhuman animals are ‘property’ 
because they are not (human) persons. 
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In the following chapter, I reveal in more detail precisely how the legal characterisation of 
nonhuman animals as legal property facilitates their cruel treatment. My suggestion is that 
that the provisions of Australian animal welfare law are bound tightly to protecting human 
property interests. The result is that laws which purport to prohibit cruelty to nonhuman 
animals are strictly limited in scope. Cruelty is prohibited only insofar as that prohibition 
does not prevent humans from using nonhuman animals to serve their own interests.  
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CHAPTER 4: AUSTRALIAN ANIMAL ‘WELFARE’ LAWS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
‘The law may prevent ‘cruelty’ but it does so by stripping away the meaning of this word 
through its acceptance that human privilege to use animals to our ends takes priority over 
suffering, and that human needs like efficiency, higher economic productivity, and more 
desirable aesthetics and even entertainment count as legitimate ends’.
1
 
In the previous chapter, I explained that nonhuman animals in Australia are legally classified 
as property. I argued that their property status facilitates cruelty towards them, because it 
legitimates the human use of nonhuman animals to serve human purposes, even where such 
usage inflicts cruelty upon them. However, as I explained in chapter one, animal welfare 
legislation exists in each state and territory of Australia and to restrict the ways in which 
humans use nonhuman animals to serve their own interests. These statutes claim to prohibit 
cruelty and promote nonhuman animal welfare. In Queensland for example, the Animal Care 
and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) subtitle reads ‘an Act to promote the responsible care and use 
of animals and to protect animals from cruelty…’.
2
 
Australian animal welfare legislation purports to meet these statutory objectives through the 
creation of offences to prohibit conduct that is cruel to a nonhuman animal or otherwise 
compromises their welfare. For example, in Victoria, section 9 of the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals Act 1986 (Vic) details the offence of cruelty towards a nonhuman animal, and 
criminalises conduct that, for example, ‘wounds, mutilates, tortures, overrides, overdrives, 
overworks, abuses, beats, worries, torments, or terrifies’ a nonhuman animal.
3
 In South 
Australia, section 13(2) of the Animal Welfare Act 1875 (SA) provides that ‘[a] person who 
ill-treats an animal is guilty of an offence’. The Act then goes on to provide a lengthy 
description of what constitutes such ‘ill-treatment’, including neglecting an animal, or 
intentionally, unreasonably or recklessly causing harm to an animal.
4
  
Although animal welfare legislation may appear to provide vast protections for nonhuman 
animals, I demonstrate in this chapter that these laws consistently fail in meeting their stated 
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objective. I make this claim on the basis that nonhuman animals in Australia still suffer 
greatly and lawfully in human hands, despite the seemingly strong legal protections they are 
offered by animal welfare legislation. For example, an estimated 500 million animals bred 
and raised for human consumption in Australia annually are lawfully confined to ‘factory 
farm’ conditions, where they are unable to exercise, socialise, nurture their young or explore 
nature.
5
 My contention in this chapter is that the cruelty experienced by nonhuman animals 
such as those confined to factory farms occurs not only despite animal welfare legislation, but 
precisely because of it. My argument is that animal welfare legislation, which purports to 
protect nonhuman animals from cruelty, permits their mistreatment.  
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, I detail the key protective provisions 
contained in Australian animal welfare statutes. These provisions purport to protect 
nonhuman animals from cruelty and to promote their welfare. They also outlaw specific 
offences against nonhuman animals. In the second part, I explain the first mechanism by 
which I argue these protections are consistently undermined for some species of nonhuman 
animal kept in certain contexts. I argue that the use of qualifying language such as 
‘necessary’ and ‘reasonable’ qualify and limit the general protections that the law offers to 
nonhuman animals. My argument is that the law does not protect nonhuman animals from 
cruelty per se, but only from ‘unreasonable’ or ‘unnecessary’ cruelty. Given that nonhuman 
animals are characterised as legal property, these qualifying terms legitimate cruelty that 
serves human ownership interests. In the third part, I explain the role of Codes of Practice and 
Standards and Guidelines, which supplement Australian animal welfare legislation. Codes of 
Practice and Standards and Guidelines dictate the legal standards that govern the treatment of 
nonhuman animals in industries that have a positive interest in treating nonhuman animals 
cruelly because such cruelty serves an economic purpose. The result is that those nonhuman 
animals that are the most vulnerable to experiencing cruelty by human hand, are 
systematically exempted from the general protections offered by Australian animal welfare 
legislation. In the fourth part, I use the case study of factory farmed pigs in Australia to 
demonstrate the failings of Australian animal welfare legislation in protecting pigs from 
cruelty.  
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II. AUSTRALIA’S ANIMAL WELFARE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The Australian animal welfare legislative framework is vast and varied.
6
 As I explained in 
chapter two, the treatment of nonhuman animals is dealt with by numerous branches of law. 
In general however, the Australian constitution makes no provision for the federal 
Government of Australia to legislate with respect to animal welfare, except where the power 
can derive indirectly from other heads of power.
7
 For example, federal legislation covers 
animal welfare matters in the live animal export trade, created under the federal government’s 
power to legislate with respect to trade and commerce.
 8
 As a result, the regulation of animal 
welfare in Australia is not addressed by a uniform legislative framework, but rather is 
addressed individually by each state and territory of Australia.
9
 In addition, local councils are 
responsible for the creation of by-laws relating to the management of companion animals, 
such as dogs and cats.
10
  
In 2005 the Australian Animal Welfare Strategy (‘AAWS’) was developed by the Australian 
Government to create more consistency across Australia with respect to animal welfare 
standards.
11
 The AAWS was originally governed by the Australian Animal Welfare Advisory 
Committee (AusAWAC), which was comprised of representatives of industry, researchers, 
veterinarians and animal welfare advocates. The AusAWAC was charged with the task of 
providing advice to Government on animal welfare policy. Government funding for the 
AAWS was withdrawn in the 2014-15 federal budget, to allegedly secure a saving of 3.3 
million dollars over three years.
12
 The AusAWAC was also disbanded, with responsibility for 
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the AAWS being taken up by the Department of Agriculture.
13
 I return to the AAWS later in 
this chapter. 
A. The Legal Definition of ‘Animal’ 
Before examining the legislative provisions that purport to protect nonhuman animals from 
cruelty, it is necessary to explain how the law defines the term ‘animal’. The legal definition 
of ‘animal’ is important because it sets the scope of animal welfare legislation. Only those 
who are included within the legal definition of the ‘animal’ are entitled to protections 
provided by animal welfare laws. This is a point which I return to in more detail chapter six, 
where I argue that the legal definition of the term ‘animal’ is inadequate because it fails to 
include nonhuman animal species that are capable of suffering.   
 
State based statutory frameworks for protecting nonhuman animals from harm do not share a 
common definition of the term ‘animal’. As a result, each state and territory of Australia 
separately defines ‘animal’ for the purposes of defining the scope of animal welfare 
legislation in their respective jurisdictions. In Victoria, the definition of ‘animal’ even 
changes throughout the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic), such that certain 




Though there is no unified definition of ‘animal’, it is possible to find commonalities between 
the various definitions of ‘animal’ across Australia. In all states and territories of Australia – 
human beings are also explicitly excluded from the definition of ‘animal’.
15
 Live members of 
a vertebrate species are included under all animal welfare acts, including amphibians, 
reptiles, birds, and mammals.
16
 Insects by contrast, are excluded in all states and territories. 
Fish are included in Queensland, the Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania, Victoria and 





 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic) ss3, 25. 
15
 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) s4, Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) s2(a)(iv), Animal 
Welfare Act 1985 (SA) s3, Animal Welfare Act (NT) s4, Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) s5, Animal Welfare 
Act 1993 (Tas) s3, Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s11(a), Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 
1986 (Vic) s3(3)(a)(ii). 
16
 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) s4, Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) s2, Animal Welfare 
Act 1985 (SA) s3, Animal Welfare Act (NT) s4, Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) s5, Animal Welfare Act 1993 
(Tas) s3, Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s11, Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic) 
s3(3). 




 In the Northern Territory, fish are only included if they are kept under 
human control, either in captivity or if they are otherwise dependent on humans for food.
18
 




The Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland also include 
crustaceans in the statutory definition of ‘animal’, but Victoria is the only jurisdiction among 
these that does not limit the definition to include only crustaceans being confined and used 
for human consumption.
20
 The Australian Capital Territory, Victoria and Queensland are the 
only parts of Australia which extend animal welfare laws to live cephalopods (such as 
octopus, cuttlefish and squid), though Victoria only includes them for the purposes of 
provisions pertaining to scientific research on nonhuman animals.
21
 Cephalopods in all other 
states and territories do not receive any protections for their welfare – despite scientific 




In addition, Queensland and Victoria are the only states in which some classes of mammals 
are included in utero. In Victoria, mammals that have reached over half their gestation period 
are considered ‘animals’ for the purposes of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 
(Vic).
23
 In Queensland, mammals, reptiles and avian young are included where they are in the 
last half of gestation or development.
24
 The spawn of fish are expressly excluded by the 
Queensland Act.
25
 I return to the legal definition of the ‘animal’ in chapter six. 
B. Key Animal Welfare Provisions 
Having briefly explained which nonhuman animals are defined as ‘animals’ in Australian 
animal welfare legislation, I now describe the key provisions in each state. Whilst the content 
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of the provisions varies across each Australian state and territory, each share some important 
sections that are similar in terms of their purported effect. I divide these provisions into three 
themes: anti-cruelty provisions, animal welfare provisions, and specific offences against 
nonhuman animals. 
1. Anti-Cruelty Provisions 
Animal welfare legislation in each jurisdiction contains provisions which purport to prohibit 
cruelty towards nonhuman animals. These provisions apply to the conduct of any person, 
regardless of whether they are the owner of a nonhuman animal, and prohibit certain forms of 
conduct. For example, in South Australia, it is an offence to ‘ill-treat’ an animal.
26
 This is a 
broad offence that covers a wide variety of human conduct that may cause a nonhuman 
animal to suffer unnecessarily. The ill-treatment offence covers both intentional acts, as well 
as reckless and negligent acts that unnecessarily cause an animal harm.
27
 The South 
Australian Act defines ‘harm’ broadly, to include any form of damage, pain, suffering or 




The South Australian Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) also contains an aggravated offence 
provision, which applies where a person ill-treats a nonhuman animal, and that ill-treatment 
caused death or serious harm to the animal, and the person intended to cause, or was reckless 
about causing the death or serious harm.
29
 Each jurisdiction except Queensland and Western 




In New South Wales, under section 5 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 
(NSW) it is also an offence to be cruel to a nonhuman animal. In New South Wales however, 
the definition of what constitutes ‘cruelty’ is given more detail than it is in South Australia. A 
person commits an act of cruelty upon a nonhuman animal in New South Wales if they cause 
that nonhuman animal to be 
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s4(2)(a) unreasonably, unnecessarily or unjustifiably beaten, kicked, killed, wounded, 
pinioned,
31
 mutilated, maimed, abused, tormented, tortured, terrified or infuriated,   
s4(2)(b) over-loaded, over-worked, over-driven, over-ridden or over-used, 
s4(2)(c) exposed to excessive heat or excessive cold, or 
s4(2)(d) inflicted with pain. 
The Victorian Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic), the Western Australian 
Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA), the Queensland Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) 
and the Tasmanian Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tas) contain very similar provisions.
32
 New 
South Wales is distinctive in that the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) also contains offences that 
address serious acts of animal cruelty. Under those provisions, it is an offence to: ‘torture, 
beat or commit a serious act of cruelty on an animal with the intention of inflicting severe 
pain; and kill, seriously injure, or cause prolonged suffering to an animal’.
33
 The New South 
Wales Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) contains an additional obligation 
that is not present in animal welfare legislation in other jurisdictions, whereby it is an offence 




In the Australian Capital Territory, the Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) similarly creates an 
offence where a person commits an act of cruelty on an animal.
35
 In addition to the anti-
cruelty provision, section 8 of the Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) also provides that it is an 
offence to cause pain to an animal. ‘Pain’ is defined in the Act to include suffering and 
distress.
36
 The Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) is the only animal welfare statute in Australia 
to include detailed rules pertaining to the keeping of some nonhuman animals raised for food, 
namely chickens kept of egg production and pigs kept for commercial purposes.
 37
 In all other 
states and territories, such laws are largely contained in the subordinate regulations and 
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Codes of Practice which I discuss in part three of this chapter. The Australian Capital 
Territory is also the only jurisdiction in which the de-beaking of fowl, the confinement of 
hens to battery cages and the confinement of sows to stalls is outlawed.
 38
 Whilst an important 
symbolic gesture, this prohibition has little practical effect since the Australian Capital 
Territory does not house any factory farms where such cruelty would normally be practiced. 
The Northern Territory Animal Welfare Act (NT) is somewhat different to other jurisdictions 
in terms of the wording used to prohibit cruelty. The Animal Welfare Act (NT) states that a 
person commits an offence of cruelty to an animal if they fail to meet the minimum level of 
care, and intended to cause the animal harm.
39
 The Northern Territory is the only jurisdiction 
in which an allegation of cruelty must be substantiated by proof an intent to cause harm. 
Though this may seem to establish a higher threshold for the establishment of guilt than the 
anti-cruelty provisions in other jurisdictions, this Northern Territory cruelty offence is 
analogous to the aggravated charges that exist in other Australian jurisdictions. An offence 
similar to the strict liability cruelty offences that exist in most jurisdictions is instead 
established under section 7 of the Animal Welfare Act (NT), as the ‘minimum level of care’ 
required for a nonhuman animal. Any person who fails to meet that level of care, breaches the 
duty of care established in section 8. An aggravated charge in the Northern Territory 
legislation is established when a person has been intentionally cruel to a nonhuman animal, 
and in doing so, have caused the death of, or serious harm
40




Section 7 of the Northern Territory act, which deals with breaching one’s duty of care to an 
animal  provides that the minimum level of care required for an animal is that it: 
 
(a) has appropriate and sufficient food and water; and 
(b) has appropriate accommodation and living conditions; and 
(c) is appropriately treated for disease, injury or suffering; and 
                                                 
 
38
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without anaesthetic. The tip of a the beak is removed using a hot blade. The procedure is said to minimize 
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 Animal Welfare Act (NT) s9. 
40
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(d) is allowed appropriate exercise; and 
(e) is handled only in ways that are appropriate; and 
(f) is confined or restrained only in ways that are appropriate; and 
(g) is worked, ridden or otherwise used only in ways that are appropriate; and 
(h) is not abandoned; and 
(i) is not used in an organized animal fight. 
The term ‘appropriate’ is defined to mean suitable for ‘ensur[ing] the welfare, health and 
safety of the animal, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including the animal’s 
species and the environment in which it is kept or lives’.
42
 In addition, something is 




In Tasmania, the Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tas) establishes that humans in charge of an 




2. Animal Welfare Provisions 
In addition to the anti-cruelty provisions just described, animal welfare legislation in each 
Australian jurisdiction also contains what I am labelling ‘animal welfare’ provisions. These 
provisions differ from anti-cruelty provisions in two ways. First, they generally only apply to 
a person who is the owner of a nonhuman animal, or who otherwise has a nonhuman animal 
within their custody and control. Second, that they establish a positive duty. They dictate 
things that a person must do to protect a nonhuman animal’s welfare. Thus, rather than 
prohibit certain forms of conduct, as anti-cruelty provisions do, animal welfare provisions 
require those in charge of a nonhuman animal to do certain things to protect the interests of 
nonhuman animals. 
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For example, in South Australia, according to section 13(3) of the Animal Welfare Act 1985 
(SA), a person who owns a nonhuman animal, commits an ill-treatment offence if they fail to 
provide that nonhuman animal with ‘appropriate and adequate’ food, water, shelter or 
exercise.
45
 An ‘owner’ in South Australia is defined as any person who has a nonhuman 
animal in their custody or control,
46
 and would therefore include persons who are caring for a 
nonhuman animal in any capacity, even if they are not the registered owner. The obligation 
that a person with custody and control over a nonhuman animal provide it with adequate and 
appropriate food, water, exercise and shelter is common across every animal welfare statute 
in Australia.
47
  The New South Wales Act expressly excludes ‘stock’ animals in the context 
of reasonable access to exercise, where that animal is usually kept in captivity by means of a 
cage.
48
 I address this provision later in this chapter, and in chapter six. 
 
Each statute also requires that a person in charge of a nonhuman animal take reasonable steps 
to mitigate harm caused by disease or injury.
49
 In New South Wales a person also has a 
positive duty to provide a nonhuman animal under their control animal with appropriate 
supervision and care so as to prevent the commission of an act of cruelty. A person who fails 
in this regard may commit an animal cruelty offence.
50
  
3. Specific Offences Against Nonhuman Animals  
In addition to anti-cruelty and animal welfare provisions, animal welfare legislation in each 
state and territory of Australia also contains provisions which detail specific offences against 
nonhuman animals. Although these prohibited activities may already be unlawful under the 
general anti-cruelty provisions, the explicit prohibition of certain types of conduct towards 
nonhuman animals provides certainty. In some cases different penalties also apply. While 
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there is significant variety between jurisdictions with respect to the explicit prohibition of 
specific offences, some commonalities do exist. For example, abandoning an animal is an 
offence in each state and territory of Australia.
51
 Most jurisdictions also explicitly prohibit 
animal fights,
52
 the performance of surgical procedures on nonhuman animals by non-
veterinarians,
53
 the use of electric devices (except where allowed by regulations)
54
 and the 




Two noteworthy differences between jurisdictions are that rodeos are permitted in all states 
and territories of Australia, except the Australian Capital Territory,
56
 and that steeplechase 
(jumps racing) is unlawful only in New South Wales,
57
 though it is no longer practiced 
anywhere except Victoria and South Australia.
58
 
III. FAILING LEGAL PROTECTIONS 
The key provisions of Australian animal welfare legislation that I have just detailed may 
appear to provide vast protections to nonhuman animals. They purport to prohibit cruelty, and 
to place a positive duty on those in control of nonhuman animals to ensure the basic welfare 
needs are met. Yet, nonhuman animals in Australia continue to suffer lawful cruelty. As I 
have already stated, some nonhuman animals are excluded from the definition of ‘animal’ 
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and are thus offered no legal protections from cruelty. I return to this point in chapter six. In 
what follows however, I demonstrate that even those nonhuman animals who are included 
within the definition of an ‘animal’, and thus are included within the scope of the anti-cruelty 
and welfare provisions, are still systematically excluded from the law’s protective reach by 
two other less obvious mechanisms.  
First, the prohibition on cruelty is always qualified by words such as ‘legitimate’, ‘necessary’ 
and ‘reasonable’, with the result that many forms of cruelty are in fact facilitated, and not 
prohibited, by law. Second, regulations and Codes of Practice operate in each Australian 
jurisdiction to dictate separate standards for the treatment of nonhuman animals kept for 
particular human purposes. These regulations and Codes exempt some of the worst forms of 
cruelty towards nonhuman animals from the protective reach of Australian animal welfare 
laws. For the purposes of the inquiry in this thesis, I restrict my analysis to Codes of Practice, 
because they provide the most overt examples of lawful, permitted cruelty. I now describe 
each of these mechanisms in turn.  
A. Qualifying Words and ‘Necessary’ Cruelty 
The key provisions of Australian animal welfare legislation are much more limited in scope 
than they seem at first sight. Each statute contains qualifying words that limit the scope of the 
general prohibition on cruelty provisions. Critiques on the inadequacy of Australian animal 
welfare legislation have focused on these terms, because they implicitly legitimate certain 
forms of cruelty, providing it can be ‘justified’ in some way.
59
 For example, the South 
Australian prohibition on ill-treating a nonhuman animal provides that: ‘A person who ill-
treats an animal is guilty of an offence’.
60
 That same act also qualifies this general 
prohibition, defining ill-treatment as causing ‘unnecessary harm’, causing ‘unnecessary 
pain’, or failing to take ‘reasonable steps’ to mitigate harm suffered by a nonhuman animal. 
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Ill-treatment, therefore, is only prohibited by the South Australian Animal Welfare Act 1985 
(SA) insofar as it constitutes unnecessary or unreasonable ill-treatment of a nonhuman 
animal.  
Animal welfare legislation in each jurisdiction contains similar qualifications. In the Northern 
Territory, a person is cruel to a nonhuman animal where they cause it ‘unnecessary 
suffering’.
61
 In Tasmania, a person must not do any act that is likely to cause ‘unreasonable 
and unjustifiable pain or suffering’ to a nonhuman animal.
62
 Whilst purporting to meet the 
objective of prohibiting cruelty to nonhuman animals, Australian animal welfare legislation 
only prohibits cruelty of a very specific type: cruelty that is unnecessary, unjustifiable or 
unreasonable. In other words, the only cruelty that is prohibited is that which cannot be 
justified by the person inflicting it.
63
 
It is possible to imagine contexts in which these provisions, despite their limitations, could 
operate to protect the welfare of nonhuman animals. For example, the infliction of pain to 
administer a lifesaving vaccination would seem to be a ‘justifiable’ or ‘reasonable’ infliction 
of pain upon on a nonhuman animal. Here, the infliction of a comparatively minor harm upon 
a nonhuman animal could be deemed necessary to protect their future welfare, and preventing 
them from experiencing future pain and suffering. To this extent, the qualified anti-cruelty 
prohibition seems reasonable.   
However, qualifying terms can also facilitate cruelty towards nonhuman animals that is not 
justified with respect to their own interests. The qualifying words operate to facilitate cruelty 
that can be judged ‘necessary’ or ‘reasonable’ because it serves human interests to inflict it. 
This is particularly so where the infliction of cruelty serves the economic needs of an industry 
that uses nonhuman animals for human benefit. The factory farming of nonhuman animals is 
a pertinent example. As I demonstrate in chapter five, the test for what constitutes ‘necessary’ 
suffering is may be applied differently to different species, with the result that some species 
are treated more cruelly than others. As Peter Sankoff explains, ‘[h]arm is not absolute, but 
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 To explain how ‘necessary’ or ‘reasonable’ cruelty is defined in law, I now detail 
some judicial commentary surrounding the terms. 
1. Judicial Commentary on ‘Necessary’ Suffering 
There exists little case law to explain precisely what constitutes ‘necessary’ suffering in the 
context of animal welfare provisions. This is so even despite the fact that animal welfare laws 
have existed globally for almost 200 years.
65
 Sankoff attributes this lack of case law to two 
things: the ‘alarmingly inadequate’ enforcement of animal welfare laws, meaning that there 
are few cases appearing before the courts (which I address in chapter eight),
66
 and the fact 
that even fewer cases go to trial or are appealed, with the result that ‘very little case law is 
generated to assist in future interpretation of the statute’.
67
 Annabel Markham has also 
described the analysis of animal welfare case law as ‘no easy task’, since prosecutions in 
Australia typically take place in Magistrate and District courts, the decisions of which are 
unreported.
68
 As I contend later in this part and in chapter six, the prohibition on 
‘unnecessary’ cruelty also performs very limited protective work because the majority of 
cruelty is positively permitted by law that is therefore never exposed to the general anti-
cruelty provisions. As such, minimal case law is generated to give meaning to the terms. 
In addition to the lack of case law which explains precisely what ‘necessary’ cruelty is, the 
term is also notoriously difficult to define. In the English case of Ford v Wiley
69
 which I 
discuss further below, Lord Chief Justice Coleridge explained that it is easier to define the 
concept of necessary suffering ‘from the negative’.
70
 That is, it is simpler to explain what 
necessary cruelty is not, than it is to articulate precisely what it is. This makes sense when 
viewed in light of the role that qualifying terms play in Australian legislation. The very 
purpose of using such terms is to provide scope for judicial interpretation of what constitutes 
lawful or unlawful conduct through inspection of the facts of each case.
71
 What is ‘necessary’ 
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in one context may not be ‘necessary’ in another. The benefit of the use of such terminology 
in law is that it enables the creation of highly flexible provisions that can be applied to 
different factual scenarios in different ways. However, absent any statutory guidance, such 
terminology also offers little guidance on precisely how these terms should be interpreted by 
the judiciary in each case.
72
  
Two cases that have offered some guidance on what constitutes ‘necessary’ or ‘reasonable’ 
cruelty in the context of animal welfare laws are the English case of Ford v Wiley,
73
 and the 
Canadian case of  R v Menard.
74
 Although these are not Australian cases, they contain 
important judicial commentary on the concept of ‘necessary’ nonhuman animal suffering 
which took place in the context of applying similar provisions to those contained in 
Australian animal welfare statutes. The judicial commentary may therefore be persuasive in 
Australian cases if a court is required to interpret these terms.
75
 Ford v Wiley has also been 
considered and applied directly in the Australian context.
76
 
In the case of Ford v Wiley, the defendant used a saw to remove the horns of his cattle, and 
was charged with an animal cruelty offence.
77
 The question before the court was whether the 
cruelty committed was ‘necessary’.
78
 The defendant justified his actions on the basis of 
economic and practical necessity. He reasoned that by dehorning the cattle, he would obtain a 
better price for them, because he could keep more cattle in his available space, and they 
would be less likely to cause injury and damage to one another.
79
 In determining whether the 
cruelty was justified on these grounds, the court developed a two-limbed proportionality test, 
to balance the pain and suffering of the cattle, against the defendant’s intended purpose of 
achieving economic benefits: 
The legality of a painful operation must be governed by the necessity for it, and even where a 
desirable and legitimate object is sought to be attained, the magnitude of the operation and the 
                                                 
 
72
 Ibid 15. 
73
 Ford v Wiley (1889) 23 QB 203. 
74
 R v Menard (1978) 43 Ccc (2d) 458 (Que CA). 
75
 Sankoff, above n 59, 14. 
76
 For example Wilson v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SA) Inc [2016] SASC 107. 
77
 The charges were laid under s2 of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1949 (12&13 Vict. c. 92). 
78
 Dehorning is now a routine part of cattle husbandry, and is lawful in every state of Australia provided 
applicable Codes of Practice and Regulations are complied with.  
79
 Meg Lamb, 'Ford v Wiley Proportionality Analysis of the Castration of Domestic Livestock for Meat 
Production' (2015) 11 Australian Animal Protection Law Journal 20, 21. 
Page 98 of 305 
 
pain caused thereby must not so far outbalance the importance of the end as to make it clear 
to any reasonable person that it is preferable the object should be abandoned rather than that 
disproportionate suffering should be inflicted.
80
 
The court therefore established that cruelty can only be considered ‘necessary’ where it was 
inflicted in pursuit of a legitimate end, and where the means used to pursue that end were 
reasonably proportionate to the object being sought. In this case, the court found that the act 
of dehorning the cattle, which was not routinely practiced at the time, was not a legitimate 
object. Lord Coleridge stated: 
No owner is compelled by any necessity to turn his horned into his dishorned or artificially-
polled cattle….If he wishes for polled cattle he can buy naturally-polled animals, though it 
may be at a small extra price. If, however, to avoid that outlay, he prefers to buy horned 
cattle, and to enhance their value…by mutilating them at the expense to the poor animals of 
excruciating torture, how can this be said to be either necessary or reasonable?
81
 
Lord Coleridge therefore concluded that even though having polled cattle may be more 
convenient for the defendant, the fact that other farmers through England had not widely 
adopted the practice was ‘abundant proof that dishorning is not necessary’.
82
 In the same 
case, Hawkins J reasoned that the law must place limitations on the purposes for which 
humans use nonhuman animals. Not all uses of nonhuman animals to serve human interests 
should be deemed ‘necessary’ simply because they secure a human benefit. He stated: 
If the law were that any man or body of men could in his or their own interest, or for his or 
their pecuniary benefit, cause torture and suffering to animals without legitimate reasons, and 
could, when charged with cruelty, excuse himself or themselves upon the ground that he or 
they honestly believed the law justified them, though in fact it did not, it is not difficult to see 
the limits to which such a principle might not be pushed, and the creatures it is man’s duty to 
protect from abuse, would oftentimes be suffering victims of gross ignorance and 
cupidity….Constant familiarity with unnecessary torture to and abuse of dumb animals 
cannot fail by degrees to brutalize and harden all who are concerned in or witness the miseries 
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The defendant in Ford v Wiley was found guilty of animal cruelty.
84
 It is interesting to note 
however, that the act of dehorning cattle without anaesthesia or pain relief is both routine and 




In the Canadian case of R v Menard, the defendant captured and killed stray dogs and cats by 
poisoning them with carbon monoxide. The question before the court was whether the cruelty 
he inflicted upon them in the course of such actions could be considered ‘necessary’. In 
answering this question, Lamer JA adopted a utilitarian approach in which to ‘balance’ the 
negative effects of inflicting cruelty against the perceived positive ones:  
It is sometimes necessary to make an animal suffer for its own good or…to save a human life. 
Certain experiments, alas, inevitably very painful for the animal, prove necessary to discover 
or test remedies which will save a great number of human lives. [The legislation] does not 
prohibit these incidents, but at the same time, condemns the person who, for example, will 
leave a dog or horse without water and without food for a few days, through carelessness or 
negligence or for reasons of profit or again in order to avoid the costs of a temporary board 
and lodging, notwithstanding that these animals would suffer much less than certain animals 
used as guinea pigs. Everything is therefore according to the circumstances, the quantification 




The test adopted by Lamer JA reveals some important points. First, there does not appear to 
be any threshold for what may constitute necessary suffering. Even cruelty that is ‘very 
painful’ may be considered reasonable, if it is inflicted in pursuit of a reasonable object, and 
in a proportionate manner.
87
 To this extent, the reasoning provided in this case draws a 
similar conclusion to the Judges in Ford v Wiley: any cruelty can be ‘necessary’, and 
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therefore lawful, as long as it is inflicted for a legitimate purpose, and by reasonable means.
88
 
I now consider in more detail what may constitute a ‘legitimate purpose’ and ‘reasonable 
means’ with continued reference to the judicial commentary contained in both Ford v Wiley 
and R v Menard, and with additional reference to some Australian case law.  
B. Legitimacy of Purpose and Reasonableness of Means 
In considering what may constitute a ‘legitimate purpose’ or ‘reasonable means’ by which to 
inflict cruelty upon a nonhuman animal, it is necessary to first examine the context in which 
this assessment takes place. Such an examination is integral to an attempt to understand the 
concepts of ‘reasonable’ or ‘necessary’ cruelty, since the terms are highly subjective and vary 
according to the context in which they are used. 
In chapter three, I explained that nonhuman animals are legally classified as property, and so 
may be treated cruelly to serve human ends. Humans therefore occupy a privileged position 
with respect to nonhuman animals, such that legally they have a right to use them as their 
property to serve their own interests. According to Sankoff, this means that ‘the starting point 
is not a presumption that harm is generally wrong, and must be justified, but that it is 
humanity’s privilege to inflict it’.
89
 The very fact that animal welfare legislation prohibits 
‘unnecessary’ cruelty reflects a general acceptance of the infliction of cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals, so long as it takes place within certain confines. In the case of R v 
Menard, Lamer JA stated that there exists a ‘hierarchy’, in which ‘the animal is inferior to 
man’.
90
 This, he contends is the context in which animal welfare provisions which prohibit 
only ‘unnecessary’ cruelty operate:  
[I]t will often be in the interests of man to kill and mutilate wild or domestic animals, to 
subjugate them and, to this end, to tame them with all the painful consequences this may 
entail for them…This is why, in setting standards for the behaviour of men towards animals, 
we have taken into account our privileged position in nature and have been obliged to take 
into account at the outset the purpose sought.
91
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The fact that humans occupy a ‘privileged’ position with respect to nonhuman animals is an 
important consideration in the context of determining what may constitute a ‘legitimate 
purpose’ in inflicting cruelty towards nonhuman animals. The starting point created by the 
hierarchy is that the interests of humans are already substantially favored at the outset. So 
much so, that Francione suggests ‘[a]s far as the law is concerned, it is as if we were 
resolving a conflict between a person and a lamp…the winner of the dispute is predetermined 
by the way in which the conflict is conceptualized in the first place’.
92
 Though Francione 
perhaps overstates the extent of the bias towards human interests, he demonstrates that the 
interests of nonhuman animals are attributed far less weight than human interests, with the 
result some of the worst forms of animal cruelty are explicitly permitted by law, even where 
the human interest that it serves is comparatively trivial.  
1. Confirmation Bias in Law 
In addition to the fact that humans occupy a privileged position with respect to nonhuman 
animals in virtue of the owner/property relationship, decisions about what constitutes 
‘reasonable’ or ‘necessary’ suffering t are never deliberations that take place in a neutral 
setting. Rather, they are influenced and informed by human values and interests. Friedrich 
Nietzsche made this point when he wrote: 
Let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a ‘pure, will-less, 
painless, timeless knowing subject’, let us guard against the snares of such contradictory 
concepts as ‘pure reason’, ‘absolute spirituality’, ‘knowledge in itself’: these always demand 
that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular 
direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes 
seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity 
and a nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’…
93
  
Nietzsche’s point is that the ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing’ always take place from a point of view. 
The process of human thinking, reasoning, and judging, is always shaped by existing 
commitments to particular values and ideals, even when we may seek to be impartial. 
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Margaret Davies makes a similar point, stating that ‘a whole mess of laws – social, political, 
sexual, intellectual (etc) conventions, laws of thought, laws of language, the imperatives of 
place and nature, and other influence’ influence our thinking and judgements.
94
 Moreover, 
they do so not only to the extent that they influence the decisions that we reach, but also in 
the way that we perceive problems and approach their solutions in the first place.
95
 
Dan Kahan’s research also demonstrates that the process of human reasoning is always 
influenced by our existing motivations - be they silent, or otherwise.
96
 Kahan’s research is 
particularly interesting because it rests on empirical studies that illustrate the phenomenon 
which he describes as ‘motivated cognition’. Motivated cognition refers to the unconscious 
way in which we process information and reach conclusions to achieve a result that 
legitimates our existing values. Kahan demonstrates that human interests ‘motivate’ thinking 
by directing and shaping perceptions. He writes, ‘motivated reasoning refers to the tendency 
of people to conform assessments of information to some goal or end extrinsic to accuracy’.
97
 
Motivated cognition can operate even in the presence of facts, such that ‘ideological 
conflicts’ can occur even in the face of empirical evidence.
98
 He contends 
Political polarization on empirical issues…occurs not only despite the lack of any logical 
connection between the contending beliefs and the opposing values of those who espouse 




Kahan’s findings are important in the context of this discussion about what may constitute a 
‘legitimate purpose’ to inflict cruelty upon a nonhuman animal. Humans have a positive 
interest in treating nonhuman animals cruelly for various reasons. Perhaps the most 
significant in the Australian context is economic. For as long as there is a financial imperative 
to treat nonhuman animals cruelly, this motivation will continue to shape the way in which 
we perceive what constitutes ‘necessary’ cruelty, either directly or indirectly.  
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2. What is a Legitimate Purpose? 
Having explained the context in which the ‘necessary’ cruelty test takes place, I now examine 
judicial commentary concerning what constitutes a ‘legitimate’ purpose. Given the lack of 
case law in this area, it is possible to identify only a few minor points which frame the issue 
in the negative. For example, it was explicitly noted by Lamer JA in R v Menard, that cruelty 
that is inflicted due to sheer laziness or negligence is not likely to be deemed cruelty that is 
inflicted for a legitimate purpose.
100
  
Cruelty that is inflicted to express anger or hatred is also unlikely to be deemed cruelty 
inflicted for a legitimate purpose. In the South Australian case of RSPCA v Bond,
101
 the 
defendant was convicted of ill-treating an animal under s13(1) of the Animal Welfare Act 
1985 (SA) for repeatedly stabbing his girlfriend’s dog, causing its death. The ill-treatment 
took place following an argument that the defendant had with his girlfriend. The stabbing was 
motivated by rage. Foley J described the defendant as having ‘lost it, bl[own] a fuse’.
102
 The 
defendant was convicted of aggravated cruelty. On appeal, Duggan J described the 
defendant’s stabbing of the ‘in in a fit of anger… motivated by spite’ 
103
 as constituting a 
‘serious breach’ of the Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA).
104
  
3. What is a Reasonable Means? 
The second limb of the proportionality test established in Ford v Wiley requires cruelty that 
has been inflicted for a legitimate purpose also be achieved using means that were reasonable 
and proportionate to the object sought. As Sankoff argues, ‘[o]ne may have a perfectly 
legitimate purpose but exercise it in a completely inappropriate way’.
105
 Though this limb of 
the proportionality test may provide nonhuman animals with some protections from harm, it 
is important to recall the predominance of human interests in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable means. The requirement that one pursue their legitimate object via a reasonable 
means does not, for example, require a person to exhaust all alternative preferable measures 
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prior to advancing with their chosen means. Rather, it requires only that a person do that 
which can be reasonably expected of them.  
This point was reiterated in the Australian case of Brayshaw v Liosatos,
106
 in which Higgins J 
commented on section 8(2) of the Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT), which deals with failures 
to provide animals with adequate food and neglecting animals to cause pain. He said the 
section is not about ‘ensur[ing] that animals are kept in prime condition’, but rather is about 
simply preventing unnecessary suffering, and only insofar as ‘their owners or custodians are 
aware of the need and have reasonable means available to them to do so.
107
 The test of 
‘reasonableness’ does therefore not mandate that one do everything possible to achieve their 
legitimate purpose without the infliction of any cruelty or suffering.    
If a person is faced with several means by which to fulfil a legitimate object, and they elect to 
utilise a cruel means in preference to a less cruel means, the reason for that choice may render 
their selection ‘unreasonable’. This point is evidenced by the case Department of Regional 
Government and Local Department v Emmanuel Exports Pty Ltd et al,
108
 which was a 
prosecution for animal cruelty against the defendant who transported and confined live export 
sheep in a manner that allegedly caused those sheep ‘unnecessary harm’.
109
 The defendant 
loaded a shipment of 103,232 sheep for export in November 2003, with cruelty charges 
pertaining only to 13,163 of those sheep. Namely, those that were classified as A class 
wethers and Muscat wethers.
110
 The charges were restricted to these breeds of sheep because 
they were at higher risk of experiencing harm due to inanition or salmonellosis due to their 
breed, when transported in that manner at that particular time of year.
111
  
In considering whether the harm suffered by these sheep was ‘unnecessary’, Magistrate 
Crawford applied the test in Ford v Wiley,
112
 stating that ‘the beneficial or useful ends sought 
to be attained must be reasonably proportionate to the extent of suffering caused, and in no 
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case can substantial suffering be inflicted, unless necessity for its infliction can reasonably be 
said to exist’.
113
 Her Honour found that the harm caused to the sheep was unnecessary, 
because the only justification for exporting these particular sheep at this specific time of year 
was financial. Magistrate Crawford stated that there was ‘no evidence that failure to supply 
sheep in that category would jeopardize the whole shipment’.
114
 As such, the defendant was 
not justified in shipping these sheep at a time of year when it was known that such actions 
would likely result in a high degree of suffering. Her Honour reasoned that the commercial 
gain of exporting the animals had to be ‘balanced against the likelihood of pain, injury or 
death to relevant sheep shipped in the second half of the year’.
115
 On this basis, Magistrate 
Crawford was satisfied that the harm the sheep experienced was unnecessary.
116
 Although the 
elements of the cruelty offence were established, the applicable provision of the Animal 
Welfare Act 2002 (WA) was deemed operationally inconsistent with the Federal live export 
licensing provisions, which had authorized the defendant’s export.
117
 As a result, the accused 
were acquitted.  
Despite the fact that this case demonstrates that a chosen means for inflicting cruelty may be 
unreasonable where the choice to utilise that means is motivated purely by financial 
imperatives, it is important to note that the ‘reasonable means’ test can only yield limited 
results for nonhuman animals. It is implicit within Magistrate Crawford’s judgment that if the 
whole shipment would have been compromised by failing to export those particular breeds at 
that particular time of year, the cruelty may not have been ‘unnecessary’. The test of 
‘reasonable means’ therefore does not provide scope to critique, for example, the live export 
of nonhuman animals in principle. It provides only a basis upon which to examine the means 
by which the object is sought. If the purpose of the cruelty inflicted is deemed ‘legitimate’, 
then the test of ‘reasonable means’ can only serve to regulate, but not prohibit the infliction 
of cruelty to serve that purpose.  
Moreover, what constitutes a ‘reasonable means’ may vary with respect to different species 
of nonhuman animal. In chapter five, I explain how what may be considered a reasonable 
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way of treating one species of nonhuman animal may not be considered reasonable with 
respect to another. Magistrate Musk made this explicit observation in the case of Department 
of Local Government and Regional Development v Gregory Keith Dawson, noting: ‘if you 
put your pet dog on a truck and shipped [it] to the Middle East some people would say that 
would be very unkind and a cruel thing to do. But with sheep it’s all acceptable isn’t it?’.
118
 
This again reflects the extent to which human needs predominate in the context of 
determining what constitutes ‘reasonable’ or ‘necessary’ cruelty to inflict upon a nonhuman 
animal. 
C. The Limited Operation of the Prohibition on ‘Unnecessary’ Cruelty 
The cases I have just described have illustrated how the prohibition on ‘unnecessary’ cruelty 
can have a protective effect is some contexts. Despite this, animal law scholars have paid 
great attention to describing the inadequacies of the concept of ‘necessary’ suffering for the 
extent to which it fails to protect nonhuman animals,
119
 because the prohibition on 
‘unnecessary’ suffering actually performs very limited protective work for most species. This 
is not only because the protection itself is inadequate, but because it simply does not apply in 
the context of some of the worst cruelties towards nonhuman animals. Where cruelty is 
positively permitted by Codes of Practice or regulations, that cruelty is effectively exempted 
from any protections that may be offered by the prohibition on unnecessary cruelty. Thus, 
any limited protective function that the prohibition on ‘unnecessary’ cruelty could perform, is 
effectively rendered unattainable due to the troubling relationship between the operation of 
animal welfare legislation, regulations and Codes of Practice. 
It is thus important to be clear about how and why the prohibition on unnecessary cruelty fails 
to protect some nonhuman animals. Deborah Cao, for example, contends that qualifying 
words and the notion of ‘necessary’ cruelty ‘fails to protect countless farm animals from 
harm each year’.
120
 Voiceless: The Animal Protection Institute, also claim that qualifying 
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terms may serve to permit cruelty if the Court was asked to ‘consider whether it is justifiable 
to castrate a pig without anaesthetic for pig meat production’.
121
 Cao and other commentators 
are correct to describe the routine and lawful cruelty that occurs against farm animals in 
Australia. They are also correct to highlight the inadequacy of legislative provisions that 
implicitly legitimate cruelty while purporting to have the opposite effect. However, I contend 
that we must be clear that qualifying terms such as ‘necessary’ or ‘reasonable’ are not 
singularly responsible for making cruelty lawful, because in many instances cruelty is 
positively permitted by law with the result that it is effectively exempted from the reach of 
these legislative prohibitions. While Voiceless may be correct that the castration of a piglet 
without anaesthetic would be deemed ‘necessary’ or ‘reasonable’ in the context of a legal 
challenge against the practice, as long as this practice is explicitly permitted by Codes of 
Practice and Regulations, it can never be exposed to such a challenge. As a result, the 
prohibition on ‘unnecessary’ cruelty simply cannot perform any protective function. 
Codes and Regulations specifically allow cruelty such that it is exempted from the 
prohibition on cruelty that is ‘unreasonable’ or ‘unnecessary’. The explicit exemption of cruel 
practices from the reach of anti-cruelty provisions reflects the fact that these practices are in 
fact unnecessarily cruel. If they were not unnecessarily cruel, there would be no reason to 
specifically exempt them from the operation of animal welfare legislation.  For example, in 
the case of Department of Regional Government and Local Department v Emmanuel Exports 
Pty Ltd et al (discussed above),
122
  the Perth Magistrates Court held that that cruelty towards 
sheep was ‘unnecessary’ if it was inflicted solely for economic advantage.
 123
 If the principles 
articulated in this case were applied in the context of the castration of piglets without 
anaesthetic, the practice could be deemed ‘unnecessary’ and therefore ‘unlawful’ because the 
withholding of anaesthetic serves only a financial incentive. The specific approval of this 
practice within Codes and Regulations therefore ensures that this practice cannot be subjected 
to the test of ‘necessary’ cruelty.  
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Thus, although the prohibition on ‘unnecessary’ cruelty remains troubling and inadequate, the 
explicit permitting of some of the worst cruelties is the main reason why general anti-cruelty 
provisions routinely fail to protect nonhuman animals from cruelty. Codes of Practice, which 
I discuss below, permit the confinement of hens to battery cages,
124
 the castration of male 
piglets without anaesthetic,
125
 and the killing of a calf of less than 24 hours old by blunt 
trauma to the head.
126
 These practices are lawful because they are expressly permitted in 
sufficient detail to exclude them from the reach of the prohibition on ‘unnecessary’ cruelty. 
For as long as the law explicitly permits such practices, the general prohibition on 
‘unnecessary’ cruelty is rendered inapplicable, and will only operate to protect nonhuman 
animals whose mistreatment exceeds that which is positively permitted by law. I develop this 
theme in chapter six, where I demonstrate that animal welfare legislation is active in 
facilitating cruelty towards nonhuman animals. My contention is that some types of cruelty 
receive detailed and focused attention in law to ensure that they are actively permitted, and 
are thus never exposed to the prohibition on ‘unnecessary’ suffering which may perform 
limited protective work. 
 IV. AUSTRALIAN CODES OF PRACTICE AND STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES  
In addition to the results of qualifying words in Australian animal welfare legislation, each 
animal welfare statute (except Tasmania’s) also contains a provision that gives some form of 
legal force to Codes of Practice, or Standards and Guidelines.
 127
 Codes of Practice emerged 
in the 1970s in Australia to dictate in detail what constituted acceptable standards for 
farmers.
128
 The impetus for their introduction was changing community attitudes regarding 
how we ought to treat nonhuman animals, and in particular those raised and killed for food 
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 There was also an important economic incentive for the introduction of Codes of 
Practice. Farming practices in Europe were increasingly being governed by ‘tougher’ animal 
welfare standards, with the result that the Australian export market was at risk unless 
Australian farmers could demonstrate a commitment to similar, higher animal welfare 
standards.
130
  Codes of Practice were seen as a desirable response to these mounting social 
and economic pressures because they could provide certainty surrounding what constituted 
cruelty towards nonhuman animals specifically within the farming context.
131
 Codes were 
seen as a means by which farmers, deemed to be  ‘specialists’ in farm animal welfare, could 
determine what constituted proper care for their own animals.
132
 Codes of Practice were also 
deemed to be desirable because they could be more easily modernised than animal welfare 
legislation, since they could be exposed to more frequent reviews.
133
  
Despite the purported benefits of Codes of Practice, a 2005 review commissioned by the 
Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry of the Model 
Codes of Practice (entitled the ‘Neumann Report’) stated that Government representatives 
who were responsible for approving Model Codes of Practice lacked ‘expertise in animal 
welfare’, with the result that many Codes of Practice which purported to protect animal 
welfare were in fact approved ‘with minimum scrutiny’ applied from an animal welfare 
perspective.
134
 Codes of Practice have become an integral part of animal welfare regulation in 
Australia, as they now dictate the acceptable animal welfare standards in most contexts in 
which nonhuman animals are exposed to cruelty, including where they are killed as pests, 
used in scientific research or kept for meat, egg, dairy, fibre, companionship and 
entertainment.
135
  However, there remains a substantial question regarding whether Codes of 
Practice actually do facilitate better animal welfare standards, or whether they simply operate 
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to legitimate cruel animal husbandry practices that are beneficial to industry.
136
 As I discuss 
further below, whilst the transition from Codes of Practice to national Standards and 
Guidelines may serve to offer greater consistency across all Australian jurisdictions than that 
currently offered by Codes of Practice, the standards themselves continue to permit cruelty.  
A. Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Model Codes and National Standards and 
Guidelines 
Typically, the content of a Code of Practice in any particular jurisdiction is based on a Model 
Code of Practice that was developed by the Australian Government Primary Industry 
Ministerial Council (PIMC).
137
 The PIMC was responsible for the development of twenty 
two Model Codes of Practice pertaining to animal welfare,
138
 prior to the introduction of the 
AAWS, which begun the process of ‘updating’ and replacing the Model Codes with 
‘Standards and Guidelines’, following the recommendations contained with the Neumann 
report.
139
 The Standards and Guidelines were intended to achieve more national consistency 
in terms of animal welfare standards, and the way in which those standards are implemented 
across each jurisdiction. At the time of writing, only three sets of Standards and Guidelines 
have been developed which dictate legally enforceable welfare standards. These operate in 
the context of cattle farming, sheep farming, and the transport of livestock. 
The process for development of the Model Codes by the PIMC was marked by a substantial 
conflict of interest. The PIMC comprised the ‘Australian national, state and territory and New 
Zealand ministers responsible for agriculture, food, fibre, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture 
industries and production’.
140
 Model Code development also involved The Animal Welfare 
Working Group (AWWG) which comprised ‘representatives from the Commonwealth 
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Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) and its State and Territory 
counterparts, together with representatives of CSIRO, Animal Health Australia, and the 
Vertebrate Pest Committee’.
141
 The AAWG developed the Codes and reported to the Animal 
Health Committee, which was part of the Primary Industries Health Committee, all ‘sitting 
under the PIMC umbrella’.
142
  
Given that the stated aim of the PIMC was to ‘develop and promote sustainable, innovative 
and profitable industries in these commodities’,
143
 and given the heavy influence of industry 
representatives in the Model Code development process, there exists a perceived conflict of 
interest between the PIMC’s primary aim to generate and support profitable nonhuman 
animal industries, and their role in developing Model Codes of Practice that dictate 
acceptable animal welfare standards.
144
 The conflict of interest is so substantial that Arnja 
Dale and Steven White have said ‘it is almost exclusively those who have a stake in profiting 
from animals who continue to draw the line on what is necessary or unnecessary in the 
treatment of animals’.
145
 In an opinion piece for The Age, barrister and animal law scholar 




While animal welfare representatives were involved in aspects of the Model Code 
Development process, they were ‘comparatively few in number’.
147
 According to Elizabeth 
Ellis, the extent of the conflict is well evidenced by the fact that PIMC systematically failed 
to outlaw the ‘ritual’ slaughter of sheep in approved Australian abattoirs where they are not 
stunned prior to sticking (neck cutting).
148
 This is so even despite two comprehensive reviews 
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Jed Goodfellow’s research has also demonstrated that in many contexts the conflict of 
interest that manifests during Code development is not only perceived, but is actually real.
150
 
According to Goodfellow, Departments of Agriculture suffer from ‘regulatory capture’, 
which describes ‘the process in which a regulatory agency acts in the interests of the industry 
it is charged with regulating in a way that is inconsistent with the public interest the 
regulation is designed to serve’.
151
 Goodfellow’s contention therefore is that the Departments 
of Agriculture tasked with administering animal welfare legislation are also simultaneously 
required to prioritize a competing responsibility to facilitate growth in the agricultural sector. 
Whilst he contends that the existence of competing responsibilities does not prima facie 
indicate regulatory capture,
152
 a problem emerges when ‘one objective is unduly prioritized 
over another’, with the result that the department’s actions favour the industry they regulate 
in a way that is inconsistent with the public interest that they are intended to serve.
153
  
The conflict of interest inherent in the development of Model Codes of Practice has also 
resulted in a failure to properly incorporate scientific evidence pertaining to animal welfare.  
The Neumann report noted that there was no consistent method for implementing scientific 
literature in Codes of Practice: 
In Australia, although there is now widespread support for sound welfare science to be used 
to underpin Codes, there is no agreed process to manage this or to report on current science or 
international developments. Thus until recently the availability of welfare science information 
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and its role in Code development has been largely left to the initiative of the person 
nominated to lead the development or review process.
154
 
As a result, it appears that scientific literature has been insufficiently incorporated in some 
Model Codes. For example, the Model Code of Welfare for Animals – Domestic Poultry 2002 
states: ‘[i]t is noted that there are particular behaviours such as perching, the ability to fully 
stretch and to lay in a nest that are currently not possible in certain (caged) poultry housing 
systems. These issues will remain the subject of debate and review’. It is unclear what further 
‘review’ or ‘debate’ may entail in that context, or what remaining evidence is needed to 
indicate that the confinement of hens to cages that severely restricts their natural movement is 
contrary to their welfare.  
The development of Standards and Guidelines has been similarly compromised by conflicts 
of interest in the development process. For example, the above mentioned poultry code 
review is funded by ‘all [state] Governments, the Australian Chicken Meat Federation Inc, 
the Australian Egg Corporation Limited, the Australian Duck Meat Association Inc, and the 
Australian Turkey Federation Inc’.
155
 At the time of writing, there has been no independent 
comprehensive scientific review initiated as part of the standard and guidelines development 
process. This is despite the fact that a key recommendation contained within the 2005 
Neumann report was that ‘[a]n independent Animal Welfare Science Review be carried out 
as the first step in developing an Australian Standards for Animal Welfare and be 
appropriately funded’
156
. In the absence of such review, the RSPCA undertook their own 
comprehensive scientific review, demonstrating clearly that battery cages are contrary to 
animal welfare.
157
 The RSPCA has also reportedly raised concerns that the Code review 
process has been ‘heavily influenced’ by industrial producers, with the scientific integrity of 
the process being called into question by scientists.
158
  The Victorian Government similarly 
undertook its own independent scientific review to inform its position with respect to battery 
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cages and the proposed draft standards, which also indicates that battery cages are contrary to 
animal welfare.
159
   
Moreover, in December 2017, documents obtained under Freedom of Information laws 
revealed acts of alleged ‘collusion’ by the New South Wales Department of Primary Industry, 
who is responsible for drafting the proposed poultry Standards and Guidelines.
160
 The 
documents showed that the Department had participated in a number of ‘secret meetings’ 
between department and industry representatives before the standards-writing process had 
commenced. Specifically, Stephen Atkinson, who occupies the role of ‘independent chair’ of 
the group charged with advising the development of the new standards, met with egg farmers 
prior to his election into the role. During this meeting, Atkinson reportedly assured the egg 
industry that the ‘banning of cages would not be the remit of the official stakeholder 
meetings’.
161
 Troublingly, none of these meetings were disclosed to animal welfare 
stakeholders involved in the review process.
162
 At the time of writing, the proposed standards 
permit the continued use of the battery cage.
163
 
Conflict of interest in the development of national Standards and Guidelines is also 
presupposed by the appointment of Animal Health Australia to oversee the drafting of these 
documents. Animal Health Australia are a not-for-profit public company established by the 
Australian Government under the Australian Animal Welfare Strategy in 2005. Although the 
AAWS has been disbanded, Animal Health Australia continues to oversee the development 
of these standards and guidelines. The membership of Animal Health Australia comprises 
only state government agriculture departments and industry representatives. Further, an 
analysis of the drafting process by White and Dale reveals that the process of developing 
these standards and guidelines is dominated by industry voices at the expense of animal 
welfare.
164
 The process includes three stages: development, public consultation and revision. 
During the development stage, Animal Health Australia establishes a writing group of 4-8 
members, ‘including appropriate industry representation’, who prepare the draft standards 
                                                 
 
159
 C.J Nicol et al, Farmed Bird Welfare Science Review (Victorian Department of Economic Development, 
Jobs, Transport and Resources 2017) 59-60. 
160
 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Allegations of Backroom Deals to Keep Battery Hen Eggs on the 






 Proposed Draft Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines for Poultry SB1.1-1.9. 
164
 Dale and White, above n 55, 164. 




 These are then considered by a reference group that also comprises 
government and industry representatives, as well as animal welfare representatives such as 
the RSPCA and Animals Australia. Once the reference group approves the direction of the 
draft, the writing group prepares a copy for consideration by a larger reference group prior to 
public consultation. Following the review and implementation of public feedback, the full 
final draft is prepared by the writing group prior to approval by the reference group.
166
  
According to Ellis, the standards and guidelines development process with respect to ‘bobby 
calf’ welfare ‘provides little ground for optimism’ for the integrity of the process overall.
167
 
Bobby calves are the ‘unwanted by-product of the dairy industry, with about 700,000 calves 
slaughtered commercially each year’.
168
 They are typically transported to slaughter at 5 days 
of age, meaning that their welfare is at heightened risk. This is exacerbated by the fact that 
they are unweaned and separated from their mothers. One particularly controversial aspect of 
bobby calf welfare is allowable ‘time off feed’, which dictates how long feed may be 
withheld from bobby calves during transport and prior to slaughter.  
A proposed amendment to the Land Transport Standards sought the introduction of a revised 
standard which would give permission for bobby calves between 5 – 30 days old travelling 
without their mothers be withheld feed for up to 30 hours. The process for assessing the 
proposed amendment included a scientific review and the preparation of a Regulatory Impact 
Statement for consideration by the PIMC. The Regulatory Impact Statement supported a 
maximum allowable time off feed of 30 hours.
169
 This finding was supported by a science-
based review undertaken with respect to bobby calf welfare and the allowable time off feed. 
This review was funded by the Australian dairy industry,
170
 was not published in full, and 
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was not subjected to peer review.
171
 Animals Australia commissioned an independent 
scientific review of the study, which advised ‘serious methodological and interpretation 
flaws’, and that the recommended 30 hours off feed for bobby calves was not good animal 
welfare practice.
172
 At the time of writing, the proposed ‘time off feed’ amendment has not 
been incorporated into the Land Transport Standards, although Animal Health Australia 




B. How Are Codes of Practice and Standards and Guidelines Enforced?  
Codes of Practice are created and adopted under the animal welfare legislation and 
regulations in varying ways in each Australian state and territory.
174
 The extent to which 
individual Codes of Practice are implemented varies between Australian jurisdictions, and 
there is a lack of uniformity across Australia with respect to both the content and 
enforceability of animal welfare Codes.
175
 The enforceability of Codes of Practice not only 
varies between jurisdictions, but can also vary within any single state or territory. Thus, some 
jurisdictions may mandate compliance with some Codes of Practice, but not others. Further, 
they may mandate compliance only with certain provisions within any given Code. The 
difficulty in ascertaining precisely which parts of any given Code of Practice are enforceable 
(if any), has led Alex Bruce to describe them as ‘shadowy instruments’.
176
 Their operation is 
particularly ‘shadowy’ when a Code of Practice dictates only voluntary guidelines for animal 
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welfare at the same time as it purports to dictate the minimum standards that should be met to 
ensure animal welfare. 
The complexity of ascertaining the legal status afforded to a given Code of Practice is well 
evidenced by reference to the Queensland jurisdiction. The Queensland Animal Care and 
Protection Act 2011 (Qld) provides in s15(1) that ‘[a] regulation may require a person to 
comply with the whole or a stated part of a code of practice’. The implication of this section 
appears to be that the regulations can require mandatory compliance with animal welfare 
Codes of Practice. Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the Animal Care and Protection Regulations 2002 
(Qld) performs this task. Under regulation 2, ‘[a] person must comply with the code of 
practice’ contained within the provisions of schedules 1-3. These schedules contain 
provisions that pertaining to the welfare of domestic foul, pigs, and livestock during 
transport. However, regulation 3(2) of the Animal Care and Protection Regulations 2002 
(Qld) also provides that a person may comply with a Code of Practice that is mentioned in 
schedule 4. Schedule 4 lists 15 Codes of Practice pertaining to animal welfare, compliance 
with which is therefore only voluntary. Non-compliance with Codes of Practice listed in 
Schedule 4 in Queensland is therefore not an offence under the Animal Care and Protection 
Act 2011 (Qld).
177
 The legal status of Code of Practice in the Queensland jurisdiction thus 
varies, with compliance with some Codes of Practice being mandatory, and others being only 
voluntary. By contrast, in South Australia for example, compliance with all Codes of Practice 
adopted under the Animal Welfare Regulations 2012 (SA) is mandatory.
178
 
Even where a Code of Practice dictates a ‘mandatory’ standard, their ‘shadowy’ character 
remains. Codes of Practice are marked by a distinction between two different types of 
instruction: those that dictate what a person must do to ensure animal welfare, and those that 
dictate only what they should do. The Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: 
Livestock at Slaughtering Establishment, for example, is mandatory in South Australia, with 
a penalty attached to non-compliance.
179
 However, many of the provisions contained within 
the Code dictate only ‘should’ requirements. For example, part 2.6.1.4 provides that 
‘[a]nimals should not enter the knocking box unless they are to be stunned immediately’. 
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Similarly, part 2.6.3.3 provides: ‘[t]he practice of hoisting pigs and calves after electrical 
stunning and before sticking is not recommended as it may extend the time between these 
operations and allow return of consciousness. Animals should be stuck before hoisting’. 
Given that these provisions are worded only as a ‘should’ requirements or ‘recommended’ 
practice, compliance with them is not mandatory.  
The distinction between what ‘should’ be done, as opposed to what ‘must’ be done to ensure 
animal welfare was raised as a point of concern in the Neumann Report, because the 
distinction confuses what constitutes a mandatory standard versus a suggested practice.
180
 
The new Australian Standards and Guidelines for animal welfare (discussed further below) 
address this concern by drawing a clear distinction between ‘standards’ which articulate 
mandatory requirements and ‘guidelines’ which constitute only recommended practice. From 
an animal welfare perspective, it remains unclear why the distinction should remain at all, 
since the guidelines will supposedly constitute ‘recommended practices to achieve desirable 




Adding to the complexities surrounding the legal status of Codes of Practice is the fact that 
compliance with a Code of Practice provides a defence to an allegation of animal cruelty 
under animal welfare legislation in some jurisdictions. For example, in the Australian Capital 
Territory, compliance with a Code of Practice is a defence to most allegations of animal 
cruelty.
182







the Northern Territory, 
186
 and Western Australia.
187
 In New South Wales no specific defence 
exists for compliance with a Code of Practice. However, evidence of either compliance or 
non-compliance with a Code of Practice ‘is admissible in evidence in proceedings’ pertaining 
to an allegation of cruelty under the Act.
188
 The legal status of Codes of Practice in Tasmania 
is particularly unclear with no statutory provision detailing the legal status of Codes of 
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 However, the Tasmanian Government department describes Codes of Practice as 
‘advisory documents’, such that they may have similar legal force to Codes of Practice in 
New South Wales, where compliance or non-compliance may substantiate an allegation of 
animal cruelty under the Act.
190
As I explain in Chapter six, although compliance with a Code 
is not a defence in New South Wales, section 24 of the New South Wales Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals Act makes specific provisions to exempt certain cruel practices from the 
reach of anti-cruelty provisions.  
The transition to Standards and Guidelines partially remedies the lack of clarity and 
uniformity currently offered by Codes of Practice. Given that each Australian jurisdiction has 
agreed to implement the new national Standards and Guidelines as they are endorsed, this 
should result in greater consistency across Australian in terms of the animal welfare standards 
required to be met by various industries that that which is currently provided by stated-based 
Codes. Whilst each Australian jurisdiction appears to be moving towards implementing 
existing Standards and Guidelines, uptake has been slow in some instances.  For example, the 
Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines: Land Transport of Livestock were 
released in 2012, but have not yet been implemented in Western Australia or the Australian 
Capital Territory. The Standards and Guidelines are also being implemented in different ways 
in each jurisdiction. In many instances, they are being adopted by act of regulation, much in 
the same way as Codes of Practice. In other contexts, it appears some jurisdictions will 
implement the enforceable components of the Standards and Guidelines by way of 
amendment to animal welfare legislation. For example, according to Animal Health 
Australia, the state of Victoria intends to implement the Standards and Guidelines relating to 
both sheep and cattle by way of a proposed new Animal Welfare Act.
191
 
Standards and Guidelines also draw a more clear distinction between mandatory, enforceable 
requirements and recommended, voluntary ones than Codes of Practice do. Mandatory 
‘standards’ are accompanied by the term ‘must’, and are intended to be legally enforceable. 
By contrast, the ‘guidelines’ constitute only ‘recommended practice’, and are therefore 
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suggested to ‘achieve desirable livestock welfare outcomes’. Whilst the Standards and 
Guidelines therefore offer greater clarity regarding what constitutes an enforceable legal 
obligation than Codes of Practice, the fact that practices which are said to promote welfare 
remain only ‘voluntary’ is troubling. In the state of Western Australia, proposed amendments 
to the Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) may see these ‘voluntary’ requirements prescribed by 
act of regulation, with the result that whilst they cannot be directly enforced, they may guide 
a Court in considering whether a cruelty offence has taken place.
192
 
Thus, while the transition to Standards and Guidelines may offer greater uniformity across 
Australia, and clarify which standards are legally enforceable, the transition has only just 
commenced with the result that many Codes of Practice continue to operate with negative 
animal welfare outcomes. Moreover, as the above discussion has suggested, much like the 
development of Model Codes, the Standards and Guidelines development process has also 
been unduly influenced by industry representatives. As a result, the Standards and Guidelines 
continue to permit cruelty to nonhuman animals where that cruelty serves a human interest. 
V. CASE STUDY: FACTORY FARMED PIGS IN NEW SOUTH WALES 
Conflicts of interest and inadequate attention to animal welfare science has led to the 
development of Codes of Practice that permit cruelty towards nonhuman animals.  The 
inadequacies of Codes of Practice, and the animal welfare legislation that give them legal 
force is powerfully illustrated by a consideration of an individual animal in Australia whose 
treatment is governed by a Code. Pigs that are bred in factory farms are a revealing case study 
since they are among the most lawfully mistreated nonhuman animals in Australia. A brief 
consideration of the life of a factory farmed pig in Australia is revealing of the extent to 
which Australian animal welfare legislation fails to meet its purported purpose of protecting 
nonhuman animals from harm. For the purposes of this example, I consider the New South 
Wales Jurisdiction. The applicable law is the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 
(NSW) (‘NSW Act’), the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Regulation 2012 (NSW) (‘NSW 
regulations’) and the Animal Welfare Code of Practice – Commercial Pig Production 2009 
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(NSW) (‘NSW code’). I focus on the New South Wales jurisdiction because the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) contains an interesting provision with respect to the 
confinement of ‘stock’ animals that is unique to the New South Wales jurisdiction, which 
explicitly demonstrates the way in which human interests dominate the provisions of animal 
welfare protections.  
Pigs are mammals that are included under the definition of ‘animal’ in the NSW Act. The Act 
prohibits cruelty to animals in section 5(1), which reads: ‘A person shall not commit an act of 
cruelty upon an animal’. This provision explicitly purports to prohibit cruel acts towards pigs 
in New South Wales. This s5(1) general prohibition on cruelty is accompanied also by some 
specific provisions which articulate the legal requirements for the keeping of nonhuman 
animals in certain contexts. For example, section 9(1) of the Act provides that ‘[a] person in 
charge of an animal which is confined shall not fail to provide the animal with adequate 
exercise’. Yet, these protective provisions are consistently undermined by other provisions in 
the NSW Act, the Regulations and the Code. 
Factory farmed pigs in New South Wales do not benefit from this provision against 
confinement without exercise. Section 9(1A) of the Act expressly excludes them in two ways, 
stating first that the rules ‘does not apply to a person in charge of an animal if the animal is a 
stock animal other than a horse’, and further stating that it does not apply to any nonhuman 
animals that is ‘an animal of a species which is usually kept in captivity by means of a 
cage’.
193
 Given that the Act defines a ‘stock animal’ as ‘an animal which belongs to the class 
of animals comprising cattle, horses, sheep, goats, deer, pigs, poultry and any other species 
prescribed for the purposes of this definition’ factory farmed pigs are excluded from the 
protection against confinement without exercise.
194
 Further, since factory farmed pigs are 
routinely confined without exercise; they may also be excluded on the basis that they are so 
routinely confined. The puzzling effect of provisions 9(1) and 9(1A) is that those nonhuman 
animals who would most benefit from a prohibition on confinement are expressly excluded 
from its protective reach. As Siobhan O’Sullivan explains, ‘the exercise provision only 
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Breeding sows in New South Wales typically and lawfully live for significant portions of 
their lives confined to a ‘sow stall’. Legal requirements contained in the Code for these stalls 
dictate a minimum space requirement of floor space 0.6 metres wide and 2.2 metres long.
196
 
A sow in such conditions must be able to stand or lie down without ‘being obstructed by 
fixtures or fittings’, and must be able to lay or stand ‘without simultaneously touching 
opposite ends or sides of the stall’.
197
 However, she need not be provided enough space to be 
able to turn around. From July 2017, a producer in NSW may lawfully keep a sow in these 
conditions for up to 6 weeks in any gestation period, unless special circumstances apply.
198
 
For these six weeks of her pregnancy, she may lawfully be confined to a stall where she must 
live, sleep, defecate and drink and eat. 
 




Just prior to giving birth, sows are typically moved to alternative cages called ‘farrowing 
crates’. In these crates, sows birth their litter of piglets. The crates often consist of two 
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sections – one which tightly confines the mother pig, and a second adjacent section which the 
piglets can access due to their small size. The purpose of the division between these sections 
is to enable the piglets to nurse from the sow, whilst simultaneously preventing the sow from 
accessing her young. The Code dictates that the floor space of a farrowing crate with adjacent 
‘creep’ area for her piglets should provide an area of 3.2 square metres.
200
 Of this 3.2 square 
metres, the sow must only be provided a floor space of 0.5 metres wide by 2 metres length, 
some of which may be occupied be a ‘rear anti crush rail, appropriately placed’, to prevent 
her from squashing her own piglets.
201
 When lactating, the sow must be able to ‘lie and 
extend her limbs freely and position herself so that both sides of her udder are accessible to 
her piglets’.
202
 A sow may be kept in these conditions for 6 weeks in any one reproductive 
cycle, except in ‘emergency or exceptional circumstances’, including where she may be 
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By confining sows confined to stalls, producers can not only house more pigs, but they can 
also minimize the amount of time and effort involved in tending to the welfare needs of each 
pig. They also claim that the use of sow stalls was necessary to protect pigs from fighting 
with each other.
205
 Interestingly, the Australian pork industry committed to a voluntary phase 
out of sow stalls (but not farrowing crates) by 2017, opting to provide sows with ‘freedom of 
movement’ during pregnancy. At the time of writing, there is no evidence that producers have 
honoured this commitment. 
It has been argued that farrowing crates are necessary for preventing piglets from crush 
injuries. In a study by G Cronin and G Amerongen however, a total of 16 sows were 
monitored over a period of 8 months.
206
 Some sows were kept in standard farrowing crates, 
and some were kept in ‘modified’ crates in which they had access to straw, and were 
provided with a hessian ‘roof’ to mimic the shelter they would normally seek in the wild. The 
experiment found that none of the sixty five piglets that were live-born into the modified 
crate environment died before weaning. By comparison, 7 of the 66 piglets born into the 
standard crate died prior to weaning. Four piglets were savaged to death by the sow, 2 were 
crushed by the sow and 1 fell ill. In addition, the experimenters observed that human 
intervention saved several other piglets in the standard crate, and that the observed level of 
piglet mortality in that instance was thus ‘conservative’.
207
  
The NSW Act also purports to provide nonhuman animals other protections from harm. For 
example, section 12 prohibits certain painful procedures from being performed on a 
nonhuman animal, including the cropping of a dog’s ears, the removal of a cat’s claws, or the 
hot iron branding of an animal’s face, unless the performed by a veterinary practitioner. 
208
 
Pigs however, are not afforded protection from similarly painful procedures. Section 8 of the 
NSW Code provides that ‘elective husbandry procedures’ may be carried out on a pig by a 
suitably qualified person. Such procedures include: castration or vasectomy, docking a pig’s 
tail, clipping a pig’s needle teeth, inserting a nose ring to a pig’s nose, applying identification 
marks to a pig’s ear by notching, or attaching clips or tags, measuring a pig’s back fat, 
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diagnosis of pregnancy and tusk trimming.
209
 The Code does not require the provision of 
anaesthetic or pain relief for the performance of painful surgical procedures. 
The Code is silent as to the method by which such ‘elective husbandry procedures’ must be 
performed (I return to this point in chapter six). As such, these procedures are effectively 
unregulated but are positively permitted by law even though they are cruel. Teeth cutting for 
example, is routinely performed on piglets, despite the fact that such a procedure is known to 
cause both acute and chronic pain.
210
 Piglets also commonly have their tails cut short without 
pain relief, and have their ears notched for identification purposes.
211
 Male piglets are also 
routinely castrated without anaesthetic or pain relief. 
The Code also provides authority for the ‘humane destruction’ of pigs, so long as it is 
performed by a ‘suitably qualified person’, or a person under the supervision of somebody 
‘suitably qualified’.
212
 The New South Wales Code is silent with respect to the methods by 
which ‘humane destruction’ may be performed. However, the Model Code of Practice for the 
Welfare of Animals: Pigs, which is intended to provide ‘detailed minimum standards for 
assisting people in understanding the standard of care required to meet their obligations under 
the laws that operate’ in their own jurisdiction provides suitable methods may include: carbon 
dioxide induced respiratory arrest, anaesthetic overdose, gunshot, penetrative captive bolt 
followed by bleeding out, or blunt trauma to the head followed by bleeding.
213
 I return to this 
discussion in chapter 7, where I explain why the method of carbon dioxide induced arrest is 
actually cruel, even though it is purportedly ‘humane’. 
This brief overview of the lawful cruelties inflicted upon pigs serves to illustrate the key 
contention I make in this thesis. Namely, the very same laws that purport to protect 
nonhuman animals not only fail to do so, but explicitly permit their cruel mistreatment.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have suggested that although Australian animal welfare legislation purport 
to offer broad protections to nonhuman animals, those protections are consistently 
undermined by qualifying words and Codes of Practice and Standards and Guidelines which 
serve human interests. The general prohibition on cruelty contained within animal welfare 
legislation are qualified by terms such as ‘reasonable’ and ‘necessary’ that enable cruelty to 
occur where it serves a human interest. The starting point for making an assessment as to 
what constitutes ‘necessary’ or ‘reasonable’ suffering, is the view that suffering is, prima 
facie, acceptable if it serves a human interest. Further, I have argued that Codes of Practice 
and Standards and Guidelines dictate separate standards to govern the treatment of nonhuman 
animals in industries. These Codes of Practice and Standards and Guidelines are developed 
by those who have a positive interest in sustaining the profits of industries that are routinely 
cruel to nonhuman animals. As a result, they tend to permit cruelty rather than prohibit it.  As 
the case study of factory farmed pigs illustrated, those nonhuman animals that are the most 
vulnerable to being mistreated are effectively exempted from the reach of animal welfare 
statutes with the result that the protections provided therein do not extend to them. 
In the next chapter, I re-visit the concept of ‘necessary’ suffering to demonstrate how what 
constitutes ‘necessity’ with respect to one species may not constitute ‘necessity’ with respect 
to another. I demonstrate that Australian animal welfare legislation and Codes of Practice 
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CHAPTER 5 : THE COMMODIFICATION OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 ‘…animals are not just raised for food; they are raised as food’.
1
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the provisions of Australian animal welfare legislation 
are facilitating cruelty towards nonhuman animals in two ways. First, they only prohibit 
cruelty that is ‘unreasonable’ or ‘unnecessary’. The use of such qualifying terms legitimates 
forms of cruelty where it can somehow be ‘justified’ with respect to human interests. I also 
demonstrated that Codes of Practice and Standards and Guidelines facilitate some of the worst 
forms of cruelty towards nonhuman animals. They do so by exempting some of the most 
vulnerable species of nonhuman animals, and some of the cruellest practices towards them, 
from the protective reach of Australian animal welfare legislation.  
In this chapter, I say something more about the concept of ‘necessary’ cruelty to illustrate that 
other legal mechanisms operate in conjunction with it to permit cruelty towards nonhuman 
animals. The concept of ‘necessary’ cruelty seeks to balance the interests of nonhuman 
animals against the interests of humans. My focus in this chapter is how nonhuman animal 
interests are constructed by the very same laws that purport to protect them. We saw in the 
third and fourth chapters that the interests of nonhuman animals are generally afforded less 
weight than the interests of humans. In this chapter, I argue that at times, sentient nonhuman 
animals are constructed not only as having interests of less importance, but that sometimes 
they are constructed as if they have no interests at all. Such a construction, facilitates cruelty 
towards them by making their interests invisible. Cruelty is ‘necessary’ or ‘reasonable’, 
because the interests of the nonhuman animal concerned simply do not count. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. First, I argue that nonhuman animals are commodified 
by law, and that the commodification of nonhuman animals facilitates cruelty towards them. 
Using Karl Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism, I argue that nonhuman animals who are 
commodified are constructed as having only exchange value. The value of a commodified 
nonhuman animal is thus deemed to be synonymous with the price that can be obtained for 
them or their bodies when they are sold for human use and consumption. Conceptualised as 
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having only exchange value, nonhuman animals as sentient creatures possessing morally 
relevant interests become what Carol Adams describes as ‘absent referents’ because their 
interests disappear from our consideration. As such, they simply do not count. 
In the second part of this chapter, I detail specific examples from within Australian Codes of 
Practice and Standards and Guidelines which facilitate the commodification of nonhuman 
animals. Specifically, I consider provisions which operate predominantly to maximise the 
profits of producers at the expense of animal welfare, and where Codes of Practice use 
language that directly conflates nonhuman animals with the product that humans seek to 
obtain from them. Hens become ‘layers’ or ‘broilers’ and cows become ‘dairy cows’. In these 
and other instances, I demonstrate that the commodification of nonhuman animals facilitates 
their cruel mistreatment. 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH BEING A COMMODITY  
So far in this thesis I have demonstrated that Australian animal welfare legislation prohibits 
only ‘unnecessary’ or ‘unreasonable’ cruelty towards nonhuman animals. This prohibition 
seeks to strike a balance between the property rights that humans are endowed with over 
nonhuman animals, and the fact that nonhuman animals are sentient creatures that possess 
interests of their own. The result is that animal welfare legislation does not prohibit cruelty 
towards nonhuman animals per se, but only prohibits forms of cruelty that are unreasonable 
or serve an illegitimate human end. Cruelty, I have argued, is therefore prima facie lawful, 
provided it can be justified with respect to human interests. 
The prohibition on ‘unnecessary’ or ‘unreasonable’ cruelty performs limited protective work 
for nonhuman animals because they are classified as legal property.
2
 As legal property, their 
interests are ‘regarded as of lesser import’ than the legal rights of human to use their property 
to serve their own purposes.
3
 Human property rights, and the interests of nonhuman animals, 
are ‘two very different entities’, and when the law seeks to balance those entities, human 
property rights and interests typically prevail.
4
 This is true even where ‘a relatively trivial 
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human interest is balanced against an animal’s most fundamental interest in not experiencing 
pain or death’.
5
 In chapter four, I provided the example of pigs, who are routinely confined to 
sow stalls and farrowing crates, despite the fact that such conditions are contrary to their 
basic welfare needs. The problem for these pigs, is that the Codes of Practice which 
effectively dictate what constitutes ‘unnecessary’ or ‘unreasonable’ suffering, result from an 
‘unbalanced balancing act’ that yields ‘lopsided results’, because their interests are prima 
facie less important than human interest in confining them.
6
 
A. The Commodification of Nonhuman Animals 
In addition to the fact that nonhuman animals are legal property, and thus have interests that 
are prima facie less important than human interests, some nonhuman animals are also 
positively commodified by law. As the Macquarie dictionary defines it, a commodity is ‘a 
thing that is of use or advantage’; ‘an article of trade or commerce’.
7
 In the context of 
capitalist society, Karl Marx also defines commodities as objects that are ascribed value 
based not their intrinsic properties, but on the rate at which they may be exchanged for other 
commodities in the marketplace.
8
 When nonhuman animals are commodified, they are 
therefore made synonymous with the ‘thing that is of use or advantage’ to humans, which is 
typically attained through the breeding, use or slaughter of their bodies. Commodified 
nonhuman animals are not conceptualised as having interests that are simply less important 
than human interests. Rather, they are conceptualised as essentially having no interests at all. 
Pigs are commodified when their bodies are slaughtered and sold as ‘pork’. Racehorses are 
commodified when they are raced for money and then slaughtered and turn into dog food 
because they were not fast enough to win a race. Birds are commodified when they are 
confined to cages and sold in pet shops. In each instance, a sentient nonhuman animal is 
ascribed value only insofar as their bodies can be exchanged for money or other commodities 
within the capitalist marketplace. In each context, the interests of the nonhuman animals that 
were raised, kept and slaughtered to produce a product or serve human purposes do not count.  
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Marx describes commodities as becoming ‘fetishized’ in the capitalist marketplace, by which 
he means that they are ascribed value only in relation to the extent to which they can be 
exchanged for money or other commodities. Tim Dant explains that a ‘fetish is created 
through the veneration or worship of an object that is attributed some power or capacity, 
independently of its manifestation of that capacity’.
9
 In the context of nonhuman animal 
products, the fetish emerges where the exchange value of their bodies appears to be their true 
or only value. In other words, the ‘value’ of a pig only emerges at the time of exchange once 
its body has been turned into ‘pork’. Pork producers ‘don’t know and can’t know what the 
value of their commodity is until they take it to the market and successfully exchange it’.
10
 
When a pig is conceptualised merely as ‘pork’, it is perceived as having value only insofar as 
its body can be exchanged for money or other commodities in the marketplace. A pig that 
does not sell, or which cannot be sold as ‘pork’, would be deemed to have no value at all.
 11
 It 
is in this way that the pig becomes a ‘fetishized’ commodity. Its value is attributed to it at the 
time of exchange in the capitalist marketplace, but is perceived as being something inherent 
to the pig itself.
12
  
For Marx, the fetishism of commodities conceals the true value of a commodity, which he 
contends is to be found in the social relations and human labour that went into its 
production.
13
 Marx’s primary concern was that commodity fetishism in the capitalist 
marketplace disguised ‘real social relations through the exchange of things’.
14
 Put simply, he 
was concerned with the way in which the exchange of commodities appears in the capitalist 
marketplace to be an exchange between things, when it is an exchange between persons.  
In the context of the commodification of nonhuman animals, it is possible to extend Marx’s 
analysis to consider the experience of the nonhuman animal itself. Just as Marx argues that 
commodity fetishism conceals the social relations and human labour value of a commodity, 
so too does it conceal the context in which a nonhuman animal is bred, raised, kept and 
slaughtered for human use or consumption. When a consumer walks into the supermarket to 
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purchase meat, for example, they see only the ‘price’ on the shelf. This price is perceived as 
being the meat’s value, and is therefore implicitly the same value that is attributed to the 
animal itself. In exchanging money for meat, a consumer does not see the nonhuman animal 
that was raised and killed to produce the product, nor do they learn about the conditions in 
which it lived and died.
15
 These realities do not present themselves to the consumer in the 
supermarket aisle, nor are they reflected in the price ‘value’ that is attributed to the 
commodity.  It is in this way that commodity fetishism ‘drains products of their original 
meaning, which derives from the circumstances of production’,
16
 with the result that animal 
suffering is made invisible to consumers. Meat, as a fetishized commodity, does not reveal 
the ‘radical disjuncture between the violent material conditions of production and the 
sanitized, seductive physical conditions of consumption’, even though such disjuncture is 
integral to the way in which the meat is produced and sold.
17
 Chris Otter contends that meat 
is one of the most 
magic and beguiling of commodities – one that just appears, bearing almost no trace of its 
brutal origin. That rows of wrapped, severed cubes of flesh, perhaps adorned with labels 
decorated with carton pigs or cows, are just there in the shop, next to smiling children and 
sweet old men, is one of the strangest normal things in our world.
18
 
Each time a nonhuman animal is commodified - when pigs become ‘pork’, cows become 
‘beef’, chickens become ‘layers’ – their value is perceived as synonymous with the price 
which can be attained for their bodies at the time of sale.   
B. Commodification Facilitates Cruelty 
Thus far, I have argued that when nonhuman animals are commodified, they are 
conceptualised as having only exchange value such that their morally relevant interests are 
rendered invisible. It is for this reason that David Cassuto contends that exchange value is the 
opposite of ‘inherent value’.
19
 Whilst it is not within the scope of this thesis to consider 
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whether nonhuman animals have ‘inherent value’, the central point that Cassuto makes is that 
the interests of nonhuman animals who have only an exchange value are invisible because 
they are defined solely by their ‘transactional worth in a market economy’.
20
 The concept of 
the ‘absent referent’ is a powerful way of explaining precisely how commodification makes 
nonhuman animal interests invisible. 
1. How Commodified Animals Become ‘Absent’ 
According to Carol Adams, the absent referent is ‘anything whose original meaning is 
undercut as it is absorbed into a different hierarchy of meaning’.
21
 Nonhuman animals are 
made absent when they are commodified, because with their interests these sentient creatures 
are absorbed by their commodification which endows them only with exchange value. As 
absent referents, nonhuman animals are simultaneously both ‘there and not there’.
22
 They are 
literally there when they are confined to battery stalls, or slaughtered and sold as ‘meat’. Yet 
they are simultaneously ‘not there’, in that their interests do not count, and their lives are 
deemed meaningful only insofar as their bodies can be used as objects of exchange in the 
marketplace. They are absent because we fail to accord them their own existence.
23
 The 
commodified pigs becomes ‘pork’. The commodified cow becomes ‘beef’. The commodified 
hen becomes a ‘layer’.  In each case, the sentient nonhuman animals are made absent. 
One of the ways in which Adams’ contends nonhuman animals can be made absent is 
through language. It is through language that Adam contends ‘meat’s true meaning is cast 
out’.
24
 Language can ‘distance us further from animals by naming them as objects, as “its”’.
25
 
The application of such a ‘generic’ term to nonhuman animals ‘erases the living, breathing 
nature of the animals and reifies their object status’.
26
 Characterised by language as 
commodities, or as ‘its’, nonhuman animals don’t have interests that matter less than human 
interests, rather they are deemed to have no interests at all. 
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The critique of language has been an important tool used in feminist thinking to reveal that 
language not only describes things but also brings them into being.
27
 As Judith Butler has 
stated in the context of gender, language not only ‘report[s] a pre-linguistic experience, but 
constructs that experience as well as the limits of its analysis’.
28
 In the context of the 
oppression of women by men, Sarah Hoagland argues that when language which reflects only 
a male perspective is used to describe women, that language not only operates in a descriptive 
fashion, it also operates in a normative way to dictate not only what women are like, but what 
women should be like, as it is perceived from a predominantly male perspective.
29
 Such 
language therefore operates to legitimate the oppression of women, since it operates to define 
women according only to the male perspective of what women should be like.  
American linguist, philosopher and feminist Julia Penelope has argued that language not only 
facilitates continued sexism, but is capable also of ‘prescribing passivity’ towards it.
30
 
Penelope’s point is that the continued acceptance of language that contains harmful values 
facilitates the continuation of those harms. In the context of women, the continued usage and 
acceptance of language that contains gender bias not only sustains the existence of that bias, 
but also neutralises that bias. She provides the example of language that is seemingly neutral, 
like the word ‘surgeon’, that is typically assumed to refer to a male occupation. This is 
evidenced, she suggests, by the fact that people typically refer also to ‘female surgeons’ as a 
point of contrast to the ‘standard’ definition.
31
 The use of the term ‘surgeon’ in contrast to the 
phrase ‘female surgeon’, operates to sustain the standard view that surgeons are necessarily 
male, unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. It is for this reason that Penelope contends that 
dismantling language, by  ‘removing biased gender reference from our vocabulary’ can be a 
powerful means of interrupting continued sexism.
32
 Language, she contends, is capable of 
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Just as feminists have argued that language depicts the female identity as being synonymous 
with one single male perspective on how women should be, it is possible to see also how 
language constructs the identity of sentient nonhuman animals and defines them as  
commodities. Even changes in syntax, which alter the arrangement of words within a 
sentence, can vastly affect the meaning of a sentence, and can impart values that harm others 
– both human and nonhuman. To illustrate this point, I turn first to Penelope’s illustration of 
how the identity of women who have been domestically abused can be consumed by 
language that describes them as ‘battered’. I then turn to consider how a similar process takes 
place in the context of nonhuman animals who, by language, simply become ‘meat’. Consider 
now how language operates to dictate meaning about a person, namely Mary, in the following 
series of sentences and terms:
34
  
‘Mary was beaten by John’ 
‘Mary was beaten’ 
‘Mary is a battered woman’ 
‘Battered woman’ 
‘Battered’ 
The first sentence, that is, ‘John beat Mary’ – positions John as the agent of an action that 
caused harm to Mary. In this case, Mary is the object of the sentence and she has something 
done to her. In the second sentence, ‘Mary was beaten by John’, Mary has become the focus: 
John’s role as the perpetrator of violence upon Mary is less central than it was in the first 
instance. By the time the sentence transitions to ‘Mary was beaten’ – John, the perpetrator of 
the violence, has entirely disappeared from the scenario. And, with his disappearance, the 
beating has become a temporary characteristic of Mary herself – as opposed to something that 
was done to Mary, by John. By the end of the sequence, Mary has been labelled a ‘battered’ 
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woman. Mary now possesses a certain characteristic (in this case, ‘batteredness’) that now 
classifies her as a certain kind of woman. As such, Hoagland concludes, ‘something men do to 
women has become instead something that is part of women’s nature’.
35
 Ultimately, when 
there are enough ‘battered women’, we lose sight of Mary completely, and she is simply 
absorbed anonymously into the category of ‘battered women’. At this point, Mary becomes 
the absent referent. She is simultaneously ‘there and not there’.
 36
 
Moreover, the person who is responsible for having been violent towards Mary, has 
disappeared from our contemplation entirely. 
37
 Sarah Hoagland contends that we can see this 
type of language shift occur in  numerous practical contexts. She contends that statements 
such as ‘one-half to two-thirds of women who live with a man will be beaten’ are 
commonplace.
 38
 These statements routinely appear in preference to the alternative statement: 
‘one-half to two-thirds of all men who live with a woman will beat her’.
39
 The juxtaposition 
between the two demonstrates that the way in which we use language can dramatically alter 
the message and meanings that we convey. 
Adams has used a similar sequence in the context of nonhuman animals to illustrate how, 
through language, they are commodified: 
 ‘Someone kills animals so that I can eat their corpses as meat’  
‘animals are killed to be eaten as meat’  
‘animals are meat’  




Whilst the original statement casts animals as creatures that have something done to them by 
humans, it is possible to see that by the final statement, nonhuman animals have been 
commodified and are conceptualised as mere carriers of flesh:  the ‘meat’ becomes ‘part of 
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 The sentient animal has disappeared entirely form contemplation. 
Moreover, the human role in creating meat has also disappeared.
42
 Just as Mary was defined 
by the term ‘battered’, nonhuman animals are defined by language that commodifies them or 
simply turns them into ‘meat’. In each case, important meaning is lost through language, and 
as a result, both Mary and nonhuman animals become absent referents. 
Making nonhuman animals absent facilitates cruelty towards them by keeping their interests 
invisible. As Adams explains, ‘[t]he function of the absent referent is to keep our “meat” 
separated from any idea that she or he was once an animal, to keep the “moo” or “cluck” or 
“baa” away from the meat, to keep something from being seen as having been someone’.
43
 If, 
as Adams suggests, language ensures that ‘animals are ontologized as carriers of meat’,
44
 then 
the role of the human actor in producing that meat is necessarily eliminated from our 
consideration. This is evident when we ‘no longer talk about baby animals but about veal or 
lamb’.
45
 It makes ‘meat’ an essential part of their being, much like ‘batteredness’ can become 
an essential part of Mary through language. Such language equates living, sentient nonhuman 
animals with the fetishized product that we hope to obtain from the use, slaughter, or 
butchering of their bodies.  
 
Examples abound in the supermarket aisles – where we see bodies that have been butchered 
re-conceptualised as ‘whole’. Consumers order a ‘whole chicken’ when in fact, they are 
receiving a dismembered body, ‘whose feathers, feet and head are missing’.
46
 The term 
‘whole’ when applied to a slaughtered, dismembered animal, conceals the process by which 
meat came to be on the supermarket shelf, and re-defines an animal’s dismembered body as 
being ‘whole’ – as if to imply it sits there on the shelf in a natural state. It is also possible to 
find examples of such language in law. Troublingly, they can be found in the very same 
Codes of Practice that purport to exist for the protection of nonhuman animal interests.  
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III. ‘TREATING MEAT HUMANELY’:
47
 LEGAL LANGUAGE THAT COMMODIFIES 
NONHUMAN ANIMALS 
Thus far, I have argued that language that commodifies nonhuman animals facilitates cruelty 
towards them by making them absent referents. Conceptualised as mere ‘objects’ or even as 
‘pre-food’, the interests of commodified nonhuman animals disappear from our consideration. 
The result is that ‘we do not see our meat eating as contact with animals because it has been 
renamed as contact with food’.
48
 Such renaming facilitates cruelty towards nonhuman animals 
as it ‘blinds’ us to the ‘independent consciousness of the creature and chang[es] our 
sentiments’ towards them.
49
 Pigs and cows have morally relevant interests that can demand 
our consideration. Pork and beef do not.  
A. Where Law Maximises Exchange Value at the Cost of Animal Welfare 
Perhaps the most obvious way in which Australian animal welfare statutes, regulations and 
Codes of Practice facilitate the commodification of nonhuman animals is through the 
permitting of practices that operate to protect the human interest in maximising exchange 
value, at the cost of animal welfare. The example I provided in chapter four is pertinent: pigs 
may lawfully be confined because such confinement maximises their exchange value. 
Confinement enables a producer to produce more pigs, with less effort, at the lowest possible 
cost. Similar examples can be found with relation to all nonhuman animals who are 
intensively farmed in accordance with the law: ‘broilers’ confined to crowded indoor barns,
50
 
‘layers’ confined to battery cages,
51
 and cattle confined to feedlots.
52
 In each case, the 
exchange value of these nonhuman animals is realised through the slaughter and the 
butchering of their bodies, or the use of their bodies as ‘producers’ (of eggs or milk). 
Moreover, their exchange value is maximised by keeping production costs to a minimum. 
Thus ‘the economic incentive – which  is, after all, what drives exchange value, lies with 
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minimizing expense associated with the thing while maximizing its yield’.
53
 In such settings, 
Codes of Practice operate not to prohibit cruelty towards nonhuman animals, but to permit 
systems that ‘maximise the use of animal property’ to maximise exchange value.
54
 This 
position is maintained even though such use typically involves egregious cruelty.
55
 It is for 
this reason that Gary Francione contends that the ‘regulation of animal use does 
not…transcend that level of protection that facilitates the most economically efficient 
exploitation of the animal’.
56
 
There are also less obvious ways in which Codes of Practice facilitate the commodification of 
nonhuman animals. For example, it is lawful to dock the tail of a pig in South Australia.
57
 By 
contrast, it is unlawful to dock the tail of a dog in any Australian jurisdiction, unless the 
procedure is performed by a veterinary surgeon for medical (non-cosmetic) reasons.
58
 The 
docking of a pig’s tail need not be performed under anaesthetic as there is no legal 
requirement that anaesthetic be provided, despite the fact that the procedure causes ‘pain and 
distress’.
59
 Moreover, the tail docking need not be performed by a veterinary surgeon, but 
may be performed by a ‘suitably qualified person or by a person acting under the supervision 
(whether or not direct supervision) of a suitably qualified person’.
60
 To understand how the 
provisions which permit the docking of a pig’s tail facilitate the commodification of pigs, it is 
necessary to briefly examine the justification for the practice. 
The tail docking of pigs is typically justified on the basis that it prevents pigs from biting the  
tails of other pigs. Tail biting between pigs not only results in pain and suffering for the pigs 
who are bitten, but also causes ‘substantial loss to producers due to deteriorating body 
conditions in affected animals’.
61
 Docking the tails of pigs is a preventive action that is said 
to remove the possibility of tail biting, and thus prevent the negative consequences it entails. 
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However, it is necessary to note that tail biting between pigs is an ‘abnormal behaviour’ that 
only becomes a problem when pigs are ‘situated in an inadequate environment…[that denies 
them] the freedom to express their normal explorative behaviour’.
62
 Provisions which permit 
tail docking therefore necessarily facilitate and legitimate other provisions which permit the 
intensive farming of pigs as mere commodities. Tail docking does not ‘resolve the underlying 
causes of tail biting’,
63
 but merely removes the possibility of tail biting in intensive systems 
where pigs are denied their most basic interests. It is possible therefore to see how any claim 
that tail docking is a ‘necessary’ practice implicitly legitimates other cruel practices towards 
pigs, including the confinement of them in housing that fails to meet their most basic welfare 
needs.  
Another example can be taken from the provisions which purport to ensure that the slaughter 
of nonhuman animals for human consumption is ‘humane’. The Model Code of Practice for 
the Welfare of Animals: Livestock at Slaughtering Establishments and the Australian 
Standard for the Hygienic Production of Meat for Human Consumption together require that 
livestock be ‘stunned effectively’, rendering them ‘unconscious and insensible to pain’ prior 
to and during slaughter.
64
 Although I argue in chapter seven of this thesis that some of the 
recommended methods for ‘humane’ stunning are inherently cruel, for the purposes of this 
section it is sufficient to note that these provisions are intended to protect the most basic 
welfare interests of nonhuman animals to be rendered unconscious prior to slaughter. Given 
the purpose of these provisions, it is troubling that operators working under an ‘approved 
arrangement’ to provide animals that have been slaughtered according to religious 
requirements may have their throats cut prior to being stunned.
65
 These nonhuman animals 
may therefore lawfully be stuck while fully conscious. Such provisions most clearly reflect 
the commodity status of these nonhuman animals. If it is the most basic and fundamental 
principle of so-called ‘humane’ slaughter that nonhuman animals be rendered insensible to 
pain before they are killed, those nonhuman animals who are killed in accordance with ritual 
slaughter standards are most clearly commodified. They have value only when they can be 
exchanged, and they can be exchanged only when they are killed according to religious 
                                                 
 
62




 Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals : Livestock at Slaughtering Establishments s.6.2.1; 
Australian Standard for the Hygienic Production of Meat for Human Consumption 7.10. 
65
 Australian Standard for the Hygienic Production of Meat for Human Consumption 7.12. 
Page 141 of 305 
 
requirements. As such, their most basic welfare interests are not reflected in law, and simply 
do not count. 
B. Where Law Conflates the Life and Death of Nonhuman Animals 
It is also possible to identify instances in which the language contained within Codes of 
Practice serves to commodify nonhuman animals and make them absent referents. In many 
cases, nonhuman animals become the absent referent when language conflates their living, 
sentient selves with the commodity or product that we seek to use them for. When this 
happens, the law facilitates a conceptual merging of nonhuman animal life and death as it 
conflates sentient, living nonhuman animals, with the product that humans intend to create 
from that nonhuman animal when it is killed. The legal language thus reflects the position 





Or, as David Cassuto suggests – the law ‘merges live animals and carcasses into one’.
68
 The 
result is that the death of a nonhuman animal appears to be a natural phenomenon, when it is 
in fact inflicted upon them by human agents.  
The Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: Livestock at Slaughtering 
Establishments is a pertinent example of this. ‘Livestock’, as the Macquarie Dictionary 
defines it – are creatures who are categorised according to the purpose for which they are kept 
by humans to serve human purposes: ‘noun the horses, cattle, sheep and other useful animals 
kept or bred on a farm or ranch’.
69
  The use of the term ‘livestock’ in legislation that purports 
to protect their welfare therefore facilitates the concealment of their interests. They are 
referred to by law as existing to serve a specific human purpose. The fulfilment of those 
human purposes typically legitimates their cruel slaughter. 
Another example of this comes from the Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: 
Livestock at Slaughtering Establishments where determinations about holding times, (that is – 
the amount of time which an animal should be rested in a pen prior to slaughter) – is made 
based on ‘carcass quality’. The applicable Code of Practice states: ‘[f]or carcass quality 
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purposes a minimum rest period of 2 hours between arrival and slaughter is desirable’.
70
 Here 
I have identified a direct conflation between the life and death of nonhuman animals in law. 
The Code purports to contain rules which exist for the purposes of promoting the welfare of 
living nonhuman animals.
71
 It states that animals that are stressed or suffering from 
exhaustion, or animals that have been travelling for extended periods, should be rested for 
longer periods prior to being moved to the slaughter floor.
72
 This reflects the scientific 
understanding that the ‘physical, psychological and physiological stress’ experienced by 
nonhuman animals during transport can be alleviated by an adequate rest period upon arrival 
at the slaughterhouse,
73
 and thus that resting nonhuman animals prior to slaughter has 
important animal welfare implications.  
Yet, the very first rule regarding holding times in the applicable Code of Practice refers 
explicitly to the ‘carcass’ of the nonhuman animal. What is evident is thus that the reduction 
of stress is deemed important not for animal welfare reasons, but for the creation of a 
desirable meat product. It is in this sense that I suggest the life and death of these nonhuman 
animals is directly conflated.  If human life and death were similarly conflated, it is evident 
how troubling it is: ‘living people and dead people are fundamentally different; a corpse is not 
the same as a person’.
74
 Yet, in this context, the Code that purports to protect nonhuman 
animals prior to slaughter also refers directly to their ‘carcass’. Through such conflation, it 
becomes conceptually impossible to ‘escape the animals’ commodity status even as ethics 
demand[s] their decent treatment’.
75
  
Some species of nonhuman animal are also described in law with reference to the means by 
which humans choose to cook them.  The term ‘broiler birds’, which is used throughout  the 
Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals (Domestic Poultry) is one such example. 
‘Broiler’ chickens are also known as ‘meat chickens’.
76
 As the Macquarie Dictionary defines 
it, a ‘broiler’ is ‘a young chicken, twelve to fourteen weeks old, that can be cooked by 
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 ‘Broiler’ chickens are thus described in terms that mirror the product that humans 
create by slaughtering them, and the method by which it is preferable to cook their butchered 
bodies. It is clear how the chicken itself becomes an absent referent. A cooking technique 




Language that facilitates a conceptual blending of the life and death of a nonhuman animal 
makes the animal, as a sentient creature, an absent referent. They are defined by words that 
describe them as a product that has only exchange value: they are ‘food’, or ‘carcasses’. To 
describe these nonhuman animals in these terms constitutes what Adams describes as a 
‘denial of beingness’
79
 – since the language we use to describe them does not observe their 
sentience, but conflates them with their dead or productive bodies. They are denied their very 
essence: 
Animals in name and body are made absent as animals for meat to exist. If animals are alive 
they cannot be meat. Thus a dead body replaces the live animal and animals become absent 
references. Without animals there would be no meat eating, yet they are absent from the act of 
eating because they have been transformed into food. Animals are made absent through 
language that renames dead bodies before consumers participate in eating them…The roast on 
the plate is disembodied from the pig who she or he once was.
80
 
Another way in which nonhuman animals become absent referents is where the product that 
nonhuman animals gain from them is referred to as if it is a naturally occurring quality of the 
nonhuman animal itself. In this context, the animal is conflated with the ‘product’ it is used to 
produce, such that the product itself appears to be a part of the animal in its natural state. 
Take for example hens which are routinely kept to provide humans with eggs. The Code of 
Practice which purports to protect their interests refers to them explicitly as ‘layers’,
81
 such 
that daily egg-laying appears to be a natural characteristic of the bird itself. In much the same 
way as Mary’s identity is consumed when she becomes ‘battered’, so too is the identity of the 
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bird who is consumed by the label ‘layer’. In the creation of the label ‘layer’ the human agent 
in stimulating unnatural egg laying behaviours disappears, as does the process by which a 
‘layer hen’ was created by humans, to serve human purposes.  Siobhan O’Sullivan describes 
it thus: 
It is a fallacy to believe that the battery hen is in some way a ‘natural’ phenomenon. The 
modern egg-laying hen is derived from the South-East Asian rainforest fowl that has a 
seasonal laying cycle that produces around seven eggs annually. Through cross-breeding, the 
annual egg production capacity of the laying hen was increased to around 120 eggs per 
annum. Industrial processes have extended that to almost an egg a day. The hens are hatched 
in purpose built breeding facilities. Once they are sexed, the males are killed and the females 
are transported to their permanent home, a factory farm. The sheds in which battery hens are 
housed use high-level artificial lighting for up to 16 hours a day, creating the illusion it is 
always spring. Antibiotics are used as a growth stimulant. When the hen’s laying capacity 
drops, a technique termed “forced moulting” is used to re-stimulate production. During forced 
moulting hens are kept in darkness without food or water for up to three days. After their 
environment returns to its pre-forced moulting state, optimal egg production levels are 
recovered. Egg-laying birds are not commercially viable after 12-18 months. They are then 
slaughtered and their flesh is sold to processed food manufacturers. There is nothing natural 
about the egg production industry.
82
   
Yet, the application of the term ‘layer’ removes the human agent from the story of what is 
done to chickens - much like John disappears as the perpetrator of what is done to Mary. As 
such, a myriad of cruel practices are permitted towards ‘layers’ to maximise the exchange 
value of eggs. As I explain further in chapter five, hatcheries that breed ‘layer’ hens cull all 
male chicks that hatch. These male hatchlings are among the most overtly commodified 
nonhuman animals. They have no exchange value as ‘layers’ because they do not lay eggs. 
As such, their interests do not count, and they are therefore merely ‘disposable’.
83
 
The precise same effect is achieved by usage of the term ‘dairy cattle’ in the Australian 
Animals Welfare Standards and Guidelines for Cattle 2016. The objective of the provisions 
on ‘dairy management’ is that ‘dairy cattle are managed to minimise the risk to their 
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 Yet, the term ‘dairy’ cattle indicates that those cows who are kept for the purposes 
of providing milk are positively commodified. They are cows with interests that require our 
protecting. They are providers of dairy products, and ‘dairy’ cattle are exposed to some of the 
most egregious forms of lawful cruelty. One of the most significant cruelties inflicted on 
‘dairy’ herds is the forcible removal of a calf from its mother soon after birth. The removal is 
extremely distressing for both mother and calf,
85
 but is deemed a virtual necessity in the 
commercial dairy industry. The calf must be removed from the mother so that the milk can be 
harvested in commercial quantities for human consumption. When a cow becomes a 
commodified ‘dairy’ cow, forms of cruelty towards her are more readily justified. The 
forcible removal of her calf is justified as not only ‘reasonable’, but as ‘necessary’, because 
she is valuable only insofar as she can produce dairy for human consumption. Her calf must 
be removed because she is a producer of dairy for human consumption. I return to talk about 
these calves in the section below. 
All of these examples are reflections of what Adams describes as the process of ‘false 
naming’.
86
 In the American context, she contends through false naming ‘we see ourselves as 
eating pork chops, hamburger, sirloins, and so on, rather than 43 pigs, 3 lambs, 11 cows, 4 
‘veal’ calves, 2,555 chickens and turkeys and 861 fishes that the average American eats in a 
lifetime’.
87
 It is through this process of false naming, and through the associated ‘detachment, 
concealment, misrepresentation, and shifting [of] the blame’, that it enables, that the 
‘structure of the absent referent [can] prevail’.
88
 Moreover, for as long as Codes of Practice 
facilitate such false naming, the very same provisions which purport to protect nonhuman 
animals from harm, merely legitimate their commodification and are thus complicit in the 
denial of their most basic welfare interests. 
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C. Where Nonhuman Animals become ‘Wastage’ 
Another way in which nonhuman animals become the absent referent in Australian law is 
where they are defined as mere ‘wastage’. These nonhuman animals have their interests 
denied not because they have exchange value, but because they do not. Nonhuman animals 
who have no exchange value not only have no interests, but they also have no value at all.  
So called ‘bobby calves’ are an important example of such animals, and are referred to as 
‘bobby calves’ in both the Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines: Land 
Transport of Livestock and the and the Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: 
Livestock at Slaughtering Establishments. As I explained above, to sustain milk production, 
cattle kept for dairy production are impregnated annually. ‘Bobby calves’ are typically male 
calves born into the dairy industry who have ‘no value as a dairy replacement’.
89
 
Approximately 450,000 bobby calves are slaughtered in Australia annually, because they are 
‘surplus to dairy industry requirements’.
90
 Bobby calves, by definition, are the wastage of the 
dairy industry. The term ‘bobby’ refers explicitly to those calves that have no exchange value. 
After they are born and have stimulated (or re-stimulated) their mother’s milk production, 
bobby calves simply serve no human purpose as dairy commodities. As a result, bobby calves 
are ‘prone to being neglected and ill-treated’.
91
 One of the most troubling cruelties inflicted 
upon dairy calves is the forcible separation of them from their mothers (discussed above) as 
well as their lawful transport to slaughter at only a few days old, and the withholding of feed 
and water that I discussed in chapter four.
92
  
D. Nonhuman Animals that are ‘Pests’ 
Animal welfare legislation and Codes of Practice also routinely refer to some species of 
nonhuman animal as ‘pest animals’. Like those that are ‘wastage’, ‘pests’ have no exchange 
value. Moreover, they are typically seen to compromise the exchange value of other things. 
Thus, even though nonhuman animals such as rats are ‘lively, intelligent and sociable 
creatures’, their public image has been shaped by the notion that they are ‘pests…competitors 
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with us…for access to stores of grain’, and as ‘carriers of disease’.
93
 According to Mary 




It is not surprising then that ‘pests’ are routinely exempted from the reach of animal welfare 
legislation through various mechanisms. For example, in Queensland, ‘pest’ animals are 
specifically excluded from animal welfare legislation by way of section 42, which reads that 
where an act done by a person was done ‘to control a feral animal or pest animal, including, 
for example, by killing it; and (b) the act does not involve the use of a prohibited trap or spur’, 
it is an exemption to an offence if that act was done so as to cause the animal ‘as little pain as 




In Victoria, under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Regulations 2008 glue traps may be 
used with Ministerial approval by ‘commercial pest controller operators’, for the purposes of 
trapping rodents in accordance with Ministerial directions. The Victorian Government 
provides that ‘consideration was given to a total ban’ on the use of glue traps, on the basis that 
they are ‘one of the most inhumane methods of rodent control’.
96
 Specifically, a trapped 
animal experiences: 
Enormous distress….even if the trapped animals are found after just a few hours and then 
humanely dispatched…rodents are likely to experience pain and distress through being 
trapped, the physical effects of the adhesive on functioning (e.g. suffocation), and trauma 
resulting from panic and attempts to escape, such as forceful hair removal, torn skin and 
broken limbs. After three-five hours animals have been reported as covered in their own 
faeces and urine. When boards are collected, animals are also often squealing; one pest 
controller even described them as ‘screaming their heads off’. Some rodents even bit through 
their own limbs to escape.
97
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Yet, the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Regulations 2008 allow a commercial pest 
controller to continue to use them. Interestingly, such provisions contradict a 2005 regulatory 
impact statement on a proposed total ban on the use and selling of glue traps. The statement 
found that any negative cost implications of the ban would be ‘outweighed by their expected 




In this chapter, I have argued that nonhuman animal interests not only matter less than human 
interests, but that sometimes the very laws which purport to protect their interests, serve to 
commodify them. As commodities, nonhuman animals are conceptualised as having no 
interests at all. This is a problem since Australian animal welfare laws prohibit only 
unnecessary or unreasonable cruelty. That prohibition seeks to balance the human interest in 
treating nonhuman animals cruelly against a nonhuman animal’s interest in being protected 
from it. When nonhuman animals are positively commodified by law, their interests do not 
count. Cruelty towards them therefore becomes more readily justified as necessary or 
‘reasonable. 
In the chapter that follows, I shift my focus to look not at what the law says about the 
interests of nonhuman animals and the prohibition of cruelty towards them, but at what it 
does not say. My argument is that in many instances, Australian animal welfare legislation 
contains a declaration of ‘inaction’ with respect to some of the worst forms of cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
‘not responding is a response – we are equally responsible for what we don’t do’. 
2
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Australian Codes of Practice positively commodify 
some nonhuman animals. As commodities, nonhuman animals are conceptualised as having 
only an exchange value. In other words, they are valuable only insofar as their bodies can be 
used or sold for human benefit. The commodification of nonhuman animals makes them 
absent references, as their most basic welfare interests are made invisible. In the context of 
animal welfare laws which operate to prohibit only unnecessary or unreasonable cruelty, 
those nonhuman animals who are commodified are offered minimal welfare protections. 
They are defined by law not as creatures who have interests that are less important than 
human interests, rather they are defined as commodities who have no interests at all. 
In this chapter, I shift my focus. I look not at what type of cruelty the law says are prohibited, 
but at what it does not say about certain forms of cruelty. Specifically, my focus in this 
chapter is where the law declares ‘inaction’ with respect to certain types of cruelty towards 
certain types of nonhuman animals. By ‘inaction’ I refer to instances in which the law is 
silent, or fails to provide an avenue for legal recourse with respect to harmful conduct. My 
argument in this chapter is that Australian animal welfare laws utilise inadequate definitions, 
legal fictions and express exclusions to declare inaction with respect to certain types of 
cruelty. Consequently, the law is silent with respect to some of the worst forms of cruelty 
towards nonhuman animals. Their suffering does not count. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I argue that the law’s inaction is not a 
neutral stance. Rather, I argue that inaction is an active stance, which serves to legitimate the 
status quo, in which some types of cruelty towards some nonhuman animals is deemed 
acceptable and justifiable. In the second part, I identify three mechanisms by which I contend 
the law declares a policy of inaction with respect to some forms of cruelty. First, I critique 
limited and inadequate definitions of what constitutes an ‘animal’ in Australian animal 
welfare legislation. This definition explicitly exempts certain categories of sentient 
nonhuman animals from the law’s protective reach. It does so specifically to serve human 
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interests. If these nonhuman animals are not protected, humans have no legal obligation to 
take their suffering into account. Second, I explain the use of a legal fiction operating in the 
New South Wales jurisdiction. This fiction, I argue, deems that certain types of cruelty are 
not cruelty at all for legal purposes. It does so, I contend, knowing that this is a false claim. 
By deeming certain forms of cruelty to be ‘non-cruelty’ when they are in fact cruel, the law 
facilitates forms of cruelty that are economically advantageous to humans. Third, I identify 
the operation of an express exclusion from anti-cruelty provisions in Western Australia and 
the Australian Capital Territory where conduct can be described as accepted animal 
husbandry practice. This exclusion, I demonstrate, enables those who use nonhuman animals 
for human purposes to set their own standards as to what constitutes cruelty. As such, the 
nonhuman animals that are most vulnerable to experiencing cruelty are again exempted from 
the protective reach of Australian animal welfare legislation. 
II. ‘INACTION IS A POLICY’
3
 
The legal prohibition on animal cruelty is inadequate. Thus far in this thesis I have critiqued 
what the law says about cruelty towards nonhuman animals, and have demonstrated that the 
standards contained within animal welfare legislation are consistently undermined by 
qualifying words and Codes of Practice. Here, I critique the law’s silence, because the law is 
active not only when it prohibits cruelty towards nonhuman animals, but also when it permits 
it, or fails to prohibit it.
 4
   
Commentators on animal law issues have readily identified the fact that the law fails to 
protect nonhuman animals from cruelty. In some instances, these commentators state that 
there is a ‘gap’ in animal welfare legislation.
5
 However, the concept that there exists a legal 
‘gap’ implies that the law on a certain matter is simply ‘missing’, or that the law merely has 
nothing to say on a subject.  This claim overlooks the fact that the law is never neutral. Even 
when it is silent, the law reflects what Duncan Kennedy describes as a ‘conscious decision’ to 
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facilitate a particular state of affairs.
6
  Where the law is silent, it does not have a ‘gap’ in the 
sense that it does not proscribe any standards. The law always conveys and reflects a point of 
view. When it is silent, the law is complicit in facilitating the status quo.  
To reveal how the law is always active in either prohibiting or permitting certain types of 
conduct, Kennedy cites the example of building regulations, which he argues enable 
homeowners to develop their blocks even where that development hinders a neighbouring 
person’s enjoyment of their own land (for example, because it blocks light to their property). 
This legal permission to hinder the enjoyment of others, Kennedy argues, is not a neutral 
legal stance, but is a deliberate and conscious decision to ‘let builders have their way, and 
make victims buy them out if they care that much about their view’.
7
 Kennedy’s point is that 
the law, in failing to proscribe standards of behaviour, facilitates the status quo. Building 
regulations are not neutral with respect to whether a neighbour’s enjoyment of their land may 
be hindered by further developments. Rather, it is complicit in that hindering, because it 
creates and maintains a set of standards that facilitate the actions of those who have a positive 
interest in developing buildings that hinder others. According to Kennedy, 'inaction is a 
policy’ and the law must always be seen to bear some responsibility for a social outcome, 
even where it appears to be silent on an issue.
 8
 By being silent, the law is always responsible 
for an outcome insofar as it ‘could have made it otherwise’.
9
 
The law is thus always performing an important political task. In the context of nonhuman 
animals, it reflects which nonhuman animals the law values, and to what extent it values 
them.
10
 As I explain in part two of this chapter, Australian animal welfare law is silent with 
respect to some of the worst forms of animal cruelty, such that the law necessarily becomes 
complicit in it. Fundamental to my argument in this chapter, is Kennedy’s argument that the 
law is always ‘active’, even when it is failing to do something.
11
 For example, South 
Australian animal welfare legislation is silent with respect to fish welfare. By being silent, the 
law should not be deemed ‘neutral’ with respect to cruelty towards fish, but rather it should 
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be viewed as being necessarily complicit in their suffering. The law excludes fish because 
parliament has explicitly decided not to include them.
12
 I return to this point in part two. 
The fact that the law is complicit in maintaining the status quo has also been made by Frances 
Olsen in the context of what the law prohibits and permits with respect to family life.
13
 
According to Olsen, the law has historically failed to articulate the criminal nature of abuses 
that had been deemed to be ‘private’ family matters. The law reflected the view that domestic 
abuse was not the law’s jurisdiction, and that they should be dealt with privately and 
internally by the family. Olsen contends this legal position did not reflect ‘neutrality’ towards 
family life, but rather explicitly legitimated and facilitated conduct within the family home 
that has been harmful, particularly for women and children. Moreover, the law was engaged 
in positively defining the family in defining the relationship of marriage and enforcing the 
roles ‘it decided each family member would fill’.
14
 
The patriarchal construction of the family, which prioritizes the interests of men, has seen 
women and children exposed to acts of domestic violence that have been positively permitted 
by law. Although the law of assault in Australia has always applied to an assault upon any 
person, the patriarchal construction of the family has served to legitimate forms of abuse by a 
husband against his wife, with the result that domestic abuse was rarely prosecuted. Thus, 
while abuse was always a criminal act, domestic abuse was historically still deemed to be a 
‘private’ matter, and was not seen as being criminal in nature.
15
  
At common law in Australia, there also existed a legal presumption that a wife, in virtue of 
becoming married, consented to sex with her husband. A husband could therefore not be 
prosecuted for raping his wife, because at common law she was presumed to have consented 
to sex with him at the time she became married.
16
 The law in this instance was not ‘neutral’ 
with respect to the rape of a wife by her husband. Rather, it explicitly served to ‘empower’ a 
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husband in exerting physical dominance over his wife.
17
 The law there was complicit in the 
rape of a wife by her husband. The maintenance of a space deemed ‘private family matters’ in 
which the law does not intrude has therefore been central to the continuation of lawful 
violence within the family home. Indeed, the absence of laws to protect women within these 
spaces is precisely what has enabled those who have excessive power (in this case, men) to 
retain it.
18
 Furthermore, the implicit permitting of such violence by law can become self-
legitimating: ‘men in fact use the coercive power of the state to reinforce and consolidate their 
authority over wives and children’.
19
 
As Olsen demonstrated in the context of the family, the law has historically empowered 
perpetrators of violence because it has failed to prohibit their conduct. The law was thus 
complicit in suffering of victims. As social and legal conceptions of marriage, family life and 
the status of women have changed, Australian law has changed to reflect a shift in 
conceptions of violence within the family home. In Australia, assaults that occur within the 
family home are now considered to be assaults of the worst kind. For example, section 5AA 
the South Australian Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), lists offences against a 
spouse or former spouse, domestic partner or child as an ‘aggravated offence’, which carries a 
higher penalty than a non-aggravated offence of a similar kind. The inclusion of domestic 
assaults as aggravated offences marks a clear and intentional shift to no longer view assaults 
within the family home as private family matters. Such assaults are now not only criminal, but 
they are one of the most serious types of criminal wrongdoing.  In 2009, South Australia also 
introduced the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009, which states explicitly 
amongst its objects ‘to assist in preventing domestic and non-domestic abuse, and the 
exposure of children to the effects of domestic and non-domestic abuse’.
20
 South Australia 
was also the first Australian state to abolish the common law presumption of a wife’s consent 
to sex with her husband.
21
 Whilst these laws do not have the effect of eradicating family 
violence, they are representative of an important shift in law away from practical complicity 
in family violence.  
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A. Language Use: The Law as ‘Intervening’  
Legal changes interrupt existing power structures in society. Thus, when the law in South 
Australia shifted to explicitly prohibit violence in the family home, it also interrupted a series 
of views about family relationships that had previously sustained such violence. According to 
Suzanne Hatty, such a legal shift towards prosecuting family violence that had historically 
been viewed as an acceptable use of a husband’s force ‘would seriously challenge the male 
prerogative of dominion over women in the private sphere. It would also conflict with the 
concept of the “chivalrous male” as constructed within discourses of masculinity’.
22
  
The extent to which the law can interrupt existing power structures and accepted norms of 
social behaviour is demonstrated by the language that is used to describe such interruptions. 
Olsen provides the example that if the law were to allow a child to seek damages against their 
parents for being confined to their room as punishment, it would largely be considered an 
unjustifiable ‘intrusion’ of the law into private family matters. Punishment and discipline, the 
argument goes, should be managed by the parent and not dictated by law. Yet, Olsen notes we 
also accept that if the same act of false imprisonment had been committed by a third party, 
who is not a part of the family structure, the act should be punishable by law.
23
 Such 
punishment would not be intrusive or invasive, but rightful and necessary.  
The family structure is therefore a source of very specific social and cultural values, which are 
often deemed to be untouchable by law. Interestingly, the notion that a family is the subject of 
intrusion by law, only exists where the law seeks to challenge the status quo about socially 
accepted family power dynamics. Where the law ‘ratifies the prexisting social roles within the 
family’ it is deemed to be ‘neutral’.
24
 The concept of ‘interference’ is thus not, as Olsen 
reminds us, ‘a simple description of state action or inaction’.
25
 Rather, it is a means of 
condemning the law where it seeks to change preconceived notions of what a family is, and 
how each person within the family should operate.  
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The same is true in the context of nonhuman animals. In chapter eight of this thesis, I 
demonstrate how the idea that the law is ‘interfering’ operates in the animal welfare law 
context. There, I detail discussions surrounding the introduction of ag-gag laws, which are 
designed to stifle the work of animal advocates. Advocates who challenge the cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals are consistently described as ‘intruders’. So much so, that prominent 
Australian politic figure Katrina Hodgkinson has even described them as ‘terrorists’.
26
 
III. LEGAL MECHANISMS ENABLING SILENCE ON CRUELTY 
In the first part of this chapter, I argued that the law’s silence can never be described as 
neutral. A legal policy of inaction is active in legitimating and facilitating the status quo. 
Thus, where the law does not operate to intervene to prohibit cruelty or violence, it is 
complicit in it. In this part, I detail three legal mechanisms through which the law reveals a 
deliberate policy of inaction with respect to certain forms of cruelty towards some nonhuman 
animals: through deliberately inadequate definitions, through the operation of legal fictions, 
and through express exclusions. The word deliberate is important here, because lawmakers 
explicitly declare a policy of inaction in Australian animal welfare legislation with respect to 
particular types of cruelty. The law therefore reflects a conscious and deliberate decision to 
remain complicit in the suffering of some sentient nonhuman animals.  
A. The Meaning of ‘Declared Inaction’ 
Throughout this section, I describe the law as ‘declaring inaction’. This unusual use of 
terminology is intended to convey a very important point. To date, animal law scholars have 
focused on the way in which the proportionality test of ‘unnecessary’ cruelty legitimates 
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cruelty towards some of the most vulnerable nonhuman animals.
27
 Their focus is not 
surprising. The very concept of ‘necessary’ cruelty is uncomfortable and unfamiliar. 
However, my contention in this section is that there is an (even more) troubling aspect of 
Australian animal welfare legislation that requires inspection. There are times where the law 
explicitly articulates a conscious decision by law makers to ignore certain types of cruelty. 
The presence of explicit words to this effect is the reason I describe the law as ‘declaring’ 
something. I do not conceptualise the law as containing a ‘gap’, rather I conceptualise it as 
positively articulating a position of intentional and deliberate inaction.   
As I discussed in chapter four, the concept of ‘necessary’ suffering contains tacit acceptance 
of cruelty towards nonhuman animals in certain circumstances.  The protective work of the 
prohibition against ‘unnecessary’ cruelty therefore legitimates cruelty towards some of the 
most vulnerable species of nonhuman animal. However, those nonhuman animals that are the 
subject of declared inaction fare even worse than those who are exposed to ‘necessary’ 
cruelty.  Declared inaction represents an explicit and intentional decision by lawmakers to 
exclude some acts of cruelty from the reach of animal welfare legislation. Such a move is 
presumably deemed necessary on the basis that the exempted acts are in fact acts of 
unnecessary cruelty. The move to explicitly exclude them, therefore, reflects a conscious 
decision by Parliament to ignore some of the worst forms of cruelty towards nonhuman 
animals.  
B. Consciously Inadequate Definitions of ‘Animal’ 
Law makes frequent use of definitions. They are an integral legal device because they 
articulate both the scope and purpose of legislation. Definitions do not only give a meaning to 
specific words used throughout legislation, but they may also be referred to in inferring the 
purpose of a statue as a whole. Under the South Australian Acts Interpretation Act 1915 for 
                                                 
 
27
 Deborah Cao, Animal Law in Australia (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, 2015) 213-216; Katrina Sharman, 'Farm 
Animals and Welfare Law: An Unhappy Union' in White and Sankoff (eds), Animal Law in Australasia: 
Continuing the Dialogue (2nd ed, The Federation Press, 2013) 61, 78; Peter Sankoff, 'The Protection 
Paradigm: Making the World a Better Place for Animals?' in Sankoff, White and Black (eds), Animal Law in 
Australasia: Continuning the Dialogue (The Federation Press, 2013) 1, 13-20; Steven White, 'Exploring 
Different Philosophical Approaches to Animal Protection Law' in Animal Law in Australasia: Continuing 
the Dialogue (2nd ed, The Federation Press, 2013) 31, 49-51. In the American context see Gary Francione, 
Animals, Property and the Law (Temple University Press, 1995) 17-32; Steven Wise, Rattling the Cage 
(Cambridge Press, 2000) 259-260. 
Page 158 of 305 
 
example, the definitions provisions form part of the Act.
28
 Further, in interpreting a provision 
within a statute, ‘the construction that would promote the purpose or object of the Act 
(whether or not that purpose or objects is expressly stated in the Act) must be preferred to a 
construction that would not promote that purpose or object’.
29
 Definitions in legislation 
therefore are not only important insofar as they give meaning to particular words. They are 
also important in that they inform the legislative intention and overall meaning and purpose 
of a statue. 
In the context of Australian animal welfare legislation, the term ‘animal’ is defined separately 
in each jurisdiction, and does not accord with the common place meaning typically given to 
the term. The commonplace meaning ascribed to the term can be taken from the Macquarie 
Dictionary, to mean ‘any living organism characterised by the capacity for voluntary motion, 
sensation, and the ingestion of food such as plants and other animals, and which has a non-
cellulose cell wall’.
30
 A second definition is also provided: an ‘animal’ is ‘any animal other 
than a human’.
31
 On this definition, both vertebrate and invertebrate species are included, 
including fish and cephalopods. 
As I explained in chapter four, the law defines the term ‘animal’ in a more limited way.  My 
contention is that in some jurisdictions, this definition is inadequate because it fails to include 
species of nonhuman animal that should, by virtue of their capacity to suffer, be included 
within the legal meaning of the word. The commonplace meaning of the term ‘animal’ 
characterizes them by their ability to experience the sensations of pleasure and pain. The 
failure to include species of sentient nonhuman animals within the legal definition therefore 
represents an explicit declaration by Parliament that the law be inactive with respect to 
cruelty inflicted upon these species. To illustrate my point, it is necessary to revisit the 
definition of ‘animal’ that I considered in chapter four. 
In Victoria, the term ‘animal’ is given two different meanings within the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic). For the purposes of the anti-cruelty provisions, the 
legislation defines an ‘animal’ as a member of a vertebrate species which include 
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amphibians, birds, fish, mammals, (including those above the midpoint of gestation or 
incubation), reptiles or live adult decapod crustaceans (lobster, crab or crayfish). Invertebrate 
animal species (such as octopus, squid, insects, and molluscs) are explicitly excluded from 
this legal definition of the term ‘animal’. Part 3, section 25 of the legislation however, which 
regulates the performance of scientific procedures on nonhuman animals, provides a different 
definition. This definition is broader than that offered for the purposes of the anti-cruelty 
provision, and here includes cephalopods (octopus, squid, cuttlefish, nautilus).
32
 It does not 
extend to other nonhuman animals, such as insects and spiders.  
In South Australia and Western Australia, ‘animal’ is defined so as to explicitly exclude 
fish.
33
 A Bill was introduced in 2016 to amend the South Australian legal definition of 
‘animal’ to include fish, however debate on the matter remains adjourned.
34
 In New South 
Wales, a crustacean only counts as an ‘animal’ in law if it is being kept for specific purposes, 
namely ‘at a building or place (such as a restaurant) where food is prepared or offered for 
consumption by retail sale in the building or place’.
35
 The provisions are similar in the 
Australian Capital Territory, where live crustaceans are included as ‘animals’ if they are 
‘intended for human consumption’.
36
 Pre-natal or pre-hatched mammals, reptiles or avian 
young are defined as ‘animals’ in both Queensland and Victoria, once they have reached the 
half-way point of gestation or incubation.
37
 
The law is used to define the term ‘animal’ in very specific and limiting ways: it includes 
only certain types of creatures – and sometimes it only includes them in contexts where they 
are being used for a human purpose. The legal meaning given to the term ‘animal’ serves the 
legal purpose of limiting the scope of animal welfare legislation. By dictating precisely which 
species count as an ‘animal’ for the purposes of animal welfare legislation, the definition 
serves to provide protections to some forms of nonhuman animals and to ensure they do not 
apply to others.  
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The fact that fish and cephalopods (and crustaceans in some jurisdictions)
38
 are explicitly 
excluded from the definition of ‘animal’ is not a neutral ‘gap’ in the law. Rather, it is a 
conscious declaration by Parliament that cruelty towards those nonhuman animals does not 
count for the purposes of animal welfare legislation. It is possible also to see how this 
position facilitates the pursuit of human interests. For example, fish are increasingly being 
raised for human consumption in intensive farms (‘aquaculture’), where stressors to the fish 
are ‘unavoidable’.
39
 Stressors that compromise fish welfare in aquaculture include handling, 
transport, food withdrawal prior to slaughter or transport, high stocking densities and 
slaughter methods that prioritize ‘product’ quality over animal welfare.
40
 For as long as fish 
are not protected by animal welfare legislation, there is no requirement that aquaculture 
practices be tailored to improve fish welfare. This point also links with my discussion in 
chapter five. Fish are commodified, and are viewed as ‘products’ that may legitimately be 
treated cruelly to serve human interests. In this case, their commodity status is reflected in 
their express exclusion from the legal definition of ‘animal’. 
Similarly, scientific evidence confirms that so-called ‘recreational fishing’, in which fish are 
caught and then released back into the water, ‘results in some level of injury and stress to an 
individual fish’.
41
 This evidence clearly confronts the ethics of a popular Australian pastime. 
When a hook penetrates the flesh of a fish, ‘there is no doubt…there will inevitably be some 
form of tissue damage or injury’.
42
 This injury not only causes acute pain, but may also 
impair a fish’s ability to engage in other normal behaviours such as foraging or avoiding 
predators.
43
 Fish that are caught and released are also routinely subjected to stress of various 
kinds, some of which require ‘extended recovery periods’.
44
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The exclusion of mammals and reptiles in utero in some jurisdictions is also important for 
two reasons. First, because scientific literature suggests that they have a capacity to suffer,
45
 
and second, because they may be exposed to suffering in industries that use nonhuman 
animals for human purposes.
46
 For example, the foetuses of livestock are also killed when 
pregnant dams are slaughtered. In jurisdictions where nonhuman animals in utero are 
excluded from the definition of ‘animal’, there is no obligation for their welfare to be 
considered. Further, medical experiments often intentionally use pregnant nonhuman animals 
to explore the effect of new human medicines on a nonhuman foetus. Excluded from the 
definition of ‘animal’, these foetuses are not the subject of animal welfare provisions which 
may curtail the types of experiments that one may reasonably perform. 
In other contexts, a foetus is intentionally killed to obtain a product. Fetal calf serum, for 
example, is obtained after the slaughter and bleeding of a pregnant cow at an abattoir. The 
uterus, containing the calf foetus is removed during the process of eviscerating the cow, and 
the foetus’ blood is collected via a needle inserted into the heart. The blood is deemed to be 
particularly valuable because it is free from micro-organisms and can therefore be used 
routinely for scientific purposes.
47
 These calves have no welfare protections for their 
suffering, and the collection of valuable fetal calf serum is thus uninterrupted, with no legal 
requirement that their welfare be taken into consideration.  
What these examples show is that legal definitions are a powerful legal device. Where the 
law does not intervene to prohibit the suffering of nonhuman animals, it implicitly permits it. 
Scientific literature confirms that fish, cephalopods and decapods are capable of suffering in 
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numerous and complex ways.
48
 Similarly, nonhuman animals above the midpoint gestation 
also possess a capacity to suffer.
49
 The continued exclusion of these nonhuman animal 
species from the protective reach of animal welfare legislation therefore serves not to reflect 
their intrinsic properties, but rather to facilitate the human interest in being cruel to these 
them. By failing to include them, the law is complicit in their suffering. 
C. Legal Fictions 
The legal fiction is another device that is employed within Australian animal welfare 
legislation to declare inaction with respect to certain forms of cruelty. I introduced the legal 
fiction chapter three in the context of legal personhood, and will say some more about it now. 
The legal fiction deems a ‘consciously false’ premise to be true to serve a legal purpose.
50
 
The legal fiction differs from a legal definition of the type discussed above, because the legal 
fiction involves a deeming. Whilst a definition may be described as inadequate or inaccurate 
with respect to the meaning normally attributed to the term, a legal definition does not 
generally deem something to be true, in the same way that a legal fiction does.  
Though the legal fiction is intentionally based on false premises, it is also different from a lie 
or an erroneous conclusion.
51
 Legal fictions necessarily involve a conscious deeming by law 
of a knowingly false premise. The deeming therefore is ‘not intended to deceive’ since it does 
not entail any claim to reflect a truth in the external world.
52
 To therefore critique the fiction 
solely on the basis that it is ‘false’ misses the point. As Naffine and Neoh suggest, ‘falsehood 
is the essence of the fiction. It does not destroy the fiction: it is its very basis’.
53
 As we saw in 
chapter three, a legal fiction, by virtue of the fact that it is a known falsehood, may offer 
greater legal and conceptual possibilities than other legal devices. The fiction of the legal 
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person, for example, creates theoretical scope to include a much broader range of entities 
within the construct of the ‘person’. The legal fiction enables us to call a corporation a 
‘person’ in law. We do so knowing a corporation is not actually a person (i.e. a human being) 
but we treat them as if they are for legal purposes. 
Legal fictions are thus employed to serve a legal purpose.
54
 In the context of Australian 
animal welfare law, my argument is that legal fictions are operating to declare the law’s 
deliberate and conscious inaction with respect to certain types of cruelty.  For the purposes of 
the following discussion, I have identified a legal fiction that I contend is operating in the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW), that serves the purpose of declaring the  
inaction with respect to specific forms of cruelty towards nonhuman animals.  
1. Deeming ‘Non-Cruelty’  
The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) purports to have several purposes. At 
the outset, the title tells us it is concerned with preventing cruelty towards nonhuman animals. 
This object is explicitly re-iterated in section 3(a) of the Act, alongside the additional object 
of ‘promoting the welfare of animals by requiring a person in charge of an animal to provide 
care for the animal, and to treat the animal in a humane manner, and to ensure the welfare of 
the animal’.
55
 The Act provides an expansive description of what may constitute cruelty for 
the purposes of the Act, with cruelty including  
reference to any act or omission as a consequence of which the animal is unreasonably, 
unnecessarily or unjustifiably: beaten, kicked, killed, wounded, pinioned, mutilated, maimed, 
abused, tormented, tortured, terrified, or infuriated, over-loaded, over-worked, over-driven, 




In providing such an expansive definition of ‘cruelty’, the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
Act 1979 (NSW) mirrors the everyday understanding of what may constitute cruelty toward a 
nonhuman animal. So much so, that it is difficult to think of any act of cruelty towards a 
nonhuman animal that is not included within the legal definition. My contention is that this is 
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intentional. The law seeks to reflect the everyday understanding of what it means to be cruel 
to a nonhuman animal, because Australian society cares about preventing cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals. The result is that the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) 
provides more than just a legal definition of what constitutes ‘cruelty’ in a legal context. It 
goes one step further, and makes broader claims about the type of people we are: we are kind 
to nonhuman animals, we are concerned about their welfare, we do not inflict pain upon 
them, nor any other type of suffering without a legitimate reason. Read in conjunction with 
the objects of the Act, the legal definition of cruelty in New South Wales is making a truth 
claim about how we, as Australians, care about nonhuman animals. 
The parliamentary debates surrounding the introduction of the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals Bill (NSW) support my contention. The Bill was met with almost unanimously 
positive feedback, and was described as ‘modern and enlightened’.
57
 Minister Crabtree, who 
introduced the Bill, was praised for being an ‘animal lover’.
58
 Minister Hatton extended 
thanks to ‘all members of the community…who are vigilant in the protection of animals 
against cruelty’.
59
 During debate the bill was consistently described as representative of 
something fundamental about Australian values: it was about ‘compassion’ for nonhuman 
animals,
60
 and about being ‘humanitarian’.
61
 The Bill was called a ‘safeguard for those 
creatures which are unable to fend for themselves’.
62
 It defended those who are 
‘defenceless’.
63
 Minister Barraclough claimed that Australians are recognised for ‘their love 
and protection of animals’,
64
 and concluded his offering by claiming: ‘[w]e have only one 
creed- to speak for those who can’t’.
65
 Despite opposing the ‘far-reaching provisions’ of the 
Bill that compromised routine farming practices, Minister MacDiarmid stated that ‘this 
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[animal welfare legislation] is an area which is apolitical’.
66
 He therefore claimed that the 
prevention of cruelty to nonhuman animals was such a fundamental and uncontroversial 
aspect of human responsibility, that there ought to be no need for it to be perceived as ‘a case 
of Opposition versus the Government’.
 67
 
Several Ministers were also critical of people who perpetrated cruelty towards nonhuman 
animals. These perpetrators were described by Minister Crabtree as ‘irresponsible and 
callous’.
68
 He contended that the need to prevent cruelty to nonhuman animals was so 
obvious that it was ‘disappointing’ that legislation to protect nonhuman animals was even 
considered necessary in the modern age.
69
 For Minister Crabtree, those who were cruel to 
nonhuman animals desecrated fundamental human values: they ‘have no respect for life and 
feeling’.
70
 He described cruelty towards ‘defenceless’ nonhuman animals as ‘savage and 
incomprehensible…’.
71
 Those who are a cruel, he said, are ‘inhumane…callous’ people,
72
 
best described as ‘sadists’.
73
 Minister MacDiarmid was similarly scathing, stating that those 




The Parliamentary debates surrounding the introduction of the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals Bill 1979 (NSW) thus reveal that the prevention of ‘cruelty’ towards nonhuman 
animals is intended to reflect fundamental human values. So much so that those who inflict 
cruelty on nonhuman animals are deemed to exhibit values that conflict so greatly with 
humanity that they ought more reasonably be described as ‘savages’.
 75
 The legal definition of 
‘cruelty’ in the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) therefore does much more 
than define what constitutes ‘cruelty’ for legal purposes. It makes moral truth claims about 
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what it means to be kind, compassionate human beings, and what it means to love and care 
for nonhuman animals. 
A legal fiction can therefore be identified when these general propositions are reversed by 
law. For example, section 24 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) reads: 
In any proceedings for an offence against this Part or the regulations in respect of an animal, 
the person accused of the offence is not guilty of the offence if the person satisfies the court 
that the act or omission in respect of which the proceedings are being taken was done, 
authorized to be done or omitted to be done by that person: 
Where, at the time when the offence is alleged to have been committed, the animal was: 
 
a. A stock animal – in the course of, and for the purpose of, ear-marking or ear-tagging 
the animal or branding, other than firing or hot iron branding the face of, the animal 
 
b. A pig of less than 2 months of age or a stock animal of less than 6 months of age 
which belongs to a class of animals comprising cattle, sheep or goats – in the course 
of, and for the purpose of, castrating the animal, 
 
c. A goat of less than 1 month of age or a stock animal of less than 12 months of age 
which belongs to the class of animal comprising cattle – in the course of, and for the 
purpose of, dehorning the animal, 
 
d. A sheep of less than 6 months of age – in the course of, and for the purpose of, tailing 
the animal, or 
 
e. A sheep of less than 12 months of age – in the course of, and for the purpose of, 
performing the Mules operation upon the animal, 
 
In a manner than inflicted no unnecessary pain upon the animal. 
These provisions operate as a legal fiction. To illustrate precisely how, I look exclusively at 
section 24(e).This provision operates as a fiction in two ways: it deems it to be ‘non-cruelty’ 
to perform a mules operation upon a sheep of less than 12 months of age, and it also makes a 
sheep of less than 12 months of age, in this particular context, a ‘non-animal’ for the purposes 
of this legislation. In doing so it engages in a positive legal deeming based on knowingly 
false premises: cruelty is deemed not be cruelty, and a sheep is deemed not to be an animal. 
Moreover, the very fact that the law explicitly says it is not cruelty towards an animal to 
perform such a procedure reveals that it in fact is. If it were not, there would be no need for 
provision 24(e) because the act of mulesing a sheep under the age of 12 months would not be 
prohibited by the general provisions of the Act which prohibit unnecessary cruelty. 
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2. What is Mulesing? 
Mulesing is described in the scientific literature as a method of preventing flystrike, which 
occurs when the ‘larvae of the blowfly infest the skin and fleece of a sheep, resulting in both 
mechanical and chemical damage to the tissue and a substantial stress response in the 
animal’.
76
 Flystrike typically occurs in the ano-gential region of sheep in the moist and dirty 
wool of the surrounding area.
77
 It is typically fatal if left untreated.
78
  Mulesing, as a method 
of preventing flystrike, is described as a ‘surgical procedure that involves cutting away the 
skin around the tail and perineum, with resulting scar tissue providing a bare surface that is 
resistance to flystrike’.
79
 It is routinely performed without anaesthetic or pain relief, and 
‘almost always’ in conjunction with other painful surgical procedures such as tail docking.
80
  
3. Why Mulesing is Cruel 
Mulesing is cruel because it is performed in preference to less invasive measures for reasons 
of human convenience and economic efficiency. Whilst the need to reduce instances of 
flystrike is clear, the use of mulesing to achieve this end is unjustifiable. In chapter four, I 
demonstrated that even from a legal perspective, financial gain alone is not an adequate basis 
for justifying an act of cruelty towards a nonhuman animal as ‘necessary’.
81
 Alternative 
methods of preventing flystrike include the use of insecticides, or the practice of ‘crutching’ 
to remove excessive wool (but not skin) in the vulnerable region of the body. Such 
alternatives have been described as ‘labour intensive’ because they provide only temporary 
protection and require repeating on a recurrent basis.
82
 Mulesing, however, despite providing 
a more permanent solution, has known poor animal welfare outcomes. Not only does it cause 
acute pain at the time of the procedure, but studies have revealed lambs that have been 
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mulesed can suffer for weeks following the procedure.
83
 While topical analgesics are now 
available for use, their use is not mandated, and they do not provide analgesia during the 
operation itself, nor do they provide lasting effects that cover the period of ‘pain and 
discomfort that follows mulesing’.
84
 
Animal welfare organisations are vocal in their opposition to the practice of mulesing 
because of the cruelty it involves. The RSPCA has ‘called for a greater commitment from 
wool producers’ to find alternative strategies for preventing flystrike.
85
 People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (‘PETA’) contend that ‘better husbandry’ can alleviate the risk of 
flystrike without the need for mulesing.
86
 New Zealand Primary Industries have now 
proposed new animal welfare regulations, which make it a criminal offence for anybody other 
than a veterinarian to mules a sheep.
87
 During public consultation, the provisions received 75 
submissions from the public, 92% of which supported the ban.
88
 The New Zealand 
Veterinary Association policy on mulesing also describes it as an ‘unacceptable procedure’.
 89
 
They do ‘not condone the use of the procedure in New Zealand in any 




Following an international PETA campaign targeting the mulesing of sheep by Australian 
wool producers,
91
 several international apparel retailers, including H&M, Adidas and Hugo 
Boss pledged to stop purchasing Australian grown wool from mulesed sheep.
92
 In response, 
the Australian Wool Growers Association announced a commitment by Australian sheep and 
wool industry leaders to phase out the practice of mulesing by the year 2010, which they did 
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 At the time of writing, mulesing is still commonplace in the Australian wool 
industry, although alternative permanent solutions such as selective breeding to develop 
sheep without the vulnerable skin folds continue to be pursued.
94
  
4. Identifying the Legal Fiction 
Section 24(e) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) is operating as a legal 
fiction because it deems a known-to-be cruel act against a nonhuman animal to be ‘not-
cruelty’ against a ‘non-animal’. It does so to serve a clear legal purpose. Namely, the 
exemption of the mulesing practice from the protective reach of the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals Act 1979 (NSW). 
It is necessary to be quite clear about what the law is doing here. The law is not simply saying 
that mulesing is ‘cruelty’ that we deem reasonable, or that we deem necessary – and therefore 
should be viewed as lawful. The law is positively deeming something that is known to be 
false to be true: an act of cruelty is deemed in law as not an act of cruelty, as the very same 
Act defines it. It thus invokes a legal fiction to exempt sheep exposed to the mules operation 
from the protective reach of the anti-cruelty provisions contained within the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW). 
D. Express Exclusions 
The third legal mechanism that is utilised by Australian animal welfare legislation to declare 
‘inaction’ with respect to certain forms of cruelty is the express exclusion. My focus in this 
chapter is the exclusion of ‘accepted animal husbandry procedures’ from the scope of anti-
cruelty provisions in both Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory.  
The Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) contains the provision: 
a person must not be cruel to an animal’.
95
 Section 23 however, provides a defence where the 
act was done ‘in accordance with generally accepted animal husbandry practice, other than a 
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prescribed practice, that is used in (i) farming or grazing activities; (ii) the management of 
zoos, wildlife parks or similar establishments; (iii) the management of animal breeding 
establishments; or (iv) the training of animals’,  
and is performed in a ‘humane manner’.
96
 The  Australian Capital Territory Animal Welfare 
Act 1992 (ACT) contains an almost identical provision, though it applies more narrowly only 
to conduct that constitutes the carrying out of a medical or surgical procedure on a nonhuman 
animal by a person other than a veterinarian.
 97
 
The term ‘accepted animal husbandry practice’ is not defined by either Act, and therefore 
seemingly excludes any practice that is accepted by the community of persons who engage in 
animal husbandry of a given type, as long as it does not constitute a prescribed practice.
98
 
This exclusion therefore represents a declaration of legal inaction with respect to any activity 
that is considered 'normal’ or ‘routine’ by those who engage in a particular cruel practice.
99
 
The result is that it is industry which articulates what constitutes ‘cruelty’ in certain contexts, 
rather than animal welfare legislation that purports to prohibit it. According to Katrina 
Sharman, industry therefore dictates its own standards surrounding what constitutes the 
‘cruel’ treatment of nonhuman animals.
100
 This express exclusion offered to ‘accepted animal 
husbandry procedures’ therefore facilitates cruelty to nonhuman animals. These procedures 
are deemed legitimate purely because they are used routinely and widely by those within a 
certain industry that use nonhuman animals.
101
 So long as cruelty is considered ‘normal’ by 
those who practise it, the nonhuman animals who are exposed to such cruelty are removed 
from the protective reach of Australian animal welfare legislation. Ruth Harrison explains:  
[i]f one person is unkind to an animal it is considered to be cruelty, but where a lot of people 
are unkind to animals, especially in the name of commerce, the cruelty is condoned and, once 
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It is necessary to include this exclusion only because the conduct that it expressly excludes is 
in fact cruel.
103
 The law is silent with respect to the suffering of these nonhuman animals, and 
is therefore complicit in it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have argued that the law’s inactivity with respect to certain forms of cruelty 
reveals a deliberate and conscious decision to be complicit in those types of cruelty. I have 
identified three legal mechanisms in Australian animal welfare legislation that are utilised to 
declare such inaction: inadequate legal definitions, legal fictions, and express exclusions. 
Each of these mechanisms operate to exclude nonhuman animals from the protective reach of 
Australian animal welfare legislation. Such exclusion does not constitute a ‘gap’ in the law, 
but rather reflects a policy of inaction towards some of the worst cruelties towards nonhuman 
animals. The law is thus complicit in the suffering of the nonhuman animals who endure this 
lawful cruelty.  
In the following chapter, I describe another way in which Australian animal welfare law is 
facilitating cruelty towards nonhuman animals. Namely, by generating and sustaining and a 
myth of ‘animal protection’. This myth facilitates cruelty by communicating to the Australian 
public that Australian animal welfare laws are doing something that they are not. I argue that 
this myth not only facilitates cruelty by concealing it, but also by legitimating it.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
‘Anti-animal cruelty statutes throughout the Western world are amazing in their 
capacity to appear to support one principle while containing clauses that actually 
generate a completely different outcome. They would be most poetically 
beautiful in their ability to defy logic were it not for the sad fact that these 




In the previous chapter, I argued that Australian animal welfare legislation declares inaction 
with respect to some forms of cruelty. I identified three legal mechanisms through which 
such a declaration is made: statutory definitions, legal fictions and express exclusions. These 
mechanisms are explicitly used to carve out types of cruelty that are not protected by 
Australian animal welfare legislation. Australian animal welfare laws therefore contain an 
express declaration of ‘inaction’ with respect to some of the worst forms of cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals. Such inaction is an active stance, and the law is thus complicit in the 
cruelty that it fails to prohibit.  
In this chapter, I describe another way in which Australian animal welfare law is facilitating 
cruelty towards nonhuman animals. Having demonstrated that Australian animal welfare 
legislation systematically fails to meet its objective of prohibiting cruelty towards nonhuman 
animals, here I contend that Australian animal welfare legislation generates a ‘myth’ of 
animal protection. I call it a myth for two reasons. First, because it holds out the promise of 
prohibiting cruelty towards nonhuman animals, and systematically fails to meet this promise. 
Second, because it is a powerful story that informs the significance that can be attached to the 
animal welfare legislation in Australia.
2
 The myth of animal protection is a story that 
legitimates cruelty, by informing the way that we that perceive the laws that purport to 
prohibit it.  
The myth of animal protection makes cruelty towards nonhuman animals invisible. The law 
communicates to the public that it prohibits cruelty towards nonhuman animals, and the 
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public therefore may form the false believe that the law fulfils this stated purpose. In holding 
this false belief, the public remain unaware of the cruelty that Australian animal welfare laws 
permit. My suggestion is that if people do not know that nonhuman animals are suffering 
lawful cruelty, then they cannot oppose it. I develop this theme further in the following 
chapter, where I consider how Australian animal welfare laws and Codes of Practice interact 
with legislation that may stifle animal activists who seek to expose lawful cruelty to the 
Australian public. 
This chapter is divided into four parts. In the first part, I explain how the myth of animal 
protection facilitates cruelty towards nonhuman animals. I distinguish my argument in this 
chapter and the next from other arguments that seek to make the mere visibility of cruelty 
towards nonhuman animals a sufficient condition for change. Instead, I suggest only that it is 
a necessary one. In the second part, I explain the first way in which the myth of animal 
protection is created and sustained by Australian animal welfare legislation and Codes of 
Practice. My argument is that animal welfare statutes and Codes of Practice serve two 
different functions, and that these functions are kept separate, and are addressed to different 
audiences. The result is that as it stands alone; animal welfare legislation falsely appears to 
provide strong protections for all nonhuman animals. Yet, Codes operate in tandem to erode 
the content of these protections for nonhuman animals that are kept and killed to serve human 
purposes. They do so discretely, as they contain provisions that are kept separate from 
general anti-cruelty provisions, and are addressed specifically to those who are engaged in 
cruelty towards nonhuman animals. 
In the third part, I demonstrate a second way in which Australian animal welfare legislation 
and Codes of Practice generate a myth of animal protection. My argument in this part is that 
both animal welfare legislation and Codes of Practice fail to communicate fairly and honestly 
what they are doing. They appear to prohibit cruelty at the same time as they explicitly permit 
it. I argue that the meaning given to the term ‘cruelty’ in Australian animal welfare legislation 
is unclear and misleading, and Codes of Practice use ‘weasel words’ which deflect from the 
fact that they permit cruelty. In presenting a false image of what they allow, Australian 
animal welfare laws and Codes of Practice both sustain a myth of animal protection. 
In the fourth part, I shift my focus and look at the enforcement mechanisms provided by 
Australian animal welfare legislation. My claim in this section is that even those provisions 
that do offer animals some form of protection from cruelty are not accompanied by adequate 
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enforcement mechanisms. I focus my discussion in this part on the role of the RSPCA in 
enforcing animal welfare legislation, and make three key claims regarding inadequate 
enforcement. First, that Animal welfare legislation provides the RSPCA with inadequate 
enforcement powers which not only result in poor enforcement of animal welfare laws, but 
serve to necessitate such poor enforcement. Second, that the RSPCA is an underfunded 
charity, meaning that they cannot respond to all reports of animal cruelty. Third, that there 
exists a significant question regarding whether the RSPCA is well placed to enforce 
Australian animal welfare legislation at all, since they possess conflicting interests. These 
three factors combined demonstrate that Australian animal welfare legislation generates a 
myth of animal protection, not only by providing a false image of animal protection, but also 
by providing insufficient mechanisms to enforce the inadequate protections they contain. 
II. INVISIBILITY FACILITATES CRUELTY: THE PROBLEM WITH THE MYTH OF 
ANIMAL PROTECTION 
The starting point for this chapter and the next is that making animal cruelty invisible 
facilitates that cruelty. Cruelty that is out of sight, is cruelty that is out of mind. It is necessary 
at the outset of this chapter to distinguish my argument from others that have been made 
previously. My claim is not that visibility alone is a sufficient condition for the abolition of 
cruelty towards nonhuman animals. Rather, my argument is that visibility and transparency 
are necessary to achieve change for nonhuman animals. Simply, if people do not know that 
nonhuman animals are suffering lawful cruelty, then they cannot object to it.    
The relationship between visibility and change for nonhuman animals is more complex than 
has been suggested by some thinkers. Paul McCartney, for example, claimed that ‘if 
slaughterhouses had glass walls, everyone would be vegetarian’.
3
 In making this statement, 
McCartney drew a direct link between visibility and the abolition of cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals. He implies that the visibility of cruelty is a sufficient condition for 
alleviating it. If people see cruelty towards nonhuman animals, they will necessarily oppose it.  
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Drawing such a direct link between ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing’ is inherent in our everyday 
language: 
If we grasp an idea, we say ‘I see’….When we make sense of something, we may ‘observe’ it 
to be so. If someone ‘sheds light’ on a problem, they help to explain it. Should they persuade 
us to change our minds, we say we have come ‘to see’ the situation ‘in a different light’. Our 
language is peppered with metaphors linking vision with knowledge. Seeing it seems is 
knowing as well as believing.
4
 
However, the relationship between what we see, what we know, and how we know it is much 
more complex. It is not sufficient that one merely sees cruelty towards a nonhuman animal 
for that person to oppose it. There is a step between ‘seeing’ and ‘opposing’. In some 
instances, human beings actually take pleasure in witnessing cruelty towards nonhuman 
animals. Rodeos are one obvious example, in which nonhuman animals (typically horses and 
cattle) are provoked into displaying ‘wild’ behaviours for the purposes of being captured and 
restrained by human participants. The method of provocation varies, but often involves the 
use of spurs and flank straps to inflict pain.
5
 Rodeos have been described by the RSPCA as 
‘inherently inhumane’.
6
 Yet, they remain a lawful form of entertainment in all jurisdictions of 
Australia except the Australian Capital Territory.
7
 
There are numerous reasons why a person who is witness to cruelty may not immediately 
oppose it. According to Peggy Larson, education may play an important role. In the context 
of rodeos, Larson contends ‘[i]t takes knowledge of livestock and awareness of the animal in 
the rodeo event to understand that these animals are being injured’.
8
 An observer who lacks 
this knowledge may therefore not perceive what they witness at a rodeo event as cruel.  
Those who make a profit from the rodeo business may also deem the cruelty that is involved 
as justifiable.
9
 Cruelty towards nonhuman animals is more readily rationalised and justified 
by those who have a strong interest in continuing it. As I argued in chapter four, the 
prohibition on unnecessary cruelty in animal welfare legislation prohibits only those acts of 
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cruelty that serve illegitimate human interests, or which serve legitimate human interests by 
unreasonable means.
10
 This prohibition thus reflects the view that it is possible to justify 
cruelty where a human interest is at stake. In chapter six, I also talked about the operation of a 
legal fiction that deems the overtly cruel practice of mulesing to be ‘non-cruelty’.
11
 In that 
context, the deeming again legitimates a human economic interest mulesing, and in doing so 
justifies an act of egregious cruelty towards sheep. 
Another reason why a person who witnesses cruelty may not contest it is that the observation 
of cruelty may not be their focus. If we are not focused on something, we may fail to see it, 
even if it is seemingly overtly visible. Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons have called 
this phenomenon ‘inattentional blindness’.
12
 Chabris and Simons developed the concept of 
inattentional blindness in conjunction with an experiment conducted at Harvard University, 
which asked participants to observe video footage of six people playing with a basketball. 
Three of the players in the video were dressed in white, and three were dressed in black. The 
participants were asked to count how many passes of the ball were made between players 
wearing white shirts. They were thus instructed to focus only on the white shirt players in the 
video footage. During the video, as two balls were passed around between the players, a man 
dressed in a gorilla costume passed directly through the game. He stopped in the centre of the 
video to thump his chest, and then moved off screen. The study revealed that a majority 
(66%) of participants did not notice the gorilla passing through the game. These people were 
so focused on observing the ball as it passed between the players dressed in white that they 
did not see a seemingly obvious gorilla passing right through the centre of the scene. To 
explain this phenomenon, Simons and Chabris concluded: ‘we perceive and remember only 
those objects and details that receive focused attention’.
13
 We are ‘inattentionally blind’ to 
that which we elect not to focus on. It is possible to see how this phenomenon may occur in 
the context of rodeos. A person who is focused on observing a stockperson’s ‘mastery’ of 
animals may focus their attention entirely on his skills and speed. They may remain 
inattentionally blind to the suffering of the animal, even though it is occurring before their 
very eyes. 
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In the context of an American slaughterhouse, Timothy Pachirat has also explored the 
concept of visibility. According to Pachirat, even though a slaughterhouse offers apparent 
conditions of total visibility of cruelty towards nonhuman animals, ‘isolation and 
sequestration are possible’.
14
 A portion of Pachirat’s study focuses on the Quality Control 
worker in the slaughterhouse. This worker has physical access to the entire slaughterhouse, 
and thus has visual access to the entire slaughter process. Yet, Pachirat contends, even the 
overt acts of cruelty that the Quality Control officer witnesses remain invisible if they offer 
no ‘visceral engagement’ with it.
15
 Unlike Simons and Chabris, Pachirat does not suggest that 
the cruelty is literally invisible to the Quality Control worker. Rather, he is concerned with 
the extent to which cruelty can be so overtly visible, but not perceived by the viewer as 
cruelty. In the slaughterhouse environment, Pachirat contends cruelty is normalised and 
bureaucratised, to the point that it no longer appears as cruelty.  In such a context, ‘sight and 
concealment work together and quarantine is possible even under conditions of total 
visibility’.
16
 He details the operations of a Quality Control worker within a slaughterhouse to 
illustrate his point: 
The QC [Quality Control worker] looks at workers but sees failures to sanitize knives. The 
QC looks at and listens to cattle, but sees statistics on slips, falls, and vocalizations – 
quantifiable data points within a technical procedure designed to facilitate rather than 
confront the work of killing...the QC becomes an exemplary instances of how experiential 
compartmentalization is produced even, and perhaps especially, under conditions of total 
visibility.
17 
Pachirat also talks about employees in the slaughterhouse who are directly confronted with 
the task of killing. These workers allow themselves to be overcome by a ‘hypnotic numbness’ 
to the work that they are doing.
18
 This numbness, he claims, is fundamental to their 
wellbeing. It allows them to lose track of time, and relieves the psychological discomfort 
inherent in their work.
19
 A refusal to viscerally engage with cruelty that places workers at 
such risk may therefore be self-protective. At the same time, it operates as a means of 
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distorting cruelty such that even the most overt instances of cruelty do not appear to the 
viewer to be cruel. 
Whilst it is not within the scope of this chapter to further elucidate the complex relationship 
between visibility and invisibility, the above discussion serves to highlight the complexities 
of the relationship between seeing cruelty, and demanding change for nonhuman animals. 
With these complexities in mind, my argument in this chapter and the next is simply that 
invisibility facilitates cruelty towards nonhuman animals. It does so because it precludes the 
public from knowing how nonhuman animals are treated. And, as O’Sullivan puts it, 
‘decisions cannot be made in the absence of information.
20
 I establish the link between 
information and change for nonhuman animals in chapter eight.  
A. How the Myth of Animal Protection Sustains Invisibility 
According to Tamie Bryant, myths are part of every society, and they are means by which 
societies ‘define and inspire themselves’.
21
 Myths then are not deliberate lies or falsehoods, 
but are ‘imaginative patterns, networks of powerful symbols that suggest particular ways of 
interpreting the world’.
22
 Myths play a powerful role in shaping our thinking and how we give 
meaning to things. Mary Midgley contends they are ‘an integral part of our thought-structure’, 
and play a crucial role in how we interpret the world around us.
23
 Importantly then, they are 
more than ‘a surface dressing of isolated metaphors’ operating in the real world. Rather, 
myths govern precisely how ‘we imagine the world’.
24
 They dictate how we access it, and 
determine ‘what we think important in it’.
25
 They define ‘what we select for our attention 
among the welter of facts that constantly flood upon us’ in the world.
26
 It is thus important to 
think critically about the ‘myths that we live by’, since it is in virtue of these myths that we 
‘form our official, literal, thoughts and descriptions’ of the world around us.
27
  
Even though myths play a central role in shaping how we view the world around us, they 
should not be understood only as grand, overarching ideologies by which we live our lives. 
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Myths also operate in the context of our ordinary, everyday interactions with the world. One 
such myth, and the myth that I am concerned with in this chapter, is the myth of animal 
protection. This myth holds not only that we are actually, protecting nonhuman animals from 
cruelty. It also sustains much bigger ideas about who we are as people, and the kinds of laws 
that we have in place to protect the nonhuman animals that we care for. In chapter six, I 
detailed some of the truth claims that I contend are made by the key provisions of animal 
welfare laws in New South Wales which purport to prohibit cruelty. I explained that those 
provisions are not merely a series of words confined to a statute to serve a legal purpose and 
to protect nonhuman animals, but that they are thought to reflect important truths about our 
very nature: our ‘compassion’,
 
our ‘humanity’ and our concern for those nonhuman animals 
that are at our mercy.
28
 The myth of animal protection therefore is a story that reflects a set of 
shared ideas not only about what we are doing to protect nonhuman animals, but how we are 
doing it, and who we are as people. 
The problem with the myth of animal protection is that Australian animal welfare laws and 
Codes of Practice simply do not protect nonhuman animals from cruelty. Moreover, I have 
consistently argued they actively facilitate and permit some of worst cruelties towards them. 
The myth of animal protection is thus at odds with the reality of what we are really doing to 
nonhuman animals, and how we are doing it. We are failing to protect them from cruelty, and 
we are failing to live up to our own stated ideal of being compassionate people that are 
concerned for the welfare of those creatures vulnerable than us. The myth of animal 
protection however serves to facilitate and legitimate our cruel treatment of nonhuman 
animals. It does so in two ways. 
First, the myth of animal protection makes it seem as though Australian animal welfare laws 
and Codes of Practice are doing something that they are not. In this sense, the myth conceals 
or diverts our attention away from the facts of the matter. Simply, we may not realise that our 
animal welfare laws are permitting cruelty, because they say that they prohibit it. The myth of 
animal protection therefore represents a ‘widespread misconception’ that Australian animal 
welfare laws are operating to protect all nonhuman animals from harm.
29
 This misconception 
facilitates cruelty by precluding opportunities for the normative scrutiny of animal welfare 
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practices. If people believe that Australian animal welfare laws are doing something that they 
are not, then they have no reason to oppose the cruelty that they permit. In the American 
context, Gary Francione presents the problem thus: 
On the one hand, it appears clear that most people strongly condemn, on moral grounds, the 
mistreatment of animals. On the other hand, although our written laws ostensibly reflect this 
concern, the legal system in practice seems to be completely unresponsive to that moral 
sentiment and permits any use of animals, however abhorrent’.
30
 
Second, the myth facilitates and legitimates the view that lawful acts of cruelty are 
compatible with the notion that we are animal ‘protectors’. In this sense, the myth operates as 
a story that tells us that we are compassionate people who take care of nonhuman animals, 
and that these qualities are reflected in law. The myth legitimates cruelty by shaping the way 
that we perceive the provisions which permit cruelty. As Wiseman and Smith define it, 
‘[l]egitimation is the process by which social knowledge explains and justifies prevailing 
social reality’.
31
 The myth of animal protection therefore legitimates cruelty by explaining 
and justifying it according to the ideals that are upheld by the myth itself. In this sense, the 
myth of animal protection facilitates the view that cruelty is, as a matter of fact, synonymous 
with animal protection. In other words, cruelty is not cruelty, because it is ‘animal 
protection’. This point connects directly with the point that I made in chapter six with respect 
to mulesing. Australian animal welfare laws reflect important human values surrounding how 
we treat nonhuman animals. Mulesing is not only deemed ‘non-cruelty’ when it is explicitly 
permitted by law, but it can also be perceived as non-cruelty when viewed in light of the 
myth of animal protection.  The myth provides that Australian animal welfare laws reflect our 
compassion towards nonhuman animals, and our desire to protect them from cruelty. When 
the very same laws that ostensibly reflect these concerns also permit mulesing, they 
legitimate that cruelty by calling it non-cruelty. The law makes the act of mulesing 
compatible with animal protection law.  
It is possible to find numerous examples of the myth of animal protection serving to justify 
and legitimate acts of cruelty. For example, the National Secretary of the Australian Meat 
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Industry Employee’s Union, Graham Smith, has described the slaughter of nonhuman 
animals in Australia as being humane, and safeguarded by regulations that are ‘extremely 
strict…because people in Australia have a high expectation that the animals are going to be 
looked after’.
 32
 With respect to the use of painful electric prodders to move cattle into the 
slaughterhouse, he replied, ‘there are regulations to stop you hurting the animals with 
prodders’.
33
 Yet, in reality, the new standards and guidelines merely require a person using a 
prodder to ‘consider the welfare of cattle’, and state that it must not be used on particular 
types of the body (e.g. the genitals and face) or on cattle who are unable to move away.
34
 
These regulations do not prohibit cruelty, nor do they prohibit a person hurting cattle with a 
prodder. They merely ‘regulate’ the cruelty – and in doing so, serve to legitimate it. 
III. THE LAYERING OF LAWS 
Having established how the myth of animal protection facilitates cruelty, I now turn to 
explain how this myth of generated, sustained and legitimated by Australian animal welfare 
laws, regulations and Codes of Practice. In this part, I consider the physical 
compartmentalisation of provisions that permit cruelty from those that prohibit it, to 
demonstrate how such separation sustains a false message about what animal welfare laws 
are doing.  
At first glance, farm animals appear to be the subject of state-based animal welfare 
provisions. For example, the South Australian Animal Welfare Act 1985 provides the simple 
and clear statement:  ‘A person who ill-treats an animal is guilty of an offence’.
35
 An ‘animal’ 
is defined by the same Act as ‘any member of any species of the sub-phylum vertebrata’ 
except for a human being or a fish.
36
 Vertebrate farm animals (such as cattle, poultry, pigs 
and sheep) thus are covered by this general provision. Yet, in practice, most of these animals 
consistently fall ‘beyond the protective reach of the law’.
37
 In chapter four, I explained how 
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Codes of Practice, and the defences and exemptions that they provide for treating a 
nonhuman animal cruelly, consistently make lawful many acts of cruelty. Cao describes 
Codes of Practice as enshrining a ‘double standard in the legislation whereby farm animals 
are afforded substantially less protection than those animals that are not considered crucial to 
industrialised food production’.
38
 This legal double standard has also been observed by the 
Fremantle Magistrates Court, in which Magistrate Musk observed: 
A lot more is tolerated towards animals in business and industry than would otherwise be 
tolerated say towards a domestic pet. For example, it’s difficult to imagine any circumstances 
where the use of a cattle prodder on a pet dog would ever be tolerated by anybody in society 
but it’s a different standard, with respect to industry and business…[and]…a lot more people 
find aspects of industry cruel but the politics of law doesn’t.
39
 
The way in which animal welfare is regulated in Australia serves to conceal this double 
standard, and therefore sustains the myth that Australian animal welfare laws are protecting 
farm animals. The provisions which permit cruelty are generally contained within regulations 
or Codes of Practice, which are physically separate from the provisions of Australian animal 
welfare legislation which purport to prohibit it. Moreover, the provisions of Australian animal 
welfare legislation that give legal force to Codes of Practice are typically far removed from 
the other provisions within the same statute which claim to protect nonhuman animals. In 
South Australia for example, a single provision contained with the Animal Welfare Act 1985 
(SA) provides: ‘[n]othing in this Act renders unlawful anything done in accordance with a 
prescribed code of practice relating to animals’.
40
 Despite the egregious cruelty that is made 
lawful by the operation of this single provision, the provision itself sits discretely towards the 
end of the Act, under the ‘miscellaneous’ division. Thus, the key provisions of the South 
Australian animal welfare statute that appear to provide vast protections for all nonhuman 
animals, including farm animals, are physically isolated from the single powerful provision 
which permits forms of  cruelty that comply with Codes of Practice. This physical 
compartmentalisation of the laws that prohibit cruelty and those that permit it serves to 
facilitate the myth that the key protective provisions of Australian animal welfare legislation 
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operate to protect all nonhuman animals form harm. Viewed in isolation, Australian animal 
welfare laws genuinely appear to prohibit cruelty towards all nonhuman animals. 
In addition to the fact that Codes of Practice separately permit cruelty, they also only address 
those who work in the industries that are routinely cruel towards nonhuman animals and are 
therefore intended only to be read by that audience. The Model Code of Practice for the 
Welfare of Animals: Pigs, addresses ‘all people responsible for the welfare of pigs’.
41
 The 
Model Code for the Welfare of Animals: Poultry, is a guide ‘intended…for people involved in 
the care and management of poultry’.
42
 The Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of 
Animals: Livestock at Slaughtering Establishments is for ‘all people…involved in the 
management of animals of various species at slaughtering establishments (abattoirs, 
slaughter-houses and knackeries)’.
43
 The fact that Codes are addressed only to specific 
persons working in specific industries reflects the reason that Codes were developed in the 
first instance. As I explained in chapter four,
44
 Codes were originally developed so that 
industry could be governed by a separate, detailed set of standards. The Codes were intended 
to alleviate increasing public concern for the welfare of nonhuman animals, and to give those 
who were ‘specialists’ in their respective field the ability to dictate their own animal welfare 
standards. 
Australian animal welfare statutes, by contrast, are addressed to the public. As I explained in 
chapter two, many of the obligations in Australian animal welfare legislation apply to all 
persons, regardless of whether they are the owner of a nonhuman animal. The duties that are 
contained with Australian animal welfare legislation are thus directed to all members of the 
Australian public, and not only a select few who deal with particular species in specific 
contexts. For example, the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) provides ‘a person 
must not be cruel to an animal’.
45
 In Tasmania, the prohibition on causing an animal 
‘unreasonable or unjustifiable pain of suffering’ also applies broadly to ‘person[s]’.
46
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Animal welfare legislation also generally has a strong public face. State government websites 
typically direct the public to animal welfare statutes as a way of providing information on 
animal welfare. In South Australia, for example, the government webpage on animal welfare 
reads ‘[a]nimals in South Australia must be treated in accordance with the Animal Welfare 
Act 1985 and the Animal Welfare Regulations 2012’.
47
 The webpage also provides that 
‘anyone who ill-treats an animal is guilty of an offence’.
48
 However, the webpage does not 
contain any reference to the operation of Codes of Practice. Yet, for those species who are 
kept and killed for human purposes, it is Codes of Practice, and not animal welfare legislation 
that primarily dictates how they may lawfully be treated, and therefore is the primary source 
of information for legal requirements pertaining to their welfare. 
Although I have addressed the complexities of enforcing Codes of Practice,
49
 they largely 
operate to give meaning to what constitutes ‘cruelty’ in any given case.  While nonhuman 
animals that are governed by a Code are typically also contained within the definition of 
‘animal’ in welfare statutes, they are also largely excluded from all the protections those 
statutes offer. Thus, the notion that ‘animal welfare’ in Australia is predominantly governed 
by animal welfare statute is misleading. Any suggestion that the protections within these 
statutes protect nonhuman animals is true only insofar as they are nominally included within 




The general provisions of animal welfare statutes will therefore generally only apply to an 
animal governed by a Code if they have been ill-treated in excess of what Codes already 
allow. Thus, the prohibition on ill-treating a nonhuman animal in South Australia does not 
prohibit the act of killing an intensively farmed rabbit by cervical dislocation (i.e. breaking 
the neck), because such a method is permitted by the applicable Code.
51
 The general statutory 
provision that prohibits ill-treatment may however apply where a person kills a rabbit using 
an alternative method that causes it to suffer over an extended period. It is possible to see 
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therefore how the applicable Code of Practice effectively operates to define ‘ill-treatment’ in 
this context.  
Given that Codes of Practice play such a defining role in how nonhuman animals may 
lawfully be treated, it is troubling that it is generally only Australian animal welfare statutes 
that are presented as the ‘face’ of animal welfare in Australia. The South Australian 
Government website provides information on animal welfare with respect to the Animal 
Welfare Act 1985 (SA). Yet, intensively farmed rabbits, as I have mentioned, are 
predominantly governed by different standards, namely the Model Code of Practice for the 
Welfare of Animals: Intensive Husbandry of Rabbits. Given that this is a prescribed Code of 
Practice in South Australia,
52
 the treatment of intensively farmed rabbits is exempted from 
the general anti-cruelty provisions by section 43 of the Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA), which 
I discussed above.
53
 Under this Model Code, intensively farmed rabbits of 12 weeks age or 
older may be confined indoors in cages allowing them a floor space of 1800cm
2 
for the 
duration of their lives.
54
 This gives than a living space only slightly larger than the size of two 
A4 sheets of paper (each of surface area approximately 861cm
2
). The RSPCA maintains that 
such confinement is contrary to rabbit welfare, given that it ‘prevents them from moving 
freely and does not satisfy their behavioural, social and physiological needs’.
55
 Thus, the 
notion that their welfare is protected by the general provisions of the Animal Welfare Act 
1985 (SA) is misleading and generates a myth of animal protection. 
What this example serves to illustrate is that the physical compartmentalisation of the key 
provisions which permit cruelty in Codes of Practice from those which prohibit it in animal 
welfare statute, serves to generate a myth that Australian animal welfare legislation is 
operating to genuinely protect nonhuman animals from harm. Viewed in isolation, it appears 
that Australian animal welfare statutes provide rigid protections for all nonhuman animals – 
including intensively farmed rabbits. Yet, as numerous examples throughout this thesis have 
demonstrated, Codes of Practice operate in tandem with animal welfare statute to erode the 
meaningful content of the protections they offer. The result, I suggest, is that the physical 
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separation of provisions which enable and prohibit cruelty generates a myth of animal 
protection. 
IV. UNFAIR LABELS AND WEASEL WORDS 
 
A second way in which Australian animal welfare legislation generates a myth of animal 
protection is through the use of language which fails to communicate precisely what the law 
allows. The law should communicate clearly and honestly with the citizens that it governs. 
Lon Fuller stated that ‘[t]he desideratum of clarity represents one of the most essential 
ingredients of legality’, and that that ‘proposition is scarcely subject to challenge’.
56
 At its 
most simple, the requirement of clarity is what makes it possible for citizens to obey the law. 
As Fuller put it, legislation that fails to be sufficiently clear makes ‘legality unattainable by 
anyone’.
57
  John Gardner made a similar point, stating: 
…the law must be such that those subject to it can reliably be guided by it, either by avoiding 
violating it or to build the legal consequences of having violated it into their thinking about 
what future actions may be open to them. People must be able to find out what the law is and 
to factor it into their practical deliberations. The law must avoid taking people by surprise, 
ambushing them, putting them into conflict with its requirements in such a way as to defeat 
their expectations and to frustrate their plans.
58
 
In the context of the criminal law, Andrew Ashworth stated that the law must abide by the 
principle of ‘maximum certainty’,
59
 so that any member of the public can know whether their 
behaviour is criminal without the aid of a lawyer. His key idea is that the criminal law must 
provide autonomous and rational citizens with the ability to know what it requires of them, so 
that they may obey the law, or be aware of the consequences of dissenting.
60
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A. One Measure of the Law’s Clarity: The Principle of Fair Labelling 
One way of assessing the clarity of Australian animal welfare legislation is to look at the way 
in which the offences it contains are labelled. Ashworth coined the term ‘fair labelling’ in 
1981, in reference to the principle that the criminal law should communicate fairly and 
clearly with the public.
61
 Ashworth and Jeremy Horder have argued that adhering to the 
principle of ‘fair labelling’ is essential to ensuring maximum certainty.
62
 It demands that the 
distinctions that are contained within the criminal law, and represented by labels (for example 
‘rape’, ‘murder’, ‘manslaughter’) are both fair and accurate in the way in which they 
distinguish between moral wrongs and communicate those wrongs to the public. A system of 
criminal law that contained only a small number of very broad offences, such as ‘causing 
harm to another’, would thus be inadequate to the extent that the criminal label of ‘causing 
harm to another’ would fail to capture morally relevant distinctions between various types of 
conduct that amount to causing harm. It would simultaneously be used to describe contexts in 
which the ‘victim suffered death or a mere scratch’.
63
  
There are several reasons why such broad labels would be inadequate. One simple reason is 
that ‘truth is intrinsically valuable’,
64
 and that the labels used in the law should communicate 
the moral character of an offence with honesty. James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick also 
suggest that labels may limit the amount of discretion available to judges at the time of 
sentencing, by prescribing maximum sentences attached to specific offences that are clearly 
delineated from one another.
65
 A label should also be fair to an offender.
66
 Given that the 
criminal law has a ‘condemnatory function’,
67
 it seems important that the law distinguishes 
between people who cause a scratch and people who cause death. Moreover, given that a 
person’s criminal record has long lasting effects on things such as their ‘employability or 
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 it is important that the criminal law condemns offenders accurately, using 
labels that ‘fairly represent the nature of the offender’s criminality’.
69
  
The reason why fair labelling matters that is of most relevance to my discussion in this 
chapter, is that the labelling of criminal offences communicates to the public. It does so by 
‘reflect[ing] the moral judgements that the public makes about…conduct’.
70
 As such, 
Ashworth contends, ‘where people generally regard two types of conduct as different, the law 
should try and reflect that difference’.
71
 Several commentators agree. Barry Mitchell, for 
example, has described the labels attached to criminal offences as having a declaratory 
function, since they ‘communicate effectively to ordinary people the rules of acceptable and 
non-acceptable behaviour and the ways in which the criminal justice system deals with 
unacceptable behaviour’.
72
  Victor Tadros also contends there is ‘something intuitive about 
the criminal law being unfair if its distinctions are too far detached from those used in 
ordinary morality’.
73
 Australian animal welfare legislation therefore speaks not only to an 
offender when it labels an offence, but also to Australian society. The label applied to any 
animal cruelty offence casts society’s judgement onto an offender, and that judgement should 




Australian animal welfare legislation groups morally different forms of conduct together 
under the same general label. For example, under South Australian legislation, a person who 
cannot afford to seek veterinary treatment for their animal,
75
 and a person who beats a dog 
their dog with a stick
76
 could both be charged for ‘ill-treating an animal’ and thus would both 
share the same label of ‘animal ill-treater’. The legislation mandates this grouping, with ‘ill-
treatment’ being defined in the legislation as covering a very wide range of offences against 
nonhuman animals, many of which seem morally different in character to each other. 
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Certainly, all forms of ‘ill-treatment’ listed in the South Australian Act result in harm towards 
a nonhuman animal, and should rightfully be prohibited by legislation that seeks to prohibit 
cruelty towards nonhuman animals. What is not clear, however, is that the offences contained 
within the South Australian Act adequately distinguish between different types of offending. 
The principle of fair labelling requires that the criminal law makes such distinctions, not only 
to reflect society’s sentiments surrounding morally distinct forms of wrongdoing against 
nonhuman animals, but also to communicate to society with precision the nature of an 
offender’s wrongdoing. 
What is more troublesome however, are not the distinctions that Australian animal welfare 
law fails to make between various types of offending, but the distinctions that it does make. 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that animal welfare legislation permits cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals, at the same time as it purports to prohibit it. Assessed with reference to 
the principle of fair labelling, this presents a significant problem. Australian animal welfare 
legislation distinguishes between various forms of wrongdoing that, ultimately, all entail 
cruelty towards nonhuman animals. A pertinent example can be found in New South Wales.  
There, the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) states that it is an act of cruelty 
to unreasonably maim (cause a disabling injury) or infuriate a nonhuman animal.
77
 At the 




Pinioning is the act of ‘permanently mutilating’ a bird to prevent flight.
79
 Section 4(2)(a) 
explicitly defines cruelty as including an act of pinioning. Yet, in the very next provision, it 
excludes the pinioning of birds in accordance with regulations which dictate how and when 
the procedure can be performed. This distinction is troubling given that pinioning in all 
instances is a form of disablement, typically achieved by a surgical procedure in which the 
part of a bird’s wing from which the flight feathers grow is partially amputated.
80
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Pinioning is generally performed so that birds may be exhibited by humans in open spaces. 
The New South Wales Government Guidelines for the Pinioning of Birds notes the ‘benefits’ 
of pinioning birds, from the perspective of an animal exhibitor, are 
that pinioned birds can be displayed in a more cost-effective way in larger, more open 
exhibits giving visitors the impression that the birds are “free”, visitors can get closer to the 
birds, it helps to ensure that the birds do not escape; and the pinioned birds may serve to 
attract additional wild birds to utilise in an open exhibit.
81
 
It has also been said that pinioning serves the interests of exhibited birds, because they may 
benefit from larger, more open enclosures, and they are prevented from flying into enclosure 
walls which may cause injury.
82
  
The guidelines provide that the procedure of pinioning, using the wingtip amputation 
methods, may be performed without anaesthetic on birds less than three days of age.
83
 Such 
amputation causes acute pain, and results in a permanent physical disability. Moreover, 
Penny Hawkins contends pinioned birds may also suffer from chronic ‘phantom limb’ pain, 
which has a ‘serious impact on the bird’s quality of life’.
84
 To be clear, the New South Wales 
Prevention of Cruelty Act 1979 (NSW) expressly states that causing a bird to be permanently 
disabled, and permanently infuriated by an inability to fly, ‘is not an act of cruelty’.
85
  
It is unclear how pinioning a bird in accordance with the regulations, which permits the 
procedure being carried out without anaesthetic, is less cruel than another instance of 
pinioning that is considered ‘cruelty’ for the purposes of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
Act 1979 (NSW). From the perspective of fair labelling, the distinction is morally arbitrary 
and serves to confuse the meaning of ‘cruelty’ as it used in the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals Act 1979 (NSW). In chapter four, I described provisions that have a similarly 
troubling effect. Recall that under section 9 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 
(NSW), it is an offence to fail to exercise an animal that has been confined to a cage, unless 
                                                 
 
81
 New South Wales Guidelines for the Pinioning of Birds s3.1. 
82
 Ibid s3.2. 
83
 Ibid 4.4. 
84
 Hawkins, above n 79, 84. 
85
 For more on why pinioning is cruel, see Elizabeth Tyson, 'For an End to Pinioning: The Case against the 
Legal Mutilation of Birds in Captivity' (2014) 4(1) Journal of Animal Ethics 1. 
Page 192 of 305 
 
the species concerned is a ‘stock animal’ or a ‘species which is usually kept in captivity by 
means of a cage’.
86
  
Distinctions of this kind serve to generate a myth of animal protection. The prohibition on 
pinioning, for example, is merely a token prohibition, because the act of pinioning is still 
lawful in the primary context in which it would be performed. The requirement that a person 
exercise a caged animal is similarly tokenistic, given that the duty does not apply if the 
confined animal is a stock animal or an animal that is ‘normally’ confined to a cage. The 
principle of fair labelling requires the law to communicate fairly and accurately with the 
public, yet it most clearly fails in this regard. Many of the prohibitions on cruelty that animal 
welfare statutes contain are tokenistic and do not accord with the sentiment that animal 
welfare legislation should reflect human compassion for nonhuman animals. 
B. Another Measure of Clarity: Weasel Words  
In addition to the fact that Australian animal welfare legislation fails to communicate clearly 
and honestly with the Australian public, Codes of Practice also fail in this regard. Codes of 
practice make use of ‘weasel words’ that deflect attention away from facts. Weasel words, by 
definition are ‘equivocating words or phrases’ that ‘rob a statement of its force’.
87
  George 
Orwell talked about such language as being ‘designed to make lies sound truthful and murder 
respectable and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind’.
88
 Don Watson notes further 
that weasel words can serve as ‘shields against attack, as camouflage to escape detection, as 
smokescreens or vapour to blind or repel anyone sniffing out the truth’.
89
  
In Australian Codes of Practice, weasel words sustain the myth of animal protection by 
conferring an image of benignity upon blatant acts of cruelty. Such an image not only serves 
to conceal the real cruelty that is inflicted on nonhuman animals, but can also operate to 
legitimate it. I now provide some examples. 
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1. Weasel Words and Animal Slaughter 
Weasel words are frequently used in Codes of Practice to describe the slaughter of nonhuman 
animals and serve two functions. They conceal cruelty by describing slaughter with ‘soothing 
and misleading words’,
90
 and they legitimate cruelty, by describing the slaughter of 
nonhuman animals in terms that makes that death sound necessary or unavoidable. The 
National Code of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos and Wallabies for 
Commercial Purposes, for example, provides guidelines not on killing, but on the 
‘harvesting’ of kangaroos and wallabies in Australia.
91
 Kangaroos are hunted ‘in the largest 
commercial slaughter of land-based wildlife on the planet’.
92
 The slaughter typically involves 
egregious cruelty, as kangaroos die over extended periods from non-fatal gunshots. Records 
from 2002 provide that an estimated 120,000 kangaroos were mis-shot,
93
 with the result that 
they suffered for an extended period. Joeys are also frequently orphaned during the slaughter. 
Although Codes of Practice require orphaned joeys to be ‘euthanased’,
94
 those joeys that have 
achieved some level of dependence from their mothers often escape hunters only to die later 
from ‘starvation, exposure or predation’.
95
 An estimated 800,000 joeys are killed as 
‘collateral damage’ of the Australian commercial kangaroo industry each year.
96
 To describe 
such cruelty as a ‘harvest’ fails to accurately convey the reality of what is happening to these 
animals. The word ‘harvest’ seemingly equates the cruel slaughter of kangaroos and 
wallabies with the morally neutral process of harvesting crops of vegetables or grain.  
Codes of Practice also commonly attach the word ‘humane’ to provisions that permit cruelty, 
to give the appearance of compassion towards nonhuman animals. The Model Code for the 
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Welfare of Animals: Poultry refers to ‘humane destruction’.
97
 Section 3.3.45 of the Australian 
Code for the Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes provides guidance on ‘humane 
killing’.
98
 The Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: Livestock at Slaughtering 




 and ‘humane 
slaughter’.
101
 The term ‘euthanasia’ is also commonly employed by Codes of Practice. The 
Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: Pigs outlines recommend procedures for 
‘emergency euthanasia’.
102
 The Code defines euthanasia as ‘causing a sudden 
unconsciousness with death occurring when unconscious and without distress, pain, fear or 
anxiety’.
103
 Yet, an acceptable and recommended method of ‘euthanasia’ for a piglet 
weighing less than 15kg in weight is blunt force to the head. In this context, the term 




The Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: Livestock at Slaughtering 
Establishments provides for the ‘efficient, considerate treatment of animals so that stress is 
minimised’ in preparation for, and during ‘humane destruction’.
105
 The Code provides ‘the 
best handling and slaughter methods to minimise stress and injury in each species’.
106
 For 
pigs, it provides several options for ‘stunning’ prior to slaughter. One ‘acceptable’ option that 
is used widely in Australia,
107
 is as follows: 
Stunning pigs by exposure to mixtures of air and carbon dioxide are also acceptable. The 
mixture recommended in Europe is currently 70% carbon dioxide by volume, and exposure is 
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recommended for 60 seconds. These recommendations may need to be modified for 
Australian conditions as experience with local conditions increases.
108
 
The use of carbon dioxide to stun pigs generally requires the pigs to be moved into a crate on 
a carousel, which is then lowered into a pit containing the carbon dioxide gas. As one crate of 
pigs sinks into the pit, another empty crate rises to the surface so that more pigs can be loaded 
in.
109
 Industry promotes this method of stunning as ‘humane’, because it takes account of the 
fact that pigs are intelligent, sensitive animals who are distressed by being separated from 
each other, handled excessively or being tightly restrained.
110
  It is also worth noting that 
from an industry perspective, this method has been associated with ‘positive effects on meat 
quality’ when compared to electrical stunning methods.
111
  
Although the Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: Livestock at Slaughtering 





scientific evidence demonstrates that it is not. The exposure of pigs to a 70% mixture of 
carbon dioxide in air has been said to ‘produce an excitation phase with movements which 
resemble escape behaviour…[which] has been considered unacceptable’.
114
 Although limited 
research suggests that some breeds of pig become unconscious before reaching this phase of 
behaviour,
115
 evidence also suggests that there is still a ‘window’ between the time at which 
unconsciousness is reached and the time at which suffering begins.
116
 The likelihood of a 
significant window of suffering is compounded by the fact that research by Temple Grandin 
indicates that the way in which different pigs react to the carbon dioxide gas is highly 
variable, and that ‘there is likely a genetic basis’ which accounts for such variation.
117
  In 
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addition, there are no legal requirements in Australia surrounding the concentration of carbon 
dioxide that must be used. An inappropriate concentration of carbon dioxide would 
necessarily increase the suffering of the pigs that are exposed to it. Scientific studies have 
also indicated that Argon gas may be a more welfare-friendly alternative, used either alone in 
high concentration or at a lower concentration in conjunction with carbon dioxide.
118
 
The European Farm Animal Welfare Committee, an independent advisory body established 
by the Government of Great Britain, has deemed carbon dioxide as ‘not acceptable’ from an 
animal welfare perspective.
119
 Pigs exposed to carbon dioxide experience irritation of the 
nasal mucosal membranes and lungs, and carbon dioxide ‘induces severe respiratory distress 
causing hyperventilation and a sense of breathlessness during the induction phrase prior to 
loss of consciousness.
120
 A 2007 study also illustrated that temporarily exposing a pig to 
carbon dioxide in a gas chamber was enough to generate within them a refusal to re-enter that 
space.
121
 This finding remained even with pigs that were familiarised with the process of 
entering and exiting the crate, and being lowered into a gas pit filled only with atmospheric 
air.
122
 This refusal demonstrates that the exposure caused them to suffer. In a similar aversion 
study, pigs were fasted for 24 hours to determine whether a food reward would motivate them 
to enter a chamber with an atmosphere of 90% carbon dioxide. None of the pigs entered.
123
  
The examples that I have just provided indicate that the use of weasel words can deflect from 
the fact that Australian Codes of Practice permit cruelty towards nonhuman animals. Pigs that 
are stunned using exposure to carbon dioxide are treated cruelly. At the same time, the very 
Code that permits such methods describe them as ‘considerate’ and ‘humane’.
124
 The use of 
such weasel words does not make the conduct any less cruel in practice. It merely serves to 
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deflect attention away from the facts. In the High Court case of Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation v Lenah Game Meats, which I discuss in the following chapter, Justice Kirby 
commented on footage which showed the lawful slaughter of possums:  
The gruesome sights and sounds of brushtail possums being slaughtered would be upsetting to 
many who might witness and hear the videotape. Doubtless the same would be true of the 
slaughter of other animals. Such conduct does not become more agreeable by the use of the 
word ‘processing’ [to describe their slaughter].
125
 
Codes of Practice also describe the cruel deaths of nonhuman animals in terms that make that 
death sound unavoidable. The use of such language serves to deflect from the fact that the 
killing is inflicted by humans to serve human interests. The Model Code of Practice for the 
Welfare of Animals: Poultry, describes male hatchlings, which are of no use to the egg 
industry, as ‘surplus hatchlings awaiting disposal’.
126
 The use of weasel words to describe the 
killing of these hatchlings makes their deaths appear as if they are inevitable or unavoidable. 
This language deflects from the fact that these hatchlings are killed at the time of hatching 
purely because they are male, and are thus of no use to the egg industry. Hatchlings ‘awaiting 
disposal’ are typically killed by gassing or ‘quick maceration’.
127
 Maceration involves the 
live grinding of male chicks in an industrial grinder.
128
 Footage of maceration collected by 
activists in Israel has been publicized with an accompanying disclaimer to the public: 
‘WARNING: disturbing content’.
129
 The Model Code for the Welfare of Animals: Domestic 
Poultry, which permits an identical practice, describes it as ‘humane’.
130
 
                                                 
 
125
 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Limited [2001] HCA 63; 208 CLR 199 AT 
[143] (per Kirby J). 
126
 Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: Domestic Poultry (4th Edition) 14.1. 
127
 Ibid 14.1. 
128
 Esther Han, 'Egg Industry Wants to Stop Grinding and Gassing Millions of Male Chicks to Death', The 
Sydney Morning Herald (Online), 11 June 2016, <http://www.smh.com.au/business/consumer-affairs/egg-
industry-wants-to-stop-grinding-and-gassing-millions-of-male-chicks-to-death-20160611-gpgy5s.html>. 
129
 Frank Chung, 'Animal Rights Group Releases Undercover Video Showing Baby Chick 'Maceration'', News 




 Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: Domestic Poultry (4th Edition) 14.1 
Page 198 of 305 
 
2. Weasel Words with Respect to Living Conditions 
The term ‘housing’ also appears frequently in Codes of Practice.
131
 According to Arran 
Stibbe, discourse surrounding the housing of nonhuman animal is often constructed to make 
humans appear as though they are an animal’s protector, when in fact they are often the 
perpetrators of cruelty towards them. Stibbe contends that it is often presented as if ‘[m]odern 
animal housing is well ventilated, warm, well-lit, clean and scientifically designed…[and] 
protects animals from predators, disease and bad weather’.
132
 The Australian Model Code for 
the Welfare of Animals: Pigs contains an example of this type of language, providing that 
‘[a]accommodation for pigs must be designed, constructed, and managed in such a way that it 
protects pigs from adverse weather, injuries, or other harm’.
133
 Yet, as I demonstrated in 
chapter four, the actual provisions of Codes of Practice enable pigs to be confined to cages so 
small they cannot even turn around. This reality is at odds with the notion that their 
accommodation legally must protect them from ‘harm’. 
The examples of ‘weasel words’ I have provided in this chapter demonstrate that Australian 
animal welfare legislation and Codes of Practice make use of language that fails to 
communicate honestly and clearly with the Australian public. Using the concept of ‘fair 
labelling’, I have suggested that the label of ‘cruelty’, as it is used in animal welfare statute, 
fails to communicate its meaning clearly and accurately. Animal welfare statues make various 
distinctions between forms of conduct that should not be viewed in a different moral light. 
Pinioning is cruel regardless of whether it is performed in accordance with regulations. 
Confining a nonhuman animal to a cage is also cruel, regardless of what species that 
nonhuman animal is, or whether it is normally kept in such a confined state. Provisions which 
purport to prohibit ‘cruelty’ towards nonhuman animals which make such distinctions are 
purely tokenistic, because they fail to achieve their stated purpose. They facilitate cruelty 
towards nonhuman animals not only by directly permitting cruel acts towards them, but also 
by generating a myth of animal protection. I have argued that the same is true with Codes of 
Practice. They permit cruelty towards nonhuman animals, but they do so cloaked in terms that 
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misleadingly describe that cruelty as ‘humane’. Such language does not change the fact that 
cruelty is cruelty. It merely serves to conceal it.   
V. INADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
So far I have argued that Australian animal welfare legislation and Codes of Practice generate 
a ‘myth’ of animal protection in two ways. First, through prohibiting and permitting cruelty 
in separate legislative instruments, with differing addressees, making it falsely appear as if 
Australian animal welfare laws genuinely provide protections to all no-human animals. 
Second, through weasel words contained with Codes of Practice which generate a myth of 
animal protection by failing to communicate fairly and honestly with the Australian public 
about what the law allows. In each case, the law purports to do something that it does not do. 
In this part, I address a third way in which Australian animal welfare legislation generates a 
myth of animal protection. Here I am concerned with the enforcement powers that are 
contained within Australian animal welfare legislation. Although I have argued consistently 
throughout this thesis that Australian animal welfare provisions are wholly inadequate and 
permit cruelty, here I suggest that even unlawful cruelty towards nonhuman animals is 
inadequately investigated and prosecuted.  Australian animal welfare legislation therefore not 
only offers inadequate protections to nonhuman animals, it also offers inadequate 
mechanisms to enforce those inadequate protections.   
Enforcement is relevant to the ‘myth’ of animal protection because the enforcement 
mechanisms contained with Australian animal welfare legislation tell us something about 
what type of laws they are. My suggestion is that the enforcement of Australian animal 
welfare laws is inadequate, and moreover, that the laws themselves necessitate inadequate 
enforcement. They therefore sustain the myth of animal protection by purporting to prohibit 
conduct, but simultaneously failing to provide the mechanisms necessary to enforce its key 
provisions. The result is that many of the laws that purport to prohibit cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals are little more than words written on paper. Absent adequate enforcement, 
the notion that Australian animal welfare laws provide animals with protection is merely a 
myth. 
Page 200 of 305 
 
In this chapter, I focus only on the role of the RSPCA as an enforcement agency. The RSPCA 
have an enforcement role in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, 
South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria, and Western Australia.
134
  The Northern Territory is 
the only jurisdiction that does not confer responsibility for animal welfare law enforcement 
on the RSPCA, with  the responsibility laying chiefly with the Animal Welfare Branch of the 
Northern Territory Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries.
135
 Although other 
enforcement bodies, such as the state police service and the Department of Agriculture in 
each Australian jurisdiction also share an enforcement role with the RSPCA,
136
 Deborah Cao 
suggests that the responsibility for enforcement in all jurisdictions except the Northern 
Territory rests predominantly with the RSPCA.
137
 There is however, a distinct lack of 
empirical research which explains precisely how various agencies share enforcement 
responsibilities in each jurisdiction.
138
 It also appears that each jurisdiction may share it 
somewhat differently. For example, the website of the Victorian Government suggests that 
the Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources ‘primarily 
investigate matters concerning commercial livestock’, whilst the RSPCA ‘primarily 
investigates complaints about companion animals and non-commercial livestock’.
139
 By 
contrast, in South Australia, the Department for Environment and Water only directs 




Thus, although the RSPCA is only one of several animal law enforcement bodies, I select 
them as a ‘case study’ in this chapter for four reasons. First, the RSPCA is both unique and 
interesting because they are a private charitable organisation. At the time of writing, no other 
branch of criminal law is enforced by such a body. Second, unlike Departments of 
Agriculture, the RSPCA articulate a clear and singular ‘animal welfare’ mandate. Their 
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mission is to ‘prevent cruelty to animals by actively promoting their care and protection’.
141
 
By contrast, the animal welfare portfolio belonging to Departments of Agriculture and similar 
agencies sits alongside other portfolios such as hunting, fishing, and livestock which 
potentially conflict with one and other. Departments of Agriculture are therefore typically 
responsible for animal welfare at the same time as they are also responsible for supporting 
and sustaining the profitability of industries in which animals are routinely treated with 
cruelty.  
Third, published statistics indicate that the RSPCA receive a vast number of cruelty 
complaints each year. In Victoria, for example, in 2016-2017, the RSPCA (Vic) investigated 
10,180 cruelty complaints, laid 382 charges and completed 83 successful prosecutions.
142
 By 
contrast, the Victorian Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and 
Resources reports that they enquired into 4,912 complaints and prosecuted 69 cases over a 
five year period (2012-2017).
143
  Thus, even though limited data is available to analyse the 
varying roles of Departments of Agriculture (or similar) versus the RSPCA in each 
Australian jurisdiction, it is evident from this one example that the RSPCA receive a 
substantial number of complaints per annum, and that they are therefore a very significant 
enforcement body. 
Finally, the RSPCA is an interesting case study because, although they state an animal 
welfare mandate, they are clearly provided with inadequate powers and funding to actually 
achieve their mission. For example, the RSPCA National Statistics reveal that for 2015-2016, 
in each state and territory in which the RSPCA operates, less than one percent of cruelty 
complaints received over the previous six years had resulted in a finalized prosecution.
144
 In 
2015-2016, the RSPCA investigated 62,714 cruelty complaints. In the same year, they 
finalized only 259 prosecutions with an additional 247 cases pending.
145
 Particularly in the 
context of farm animals, Cao describes prosecutions as ‘more an aberration than the norm’ 
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which she attributes to both inadequate animal protection laws, and inadequate enforcement 
of the laws as they stand.
146
 This is supported by the statements of several Magistrates. For 
example, in a New South Wales case, a Magistrate explicitly stated: 
[i]n more than 25 years sitting as a Magistrate in both city and country areas I can count on 
the fingers of one hand the number of prosecutions brought for cruelty to animals used in 




Similarly, in Animal Welfare Authority v Keith William Simpson,
148
 Magistrate Wallace 
referred to the road transport cruelty case as ‘happily unique’, but noted that ‘in all likelihood 
other shippers from Queensland and New South Wales have been in the practice of the same 
things, taking the same sort of risks and everyone’s got away with it’.
149
  
To an extent, low prosecution rates may be explained by the fact that the RSPCA can take 
another cause of action to address unlawful animal cruelty. For example, they may issue an 
infringement notice,
150
 or issue a person with a written animal welfare notice, which provides 
binding instruction as to how the welfare of a given nonhuman animal must be improved.
151
 
Failure to comply with an issued animal welfare notice constitutes a separate offence.
152
 It is 
also possible that a member of the public may report cruelty that is lawful. In such an 
instance, the RSPCA has no legal power to act with respect to that cruelty, and thus no 
prosecution could result. At the time of writing, there are no published statistics available 
which explain the alarming gap between the number of cruelty complaints received by the 
RSPCA annually, and the number of prosecutions they finalise in the same period. However, 
in what follows, I suggest three key reasons why Australian animal welfare laws are 
constructed to necessitate inadequate enforcement by the RSPCA. First, the RSPCA is 
provided with inadequate legal powers to inspect private premises by animal welfare 
legislation. Second, although they are appointed as enforcers of the law, they are underfunded 
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by the Australian Government to the extent that public donations must facilitate enforcement 
of the law. Third, by virtue of the fact that they are a private charitable organisation, they face 
conflicting interests which make it possible to question their suitability as a law enforcement 
body.   
A. The Inadequate Legal Powers of RSPCA Inspectors 
Currently, Australian welfare laws provide inadequate powers to RSPCA law enforcement 
officers, with the result that consent, and therefore notice, is required to inspect many of the 
locations in which the worst instances of cruelty towards nonhuman animals occur. In the 
absence of consent, a search warrant is generally required, which can only be obtained based 
on a reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offence.
153
 This is an alarming problem 
with serious consequences for how well Australian animal welfare laws can ever be enforced. 
During parliamentary debate, The Hon. Robert Such stated that providing notice to potential 
criminals about an imminent inspection did not accord with ‘common sense’.
 154
 He 
compared it to warning criminals that operate in secret that they were about to be raided: ‘[i]f 
you tell people they are to be raided or checked, they will take steps to make sure that they do 
not infringe the law’.
155
 It is for this reason that the element of surprise in criminal law 
enforcement is routinely employed by the Australian Police, who do not give prior warning 
of inquiry into suspected persons, and make use of unmarked police cars and plain clothed 
police officers to enforce the law.  
Given that the worst cruelties towards nonhuman animals go on behind closed doors on 
private properties and in remote locations, there is an obvious problem here. In most 
jurisdictions in which the RSPCA operates, they may only enter licensed premises with a 
search warrant that has been obtained on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that an animal 
cruelty offence has, or is, taking place.
156
 In many instances, these grounds will therefore 
constitute a report made by either a ‘whistleblower’ from within the industry, or an activist 
that has used unlawful means (such as trespass) to obtain evidence of unlawful cruelty.
157
 As 
such, the adequate enforcement of Australian animal welfare legislation implicitly relies upon 
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the unlawful conduct of activists who trespass to provide them with the evidence that they 
require to form a reasonable suspicious of animal cruelty. This is a theme I develop further in 
chapter eight, where I argue that animal activists are being stifled by legislation that seeks to 
punish and deter civil disobedience. The practical effect is that the enforcement mechanisms 
provided in Australian animal welfare laws preclude effective enforcement, in the absence of 
unlawful conduct by activists or inside ‘tip offs’. Yet, other legislation is operating to stifle 
these activists, with the result that Australian animal welfare legislation cannot be adequately 
enforced. 
In the Australian Capital Territory, an RSPCA Inspector may enter farm animal premises 
without the owner’s consent only with a search warrant,
158
 or where there are ‘serious and 
urgent circumstances’ requiring immediate exercise of an inspector’s powers.
159
 An Inspector 
may also enter any ‘business premises’ during ‘business hours’ without consent,
160
 based on 
reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence is being committed. However, the term 
‘business premises’ is not defined by the Act, and it remains unclear whether it provides 
authority for the RSPCA to enter farming premises.
161
 The law expressly prevents an animal 
welfare inspector in the ACT from entering an abattoir in any circumstances, unless ‘the 
inspector is a veterinary surgeon’, or, is accompanied by one.
162
 
In South Australia, an inspector may enter and search, and where necessary, use reasonable 
force to break into premises or a vehicle,
163
 where they are authorized either by a warrant or 
necessitated by ‘urgent’ circumstances to do so,
164
 and they have a reasonable suspicion that 
an offence has been, or is about to be committed, or an animal is being, has been, or will be 
unnecessarily harmed if urgent action is not taken.
 165
  
If a South Australian inspector proposes to conduct a routine inspection of premises in the 
absence of any reasonable grounds for suspicion of an offence, they must give the occupier 
                                                 
 
158
Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) s90. 
159
 Ibid s81(2)(d). 
160
 Ibid s81(2)(b). 
161
 Cao, above n 29, 225. 
162
 Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) ss81(5)(a), (b). 
163
 Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) s30(1)(a). 
164
 Ibid s30(2)(b). 
165
 Ibid s30(5)(b). Other circumstances warranting entry are contained within ss30(5)(c)-(f). 
Page 205 of 305 
 
of the premises notice of the proposed inspection.
166
 They must also enable the occupier, or a 
nominee of the occupier, or both, the opportunity to accompany the inspector throughout the 
inspection.
167
 Further, the inspector must take steps to ‘minimize any adverse effect of the 
inspection on the business or activities’ at the premises which they inspect.
168
 Cao contends 
such a requirement may provide a basis for delaying routine inspections.
169
 It is foreseeable 
that such a requirement could also curtail the duration of a routine inspection, potentially 
compromising the thoroughness of the investigation. In the Northern Territory, routine 
inspection of premises is similarly allowed in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of the 
commission of an offence, so long as the occupier is provided with 7 days’ notice.
170
 
In New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and the Northern Territory, a search warrant is 
required to enter premises without consent, based on a reasonable suspicion that an offence 
has been, will be, or is being committed.
171
An exception is made in each of these jurisdictions 
where the situation is so urgent that it necessitates immediate action.
172
 The Victorian 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic) provides special powers of entry for 
‘specialist’ inspectors to search premises that are not a person’s dwelling, however they can 
only do so with written permission from the Minister.
173
 According to Cao, this power is used 
‘sparingly’.
174
 Troublingly, in New South Wales, a person who commits an offence of cruelty 
upon poultry confined for egg production under Part 2 of the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals Regulation 2012 (NSW) is not guilty of an offence if they are a ‘first time offender’. 
Regulation 19 explicitly provides that a ‘first time offender’ does not commit an offence 
unless they were given a direction in writing to remedy their contravention within a period of 
3 months, and they failed to do so. Thus, in New South Wales, persons who are cruel to 
poultry on private premises must not only be given notice of an imminent inspection to 
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ensure their compliance with animal welfare regulations. They are also not to be found guilty 
of an offence if the cruelty they committed constitutes a first-time offence.
175
 
In Western Australia, an Inspector may enter farm animal premises if they reasonably suspect 
an offence has occurred, and without consent, provided they have obtained a search 
warrant,
176
 or have provided the occupier with a minimum of 24 hours’ notice of the intended 
inspection and not received an objection.
177
 The Western Australian Animal Welfare Act 2002 
(WA) also provides a power for inspectors to enter non-residential properties, or premises 
occupied by a scientific establishment without warrant, consent, or notice where they believe 
an offence has been or is likely to be committed.
178
 However, Department Policy curtails this 
power and restricts it to use only in ‘high-level emergency’ situations.
179
 
Tasmania is the only Australian jurisdiction in which inspectors are granted the power to 
enter, search and investigate premises (other than a dwelling), for the purposes of enforcing 
the Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tas) without the need for obtaining a warrant prior to entry.
180
 
The power to enter, search, and inspect however must still be accompanied by a reasonable 
belief that an offence has been, is being, or will be committed. However, an officer in 
Tasmania who has been authorized by the Minister, may also search, enter and inspect at any 
reasonable time, premises in which animals are sold, presented for sale, assembled or kept for 
commercial purposes.
181
 According to the Tasmanian Government website, unannounced 
welfare inspections take place on farms ‘about once every 2 years’.
182
 
Given that the RSPCA can generally only inspect premises based on a reasonable suspicion 
of cruelty to nonhuman animals, it is difficult to see how they can ever form a basis to inspect 
industries without somehow being alerted to potential wrongdoing. The unlawful operations 
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of animal activists facilitate law enforcement by providing these alerts.
183
 In chapter eight, I 
discuss the recent exposé of live baiting in the greyhound industry by animal activists, as a 
key example of how unlawfully obtained evidence is central to the enforcement of Australian 
animal welfare legislation. Until the RPSCA is provided with stronger powers to inspect 
private premises routinely and without the need for notice or a reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing, it is difficult to see how law enforcement, particularly in the agricultural 
context, can ever be effective in the absence of unlawful trespass and covert surveillance by 
activists or internal whistleblowers.  
In England, this barrier to effective animal welfare law enforcement is being partially 
addressed by the introduction of mandatory CCTV surveillance in abattoirs, to be accessed at 
any time by authorized persons to ensure compliance with animal welfare laws.
184
 Similar 
attempts are being made in Australia, but have not yet led to legislative change.
185
 Absent 
such measures to improve transparency in the Australian context, Australian animal welfare 
laws continue to sustain only a myth of animal protection which posits that Australian animal 
welfare laws are doing something far removed from that which they actually do. 
B. RSPCA Funding Issues Preventing Enforcement and Prosecution 
In conjunction with their inadequate inspection powers, the RSPCA is also challenged by 
significant resource constraints, given that they are a charity funded by the public.
186
 
Although the RSPCA does receive some government funding in recognition of the law 
enforcement role they perform, this funding is insufficient to cover their expenses in this area. 
The South Australian RSPCA’s annual report, for example, documents a total income of 
$15,807,566 for the 2015-2016 financial year. Of that total income, only $1,232,962 (7.80%) 
was Government funded. The clear majority of the RSPCA’s income, (73.42%) was from 
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public donations, marketing (including the retail of pet supplies), and legacies.
187
 The 
situation is similar in other states, with the RSPCA Victoria recording a Government funded 
income of $2,000,000 (5.16%) of a total income of $38,787,000 in the 2016-17 financial 
year. This was a reduction from $3,000,000 of Government funded income the previous year, 
with only $1,000,000 of the funding provided for the operation of the inspectorate.
188
 The 
most significant source of income during this period for the RSPCA Victoria during this 
period was public bequests which comprised 41.17% of their total income.
189
 
Turning then to the RSPCA’s expenses, it is possible to see that the Government funded 
portion of their income, supplied in recognition of their role in enforcing the animal welfare 
legislation, does not cover their expenses in this area. In South Australia for example, the 
RSPCA’s expenses for 2015-2016 associated with the enforcement of the Animal Welfare Act 
1975 (SA) were $2,470,429. This means that for this particular financial period, the RSPCA 
(SA)’s Government funded income associated with law enforcement made up 7.8% of their 
total income, while their expenses in the same area were 16.5% of their total expenses. The 
Queensland RSPCA similarly reported a total Government funded income of 4% for 
inspectorate and rescue, with a corresponding 8% expenditure in the same field for the 2015-
2016 financial year.
190
 This suggests that the Australian public indirectly funded the 
remainder of the RSPCA (SA) and RSPCA (Qld)’s inspectorate and prosecution work for this 
period via donations.
191
 The Victorian RSPCA does not provide the exact costs of the 
inspectorate work, but does provide a total expenditure of $23,760,000 on ‘animal 
welfare’.
192
 The fact that they do not specify the precise costs of their inspectorate work is 
illustrative of the fact that it is difficult to divorce their expenditure in one area from their 
expenditure in another. I return to this point below.  
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Animal welfare law is the only branch of criminal law in Australia that is enforced 
predominantly by a publically funded private charity. Even though other government 
departments may supplement the RSPCA’s enforcement mechanism, Cao points out that no 
jurisdiction in Australia has an independent department charged with responsibility for 
animal welfare alone. The result, is that funding constraints may also limit law enforcement 
by Government departments, given that funding and therefore animal welfare law 
enforcement is a ‘political matter which may be subordinated by other funding priorities’.
193
  
From a practical perspective, funding constraints faced by the RSPCA also mean that even 
where they have the legal authority to inspect and enforce and prosecute under animal 
welfare legislation, costs may prevent them from doing so. They may be forced to respond 
‘tactically’ to cruelty complaints, responding immediately to only the worst cases of cruelty 
and prosecuting only those that are likely to lead to a person being found guilty. The RSPCA 
state the problematic nature of resources constraints as it effects prosecution rates on their 
website: 
 Whilst the RSPCA has an excellent prosecution record, the financial penalty of losing a case 
can be extremely high. Court cases and potential appeals can be extremely costly and difficult 
to anticipate. Fines imposed by the court, are allocated to the State Government and whilst 
costs can be awarded to the RSPCA, these are often difficult to recover from offenders.
194
 
An additional resource difficulty faced by the RSPCA is that their total income per annum is 
used to cover the very broad range of animal welfare initiatives which the RSPCA assumes 
responsibility for in Australian society. Enforcement of state based welfare legislation is only 
one of their many expenses and initiatives, and is the only one for which they receive any 
Government funding. Yet, since their initiatives are all focused on improving animal welfare 
to some degree, they are all arguably interconnected making it difficult to divorce their 
funding needs in one area from their needs in another. For example, the RSPCA is 
responsible for caring for and re-homing animals that have been surrendered to them or 
seized during property raids, which is necessarily linked to their role of inspecting potential 
breaches of animal welfare law. When officers enter premises, and uncover an animal that is 
sick or injured, they have the legal authority to seize that animal if necessary. Once they have 
                                                 
 
193
 Cao, above n 29, 229. 
194
 RSPCA Victoria, Prosecutions < http://rspcavic.org/services/inspectorate/prosecutions > . 
Page 210 of 305 
 
seized an animal, they then generally provide it with veterinary care. They may also need to 
euthanize an animal or re-home it. The number of animals that land in the RSPCA’s care 
each year is huge. The RSPCA’s published statistics for 2015-2016 indicate that during that 
one year period they received 137,391 animals into their care across the country.
195
 From 




Caring for these animals comes at a great expense to the RSPCA. For example, in the 2016 
financial year in Victoria, the RSPCA’s (Vic) animal welfare related expenditures totalled 
$22,622,000 of a total expenditure of $34,372,000 (equating to 66%).
197
 These costs cover 
things such as the provision of these animals with shelter, feed, grooming, veterinary care, 
behavioural assessments and training where appropriate. The RSPCA’s extensive adoption 




In addition to the physical care of nonhuman animals, the RSPCA also raises community 
awareness of animal welfare issues. This is inextricably linked to their role as enforcers of 
animal welfare law, since they inform the public of welfare issues to reduce the number of 
breaches of animal welfare law that they must therefore police. Further, they work directly 
with animal industries to improve welfare standards and offer the opportunity to certify 
products in accordance with the RSPCA ‘approved farming scheme’.
199
 This scheme 
establishes voluntary animal welfare standards that exceed existing regulatory requirements, 
and allows compliant producers to apply to market their product as ‘RSPCA approved’. The 
RSPCA also runs veterinary clinics in some locations, which offers the community 
competitively priced veterinary services such as de-sexing, vaccination, micro-chipping and 
euthanasia.  
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These funding constraints illustrate something important about the type of laws that 
Australian animal welfare laws are. The myth of animal protection suggests they are laws that 
prohibit cruelty. Yet, the financial constraints faced by the RSPCA who are charged with the 
responsibility of enforcing those laws render them ill-equipped to adequately perform this 
task. Moreover, they are unable to engage in the types of test litigation that are essential to 
challenging a number of widely accepted cruel practices.
200
  
C. RSPCA and Conflicts of Interest 
Whilst it is not within the scope of this chapter to discuss it in depth, there also exists a 
substantial question surrounding whether the appointment of the RSPCA as an enforcement 
body under animal welfare legislation is appropriate at all.
201
 The RSPCA is not only  
afforded inadequate legal powers and are chronically underfunded.  By virtue of the fact that 
they are private charity that stands for ‘animal welfare’, at the same time as they charged with 
the duty of enforcing laws which permit cruelty to nonhuman animals, they are also riddled 
with ethical conflicts that raise questions regarding their suitability as a law enforcement 
body. 
Before turning to explain these ethical conflicts, it is informative to first pay brief attention to 
the history of the RSPCA. The RSPCA has its origins in the Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals which was formed in England in 1824.
202
 It emerged in the context of an 
intellectual climate in which concern for animal welfare was growing. This is reflected by the 
fact that it was formed in England shortly after the first English anti-cruelty statute was 
passed in 1822, known as the Cruel Treatment of Cattle Act 1822. That legislation was 
pioneering, as it was the first piece of legislation to provide the English Courts with the 
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As similar concerns for animal welfare emerged in nineteenth century Australia, Australia’s 
first Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was formed in 1871 during a public 
meeting to discuss the ill-treatment of horses.
204
 Other Australian jurisdictions then followed 
suit, with Societies forming in Tasmania (1878), New South Wales (1873), South Australia 
(1875), Queensland (1883), Western Australia (1892), the Australian Capital Territory (1955) 
and the Northern Territory (1965).
205
 The Societies became Royal Societies for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in 1923, following the award of Royal Warrant.
206
 Informal 
meetings between all societies began to take place in 1965. By 1980, all eight RSPCA’s 
agreed to forming a national Society to unify and represent the eight member societies.  
Following the emergence of the RSPCA in Australia, the first Australian anti-cruelty 
legislation was enacted in Van Diemen’s land in 1837.
207
 New South Wales enacted similar 
legislation in the 1860s.
208
 These early laws reflected changing attitudes by enacting what 
White describes as broad ‘prohibition[s] on cruelty to animals’.
209
 However, from the 1860s 
onwards, this prohibition was continually refined, and by the 20
th
 century, jurisdictions began 
carving out ‘exceptions’ for farming practices that served commercial purposes (such as 
castration and branding).
210
 In the 1970s and 1980s, the States gave ‘blanket exemptions for 
farming practices’.
 211
 As I described in Chapter 4, similar, but more limited exceptions still 
exist today.  
Thus, the RSPCA was formed at a time when animal welfare was only an emergent public 
concern, meaning that they represented the interests of nonhuman animals when they had 
little (or no) legislative protections. Now however, the RSPCA operates in a very different 
context, in which extremely strong tensions exist between the public expectation that the 
RSPCA continues to advocate for animals, and the fact that the laws which claim to protect 
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nonhuman animals from cruelty also operate to permit and approve of some of the most cruel 
practices towards some of the most vulnerable species. As a publically funded charity, these 
tensions create significant ethical conflicts for the RSPCA. On the one hand, they are charged 
with the responsibility of enforcing laws which permit cruelty to animals, and they are 
afforded Government funding in recognition of this role (albeit inadequate). Yet, on the other 
hand, they are also an organisation that relies heavily on public donations to   fulfil their 
mandate of existing to protect the welfare of ‘all creatures great and small’. To this end, the 
RSPCA is answerable to the public, which oftentimes leads them to campaigning against the 
very same laws that they are charged with enforcing. 
Unsurprisingly, this has led to the RSPCA being heavily criticized for conflicts of interest by 
both those who are concerned about animal welfare and those within industry.
212
 For 
example, in 2016, the Hon. Robert Brown, of the Shooters and Fisher’s party, claimed that 
the RSPCA was  
once a well-respected charity, [that] has now become overzealous, drunk on power, and dominated by 
animal liberationists who put the so-called rights of animals ahead of human rights…this organisation 
plays judge, jury and executioner…the fact that the RSPCA is actively campaigning against the 
continuation of the greyhound racing industry but is granted a seat at the table by Premier Mike Baird 
to examine the greyhound racing industry’s future is ridiculous and it is fraught with danger…It can be 
either a policing body for animal welfare or a campaign house, but it cannot be both.
213
 
In 2016, Victorian Shooters and Fishers Party MP Jeff Bourman tabled a notice in the upper 
house, requesting a Parliamentary Inquiry in the RSPCA’s ‘funding…objectives and activates 
and the use of its powers’.
214
 Media reports suggested that Victorian duck shooters were 
angered by the RSPCA’s public opposition to lawful duck shooting, which they attribute to 
the ‘radicalisation’ of the charity.
215
 Western Victorian Member of Parliament, Simon 
Ramsay, stated that the Coalition pledged its support because the RSPCA ‘have branched into 
areas now which I believe are outside their charter, into larger animals where they become 
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activists with animal rights groups…the loopy left fringe’.
216
 The inquiry was conducted by 
the Legislative Council for the Economy and Infrastructure Committee, of which the Hon. 
Jeff Bourman is a member. The Terms of Reference for the inquiry included ‘the 
appropriateness and use of its powers’, ‘the appropriateness and use of [Government] 
funding’ and ‘any other consequential matters’.
217
 The report considered the fact that the 
RSPCA (Vic) was being increasingly criticized by stakeholders for its ‘activism’ with respect 
to ‘lawful activities’ such as jumps racing and duck hunting,
218
 as well as battery cages and 
the live export of animals, 
219
 as well as two ‘high profile’ alleged instances of negligent 
conduct by the RSPCA (Vic).
220
 
A key concern raised in the resulting report was a strong view held by industry that the 
RSPCA was being ‘influenced…by ideologies that might pull them towards an animal rights 
flavour’.
221
 The report also noted that the parliamentary committee had heard anecdotal 
evidence from industry stakeholders that the RSPCA (Vic) had connections to ‘extremist 
animal activist groups’.
222
 However, the inquiry did not recommend that the RSPCA take any 
particular action with response to these allegations, and rather recommended merely that the 
RSPCA be ‘mindful’ of the issues that had been raised by stakeholders.
223
 
By contrast, the RSPCA is also routinely criticised by lobby groups such as Animal 
Liberation (Vic). They claim, for example, that: 
A donation to the RSPCA funds schemes and campaigns that condone animal cruelty and the 
unnecessary death and exploitation of pigs, chickens and turkeys…The RSPCA receives royalties from 
its approved farming scheme…[it] is the only animal protection organisation that has legal powers to 
prosecute animal cruelty, yet it receives money from the very industries it is supposed to police – a 
clear conflict of interest.
224
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These concerns originate from the fat that the RSPCA facilitate and legitimate some of the 
cruellest practices towards nonhuman animals, at the same time as they purport to stand for 
the prevention of cruelty ‘for all creatures great and small’.
225
 The RSPCA ‘approved farming 
scheme’,
226
 mentioned above, accredits facilities that inflict cruelty upon nonhuman animals. 
The scheme is intended to offer consumers more welfare friendly animal products that are 
produced on farms that have higher standards than those required by Codes of Practice. Yet, 
they still permit cruelty. For example the Layer Hens: RSPCA Approved Farming Schemes 
Standards permit the cruel practice of de-beaking,
227
 meaning that farms that practice de-
beaking can be accredited by the RSPCA scheme and marketed to consumers as being more 
welfare friendly. In this particular example, the RSPCA’s ethical conflict is clear: they 
approve of more ‘welfare friendly’ products because they are less cruel than other 
alternatives on the market. Yet, they are still cruel, and therefore contrary to the RSPCA’s 
claim to exist for the purposes of protecting animal’s from cruelty.   
A similar example comes from 2012, when the RSPCA standards for pig farming came under 
criticism because of a complaint to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(‘ACCC’) pertaining to misleading and deceptive conduct by ‘Primo Smallgoods’.
228
 The 
packaging of Primo Smallgoods read ‘free range’ and ‘RSPCA approved’, which 
communicated to consumers that their product was animal welfare friendly. The ACCC 
found that the ‘free range’ claim was untrue, and so was misleading consumers.
229
 They thus 
required Primo smallgoods to withdraw the claim from their products.
230
 The finding again 
demonstrates the ethical dilemmas that the RSPCA face as their accreditation system purports 
to offer consumers options that are animal welfare friendly,
231 
at the same time as it grants 
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approvals to facilities that cannot be described as free range, and are therefore not 
commensurate with animal welfare. 
Recent media coverage has also documented ‘shocking conditions’ at Perth’s Mt Barker Free 
Range Farms which is accredited under the RSPCA’s approved farming scheme.
232
 The 
report showed chickens suffering ‘respiratory problems, burns and…cannibalism’.
233
 The 
RSPCA had allegedly audited this farm in both March 2017 and May 2017, with ‘no 
corrective actions taken’, prior to the release of this footage in June 2017.
234
 At the time of 
writing, the RSPCA approved farming scheme website is directly promoting Mt Barker Free 
Range Farms as having ‘room to move’, with an accompanying image of apparently healthy 
and happy chickens roaming freely in an appealing enriched outdoor environment.
235
 
The RSPCA faces several ethical dilemmas due to their competing interests. They are 
charged with the responsibility of enforcing laws which permit cruelty towards nonhuman 
animals. At the same time, they purport to be opposed to animal cruelty, and are involved in 
actively opposing some forms of lawful cruelty. They also seek to improve animal welfare by 
legitimating some of the cruellest practices, and marketing them to consumers as welfare 
friendly products simply because they reflect high standards of care than the comparable 
legal requirements dictated by Codes of Practice. The ethical dilemmas faced by the RSPCA 
are compounded by the fact that they are a publically funded charity, and thus seemingly 
have a responsibility to respond to public sentiment surrounding the ways that nonhuman 
animals should be treated.  
The conflicting interests of the RSPCA sustain the myth of animal protection. Australian 
animal welfare laws give legal power to the RSPCA to inspect and prosecute instances of 
unlawful animal cruelty. In doing so, they task a publically funded charity, that is riddled 
with ethical dilemmas, with the role of enforcing laws that are supposed to prohibit cruelty 
and reflect our ‘compassion’ for nonhuman animals. These factors indicate that Australian 
animal welfare legislation provides inadequate enforcement mechanisms for its protective 
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provisions. Absent adequate enforcement, the notion that Australian animal welfare laws 
ensure animal protection is merely a myth. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have suggested that Australian animal welfare laws generate a myth of 
animal protection. This myth is established and maintained in three ways. First, by the 
physical separation of provisions which prohibit cruelty from those which permit it. Animal 
welfare legislation communicates a prohibition on cruelty to the public which is consistently 
undermined by Codes of Practice. Codes of Practice are addressed specifically to those 
engaged in cruelty towards nonhuman animals. Standing alone, Australian animal welfare 
legislation therefore falsely appears to protect all nonhuman animals from cruelty.  
Second, the law fails to communicate honestly and fairly with the Australian public regarding 
what it allows. Australian animal welfare legislation prohibits ‘cruelty’, but makes 
distinctions between various forms of conduct that result in cruel acts being described as 
‘non-cruelty’. The result is that the legal label of ‘cruelty’ fails to honestly and fairly 
communicate its meaning to the Australian people. In addition, Codes of Practice use weasel 
words to cloak cruel practices in an image of compassion for nonhuman animals. Such 
language serves to conceal that cruelty, and to sustain the myth of animal protection. Third, 
Australian animal welfare legislation provides inadequate enforcement powers to the 
RSPCA. This means that animal welfare legislation is not only poorly enforced, but that the 
very laws that prohibit cruelty necessitate poor enforcement by providing an underfunded 
charity with inadequate powers to inspect private premises. 
 The myth of animal protection facilitates cruelty towards nonhuman animals by making that 
cruelty invisible. Invisibility is a barrier to the types of discourse that are essential to securing 
change for nonhuman animals. If the Australian public believes that nonhuman animals are 
already protected from cruelty, they have no need to demand a change to their treatment. In 
chapter eight, I argue that Australian law goes to great lengths to maintain this myth by 
stifling activists who seek to expose cruelty. The stifling of activists not only prevents the 
enforcement of animal welfare laws which rely upon ‘tip offs’ of animal cruelty, but it also 
sustains the myth of animal protection, which keeps cruelty out of sight so that it may remain 
out of mind.     
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  CHAPTER 8:  KEEPING CRUELTY INVISIBLE: LAWS THAT PUNISH AND 
DETER CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
  








In the previous chapter, I suggested that Australian animal welfare legislation generates a 
myth of animal protection in three ways. First, the word ‘cruelty’ is used in a way that does 
not communicate fairly and honestly with the Australian public. Moreover, I suggested that 
Codes of Practice use weasel words that mislead the public as to how nonhuman animals may 
be treated by law. In addition, animal welfare statutes provide inadequate enforcement 
mechanisms, with the result that acts of unlawful cruelty go unnoticed or are not prosecuted. 
Australian animal welfare laws therefore hold out the promise of animal protection that they 
systematically fail to meet. This myth facilitates cruelty by communicating a false message 
that cruelty is prohibited, but also serves to legitimate cruelty by informing the way that we 
interpret what Australian animal welfare laws and Codes of Practice allow. 
In this chapter, I turn to consider the potential operation of legislation that may silence 
activists who work to debunk the myth that Australian animal welfare laws protect nonhuman 
animals from cruelty. My argument is that advocacy that engages law enforcement and makes 
cruelty visible to the Australian public is silenced by anti-protest laws. Laws that silence 
activists necessarily facilitate cruelty towards nonhuman animals by keeping that cruelty 
invisible and sustaining the myth of animal protection that I established in the previous 
chapter. As long as cruelty is invisible, the public is uninformed and cannot participate 
meaningfully in the democratic processes and discussions that are essential to policy change 
or law reform for nonhuman animals. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, I provide a prima facie justification 
for acts of civil disobedience that invade an individual’s privacy. I suggest that a claim to 
privacy in democratic society can give way to a public interest in obtaining information about 
how animals are raised and killed to serve human interests. Acts of activism that serve the 
public interest may therefore justifiably infringe an individual’s claim to privacy. Second, I 
suggest that civil disobedience is morally justified in Australia’s democratic society. Using 
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criteria put forward by thinkers such as John Rawls and Henry Bedau, I argue that activists 
who unlawfully trespass to document cruelty towards nonhuman animals are morally justified 
in doing so where their actions are public, conscientious, nonviolent and aimed at generating 
policy or legal change.  
Having provided a prima facie justification for acts of civil disobedience on behalf of 
nonhuman animals, in the second part of this chapter, I explain the link between acts of civil 
disobedience and the generation of policy and legal change for nonhuman animals. My 
argument is that animal activists who expose cruelty inform public debate surrounding our 
treatment of nonhuman animals. They also facilitate law enforcement for the reasons I 
discussed in chapter seven. Where activists document lawful cruelty, they ‘debunk’ the myth 
of animal protection, and facilitate public discourse that is essential to the democratic process 
that may yield change for nonhuman animals.  
In the third part of this chapter, I discuss three examples of Australian legislation that may 
inhibit acts of civil disobedience by deterring and punishing activists that trespass to covertly 
document instances of cruelty. They are the proposed Criminal Code (Animal Welfare 
Amendment) Bill 2014 (Cth), and the Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA), and the 
Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW). While trespass is already unlawful in Australia, each of these 
pieces of legislation seek to further deter activism by providing new powers to law 
enforcement and dramatically increasing penalties for trespass. These functions, I contend, 
will further silence activism, and in doing so inhibit the democratic process and prevent the 
enforcement of Australian animal welfare laws. 
II. WHEN UNLAWFUL CONDUCT IS JUSTIFIED 
Before explaining how some Australian legislation may be operating to silence and deter 
animal activists, it is necessary to provide a prima facie justification for civil disobedience on 
behalf of nonhuman animals within the Australian context. Like all forms of activism, animal 
activism can take many forms. It is possible to conceptualise these various forms of activism 
as existing on a spectrum. At one end, there are activists who participate in lawful acts of 
leafletting, or peaceful protest. At the other end of the spectrum, there are activists that 
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conduct themselves violently and cause physical harm to others.
2
 Somewhere along this 
scale, sit activists that engage in unlawful, non-violent forms of activism on behalf of 
nonhuman animals. Trespass is a particularly common method of activism. Generally, 
activists who trespass do so to ‘gather and subsequently disseminate information’ pertaining 
to the cruel treatment of nonhuman animals on private property.
3
 This form of activism 
arguably sits on the lower end of the spectrum of animal activism. It involves unlawful 
conduct, but does not involve violence, nor does it necessarily involve the destruction of 
property. A little higher on the spectrum are activities where activists enter private properties 
to steal nonhuman animals. These activists may be found guilty of serious criminal trespass 
and property theft, although they do so to rescue nonhuman animals from cruel conditions.
4
  
In this chapter, I focus only on acts of trespass that are conducted with the intent of 
performing covert surveillance, and how these acts may be morally justified as acts of civil 
disobedience. Trespass and covert surveillance form my focus for three reasons. First, these 
methods of activism are becoming increasingly popular, and form the overwhelming majority 
of documented cases of activism on behalf of nonhuman animals.
5
 Second, because several 
examples illustrate that incognito methods are successful in generating change for nonhuman 
animals. Third, the success of these methods is making them increasingly controversial and 
activist identities are increasingly being constructed in the media and by Australian 
politicians as ideological extremists, and even ‘terrorists’.
 6
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To provide a moral justification for civil disobedience in this part, I reply to two common 
objections to activists who trespass and undertake covert surveillance. The first objection is 
that such actions invade the privacy of property owners. The second is activism involving 
trespass is unlawful and thus morally unjustifiable. I consider each of these issues in the 
context of Australia’s democratic society, and in light of the fact that the Australian public 
has no lawful means to observe cruelty that is taking place behind closed doors. 
A. Lawful Means of Observing Cruelty Not Available 
The Australian public has no lawful means of observing cruelty towards nonhuman animals 
on private property. As I explained in the chapter one, nonhuman animals are private 
property, routinely kept on private premises. The treatment of nonhuman animals within 
private industry is therefore ‘inaccessible’ to the public.
7
 Currently, the only way the public 
can observe how nonhuman animals are being treated within private industry is to either 
observe their treatment directly with consent from the owner, or unlawfully enter premises to 
observe them without permission (or to rely on footage collected by somebody else who has). 
Activists who trespass to document cruelty, therefore provide the public with a window into 
private premises that would not otherwise be available to them. 
As I discussed in chapter seven, invisibility operates to facilitate and legitimate the operation 
of animal protection laws which permit animal cruelty. Moreover, the enforcement of 
Australian animal welfare legislation implicitly relies upon acts of trespass for the RSPCA to 
form a ‘reasonable suspicion’ of unlawful cruelty towards nonhuman animals. The result is 
that Australian animal welfare laws rely upon the unlawful conduct of activists if they are to 
be adequately enforced. 
Yet, activists who wish to gain visual access to the treatment of nonhuman animals on private 
premise must  commit a criminal offence or tortious act to do so. The tort of trespass to land 
is actionable per se, meaning that a person may be sued for it even if they did not cause any 
tangible damage to the property in question.
8
 Activists entering farming premises for example 
may therefore be liable for trespass even if they merely walk on to the property to take photos 
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and then leave. This reflects the fact that trespass itself is an unlawful intrusion on the right of 
a property owner to exclusively possess their property. In the High Court case of Plenty v 
Dillon,
9
 Gaudron and McHugh JJ made this point explicitly, stating that ‘an action for 
trespass to land…serves the purpose of vindicating the plaintiff’s right to the exclusive use 
and occupation of his or her land. The appellant is entitled to have this right of property 
vindicated by a substantial award of damages’.
10
 In the case of TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v 
Anning,
11
 the New South Wales Court of Appeal similarly concluded that ‘general damages 
should reflect the significant purpose of vindicating the…right to exclusive possession’.
12
 
Criminal trespass is characterised by the act of entering a property without the consent of an 
owner. In South Australia for example, a person may be found guilty of criminal trespass if 
they enter a premise to interfere with the owner’s enjoyment of that premise, and they are 
asked to leave but fail to do so forthwith, or returns to the premise again within 24 hours.
 13
 In 
such an instance, a maximum penalty of $2500, or 6 months imprisonment may apply.
14
 An 
activist may also commit serious criminal trespass if they enter and remain in a private place 
with the intention of committing a further offence involving theft, an offence against the 
person, or interference with property of a type punishable by imprisonment for three or more 
years.
15
 A person who commits serious criminal trespass in a non-residential building (such 
as a farm premise, for example) may be penalised with imprisonment for 10 years, or 20 
years if the offence was aggravated.
16
  
There have been numerous requests for greater transparency with respect to how nonhuman 
animals are treated,
17
 which could serve to remove the need for unlawful conduct to observe 
how nonhuman animals are being treated on private premises. Should there be a move 
towards greater transparency, such that the public can lawfully be informed about how 
nonhuman animals are raised and killed within private industry, the justifications for civil 
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disobedience involving trespass provided in this chapter may require revisiting. As 
O’Sullivan and co-authors conclude: the state must ‘either take responsibility to enter private 
property and be more pro-active in making policy or accept that non-state actors will attempt 
to perform that role’.
18
 Even if the state should move towards improving transparency, there 
may still exist a legitimate role for activists, who do not have a vested financial interest in the 
continuation of cruelty towards nonhuman animals, and who have no financial incentive to 
continue to facilitate its concealment.  
Whilst it is not within the scope of this chapter to detail what transparency measures could be 
introduced, Humane Society International has suggested that greater transparency could be 
achieved through ‘simple measures’, including accurate and fair labelling of products, the 
installation of CCTV cameras in commercial facilities that breed, raise or slaughter 
nonhuman animals and the introduction of programs that allow the public to have access to 
operating farms.
19
 They have also recommended improvements in enforcement and 
monitoring of animal protection laws, a point which I addressed in the previous chapter.
20
 
Until greater transparency is achieved with respect to how nonhuman animals are lawfully 
treated in Australia, activist activity remains a ‘sad necessity’ for making cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals visible to the public.
21
 Put simply, the problem is this: ‘[i]f animal 
protection laws were adequate with sufficient compliance monitoring and enforcement, then 
there would be no need for undercover investigations to expose cruelty and neglect’.
22
 
 B. Privacy and Democracy 
Activists who trespass and covertly obtain footage of cruelty towards nonhuman animals act 
unlawfully. Farmers whose land is trespassed upon by activists also routinely state that the 
trespass amounts to a wrongful invasion of privacy. The Australian Chicken Growers 
Council, for example, stated that the lawful conduct of industry should not be subject to 
‘harassment, threats, vandalism and or trespass’ by animal advocates, who ‘may not agree 
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with intensive agriculture, or in fact any animal production system’.
23
 During parliamentary 
debate, David Ridgeway MP stated: 
I think the debate raging that animals are deliberately mistreated by [producers] is a bit of 
nonsense…I am looking forward to having further discussions with the pork industry, and 
particularly the intensive animal industry, just to ensure that, on one hand, animals are not 




Australian law is already protective of an individual’s privacy. Although there is not currently 
a cause of action available for an invasion of privacy in Australia,
25
 the High Court of 
Australia has anticipated that such an action may become available in the future.
26
 Even 
without such a cause of action, Australian law indirectly protects privacy in a myriad of 
ways. As I explained in the chapter three, the owner of real property has a legal right to 
exclusively possess it. The law of trespass is intended to protect that right, and the breach of 
privacy and exclusive possession that is involved in trespass is the reason why the tort of 
trespass is actionable per se.
27
 The tort of private nuisance is similarly designed to protect a 
plaintiff’s enjoyment of their private land.
28
 Personal information is also protected by laws in 
Australia such as The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) which governs the collection, use, holding and 
disclosure of personal information. 
Activists invade privacy when they trespass and covertly obtain footage of cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals within private businesses. However, it is necessary to say two brief things 
about the claim that activists who do so unduly invade such privacy. First, it is not clear that a 
person who operates a private business has an inalienable right to privacy. This point was 
made in obiter by the High Court of Australia in the case of Australian Broadcasting 
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Corporation v Lenah Game Meats.
29
 In 2001, Lenah Game Meats sought an injunction 
against the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, preventing the publication of covertly 
obtained footage documenting lawful cruelty towards possums in an Australian possum 
abattoir. One of the arguments put forward by Lenah Game Meats which was considered by 
the High Court, was that the publication would amount to an invasion of privacy. In 
considering this argument, Chief Justice Gleeson identified a ‘grey area’ that exists 
somewhere between that which is private and that which is public. He stated:   
There is no bright line which can be drawn between what is private and what is not. Use of the 
term ‘public’ is often a convenient method of contrast, but there is a large area in between what 
is necessarily public and what is necessarily private. An activity is not private simply because it 
is not done in public. It does not suffice to make an act private that, because it occurs on private 
property, it has such measure of protection from the public gaze as the characteristics of the 




This statement by the High Court is persuasive in any determination about what may 
constitute a private act. The mere fact that activists are entering a ‘private’ business space 
which is intended to preclude the public gaze, does not mean that the conduct within that 
space is protected by an inalienable right to privacy. 
Second, it is a fundamental tenet of liberal democratic society that private interests be 
‘balanced against public and personal goods’.
31
 One of the most significant liberal 
commentaries on this point was made by John Stuart Mill, who claimed that ‘the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’.
 32
 Although Mill did not extend his 
conception of ‘others’ to nonhuman animals, his argument has been influential for those 
theorising when individual rights should be abrogated for the greater good. A similar point, 
specifically pertaining to an individual’s claim to privacy, was also made by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission in their 2014 report entitled ‘Serious Invasions of Privacy in the 
                                                 
 
29
 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Limited [2001] HCA 63; 208 CLR 199 
(‘Lenah’). 
30
 Ibid [42] (Gleeson CJ). 
31
 McCausland, O’Sullivan and Brenton, above n 3, 213. 
32
 John Stuart Mill, 'On Liberty' in John Gray and G.W Smith (eds), J.S Mill's on Liberty in Focus (Taylor and 
Francis, 1991) 23, 30. 
Page 227 of 305 
 
 
Digital Era’, which stated that privacy is ‘an important public interest, but it must be 
balanced with, and sometimes give way to, other rights and interests’.
33
 They continued: 
[a]lthough respecting privacy will promote free expression and the free media necessary for 
effective democracy, privacy can sometimes conflict with these and other important public  
interests. Where breaching someone’s privacy is justified for an important public interest, 
privacy must give way.
34
 
In 2010, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission reached a similar conclusion, 
stating that ‘the interest in privacy is not absolute’ and that the public interest in protecting 
privacy must also be balanced against other competing public interests.
35
  
Precisely what constitutes the ‘public interest’ will always depend on the facts of any given 
case. In McKinnon v Treasury,
36
 Tamberlin J remarked that the term ‘public interest’ ‘does 
not have any fixed meaning’.
37
 He continued: ‘[i]t is of the widest import and is generally not 
defined or described in the legislative framework, nor, generally speaking, can it be 
defined’.
38
 A statutory reference to the ‘public interest’ therefore does not mandate any 
particular outcome, but rather requires a ‘conclusion or determination which best serves the 
advancement of the interest of welfare of the pubic, society or the nation’, to be determined 
by reference with the facts of any given case. 
39
 Whilst not providing a definitive answer to 
the question of whether animal welfare issues are always in the public interest, Kirby J 
provided some direction in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty 
Limited, stating: 
The concerns of a governmental and political character must not be narrowly confined. To do 
so would be to restrict, or inhibit, the operation of the representative democracy that is 
envisaged by the Constitution. Within that democracy, concerns about animal welfare are 
clearly legitimate matters of public debate across the nation. So are concerns about the export 
of animals and animal products. Many advances in animal welfare have occurred only 
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because of public debate and political pressure from special interest groups. The activities of 
such groups have sometimes pricked the conscience of human beings.
40
 
In the same case, Callinan J noted that the method of slaughter of nonhuman animals in 
Australia may be a matter of public interest, even where the chosen method is lawful. He 
stated: 
[t]he processes adopted by the respondent were neither novel nor confined to the slaughter of 
possums; they are of a kind generally employed in the slaughter of cattle, sheep and goats for 
meat. It may also be accepted that the killing and processing for export of possums as 
creatures native to Australia may well be capable of being matters of public interest.
41
 
Any claim to privacy that rests solely on the fact that one’s conduct occurs on privately 
owned land must thus be subjected to the public interest test. The ‘grey area’ between what is 
private and what is public is not simplified merely by reference to the location in which that 
conduct takes place. Moreover, it is a fundamental tenet of democratic society that a public or 
private interest in privacy may give way to other competing public interests, and I have 
suggested that the publication of footage documenting cruelty towards nonhuman animals 
may fall within the scope of the public interest.  
C. When Unlawful Conduct is Justified 
A common objection to unlawful activism is that activists unjustifiably take the law into their 
own hands. Australian deputy Prime Minister Barnaby Joyce (previously the  Minister for 
Agriculture) for example has stated:  
You cannot decide to take the law into your own hands. Once you do that…where does it 
stop? Everyone has an own purview an ethical reason [sic] to break into some industry 
because of what they judge to be correct. That judgment is overwhelmingly done by the 
police, or it is done by the RSPCA; it can’t be done by people of their own volition.
42
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However, it is necessary to make two points in response to this. First, the claim that citizens 
have a prima facie duty to obey the law is subject to intense debate. Second, even if one 
accepts that citizens have a duty to obey the law, civil disobedience may still be morally 
justified. I consider each of these points in turn.  
1. The Authority of Law 
There are ongoing conversations about whether citizens have a prima facie moral obligation 
to obey the law. According to John Hasnas, the question of whether the law creates moral 
obligations is an ‘ancient one’,
43
 which has been met with a variety of responses. Hasnas 
suggests that among these commentators, there is ‘no one...[who] argues that the duty to obey 
the law is a fundamental moral duty – one that is worth complying with for its own sake’.
44
 
However, it is possible to identify thinkers who have argued that there may be a moral duty to 
obey laws, even if those laws are unjust or violate an individual’s rights. For example, 
Thomas Hobbes has argued that there exists a duty to obey the law to avoid chaos or the 
‘weakening of an otherwise just legal system’.
45
 Hobbes said that ‘perpetual war, of every 
man against his neighbour’ would ensue if citizens failed to obey the law, and were thus 
‘masterless’.
46
 Thomas Aquinas made a similar claim, arguing that even an unjust law may 
‘bind in conscience’. 
47
 Although Aquinas argues that ‘a law that is not just, seems to be no 
law at all’, he also held that a moral duty to obey an unjust law still exist where obedience 
will ‘avoid scandal or disturbance’.
48
  
Political thinkers such as John Rawls and Jeremy Waldron have argued for the existence of a 
moral duty to obey the laws of just institutions. Rawls stated that 
[f]rom the standpoint of justice and fairness, a fundamental natural duty is the duty of justice. 
This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to 
us….if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to expect in the 
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circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do his part in the existing scheme. Each is 
bound to these institutions independent of his voluntary acts, performative or otherwise.
49
 
Similarly, Waldron stated ‘[i]t is morally imperative that the demands of justice be pursued 
period’, and that there exists a requisite ‘natural duty to support the laws and institutions of a 
just state’.
50
 John Finnis has adopted a similar approach, suggesting that a moral duty to obey 
the law stems from the fact that the law has a unique ability to coordinate society in pursuit of 
common goods. He contends, ‘the existence of the legal order creates a shared interest which 
gives everyone moral reason to collaborate with the law’s coordination solutions, i.e. moral 
reason to regard the law as (morally) authoritative’.
51
 What these arguments share is the view 




A different perspective is that the law has no prima facie moral authority over its citizens.  On 
this view, law that is unjust, or fails to accord with a conception of the greater good, may be 
considered ‘defective’, and may fail to make any moral command over citizens.
53
 According 
to William Godwin, blind obedience to unjust law confounds the ‘authority which depends on 
force, with the authority that arises from reverence and esteem’, and is a ‘violation of 
political justice’.
54
 Similarly, Scott Shapiro contends that an ‘over-reliance on authority…[t]o 
cede too much decision-making to others is both foolhardy and morally irresponsible’.
55
  
A more polemical view put forward by Robert Wolff, is that a moral obligation to obey the 
law is contrary to the ‘primary obligation’ of humans to maintain moral autonomy.
56
 Wolff 
claims: ‘[t]he autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous, is not subject to the will of 
another. He may do what another tells him, but not because he has been told to do it’.
57
 
Moreover, Wolff contends 
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there can be no resolution of the conflict between the autonomy of the individual and the 
putative authority of the state. Insofar as man fulfils his obligation to make himself the author 
of his decisions, he will resist the state’s claims to have authority over him. That is to say, he 
will deny that he has a duty to obey the laws of the state simply because they are the laws.
58
 
Whilst it is not within the scope of this chapter to contribute to these conversations regarding 
the law’s authority, the commentaries indicate that the proposition that citizens have a moral 
duty to uphold the law in all cases is subject to intense scholarly debate and that there is no 
fixed or agreed upon position. Any claim that activists who trespass act immorally, simply 
because their conduct is unlawful, must therefore be tested against these wide ranging 
perspectives. This is particularly pertinent in the context of animal welfare, where the laws 
that ostensibly protect the welfare of nonhuman animals, implicitly rely upon the unlawful 
conduct of activists to provide the RSPCA with a ‘reasonable suspicion’ of animal cruelty 
before they may enter and inspect private premises. 
D. A Statement on Civil Disobedience 
In conjunction with scholarship about the authority of law, legal and political theorists also 
debate whether there is a justification for civil disobedience. My discussion in this part deals 
with acts of positive disobedience, and is thus different from the discussion in the previous 
surrounding the authority of law and when law may have the ability to bind a population in 
conscience. Whilst it is unnecessary for the purposes of my argument to provide a full 
account of what actions might constitute civil disobedience, a brief analysis of some key 
commentators on the topic reveals that there is a prima facie moral justification for trespass 
with an intent to covertly obtain footage of lawful cruelty towards nonhuman animals.  
The morality of breaking the law in the name of civil disobedience has attracted significant 
scholarly attention.
59
 One view is that ‘disobedience may be justifiable under certain political 
systems, for instance, Nazi or Communist dictatorships, [but] it is never or almost never 
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justifiable in a democracy’.
60
 In 1970, former Prime Minister of Australia, John Gorton 
articulated this view, stating: ‘[a]s to inciting people to break the law, I think there can be no 
excuse whatsoever for those in a community where the opportunity exists to change the law 
through the ballot box’.
61
 T.H Green made a similar claim: 
Supposing then the individual to have decided that some ‘command of a political superior’ is 
not for the common good, how ought he to act in regard to it? In a country like ours, with a 
popular government and settled methods of enacting and repealing laws, the answer of 
common sense is simple and sufficient. He should do all he can by legal methods to get the 
command cancelled, but till it is cancelled, he should conform to it.
62
 
The view that democratic citizens may be under a prima facie moral duty to obey the law has 
also been discussed by McCausland, O’Sullivan and Brenton in the specific context of animal 
activism. They suggest that democratically passed laws represent the ‘majority view’ and 
may therefore make a stronger moral claim over citizens than other types of laws passed by 
other forms of government.
63
 However, even if one accepts this view, civil disobedience may 
still be justified in a democratic society provided it meets certain criteria. This is particularly 
so in the context of nonhuman animals, where trespass currently presents the only means 
available for monitoring the conduct of private industries without warning, and is therefore an 
essential component of enforcement of Australian animal welfare legislation.  
In this context, civil disobedience does not weaken the democratic state, but is rather a 
‘hallmark’ of it.
64
 Civil disobedience in the form of trespass is essential to ‘mak[ing] the 
majority realize that what is for it a matter of indifference is a matter of great importance to 
others’,
65
 and thus ‘limited disobedience…can have an important part to play’ in a democratic 
society.
66
 Moreover, disobedience might be essential to ‘ensuring the accountability of those 
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in power’, and because of the  ‘role it plays in bringing publicity to or perhaps a fair hearing’ 
on animal welfare issues, that are most clearly of public concern.
67
 
According to Hannah Arendt, civil disobedience in a democratic society is an ‘activity that 
mediates between a need for change and a need for stability’.
68
 It does not undermine the 
auditory of the law per se, but rather is an act that implicitly accepts its legitimacy.
69
 As Peter 
Burdon puts it, ‘dissent implies consent’.
70
 Thus, for Arendt, acts of civil disobedience in a 
democratic society acknowledge the authority of law as a tool that can ‘stabilise and legalize 
change once it has occurred’, though her personal view is that ‘the change itself is always the 
result of extra legal action’.
71
 Given that, as I explained in chapter seven, the RSPCA is only 
authorized to enter private premises based on a reasonable suspicion of cruelty, it is clear that 
civil disobedience is essential not only to making animal cruelty visible, but to enabling the 
enforcement of Australian animal welfare laws. To this end, it is possible to see how civil 
disobedience, in the form of trespass, explicitly affirms the authority of law, in the sense that 
it is often intended to bring to light unlawful conduct that is contrary to the values and 
provisions of Australian animal welfare legislation. 
Numerous thinkers have sought to define the limits of what constitutes justifiable law 
breaking. For the purposes of this chapter, I describe a cautious definition by drawing on the 
work of Henry Bedau and John Rawls. I describe it as ‘cautious’ because it is narrower and 
more reserved than other theories of civil disobedience, which I mention below. Civil 
disobedience, according to Rawls, is ‘a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act 
contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in law or policies of the 
government.
72
  It is morally justified on the basis that it is a ‘political act…guided and 
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justified by political principles, that is, principles of justice which regulate the constitution 
and social institution generally’.
73
  
Rawls’ account of civil disobedience may be critiqued as being too narrow. Joseph Raz, for 
example, has pointed out that at times, the requirement of nonviolence ‘may well have much 
more severe consequences than many an act of violence’.
74
 Raz provides the example of a 
nonviolent strike by ambulance drivers, which could lead to significant fatalities and 
suffering. Raz therefore contends ‘violence for political gains cannot be rejected 
absolutely’,
75
 as consideration must be given to the context and the potential outcomes of 
non-violent methods. A stronger view is that violence is prima facie justified in the context of 
civil disobedience. John Morreal for example defends violence where it is used in a deliberate 
and limited fashion to achieve limited ends.
76
 Peter Gelderloos puts forward an even stronger 
position, and argues that nonviolent methods ‘invariably lead to dead ends’ 
77
 He claims the 
requirement of nonviolence is based on ‘falsified histories of struggle…[i]t’s methods are 
wrapped in authoritarian dynamics, and its results are harnessed to meet government 




Moreover, the method of ‘applying’ a cautious definition of civil disobedience to the context 
of animal activism is not without limitation. According to Kimberley Brownlee, while such 
an approach is ‘standard…when examining civil disobedience’, she contends that ‘definitions 
tend to be overly rigid’ and tend, as a consequence, to anticipate evaluation’.
79
 Moreover, it is 
rarely possible to determine whether a particular form of disobedience can be justified ‘in the 
abstract’.
80
 As Peter Singer suggests, ‘to expect any work of theory to give answers to 
questions is to expect more than theory alone can give’.
81
 It is also important to note that 
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Rawl’s overall conception of justice is human-centric,
82
 and thus it is unlikely that Rawls 
would have contemplated civil disobedience on behalf of nonhuman animals as justifiable in 
the first place.
83
 Regardless of these limitations, my use of a cautious definition of civil 
disobedience serves to illustrate that even civil disobedience, narrowly defined, can justify 
acts of trespass on behalf of nonhuman animals. I now consider how each criterion of the 
cautious conception of civil disobedience may apply in the context of animal activists who 
trespass to document cruelty towards nonhuman animals. 
1. Public 
For Rawls, civil disobedience is a ‘public act’ that is ‘addressed to public principles [and] 
done in public…openly with fair notice; it is not covert or secretive’.
84
 Hugo Bedau makes a 
stronger claim, arguing that acts of civil disobedience are ‘necessarily public’.
85
 Bedau 
contends that if an act of civil disobedience is done privately or in secret, the act itself must 
constitute an ‘embarrassment to the dissenter’, motivating the concealment of his conduct 
from public view.
86
 An act that would cause such ‘embarrassment’, he contends could not be 
considered civil disobedience. This is because civil disobedience requires that the dissenter 
‘views what he does as a civic act, an act that properly belongs to the public life of the 
community’.
87
  On this basis, Bedau contends that the Government and the public should be 
informed in advance of any intention to engage in an act of civil disobedience.
88
 O’Sullivan 
and co-authors similarly contend that ‘secrecy is not compatible with an open and public 
appeal to common conceptions of justice’.
89
 
Animal activists can meet the requirement that their conduct be public, given that they 
publicize the footage that they covertly obtain. Part of their activism is necessarily performed 
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in private, since alerting  the subjects of covert surveillance to the fact that they are being 
filmed may cause them to moderate their behaviour. Publicizing an intent to engage in civil 
disobedience would therefore undermine the act of civil disobedience in the first place.
90
  
However, provided that activists publicize their findings, and in doing so ‘make it known that 
an act of civil disobedience has occurred, and what the motivation behind it is’, it seems the 
public communication element would be satisfied.
91
  
The publicity requirement seems even more clearly satisfied given that activists who operate 
in secret can justify the reasons for behaving covertly in the first place. The ability to provide 
such a justification will ‘reduce the perception that the intention of the disobedient act was 
deception, rather than in the interests of a conscientiously and politically supportable view’.
92
 
In the context of animal activism, where publicity would potentially undermine one’s 
‘attempt to communicate through civil disobedience’,
93
 covert conduct is arguably justified 




An act of civil disobedience must be ‘conscientious’, meaning that the ‘dissenter proposes to 
justify his disobedience by an appeal to the incompatibility between his political 
circumstances and his moral convictions’.
95
 The requirement that civil disobedience be 
conscientious does not mandate that one prove that their moral convictions are ‘true and 
justified’.
96
  Rather, according to Brownlee, the requirement of conscientiousness necessitates 
that any action be performed in light of views that are sincere, serious and morally consistent 
with the course of action taken.
97
 In addition, an action can only be conscientious if the 
person undertaking it has engaged in some form of utilitarian analysis in which they weigh 
the consequences of performing the act versus those of non-performance. A dissenter should 
thus believe that the law makes a prima facie claim upon them,
98
 and that it is ‘not lightly to 
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 An act of civil disobedience will be conscientious where the dissenter 
believes ‘it would be worse for everyone to suffer the consequences of the objectionable law 
than it would be for everybody to suffer the consequences of his…civil disobedience’.
100
 
Animal activists might satisfy the requirement of possessing a sincere and serious belief, if 
they contest systematic and routine forms of cruelty towards nonhuman animals that are 
positively permitted by the laws that purport to prohibit it. 
3. Nonviolent 
An act of civil disobedience must also be non-violent in nature. According to Bedau, an act of 
disobedience that is violent in nature simply cannot be described as ‘civil’.
101
 Though I have 
indicated that the acceptability of violence as a tool of civil disobedience is the subject of 
debate, a strong case can be made that trespass satisfies Bedau’s conception of non-violence:  
the agent does not try to accomplish his [sic] aim either by initiating or by threatening 
violence, that he does not respond with violence or violent resistance during the course of his 
disobedience….and thus that he is prepared to suffer without defence the indignities and 
brutalities that often greet his act.
102
  
The conduct of animal activists who trespass one private land to document cruelty would 
meet this requirement. While some activists do use ‘intentionally distressing shock 
tactics…[that] are not a legitimate part of the civil disobedience tool-kit’, those can be easily 
distinguished from the conduct of those who merely enter private premises.
103
 On the 
cautious view, activists who do engage in violent, threatening or destructive behaviour 
operate in a way that ‘is at risk of falling outside the scope of civil disobedience’.
104
 In one 
example, a family who ran a guinea pig farm was on the receiving end of the threatening and 
destructive conduct of several animal activists. In 2006, those threats and harassments 
culminated in the theft of a family members body from the grave.
105
 Such vicious acts clearly 
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fall outside the scope of civil disobedience on the cautious view by failing to meet the 
requirement of non-violence. If civil disobedience is a tool with which citizens can 
legitimately and justifiably break the law to oppose violence, coercion and injustice, the 
cautious view maintains that it is imperative that the act of civil disobedience itself remains 
free from these things.   
4. Aiming to Change Government Policy or Law 
Finally, an act of civil disobedience must be directed at the government because of an 
objectionable law or policy. This does not necessarily require that a dissenter engaging in an 
act of civil disobedience break the same law that they object to.
106
 Rather, an act of civil 
disobedience may involve breaking one law but be aimed at a different objectionable law 
‘indirectly’.
107
 This is pertinent in the context of animal activism, where engaging in trespass 
and unlawful covert surveillance addresses government policy and failing animal welfare 
legislation indirectly. According to Bedau, the fact that one may target objectionable laws 
‘indirectly’ and still participate in civil disobedience is necessary given that some of the most 
objectionable laws are not ‘open to direct resistance by anyone except those who administer 
them’.
108
 Nevertheless, there should be a ‘meaningful connection’ maintained between the 
offence that is committed and the law that is being opposed by the act of civil 
disobedience.
109
 That connection seems well maintained in the context of animal activism 
involving trespass and covert surveillance, since the criminal and civil laws prohibiting 
trespass are precisely those that facilitate the secrecy that sustains cruelty towards nonhuman 
animals. 
This discussion has sought to demonstrate that acts of animal activism may be characterised 
as civil disobedience. While it is difficult to undertake a thorough assessment of the different 
forms activism might take, this discussion has shown that prima facie, trespass to document 
cruelty towards nonhuman animals may be morally justified in a democratic society where 
the action is sufficiently public, conscientious and non-violent, and is intended to affect 
general policy or legal change. I have also argued that even though an individual has a 
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limited right to privacy, animal welfare matters are legitimate matters of public interest, and 
may therefore be a basis upon which individual privacy rights can be justifiably be abrogated.  
III. MAKING INVISIBLE CRUELTY ‘VISIBLE’: DEBUNKING THE MYTH 
Having provided a prima facie case for justifying acts of civil disobedience by animal 
activists, I turn now to draw a link between such acts and the alleviation of cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals. I divide this discussion into two parts: (1) the generation of public debate, 
and (2) the link between animal visibility and regulatory attention.  
A. Generating Public Debate and Enabling Law Enforcement 
There are many examples of the Australian media publicizing footage covertly collected by 
activists engaging in civil disobedience. The footage has depicted both lawful and unlawful 
cruelty. For example, in 2012, covertly obtained footage from Australia’s largest duck meat 
producer, Pepe’s Ducks, showed ducks denied access to water, trapped under metal grates 
and unable to walk or weight bear.
110
 In 2013, Animal Liberation released anonymously 
provided footage of turkeys being ‘bashed, kicked and stomped on’ at Inghams poultry 
slaughterhouse in New South Wales.
111
 Also in 2013, activist footage revealed male calves at 
a Victorian slaughterhouse being prodded excessively with cattle prods ‘and sometimes even 
thrown’ to force them into the slaughterhouse.
112
 In 2014, animal rights group PETA released 
covertly obtained footage from within Australian shearing sheds, documenting sheep being 
‘roughly handled, punched in the face and stamped upon. One sheep was beaten with a 
hammer while another was shown having a deep cut crudely sewn up’.
113
 In 2015,  footage 
was released to the public showing live possums, piglets and rabbits being used as ‘baits’ by 
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 In 2016, allegations of cruelty were made against a Hobart 
abattoir, after covertly obtained footage was collected depicting pigs ‘beaten with pipes, 
kicked in the head…[and] failed attempts to stun animals’.
115
  In 2017, Animal Liberation 
Tasmania provided anonymous footage to the Primary Industries Department depicting 
calves being mistreated at a Tasmanian abattoir. The footage depicted ‘workers beating male 
calves until they collapsed and throwing them to the ground by the ears’.
116
  
These public ‘exposés’ documenting cruelty towards nonhuman animals can cause financial 
damage to the industries that are exposed. They can also generate heated public debate 
surrounding our treatment of nonhuman animals. For example, In May 2011, ABC current 
affairs program Four Corners publicised covertly collected footage of Australian cattle being 
mistreated in Indonesian export abattoirs.
117
 The footage showed Australian cattle in 
Indonesian markets subjected to torture and abuse, and slaughtered whilst fully conscious. 
Some cattle were subjected to 33 cuts with a knife prior to an apparent loss of consciousness 
or death. The footage led to the announcement by then Prime Minister Julia Gillard of a 
temporary suspension of the trade.
118
 The cost to Australia’s live export farmers was 
reportedly significant, with a class action currently before the court seeking compensation for 
financial losses.
119
 During the hearing, the court was reportedly told that Australia’s meat 
sales had dropped by 15 percent in the week following the program, in response to ‘public 
revulsion’ over the cruelty they had seen.
120
 This followed the 2006 ban on live exports to 
Egypt, which was enacted following the public release of footage of extreme animal cruelty 
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In 2015, an exposé entitled ‘Making a Killing’ aired on the Australian television show, Four 
Corners. This revealed the use of live animal baits in the Australian greyhound racing 
industry, and is a powerful example of how activists engaging in trespass and covert 
surveillance may generate change for nonhuman animals by raising public awareness of 
animal welfare issues, and enabling the enforcement of animal welfare provisions. The 
practice of live baiting is already unlawful in Australia,
122
 yet the undercover footage 
captured by Australian animal advocacy groups revealed that the practice was notoriously 
widespread, with some of the biggest industry names engaging in the activity. The footage 
exposed greyhound trainers and handlers using live rabbits, piglets and possums to train 
racing greyhounds. In some instances, ‘bait’ animals were kept in cages and bred to ensure an 
ongoing supply of ‘baits’. In most instances, these live ‘bait’ animals were tied to a lure and 
sent around the racing track. The greyhounds were released to catch them and maul them – a 
method in the industry known as blooding. The industry rationale behind ‘blooding’ is that 
the greyhounds will race faster if they are encouraged to develop a prey instinct. The act of 
capturing live prey and the taste of blood is thought to engage such an instinct.
123
 
In the weeks following the exposé, the greyhound racing industry in Australia experienced 
widespread public backlash. Nine major corporate sponsors of greyhound racing pulled their 
funding and support from the industry.
124
 The Greyhound Racing Board of New South Wales 
was requested to stand down by Minister for Racing, Troy Grant. The CEO was also stood 
down.
125
 In addition, the entire racing board of Victoria resigned, with the Chairman even 
stating: ‘I can no longer be satisfied that live baiting was restricted to the small band of 
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 Racing Queensland’s Integrity manager was provisionally stood down, 
only to be reinstated following an internal review.
127
 Five notable Queensland trainers, Reg 
Kay, Tom Noble, Debra Arnold, James Harding and Tony McCabe, received life-time bans 
from the sport, preventing them from owning, training, or preparing a registered racing 
animal and attending the Brisbane Greyhound races.
128
 Tom Noble was charged with seven 
counts of animal cruelty, with Detective Superintendent Mark Aimsworth stating his was 
‘only the commencement of a number of arrests’.
129
 Noble pleaded guilty to the charges and 
was handed a three-year, wholly suspended jail sentence in September 2016. The Attorney 




Thirty nine trainers across the three exposed states were suspended pending further 
investigations.
131
 Racing Queensland stood down 29 trainers.
132
 In Western Australia, the 
racing industry increased live baiting penalties from a maximum 12 month disqualification 
from the sport, to a maximum 10 year disqualification and $50,000 fine.
133
 The RSPCA also 
offered a reward of $10,000 for any information leading to live-baiting convictions.
134
 In 
South Australia, the Animal Welfare (Greyhound Training) Amendment Bill 2015 was 
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introduced to amend the South Australia Animal Welfare Act 1985 to include penalties of up 
to $50,000 or 4 years imprisonment for live baiting.
135
 The Bill also created new a mandatory 
licensing scheme for anybody who wishes to own and operate a bullring (greyhound training 
facility) in South Australia.
136
 In July 2016, the New South Wales Premier Mike Baird 
announced that greyhound racing would be banned from July 2017 onwards, following a 
special commission of inquiry which found ‘overwhelming evidence of animal cruelty, 
including mass greyhound killing and live baiting’.
137
 He commissioned an inquiry into the 
sport,
138
 following which he contended there was ‘no other alternative’ but to ban it.
139
 
Within three months of announcing this ban, Baird revoked this decision due to mounting 
political and media pressures, opting instead for a 41 million dollar overhaul of the 
Greyhound industry.
140
  In Victoria, a 2015 legislative amendment passed to increase the 
penalty for ‘live baiting’ from 240 penalty units to 500 penalty units.
141
 The Amendment also 
introduced  a new offence of attending a premises (with no reasonable excuse) on which live 
baiting is occurring for the purposes of ‘blooding’ a greyhound.
142
 In November 2017, the 




Whilst substantial ethical questions still remain about the ethical viability of the Australian 
greyhound industry, the ‘Making a Killing’ exposé compiled by activists generated 
substantial, important public discourse surrounding whether the sport is conducive to animal 
welfare at all.
144
 Moreover, it is clear that ‘without the aid of hidden cameras, trespass, 
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anonymous sources and undercover investigators infiltrating the industry’;
145
 the widespread, 
unlawful use of nonhuman animal baits in this ‘sport’ would not yet have been discovered. 
The public would still be unaware of the many animal welfare issues that exist within the 
Australian greyhound racing industry. 
In the Australian case of ABC v Lenah Game Meats,
146
 the High Court of Australia also noted 
in obiter the potentially damaging consequences of allowing the public to view the 
mistreatment of nonhuman animals to the companies which rely upon it – even where that 
mistreatment is legal. It is implicit within this statement that the public who become aware of 
cruelty towards nonhuman animals may make different consumer choices as a response. In 
Lenah, the High Court explicitly noted that no evidence had been adduced at any stage to 
suggest that the Respondent had failed to comply with the applicable Animal Welfare Code of 
Practice for Processing Brush Tail Possums in the slaughter of possums,
147
 and that the 
methods employed by the Respondent’s business were not different in kind from other 
slaughter methods used routinely throughout Australia with respect to other nonhuman 
animals.
148
 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Gleeson accepted that the footage in question, ‘like 
many other lawful animal slaughtering activities…if displayed to the public, would cause 
distress to some viewers’.
149
 Justice Kirby also remarked that the footage contained 
‘gruesome sights and sounds’, which ‘would be upsetting to many who might witness and 
hear the videotape’.
150
 The Court also accepted the respondent’s argument that ‘the likely 
effect [of publication]…could be potentially catastrophic for present business and the business 
which it may be able to do in the future especially in new markets’.
151
 Quoting the 
respondent, the Court stated: 
The distribution and publication of this film is likely to adversely and substantially affect the 
[respondent’s] business. The film is of the most  gruesome parts of the [respondent’s] brush 
tail possum processing operation. It shows possums being stunned and then having their 
throats cut. It is likely to arouse public disquiet, perhaps even anger, at the way in which the 
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[respondent] conducts its lawful business. This is no different from any animal slaughtering 
operation in Australia, which is normally hidden from public view.
152
 
In opening the High Court’s judgment, Gleeson CJ provided that the fact that the ‘the 
broadcasting would cause financial harm to the respondent’ was ‘unchallenged evidence’. 
Gleeson CJ further noted that financial loss to the respondent following publication of the 
footage was ‘not inherently improbable’,
153
 and that ‘[a] film of a vertically integrated 
process of production of pork sausages, or chicken pies, would unlikely be used for sales 
promotion’.
154
   
The fact that footage depicting cruelty towards nonhuman animals may damage a business, 
suggests that the public does not wish to financially support such cruelty. In turn, it is 
possible to conclude that the footage capture by activists is essential in generating public 
debate and shaping consumer choices. On numerous occasions, animal activists have made 
cruelty towards nonhuman animals visible to the public, and have stimulated the types of 
discussion that are necessary to generate change. Moreover, these discussions are central not 
only to public awareness and policy reform, but also to keeping animal welfare matters on the 
regulatory agenda.  
B. Linking Animal Visibility to Increased Legal Regulation 
Siobhan O’Sullivan has explored the relationship between visibility and the amount of 
regulatory attention afforded to nonhuman animals. In her study in the New South Wales 
context, O’Sullivan demonstrates that those nonhuman animals that are made more visible, 
are more likely to be provided with more welfare protections by law. O’Sullivan argues that 
of 12 Codes of Practice which pertain to animal welfare and are enforceable in the New 
South Wales context, five of these pertain to animals that are highly visible: ‘exhibited, sports 
and gaming animals’. Four apply to another highly visible class of nonhuman animals: those 
that we keep as ‘companions’. By contrast, only one Code of Practice relates to the treatment 
of each nonhuman animal that is routinely kept invisible: agricultural animals and research 
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animals. This leads O’Sullivan to conclude that ‘as the level of animal visibility rises, so too 
does the number of legal instruments’.
155
  
Whilst the sheer quantity of legislative protections offered to a nonhuman animal does not 
necessarily correlate to better quality protections, O’Sullivan contends that the connection 
between high visibility and regulatory activity remains important.156 The correlation is 
important because increased regulatory attention generates and facilitates the ongoing 
discussions surrounding how nonhuman animals should be treated and protected by law that I 
mentioned above. Peter Sankoff makes a similar point, arguing that consistent and predicable 
review is the ‘best’ feature of any animal welfare law – precisely because it facilitates these 
ongoing discussions.157 According to Sankoff, increased regulatory attention ensures that 
‘animal law is always on the agenda, and in relative terms, the next chance to reform a 
practice is just around the corner’.158 Therefore, activists who consistently make ‘invisible’ 
nonhuman animals ‘visible’ may generate greater regulatory attention towards these species 
and generate more frequent discussions surrounding how they ought to be treated. 
O’Sullivan’s study demonstrates that civil disobedience therefore is not only a ‘sad necessity’ 
for public awareness surrounding the cruelty that the law allows, but may also be an essential 
component of the law reform process. Activists engaging in civil disobedience work to keep 
animals in our sight. Correspondingly, they succeed in keeping them, and their treatment, at 
the forefront of our minds.  
IV. LAWS THAT THREATEN CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE ON BEHALF OF NONHUMAN 
ANIMALS 
Given the link between public awareness of cruelty towards nonhuman animals and consumer 
choices, it is unsurprising that the increasing number of animal activists engaging in trespass 
and covert surveillance has been met by strong opposition. Agricultural groups, the media 
and members of parliament have all been vocal in urging the introduction of new laws to 
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‘crack down’ on animal activists, and to deter them from obtaining and publishing footage 
depicting cruelty towards nonhuman animals. The push for the introduction of such 
legislation has been justified on numerous grounds. Many commentators have sought to 
characterise activists as untrustworthy, or as persons that the public should fear. For example, 
Brian Ahmed, a battery egg farmer from Victoria, stated that whilst he was proud of his farm, 
he was concerned about how easy it would be for activists to ‘fabricate an image’ and to 
make his intensive farm look ‘overcrowded’.
159
 The Pastoral and Grazier’s association voiced 
a similar concern, and asserted a difference between ‘whistleblowers, who do act in good 
faith’ and animal activists, who supposedly act in bad faith.
160
 They suggested that activists 
who release ‘inflammatory material’ to the public, and rely upon the ‘court of public 
opinion’, are capable of ‘manipulat[ing] the law by moulding public sentiment’.
161
  
Some of the most powerful commentary has come from Australian political leaders. Primary 
Industries Minister Katrina Hodgkinson, for example, has made it appear that activists who 
oppose cruelty towards nonhuman animals are failing to act in the public interest. She stated 
activists are seeking ‘media opportunit[ies] to spread [their] own grubby tactics’.
162
 
Hodgkinson has also claimed that activists intentionally sensationalise their claims: ‘animal 
activist organisations are not an authority in this [animal welfare] space…animals have been 
disturbed in the middle of the night [by activists]…that makes the animals distressed…that 
makes for really good footage if your ultimate goal is to promote veganism or to promote 
human qualities onto animals...’.
163
The Sydney Morning Herald has reported on similar 
views. One of those is the views of US Senator David Hinkins, who said that that legislation 
                                                 
 
159
 ABC Radio, 'the Battle over Animal Welfare and Ag-Gag Laws', Bush Telegraph, 21 July 2014 (Temple 




 Pastoral and Grazier's Assocation, Submission No 62 to Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional 
Affairs and Transport, an Inquiry into the Criminal Code Amendment (Animal Protection) Bill 2015, 6 
March 2015, 2. 
161
 O’Sullivan, above n 156, 1. 
162
 ABC Radio, 'the Battle over Animal Welfare and Ag-Gag Laws', Bush Telegraph, 21 July 2014 (Temple 





Page 248 of 305 
 
 




Activists have also been portrayed as ideological extremists who present a danger to 
Australian society. Minister Gail Gago described activists as ‘ideological warriors [who take] 
up absolute positions’.
165
 Speaking at the New South Wales Farmers Association’s annual 
conference, Hodgkinson declared of activists: ‘These people are vandals. These people are 
akin to terrorists’.
166
 Pat Mitchell, a member of Australian Pork Limited and the Victorian 
Farmers Federation called them ‘agro-terrorists’.
167
 Victorian agriculture Minister Peter 
Walsh used the term ‘animal terrorists’.
168
 The use of such language mirrors conversations in 
the United States context, in which the phrase ‘terrorist’ is commonly used with respect to 
animal rights activists. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has 
classified animal advocates as proponents of ‘special interest extremism’, which they state 
has emerged as a ‘serious domestic terrorist threat’.
169
 According to the FBI, the animal 




Given that these types of allegations are being made against activists, it is unsurprising that 
there are several pieces of legislation in Australia that appear to have been substantially 
motivated by a desire to curtail civil disobedience by animal activists. Animal welfare groups 
describe these laws as ‘ag-gag’ laws, because they have the effect of ‘gagging’ activists 
operating to expose cruelty in agricultural industries. The term ‘ag-gag’ originated in the 
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 and is being increasingly used to describe laws that have the effect of 
punishing acts of animal activism and whistleblowing on behalf of nonhuman animals. Ag-
gag laws need not explicitly target animal activists to have the ‘gagging’ effect. It is sufficient 
that a general law may be used to serve this purpose for it to be described as ‘ag-gag’. In what 
follows, I discuss the potential ‘ag-gag’ operation of the proposed Criminal Code Amendment 
(Animal Protection) Bill 2015 (Cth), the Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA), and the 
Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW)  
A. Criminal Code Amendment (Animal Protection) Bill 2015 (Cth) 
Although the Criminal Code Amendment (Animal Protection) Bill 2015 (Cth) is still before 
the Parliament, it is my starting point for this part because it is the most overt piece of ‘ag-
gag’ law to be proposed in the Australian jurisdiction. This Bill proposes new provisions that 
specifically target animal activists. Two of these provisions are excluded from my discussion 
in this chapter because they penalize forms of activism that I have suggested cannot be neatly 
characterised as civil disobedience on the cautious view. Division 385 of the Bill, for 
example, proposes mandatory prison terms for ‘interfering with the carrying on of animal 
enterprises’, which includes conduct that destroys or damages property,
172
 or causes fear of 
death or serious bodily injury to those who work in animal enterprise or their relatives.
173
 
There is ongoing debate surrounding the justifiability of property damage and violence as 
methods of civil disobedience that are outside the scope of this chapter.
174
 Of interest to this 
discussion however, is division 383, which deals with failures to report malicious cruelty to 
nonhuman animals after that cruelty has been recorded. 
Under Division 383, a person will commit an offence if they make a visual record of what 
they believe to be malicious cruelty to animals, and fail both to notify an animal welfare law 
enforcement authority within one business day about that cruelty, and to provide that footage 
(and all copies) to that authority within five business days. This requirement to report cruelty 
only applies to those who have filmed it, and is therefore targeted towards activists or whistle-
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blowers who document cruelty. Div 383 does not extend to those who merely witness cruelty 
(but fail to film it). The RSPCA has campaigned for a more general mandatory reporting law 
of this type, which would extend to all people who witness cruelty, regardless of whether 
they choose to document it.
175
 In 2014, the Agriculture Minister Barnaby Joyce described the 
RSPCA’s proposition as ‘excessive’, claiming that there should be some ‘latitude to self-
monitoring’ in in the livestock sector.
176
 
The motivation behind the introduction of a provision requiring the mandatory submission of 
film depicting cruelty towards nonhuman animals to law enforcement authorities is two-fold. 
On the one hand, Senator Chris Back, who introduced this Bill, identified a strong need to 
protect 
citizens against a minority who believe they are above the law, who seek to take the law into 
their own hands, to invade the privacy of those engaged in their own lawful pursuit or who 
would use some activist zeal to put lives and livelihoods at risk.
177
 
This provision may therefore be important in protecting the privacy of those who are the 
subject of covert surveillance. However, Back also asserts an animal protection motivation, 
claiming that a ‘person who withholds from authorities footage of suspect malicious animal 
cruelty to animals for days, weeks, or even months, is not acting in the best interests of 
animal protection’.
178
 In both the explanatory memorandum and second reading speech 
accompanying the Bill, Back refers to the fact that the Australian community is opposed to 
malicious cruelty towards animals: it is ‘illegal and…totally unacceptable’,
179
 and is 
something which the Australian community ‘has no tolerance’ for.
180
 One of the key ways in 
which he suggests this Bill meets the objective of animal protection is by ‘ensur[ing] that 
animals are protected against further unnecessary cruelty caused by a delay in reporting’.
181
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Even though Back has maintained an animal protection motivation behind this provision, 
activist groups have been fast to condemn the Bill on the basis that it curtails covert 
surveillance techniques and silences activism. The Animal Welfare League Australia states 
that a prohibition on gathering evidence over extended periods ‘reduces the capacity to gather 
evidence and build a case, thereby placing animals at greater risk’.
182
 The RSPCA states that 
although they do ‘not condone illegal activities in pursuit of animal welfare objectives’ it 
remains ‘impossible not to acknowledge the significant impact many private investigations 
have had on the development of animal welfare law and policy, consumer protection and 
awareness, and the general public dialogue on animal welfare matters in Australia’.
183
  
Moreover, the RSPCA acknowledges that there are examples in which activist activity has 
been central to identifying acts of widespread cruelty within industry.
184
 For example, the 
RSPCA contends that the exposé of the widespread use of live animal baits in the Australian 
greyhound racing industry, discussed in the previous part,
185
 would not have been possible if 
the activists who compiled the evidence were required to curtail their investigations and hand 
the matter over to authorities prior to gathering ‘comprehensive evidence implicating 
multiple trainers in multiple states for multiple offences over a period of time’.
186
 The 
RSPCA attributes their successful prosecution of several greyhound trainers, as well as the 
widespread law and policy reform with respect to the regulation of greyhound racing to the 
‘comprehensive evidence’ collected by activists over a sustained period.
187
  
The strength of that investigation is that commentators could not justifiably dismiss the 
evidence of cruelty towards nonhuman animals as a mere one-off by individual operators, as 
they have done in other contexts. For example, even though Animals Australia has now 
revealed over 20 cases of cruelty to Australian animals in live export markets since 2003, live 
export industry supporters continue to diminish claims that the industry as a whole is cruel 
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towards nonhuman animals. After footage emerged in 2012 from Pakistan showing the brutal 
slaughter of 21,000 Australian exported sheep, Senator Joe Ludwig remarked that was simply 
a case of a single ‘mistake’ and a ‘slip’.
188
  Thus, any provision that may require activists to 
restrict the length of their investigation could have the effect of ‘defeat[ing] the detection of 
hundreds of other instances of criminal conduct… operate[ing] to permit the perpetuation of 
systemic cruelty and criminal conduct.
189
 It is for this reason that the RSPCA claims that 
‘[i]nstead of acting proactively to address the cruelty, [the proposed] Bill operates reactively 
to inhibit its exposure’.
190
 
In critiquing this Bill, animal protection groups have largely failed to address the ethical 
claim that Senator Back is making. In electing to film or document cruelty, the nonhuman 
animals under surveillance are being used as a means to an end. The activists are choosing 
not to intervene and end suffering, when it may be within their power to do so. The National 
Farmers Federation, therefore states that ‘delay[s] in reporting of [cruelty is] likely to 
contribute to serious implications for the animals involved’.
191
 The Australian Lot Feeders’ 
Association similarly claims that failing to report cruelty towards nonhuman animals 
necessarily ‘prolong[s] the suffering of the animals affected’.
192
 While activists may be 
motivated by animal protection on a much bigger scale, they still must grapple with the 
ethical dilemma of using nonhuman animals and their suffering in an instrumental way. 
The moral justification for documenting cruelty is strongest where the cruelty being 
documented is lawful. Reporting legal cruelty to the RSPCA will not yield any positive 
results for nonhuman animals, since the RSPCA can only enforce the provisions of Australian 
animal welfare legislation. However, when activists document unlawful cruelty and fail to 
report it for an extended period, the ethical dilemma they must grapple with is more complex. 
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Either activists report cruelty immediately in the hope that the cruelty will be stopped by law 
enforcement agencies, or they continue to observe that cruelty for an extended time, in the 
hope of generating more widespread change, such as policy and law reform. At the time of 
writing, it is not clear whether the Criminal Code Amendment (Animal Protection) Bill 2015 
(Cth) will continue to be the subject of parliamentary debate. The RSPCA has also 
questioned whether it would be constitutionally valid, given that it is proposed as a Bill 
pertaining to ‘animal protection’ with respect to which the Commonwealth has no 
constitutional power to pass laws.
193
 The Bill was last restored to Notice Paper in August 
2016. 
B. Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA) 
In South Australia, the Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA) prohibits the act of installing, 
using and maintaining surveillance devices to record activity or conversations without prior 
consent from the parties being observed.
194
 Moreover, it prohibits the act of publishing the 
content of that recording, unless such a Judge determines that the publication should be made 
in the public interest.
195
 The maximum penalty for participating in covert surveillance under 
the Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA) is $15,000, or 3 years imprisonment in the case of 
natural person.
196
 Publishing covertly obtained footage without a judicial order carries a 
maximum penalty of $10,000. The South Australian Law Society claims these provisions are 
‘ag-gag’ law, because they make exposing cruelty to nonhuman animals more difficult. 
Specifically, Mr Perotta, on behalf of the society, claims that section 10 of the Bill ‘is in 
actuality ag-gag law’ which ‘is about targeting undercover investigations into animal 
cruelty’.
197
 It is quite clear how this law could be used to punish or deter civil disobedience 
by animal activists. As I have demonstrated, the covert collection of footage documenting 
cruelty towards nonhuman animals, and the subsequent publication of that footage, is a key 
tool used by activists to generate public discourse surrounding out treatment of nonhuman 
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animals. Such methods could clearly be penalised by this legislation, and appear to have been 
an anticipated target.  
Before the Surveillance Devices Bill 2016 (SA) was passed, it appeared before Parliament in 
two earlier incarnations: the Surveillance Devices Bill 2012 (SA) and the Surveillance 
Devices Bill 2014 (SA). In the second reading speech that accompanied the 2014 incarnation 
of the Act, Minister Gago referred to the possibility that the general provisions within the Bill 
could be used against animal activists. She stated that debate surrounding the 2012 Bill had 
generated ‘strongly held positions [which] were not and are not reconcilable’.
 198
 She stated 
‘ideological warriors took up absolute positions… animal rights activists wanted to record 
what they thought were breaches of animal rights’ whilst ‘farmers wanted to ban them.’
199
 
During 2014 parliamentary debate on surrounding the Bill, Robert Brokenshire MP supported 
the Bill on the basis that activists ‘deliberately target agriculture because they have an agenda 




In contrast with these statements, the 2014 Attorney General John Rau went to great lengths 
to assure the public that the Surveillance Devices Bill 2014 (SA)was not a piece of ag-gag 
law. He stated that it amounts to an ‘erroneous interpretation’ to read the 2014 Bill as a piece 
of ag-gag legislation.
201
 He claimed that those with an interest in animal protection were 
‘hijacking’ the conversation, and that: ‘it is more about whether you, in your backyard, can be 
imposed upon by somebody outside your property, by either them covertly, or in other words 
secretly bugging your backyard by filming you, and then they can publish that whether it's in 
the public interest or not’.
202
 According to Rau, evidence of animal cruelty could reasonably 
fall within the ‘public interest’ exception established by the Act, though he maintained that 
such a determination should be decided by the Court, and not the publisher themselves.
203
 In 
a 2014 interview with ABC Rural with respect to an earlier edition of the Bill,
204
 Attorney 
General John Rau stated that the Bill ensured that determinations as to what constitutes the 
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‘public interest’ would be made by the Court as an ‘objective umpire’, rather than a person 
with a vested interest in making a publication.
205
  
Following the passage of the Surveillance Devices Bill 2015 (SA) into South Australian law, 
Tammy Franks MP introduced the Surveillance Devices (Animal Welfare) Amendment Bill 
2016 (SA). This amendment sought to address concerns held by activists that the provisions 
within the Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA) could be used to stifle their activities. The 
amendment sought to define animal welfare matters as prima facie being in the public interest 
in two ways. First, by adding an exception to section 10 of the Act, which prohibits the 
release of covertly obtained footage, where the material concerned relates to issues of animal 
welfare,
206
 and second, by creating a rebuttable presumption that the use of a listening or 
optical surveillance device to obtain information on material relating to issues of animal 
welfare is in the public interest.
207
 
This amendment Bill, which was intended to ensure that the activity of activists would be 
exempted from the general application of the Surveillance Devices Act 2015 (SA), was 
negatived at second reading, with a majority of 10 (4 ayes and 10 noes).  In responding to the 
Bill, the Hon. J.M.A Lensink stated that the Liberal party ‘sympathetic as [they] are’ to the 
cause, would not be supporting the Bill because they did not think the amendment was 
‘necessary to genuinely protect animal welfare interests’.
208
 The Hon. J.M Gazzola argued 
that the amendment was too wide-ranging in scope, and that the proposed amendment was 
‘premature’, since the Act had not yet been tried in practice.
209
 Franks concluded that the 
Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA) ‘silences the proper role of exposing illegality, unethical 
behaviour, cruelty not just to animals but… specifically to animals’.
210
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C. The Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW) 
Another means by which activists who trespass to covertly obtain footage may be punished or 
deterred is through  biosecurity laws. In New South Wales, the Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW) 
contains provisions which may be used to deter or punish activists who engage in civil 
disobedience and enter biosecure premises without consent. The Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW) 
‘provide[s] a framework for the prevention, elimination and minimization of biosecurity risks 
posed by biosecurity matter, dealing with biosecurity matter, carriers and potential carriers, 
and other activities that involve biosecurity matter, carriers or potential carriers’.
211
 The Act 
creates a general ‘biosecurity duty’ that applies to all individuals. The duty provides that: 
Any person who deals with biosecurity matter or a carrier and who knows, or ought 
reasonably to know, the biosecurity risk posed or likely to be posed by the biosecurity matter, 
carrier or dealing, has a biosecurity duty to ensure that, so far as is reasonably practicable, the 
biosecurity risk is prevented, eliminated or minimized.
212
 
Under section 23(1) of the Act, any person who fails to discharge that duty is guilty of an 
offence. Activists entering biosecure premises would likely be deemed ‘carriers’ of 
‘biosecurity matter’ under the Act, and could therefore be charged under s23(1) of the 
Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW), regardless of whether their conduct actually caused a 
biosecurity breach. If a breach of this duty can be characterised as ‘intentional or reckless’, 
and the breach ‘caused, or was likely to cause, a significant biosecurity impact’, the maximum 
penalty for an individual is $1,100,000 or 3 years imprisonment.
213
 Any other breach is 
characterised as a category 2 offence, which carries a maximum penalty of $220,000.
214
 
Activists could clearly be penalized under these provisions. 
In addition to the general biosecurity duty provisions, the Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW) also 
creates the offence of failing to report a suspected ‘biosecurity event’.
215
 Where the failure to 
notify is ‘intentional or reckless’ it carries the same maximum penalty as a category one 
breach of biosecurity duty.
 216
 According to Voiceless, this provision could ‘extend 
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inappropriately’ to the conduct of ‘unrelated third parties, such as media personnel or animal 
groups that are given or become aware of recordings of animal cruelty’.
217
  
In addition to their stated purpose, the provisions within the Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW)  
may also be used to target activists engaging in civil disobedience. During a 2015 roundtable 
discussion between Barnaby Joyce (then the Minister for Agriculture), and Niall Blair (then 
the Minister for Primary Industries), which was focused on the ‘serious and potentially 
devastating issue of farm trespass’, it was made clear that the provision of the Biosecurity Act 
2015 were intended to be used to penalise activists.
218
 Mr Blair stated that the Government 
had released a policy on the issue, entitled the NSW Farm Incursions Policy,
 219
 which, among 
other things, included the introduction of the Biosecurity Bill 2015 (NSW), ‘which supports 
the prosecution of people who deliberately create biosecurity risks’.
220
 Minister Joyce added:  
People who illegally enter farms and conduct unlawful surveillance not only cause distress to 
farmers and animals, they disrupt vital business practices and can even injure and kill animals, 
causing widespread production losses…Let’s be clear – to break and enter is a crime and all 
farmers have the right to be protected against unauthorized persons on their property’.
221 
Whilst biosecurity is undoubtedly important for the health and safety of nonhuman animals 
and the agricultural sector more widely, any assertion that advocates pose a substantial threat 
to biosecurity is not grounded in facts. At the time of writing, the only Australian example of 
an activist causing a biosecurity breach occurred intentionally in 2013 by animal activist 
Ralph Hahnheusser. Intentionality is important here, because there are no recorded instances 
of activists inadvertently causing biosecurity breaches. Hahnheusser’s conduct is distinct 
from the usual conduct of activists, because he deliberately contaminated the feed and water 
troughs of approximately 1700 sheep with ham. He publicized his activities the following day 
via release of a video documenting his actions. The sheep were intended for export to Muslim 
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countries, and thus the deliberate contamination of their feed rendered them unsuitable for 
Halal consumption and prevented the sheep from being exported.
222
  
Hahnheusser was charged for his actions under s45DB the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
which prohibits a person hindering another person engaging in export. The fact that he was 
charged under existing legislation suggests that the provisions under the Biosecurity Act 2015 
(NSW) could overlap with existing law to provide an alternative avenue for producers to 
prosecute activists under provisions that carry far greater penalties than existing legislation. 
The primary judge in the federal court found that the requirements of s45DB were made out, 
but held that Hahnheusser’s actions fell within s45DD(2), which provides an exception where 
the hindering is for the dominant purpose of environmental protection.
223
 Given that 
Hahnheusser’s actions were intended to ‘protect the sheep from suffering as a result of live 
export’ the judge found that the environmental protection exception was made out. On 
appeal, the full Federal Court of Australia found that the environmental protection exception 
did not extend to Hahnheusser’s actions, and that the ‘environmental protection’ exception 
applied not to the preservation of individual animals, but rather to the preservation of an 
environmental system more broadly. If Hahnheusser’s actions had have been aimed at 
preventing the extinction of sheep, the defence may have applied. However, the mere fact 
that sheep form part of the environment did not mean that his efforts to protect those 
individuals amounted more broadly to ‘environmental protection’.
224
 When the matter was re-
tried, Hahnheusser was ordered to pay damages in the sum of $72,873.73 for financial loss.
225
  
Given that, at the time of writing, Hahnheusser’s intentional biosecurity breach is the only 
recorded instance of contamination caused by animal activists, the potential operation of the 
Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW) to stifle activists more generally is concerning. Given the 
necessarily covert nature of what animal activists do, it is difficult to ascertain precisely what 
biosecurity precautions activists take. Some evidence indicates that activists do take 
biosecurity precautions,
 226
 while industry stakeholders maintain that any person entering a 
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farm unannounced poses a biosecurity risk. Australian Pork Limited, for example claims that 
an examination of footage obtained by activists reveals that they entered different farms ‘on 
the same or consecutive nights’.
227
 This, they contend, contravenes biosecurity best practice, 
which dictates a space of three days left between visits to different farms to prevent the 
spread of disease.
228
 Ultimately, protection of Australian biosecurity must be balanced 
against the need for public awareness about how nonhuman animals are lawfully treated 
within private property. In its current form, it is not clear that the Biosecurity Act 2015 
(NSW) strikes this balance appropriately.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have provided examples of two pieces of Australian legislation, and one 
Bill, which could operate to punish and deter acts of civil disobedience on behalf of 
nonhuman animals. I have argued that acts of activism that may be characterised as acts of 
civil disobedience are prima facie justified in Australia’s democratic society. Such acts are 
essential to enabling the enforcement of Australian animal welfare laws for the reasons 
described in chapter seven. They also arm the public with information about how our laws 
enable nonhuman animals to be treated that is not reasonably available by any other lawful 
means. Such information is to generating public debate of the kind that is required to debunk 
the myth of animal protection in Australia, and to facilitate change in Government policy and 
law for nonhuman animals. 
Whilst each piece of legislation I have discussed in this chapter protect legitimate interests, 
they may also be used to punish or deter activists who are currently operating to provide the 
public with information that they need to participate meaningfully in democratic processes. 
Moreover, I have argued that continued public unawareness surrounding lawful cruelty 
towards nonhuman animals sustains and facilitates that cruelty. If the public are unaware that 
Australian animal welfare laws facilitate cruelty towards nonhuman animals, then they are 
precluded from objecting to it. The research of Siobhan O’Sullivan also demonstrates a link 
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between the visibility of nonhuman animal species and the regulatory attention that they are 
afforded. The greater visibility afforded to a particular species, the more regulatory attention 
they appear to receive. The result is that increased visibility engenders greater public 
discourse that is central to alleviating cruelty towards nonhuman animals and stimulating a 
need for law and policy reform with respect to animal welfare.  
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I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this thesis, I have argued that Australian animal welfare laws and Codes of Practice are 
facilitating cruelty towards nonhuman animals. My argument has been that the very laws that 
purport to protect nonhuman animals from harm are thus directly responsible for facilitating 
cruelty towards them. I have described this cruelty as occurring on numerous levels:  it is 
contained within the explicit words of the law and it is also legitimated by the unarticulated 
premises on which these laws are based.  
I have shown in chapter three that the distinction between legal ‘persons’ and legal ‘property’ 
is fundamental to law, and facilitates cruelty towards nonhuman animals. Legal ‘persons’ 
have legal rights and legal duties. Legal things do not. Although nonhuman animals present a 
sui generis case of legal ‘things’ that have some of their interests protected in law, they 
remain objects that can be legitimately owned and used for human benefit, even where such 
ownership and usage entails cruelty or an indifference to their suffering. In critically 
analysing the legal status of nonhuman animals, I considered the writings of key thinkers on 
the legal status of nonhuman animals: Gary Francione and Steven Wise. Both Wise and 
Francione have campaigned for the inclusion of nonhuman animals within the category of 
persons. Yet, their arguments consistently affirm a conception of the legal person as tied to 
the human. My contention was not only that nonhuman animals are legal property, and that 
such classification facilitates cruelty towards them. It was also that the key theorists on the 
topic of the legal status of nonhuman animals implicitly affirm a conception of the legal 
person that necessitates the exclusion of nonhuman animals from that concept. As long as the 
category of the legal person remains tied to the human, nonhuman animals will necessarily be 
excluded. The problem, I argued, is not that the law fails to appreciate those nonhuman 
animals possess interests. It is that they are precisely that: nonhuman. 
Having explained the legal characterisation of nonhuman animals as legal property, in 
chapter four I demonstrated how this classification shapes the way the interests of nonhuman 
animals are protected in Australian animal welfare legislation. My argument was that 
Australian animal welfare laws do not prohibit cruelty per se. Rather, cruelty is prima facie 
lawful, provided it can be justified as either ‘reasonable’ or ‘necessary’ with respect to human 
interests. Given that nonhuman animals are legal property, my contention was that 
determinations of what constitutes ‘necessary’ or ‘reasonable’ cruelty rely on a background 
Page 263 of 305 
 
 
assumption that nonhuman animal interests matter less than the human rights to use them as 
property to serve their own interests. The result is that virtually any form of cruelty may be 
lawful, provided it can be justified with respect to human interests. Moreover, in many 
circumstances, a relatively trivial human interest may justify egregious cruelty towards 
nonhuman animals. In this chapter, I also explained how Codes of Practice dictate a separate 
set of standards for those who have a positive interest in using nonhuman animals for human 
purposes. These Codes reflect the property status of nonhuman animals, because they 
facilitate and permit cruelty that serves human interests. The problem is thus that those 
nonhuman animals that are the most vulnerable to cruelty by human hand are effectively 
exempted from the protective reach of Australian animal welfare legislation. 
In the fifth chapter, I returned to the concept of ‘necessary’ and ‘reasonable’ cruelty, to assess 
how nonhuman animal interests are reflected in law. I expanded upon the analysis provided 
in chapters three and four, (where I explained that the interests of nonhuman animals are 
prima facie less important than human interests in inflicting cruelty), and argued that some 
species of nonhuman animal are positively commodified by law. As commodities, nonhuman 
animals are conceptualised merely as products that can be exchanged for money in the 
marketplace. They are fetishized, in that value is attributed to them only with respect to the 
extent to which they can be exchanged for money or other commodities. The way in which 
the commodity is produced, or, in the case of nonhuman animals, the type of life and death 
they are given, does not count. As commodities, nonhuman animals are perceived as having 
no value outside the price that can be attained for their bodies. In the context of laws which 
offer protections to nonhuman animals only where their interests do not unreasonably 
infringe human property interests, this presents an obvious problem. Practically any form of 
cruelty can be deemed legitimate if the nonhuman animal that is being inflicted with cruelty 
is constructed by law as a commodity who possess no interests at all.   
In the sixth chapter, I shifted my focus. Instead of looking not at what the law says about 
cruelty, I considered what it does not say. I identified examples of  Australian animal welfare 
laws which make an express declaration of inaction with respect to some of the worst forms 
of cruelty towards nonhuman animals through the use of knowingly inadequate definitions, 
legal fictions and express exclusions. In each instance, I argued that the law declares a 
decision to ignore certain forms of cruelty by expressly excluding them from the reach of 
animal protection legislation. Such a declaration is an active stance, and thus reflects the fact 
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that Australian animal welfare laws are positively complicit in these forms of cruelty. The 
very fact that the laws contains an express declaration of inaction with respect to some forms 
of cruelty reflects the fact that they licensing cruelty. Otherwise there would be no reason to 
explicitly exempt cruel practices from general anti-cruelty provisions. In carving out a part of 
law that intentionally ignores some of the most serious types of cruelty towards nonhuman 
animals, the very same laws that purport to protect nonhuman animals are absolutely 
complicit in facilitating and permitting their mistreatment.  
In the seventh chapter, I argued that Australian animal welfare laws and Codes of Practice 
generate and sustain a myth of animal protection. I explained that Australian animal welfare 
laws, which typically contain provisions which purport to prohibit cruelty, are physically 
separated from the provision contained within Codes of Practice that typically permit it. 
Given that Codes of Practice are intended for a specific audience, namely those who work in 
the industries that are governed by Codes, they do not address the Australian public. The 
result is that Australian animal welfare laws, read alone, appear to prohibit cruelty. At the 
same time, separate provisions contained within Codes of Practice operate to erode any 
meaningful content contained within these protections. The second way in which the myth of 
animal protection is generated by Australian animal welfare laws and Codes of Practice is 
through the misleading use of terms which fail to communicate honestly with the Australian 
public. The label of ‘cruelty’ is used, but fails to reflect the meaning that the Australian 
public typically ascribe to the term. Similarly, weasel words operate to confer a false sense of 
benignity on blatant acts of cruelty. In each instance, Australian animal welfare laws and 
Codes of Practice misleadingly appear to protect nonhuman animals from cruelty. In the final 
part of this chapter, I considered the inadequate enforcement mechanisms provided by 
Australian animal welfare law. My suggestion was that Australian animal welfare laws are 
not only poorly enforced as a matter of fact, but they are constructed in such a way that they 
cannot be adequately enforced. The powers given to RSPCA inspectors are so inadequate that 
effectively law enforcement relies upon unlawful acts of trespass by animal activists who 
document animal cruelty. In the absence of adequate enforcement powers, the ideal of animal 
protection is nothing but a myth. 
In the final chapter, I considered the extent to which other laws operate to protect the myth of 
animal protection, and to inhibit the enforcement of Australian animal welfare laws by 
stifling animal activists. Activists who seek to expose cruelty towards nonhuman animals by 
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trespassing on private property infringe both civil and criminal law. Increasingly however, 
‘ag-gag’ laws are being introduced with the intent of stifling activists. They do so through the 
creation of additional means by which activists may be prosecuted, and through the provision 
of  harsher penalties.  These laws facilitate cruelty towards nonhuman animals, by silencing 
the work of those who seek to expose it to the public. They stifle activists, and in doing so 
silence the conversations that are necessary to reforming the law. Moreover, they impede the 
enforcement of Australian animal welfare laws which implicitly rely upon unlawful acts of 
activism. Cruelty that is kept out of sight, is cruelty that is kept out of mind. 
II. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis has offered an overview of the numerous, complex ways in Australian animal 
welfare legislation and Codes of Practice permit cruelty towards nonhuman animals. I have 
however not sought to identify every way in which they do so; nor have I addressed the 
significant question of how we ought to address their lawful cruel treatment. There therefore 
exist many important directions for future research that may extend the arguments contained 
within this thesis.  
From the outset, I applied a limitation to the scope of this thesis. I have looked only at 
instances where the law was permitting cruelty towards nonhuman animals. This limitation 
served the important purpose of testing the law against its own stated premise. However, 
more thinking must be done with respect to the bigger question of precisely what our laws 
should be doing with respect to nonhuman animals. Is a prohibition on cruelty enough? Are 
we, for example, morally justified in slaughtering nonhuman animals if we do so 
‘humanely’? Are we entitled to breed, keep and use nonhuman animals for entertainment in 
rodeos if we do not inflict pain? Is it morally justified to use nonhuman animals 
instrumentally, as scientific research subjects? Though many thinkers have dedicated a great 
deal of time to answering these questions,
1
 more work could be done to determine how our 
moral duties should be reflected in animal protection laws. Moreover, an additional, related 
question remains as to whether laws which permit the breeding, use, keeping and slaughter of 
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nonhuman animals for human purposes, can it ever truly live up to their stated purpose of 
prohibiting cruelty towards nonhuman animals.
2
 Is there such a thing as ‘humane’ slaughter? 
If there is, is it possible to achieve it given the rate at which meat is currently produced?  
A related future research question pertains specifically to the legal status of nonhuman 
animals. If, as this thesis contends, animal protection laws are failing to actually protect 
nonhuman animals from harm, there remains the question of whether changing the legal 
status of nonhuman animals is first, possible, and second, is the way to ensure their adequate 
legal protection. As I argued in chapter three, key commentators on the legal status of 
nonhuman animals, Francione and Wise, present impassioned arguments in favour of the 
inclusion of nonhuman animals within the category of legal persons. Yet, their arguments are 
marked by a lack of clarity surrounding what the legal person is, and who or what may be a 
legal person. I explained that a more explicit, technical and concise assessment of the concept 
of legal ‘personhood’ may provide insight into the reason why their impassioned arguments 
have failed to convince jurors in the American context. Yet, significant scope remains to 
extend my inquiry to consider some other important questions: is the concept of the ‘person’ 
ever truly an ‘empty slot’?  If it can be, how can nonhuman animals come to be included in 
it? What type of legal arguments would need to be made? Moreover, what type of legal 
protections would nonhuman animals be granted as legal ‘persons’? 
Such questions should be answered in light of other work being done on the legal status of 
nonhuman animals which seeks to remove them from the classification of ‘property’, but 
does not seek to include them as ‘persons’. David Favre (who I mentioned in the literature 
review), has suggested that a guardianship model may be more appropriate.
3
 Pietrzykowski 
has offered an alternative suggestion. Namely, that nonhuman animals be classified as ‘non-
personal subjects of law’.
4
 This characterisation, he suggests, offers the benefits of 
recognising the interests of nonhuman animals in law by providing them with some legal 
rights to protect those interests without categorising them as persons. Pietrzykowski also 
suggests that this approach has the benefit of corresponding ‘more accurately to the 
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similarities and dissimilarities between humans and animals’.
5
 Given that the legal status of 
nonhuman animals is central to the way in which the law protects them, it is imperative that 
thinking in this area continues to be developed. Efforts should be made to understand 
precisely the relationship between the legal status of nonhuman animals, and the inadequate 
protections they are offered by animal welfare legislation. 
The other substantial research question that remains at the conclusion of this thesis is what 
the solution may be to the various legal problems I have identified in this thesis. The 
arguments within this thesis were advanced within the confines of the existing legal 
framework in Australia.  Thus, it was thus restricted to a critique of existing laws and legal 
paradigms. I did not purport to conceptualise an alternative legal system, nor did I seek to 
suggest what solutions there may be to various problems I have identified throughout this 
thesis. Such a reconceptualization presents an important direction for future research as 
alternative theories of law may offer more promise for nonhuman animals than the existing 
liberal legal paradigm.
6
   
My arguments in chapter seven would be significantly strengthened by quantitative research 
that examines in more detail the way in which Australian animal welfare laws are enforced. 
At present, data are not available that explain the ‘gap’ between cruelty reports made by the 
public, and the number of prosecutions that take place. Further research that tracks cruelty 
complaints could inform further thinking on the role of the RSPCA as enforcers of the law. In 
addition, more quantitative research is needed to track precisely which cruelty complaints are 
addressed by the RSPCA, and which are addressed by other law enforcement agencies.  
An additional question emerges from chapter eight regarding the justification offered for civil 
disobedience in the context of animal welfare. Whilst I drew on a substantial body of 
literature in defining civil disobedience in that chapter, more thinking must be done regarding 
the limits of civil disobedience with specific reference to the context of animal welfare. For 
example, what constitutes ‘violence’ in this context? Is violence justified? If so, when? A 
more robust justification for civil disobedience in the specific context of activists who seek to 
inform the public about lawful animal cruelty seems important. Such analysis could 
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contribute to law reform initiatives that seek to improve transparency regarding how 
nonhuman animals are treated. Moreover, with the law being increasingly used to stifle the 
actions of animal activists, a more robust justification of civil disobedience in this space 
could be used to protect activists and clarify the scope of legitimate activist activity.   
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
In this thesis, I have argued that Australian law is facilitating cruelty towards nonhuman 
animals. I have identified six ways in which the very laws that purport to prohibit cruelty do 
the precise opposite. I have tested animal protection laws against their own premises and 
commitments, and have revealed that they consistently fail to meet their stated objectives. 
Moreover, I have identified ambivalence regarding what their true objectives are.  
The challenge that lies ahead in adequately protecting nonhuman animals from cruelty not 
only requires that the law be reformed to genuinely prohibit cruelty, and to reflect the values 
that underpin Australian animal welfare laws. It also requires a radical shift at the societal 
level and at the level of the individual. For as long as people continue to see nonhuman 
animals as things, or as commodities that exist for instrumental purposes, they will continue 
to be treated with cruelty. Moreover, that cruelty will continue to be justified as ‘reasonable’ 
or ‘necessary’. As Henry Beston explains: 
We need another and a wiser and perhaps a more mystical concept of animals. Remote from 
universal nature, and living by complicated artifice, man in civilization surveys the creature 
through the glass of his knowledge and sees thereby a feather magnified and the whole image 
in distortion. We patronize them for their incompleteness, for their tragic fate of having taken 
form so far below ourselves. And therein we err, and greatly err. For the animal shall not be 
measured by the man. In a world older and more complete than ours ' they move finished and 
complete, gifted with extensions of the senses we have lost or never attained, living by voices 
we shall never hear. They are not brethren, they are not underlings; they are other nations, 




                                                 
 
7
 Henry Beston, The Outermost House: A Year of Life on the Great Beach of Cape Cod (Selwyn & Blount, 
1928) 40. 




A. Articles / Books / Reports 
Abbate, Cheryl, ‘Adventures in Moral Consistency: How to Develop an Abortion Ethic 
through an Animal Rights Framework’ (2015) 18(1) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 145. 
Adams, Carol, 'Ecofeminism and the Eating of Animals' (1991) 6(1) Hypatia 125 
 
Adams, Carol, 'The Social Construction of Edible Bodies and Humans as Predators' in Kerry 
S Walters and Lisa Portmess (eds), Ethical Vegetarianism: From Pythagoras to Peter Singer 
(State University of New York Press, 1999)  247 
 
Adams, Carol, The Pornography of Meat (Continuum 2003) 
 
Adams, Carol, The Sexual Politics of Meat (Tenth Anniversary ed, Continuum, 2006) 
 
Adams, David and Sheriden, Allan, Specifying the Risks to Animal Welfare Associated with 
Livestock Slaughter without Induced Insensibility (Animal Welfare Working Group of the 
Animal Health Committee, Primary Industires Standing Committe of Australia, 2008) 
 
Animal Health Australia, Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines - Land 
Transport of Livestock: Proposed Amendment to the Land Transport of Livestock Standards 
(Sb4.5) Bobby Calves Time Off Feed Standard (Animal Health Australia, 2011) 
 
Arendt, Hannah, 'Civil Disobedience' in Crises of the Republic (Harcourt, 1972)   
 
Ashley, Paul, 'Fish Welfare: Current Issues in Aquaculture' (2007) 104 Applied Animal 
Behaviour Science 199 
 
Ashworth, Andrew, 'The Elasticity of Mens Rea' in C. F. H Tapper (ed), Crime, Proof and 
Punishment: Essays in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross (Butterworth, 1981)  45 
 
Ashworth, Andrew, Principles of Criminal Law (6th ed, Oxford University Press, 2009) 
 
Ashworth, Andrew and Horder, Jeremy, Principles of Criminal Law (7th ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Report 
No 123 (2004) 




Babie, Paul, 'Choices That Matter: Three Propositions on the Individual, Private Property, 
and Anthropogenic Climate Change' (2011) 22 Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 323 
 
Barr, Stuart et al, 'Nociception or Pain in a Decapod Crustacean?' (2008) 75(3) Animal 
Behaviour 745 
 
Bartlett, Andrew, 'Animal Welfare in a Federal System: A Federal Politician's Perspective' in 
Steven White and Peter Sankoff (eds), Animal Law in Australasia (The Federation Press, 
2009)  376 
 
Bedau, Hugo, 'On Civil Disobedience' (1961) 58(21) The Journal of Philosophy 653 
 
Bentham, Jeremy, Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1823) 
 
Bernstein, Jay, 'Promising and Civil Disobedience: Arendt's Political Modernism' in Roger 
Berkowitz, Jeffrey Katz and Thomas Keenan (eds), Thinking in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt 
on Ethics and Politics (Fordham University Press, 2010)   
 
Beston, Henry The Outermost House: A Year of Life on the Great Beach of Cape Cod 
(Selwyn & Blount, 1928)  
 
 
Blackstone, William, 'The Rights of Things' in Commentaries on the Laws of England: A 
Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765-1796 (The University of Chicago Press, 1979)   
 
Bogdanoski, Tony, 'Towards an Animal-Friendly Family Law: Recognising the Welfare of 
Family Law's Forgotten Family Members' (2010) 19 Griffith Law Review 197 
 
Bogdanoski, Tony, 'A Companion Animal's Worth: The Only 'Family Member' Still 
Regarded as Legal Property' in Peter Sankoff, Steven White and Celeste Black (eds), Animal 
Law in Australasia: Continuing the Dialogue (2nd ed The Federation Press, 2013)  84 
 
Broom, Donald, 'The Scientific Assessment of Animal Welfare' (1988) 20 Applied Animal 
Behaviour Science 5 
 
Broom, Donald, 'Cognitive Ability and Sentience: Which Aquatic Animals Should Be 
Protected?' (2007) 75 Diseases of Aquatic Oragnisms 99 
 
Page 271 of 305 
 
 
Brownlee, Kimberley, 'Features of a Paradigmatic Case of Civil Disobedience' (2004) 10 Res 
Publica 337 
 
Bruce, Alex, Animal Law in Australia: An Integrated Approach (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2012) 
Bryant, Tamie, 'Mythic Non-Violence' 2(1) Journal of Animal Law 1 
 
Budziszewski, J, Commentary on Thomas Aquinas' Treatise on Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014) 
 
Burdon, Peter, 'Earth Jurisprudence and the Project of Earth Democracy' in Peter Burdon and 
Michelle Maloney (eds), Wild Law - in Practice (Routledge, 2014)  19 
 
Burdon, Peter, Earth Jurisprudence: Private Property and the Environment (Routledge, 
2015) 
 
Burdon, Peter, 'A Constructive Critique' in Douglas Fisher (ed), Research Handbook on 
Fundamental Concepts of Environmental Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016)   
 
Burdon, Peter, Hannah Arendt: Legal Theory and the Eichmann Trial (Routledge, 2017) 
 
Butler, Judith, 'Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomonology and 
Feminist Theory' (1988) 40(4) Theatre Journal 519 
 
Campbell, MLH, Mellor, DJ and Sandoe, P, 'How Should the Welfare of Fetal and 
Neurologically Immature Postnatal Animals Be Protected?' (2014) 23 Animal Welfare 369 
 
Cao, Deborah, Animal Law in Australia and New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, 2010) 
 
Cao, Deborah, Animal Law in Australia (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, 2015) 
 
Cassuto, David, 'Meat Animals, Humane Standards and Other Legal Fictions' (2014) 10(2) 
Law, Culture and Humanities 225 
 
Chabris, Christopher and Simons, Daniel, 'Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional 
Blindness for Dynamic Events' (1999) 28 Perception 1059 
 
Chalmers, James and Leverick, Fiona, 'Fair Labelling in Criminal Law' (2008) 71(2) The 
Modern Law Review 217 




Cooke, Steven and Sneddon, Lynne, 'Animal Welfare Perspectives on Recreational Angling' 
(2007) 104 Applied Animal Behaviour Science 176 
 
Cottingham, John, 'A Brute to the Brutes? : Descartes' Treatment of Animals' (1978) 53 
Philosophy 551 
Croney, C. C and Reynnells, R. D, 'The Ethics of Semantics: Do We Clarify or Obfuscate 
Reality to Influence Percetpions of Farm Animal Production?' (2008) 87 Poultry Science 387 
 
Cronin, G.M. and Van Amerongen, G, 'The Effects of Modifying the Farrowing Environment 
on Sow Behaviour and Survival and Growth of Piglets' (1991) 30 Applied Animal Behaviour 
Science 287 
 
Cryer, Robert, Hervey, Tamara and Sokhi-Bulley, Bal, Research Methodologies in EU and 
International Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) 
 
Cullinan, Cormac, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice (2nd ed, Green Books, 2011) 
 
Dale, Arnja, 'Animal Welfare Codes and Regulations: The Devil in Disguise?' in Peter 
Sankoff and Steven White (eds), Animal Law in Australasia: A New Dialogue (The 
Federation Press, 2009)  174 
 
Dale, Arnja and White, Steven, 'Codifying Animal Welfare Standards: Foundations for Better 
Animal Protections or Merely a Facade?' in Peter Sankoff, Steven White and Celeste Black 
(eds), Animal Law in Australasia: Continuing the Dialogue (2nd ed The Federation Press, 
2013)  151 
 
Dant, Tim, 'Fetishism and the Social Value of Objects' (1996) 44(3) The Sociological Review 
495 
 
Davies, Margaret, 'Legal Theory and Law Reform' (2003) 28(4) Alternative Law Journal 168 
 
Davies, Margaret, Asking the Law Question (3rd ed, Lawbook Co, 2008) 
 
Davies, Margaret, Asking the Law Question (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2017) 
 
Dawkins, Marian, 'Through Animal Eyes: What Behaviour Tells Us' (2006) 100 Applied 
Animal Behaviour Science 4 
 
Diamond, Cora, 'Eating Meat and Eating People' (1978) 53(206) Philosophy 465 




Douglas, Heather, 'The Criminal Law's Response to Domestic Violence' (2008) 30 Sydney 
Law Review 439 
 
Edwards, Lauren et al, 'Acute Effects of Mulesing and Alternative Procedures to Mulesing on 
Lamb Behaviour' (2011) 133 Applied Animal Behaviour Science 169 
Ellis, Elizabeth, 'Collaborative Advocacy: Framing the Interests of Animals as a Social 
Justice Concern' in Steven White and Peter Sankoff (eds), Animal Law in Australasia (The 
Federation Press, 2009)  354 
 
Ellis, Elizabeth, 'Making Sausages and Law: The Failure of Animal Welfare Law to Protect 
Both Animals and Fundamental Tenets of Australia's Legal System' (2010) 4 Australian 
Animal Protection Law Journal 6 
 
Ellis, Elizabeth, 'Bobby Calves: An Example of the Standards Development Process' (2011) 5 
Australian Animal Protection Law Journal 89 
 
Elwood, Robert and Adams, Laura, 'Electric Shock Causes Physiological Stress Responses in 
Shore Crabs, Consistent with Prediction of Pain' (2015) 11(11) Biology Letters 1 
 
Epstein, Richard, 'Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights' in Cass Sunstein and Martha 
Nussbaum (eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford University 
Press, 2004)  143 
 
Farm Animal Welfare Council, Report on the Welfare of Farmed Animals at Slaughter of 




Favre, David, 'Integrating Animal Interests into Our Legal System' (2004) 10(87) Animal 
Law 87 
 
Favre, David, 'A New Property Status for Animals: Equitable Self-Ownership' in Martha 
Nussbaum and Cass Sunstein (eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions 
(Oxford University Press, 2004)  234 
 
Finnis, John, 'Law as Co-Ordination' (1989) 2(1) Ratio Juris 97 
 
Fisher, Andrew, 'Addressing Pain Caused by Mulesing in Sheep' (2011) 135(3) Applied 
Animal Behaviour Science 232 
 
Page 274 of 305 
 
 
Fisher, Andrew et al, 'Determing a Suitable Time Off Feed of Bobby Calf Transport under 
Australian Conditions' (2010)  Dairy Australia Project no TIG. 124  
 
Foer, Jonathan Saffran, Eating Animals (Back Bay Books, 2009) 
 
Fox, Dennis, 'The Law Says Corporations Are Persons but Psychology Knows Better' (1996) 
14 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 339 
 
Fox, Michael, 'Animal Law in Australasia: A New Dialogue, Animal Law in Australia and 
New Zealand (Book Reviews)' (2011) 36(1) Alternative Law Journal 72 
 
Francione, Gary, 'Reflections on Animals, Property and the Law and Rain without Thunder' 
70(9) Law and Contemporary Problems 9 
 
Francione, Gary, Animals, Property and the Law (Temple University Press, 1995) 
 
Francione, Gary, 'Animals - Property or Persons?' in Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum 
(eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford University Press, 2004)  
108 
 
Francione, Gary, 'Taking Sentience Seriously' (2006) 1(1) Journal of Animal Law and Ethics 
1 
 
Francione, Gary, 'Animal Welfare and the Moral Value of Nonhuman Animals' (2010) 6(1) 
Law, Culture and Humanities 24 
 
Francione, Gary and Garner, Robert, The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation? 
(Columbia University Press, 2010) 
 
Frasch, Pamela, 'Gaps in Us Animal Welfare Law for Laboratory Animals: Perspectives from 
an Animal Law Attorney' (2016) 57(3) ILAR Journal 285 
 
Fraser, Ian and Wilde, Lawrence, The Marx Dictionary (Bloomsbury Academic, 2012) 
 
Fuller, Lon, 'Legal Fictions' (1930) 25(4) Illinois Law Review 363 
 
Fuller, Lon, 'Legal Fictions' (1931) 25 Illinois Law Review 877 
 
Fuller, Lon, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, 1964) 




Garrett, Jeremy, The Ethics of Animal Research: Exploring the Controversy (MIT Press, 
2014) 
 
Gelderloos, Peter, How Nonviolence Protects the State (South End Press, 2007) 
Geoff Neumann & Associates, Review of the Australian Model Codes of Practice for the 
Welfare of Animals (2005) 
 
Giminiani, Pierpaolo Di et al, 'Docking Piglet Tails: How Much Does It Hurt and for How 
Long?' (2017) 182 Physiology and Behaviour 69 
 
Giuffre, Emmanuel and Margo, Sarah, The Animal Law Toolkit (2nd ed, Voiceless: The 
Animal Protection Institute, 2015) 
 
Godwin, William, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (Batoche Books, 2000) 
 
Goodfellow, Jed, 'Animal Welfare Law Enforcement: To Punish or Pursuade?' in Peter 
Sankoff, Steven White and Celeste Black (eds), Animal Law in Australasia: Continuing the 
Dialogue (2nd ed The Federation Press, 2013)  183 
 
Goodfellow, Jed, 'Regulatory Capture and the Welfare of Farm Animals in Australia' in 
Deborah Cao and Steven White (eds), Animal Law and Welfare - International Perspectives 
(Springer, 2016)  195 
 
Grandin, Temple, 'Making Slaughterhouses More Humane for Cattle, Pigs, and Sheep' (2013) 
11(1) Annual Reivew Animal Biosciences 491 
 
Green, T, Lectures on the Principles of Poltical Obligation (Batoche Books, first published 
1907, 1999 ed) 
 
Gregory, Neville, 'Cattle' in Neville Gregory and Temple Grandin (eds), Animal Welfare and 
Meat Production (2nd ed CABI, 2007)  61 
 
Hall, Lee, 'Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? (Book Review)' (2000) 
34(1) Suffolk University Law Review 83 
 
Halsbury's Laws of Australia,  (LexisNexis, 2007) 
 
Page 276 of 305 
 
 
Hamilton, Lindsay and McCabe, Darren, ''It's Just a Job': Understanding Emotion Work, De-
Animalization and the Compartmentalization of Animal Slaughter' (2016) 23(3) Organization 
330 
 
Harnack, A, Animal Rights: Opposing Viewpoints (Greenhouse Press, 1996) 
 
Harrison, Peter, 'Do Animals Feel Pain?' (1991) 66(255) Philosophy 25 
Harrison, Ruth, 'Cruelty and Legislation' in Ruth Harrison (ed), Animal Machines (CABI, 
2013)   
 
Harvey, David, A Companion to Marx's Capital (Verso, 2010) 
 
Hasnas, John, 'Is There a Moral Duty to Obey the Law?' (2013) 30(1-2) Social Policy and 
Philosophy 450 
 
Hawkins, Penny, 'The Welfare Implications of Housing Captive Wild and Domesticated 
Birds' in Ian Duncan and Penny Hawkins (eds), The Welfare of Domestic Fowl and Other 
Captive Birds (Springer, 2010)  53 
 
Heinz, Bettina and Lee, Ronald, 'Getting Down to the Meat: The Symbolic Construction of 
Meat Consumption' (1998) 49(1) Communication Studies 86 
 
Hemsworth, P, Jongman, E and Barnett, J, 'The Aversiveness of Carbon Dioxide Stunning in 
Pigs and a Comparison of the Co2  Stunner Crate vs. The V-Restrainer' (2000) 67 Applied 
Animal Behaviour Science 67 
 
Hemsworth, Paul et al, 'Effects of Mulesing and Alternative Procedures to Mulesing on the 
Behaviours and Physiology of Lambs' (2009)  Applied Animal Behaviour Science 20 
 
Hemsworth, Paul et al, A Scientific Comment on the Welfare of Sheep Slaughtered without 
Stunning (Animal Welfare Science Centre  (Australia) and Animal Welfare Science and 
Bioethics Centre (New Zealand), 2009) 
 
Hoagland, Sarah Lucia, 'Lesbian Ethics' (1988) 11(6) Women's Studies International Forum 
531 
 
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (The Floating Press, first published 1651, 2009 ed) 
 
Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (Yale University Press, 1919) 
 
Page 277 of 305 
 
 
House, Ian, 'Harrison on Animal Pain' (1991) 66 Philosophy 376 
 
Kahan, Dan, 'Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection' (2013) 8(4) 
Judgment and Decision Making 407 
 
Kennedy, Duncan, 'The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!' (1991) 15(4) Legal Studies 
Forum 327 
Lamb, Meg, 'Ford v Wiley Proportionality Analysis of the Castration of Domestic Livestock 
for Meat Production' (2015) 11 Australian Animal Protection Law Journal 20 
 
Larson, Peggy, 'Rodeo Is Cruel Entertainment' (1998) 16 Pace Environmental Law Review 
115 
 
Leme, Thays Mayra da Cunha et al, 'Influence of Transportation Methods and Pre-Slaughter 
Rest Periods on Cortisol Levels in Lambs' (2012) 107 Small Ruminant Research 8 
 
MacKinnon, Catharine, 'Of Mice and Men: A Feminist Fragment on Animal Rights' in Cass 
Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum (eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions 
(Oxford University Press, 2004)  263 
 
Markham, Annabel, 'Animal Cruelty Sentencing in Australia and New Zealand' in Peter 
Sankoff and Steven White (eds), Animal Law in Australasia: A New Dialogue (The 
Federation Press, 2009)  289 
 
Marx, Karl, Marx's Capital (Student ed, Electric Book Company, first published 1867, 2000 
ed) 
 
Mason, G and Litten, K E, 'The Humaneness of Rodent Pest Control' (2003) 12(1) Animal 
Welfare 1 
 
Mather, Jennifer and Anderson, Roland, 'Ethics and Invertebrates: A Cephalopod Perspective' 
(2007) 75(2) Diseases of Aquatic Oragnisms 119 
 
McCausland, Clare, O'Sullivan, Siobhan and Brenton, Scott, 'Trespass, Animals and 
Democratic Engagement' (2013) 19 Res Publica 205 
 
McEwan, Graeme, Animal Law: Principles and Frontiers (Barister's Animal Welfare Panel, 
2011) 
 
McEwan, Graeme, 'Strategic Litigation and Law Reform' (2011) 7 Journal of Animal Law 91 




Meek, Ronald, Studies in the Labour Theory of Value (2nd ed, Lawrence and Wishart, 1973) 
 
Midgley, Mary, Animals and Why They Matter: A Journey around the Species Barrier 
(Penguin Books, 1983) 
 
Midgley, Mary, 'Is a Dolphin a Person?' in Peter Singer (ed), Defense of Animals (Blackwell, 
1985)  52 
 
Midgley, Mary, The Myths We Live By (Taylor and Francis, 2003) 
Midgley, Mary, 'Is a Dolphin a Person?' in David Midgley (ed), The Essential Mary Midgley 
(Routledge, 2005)  132 
 
Mill, John Stuart, 'On Liberty' in John Gray and G.W Smith (eds), J.S Mill's on Liberty in 
Focus (Taylor and Francis, 1991)  23 
 
Milligan, Tony, Civil Disobedience: Protest, Justification and the Law (Bloomsbury, 2013) 
 
Milligan, Tony, 'Animal Rescue as Civil Disobedience' (2017) 23 Res Publica 281 
 
Mitchell, Barry, 'Multiple Wrondoing and Offence Structure: A Plea for Consistency and Fair 
Labelling' (2001) 64(3) The Modern Law Review 393 
 
Morreall, John, 'The Justifiability of Violent Civil Disobedience' (1976) 6(1) Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 35 
 
Munzer, Stephen, 'Property and Disagreement' in James Penner and Henry Smith (eds), 
Philosphical Foundations of Property Law (Oxford University Press, 2013)  289 
 
Naffine, Ngaire, 'Sight and Inisght: Is There a Lawful Relation between What We See and 
What We Know?' (1997) 12(1) Canadian Journal of Law and Society 263 
 
Naffine, Ngaire, 'Who Are Law's Persons? From Chesire Cats to Responsible Subjects' 
(2003) 66(3) Modern Law Review 346 
 
Naffine, Ngaire, Law's Meaning of Life: Philosophy, Religion, Darwin and the Legal Person 
(Hart Publishing, 2009) 
 
Naffine, Ngaire, 'Review Essay: Liberating the Legal Person' (2009) 26(1) Canadian Journal 
of Law and Society 193 




Naffine, Ngaire, 'Legal Personality and the Natural World: On the Persistence of the Human 
Measure of Value' (2012) 3(0) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 68 
 
Naffine, Ngaire, 'Legal Persons as Abstractions: The Extrapolation of Persons from the Male 
Case' in Visa Kurki and Tomasz Pietrzykowski (eds), Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial 
Intelligence and the Unborn (Springer, 2017)  15 
 
Naffine, Ngaire and Davies, Margaret, Are Persons Property? Legal Debates About Property 
and Personality (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2001) 
Naffine, Ngaire and Neoh, Joshua, 'Fictions and Myths in PGA v the Queen' (2013) 38 
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 32 
 
Nannoni, Eleonora et al, 'Tail Docking in Pigs: A Review on Its Short and Long-Term 
Consequences and Effectiveness in Preventing Tail Biting' (2014) 13 Italian Journal of 
Animal Science 98 
 
Nekam, Alexander, The Personality Conception of the Legal Entity (Harvard University 
Press, 1938) 
 
Nesteruk, Jeffrey, 'Persons, Property, and the Corporation: A Proposal for a New Paradigm' 
(1990) 39 Depaul Law Review 543 
 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 'Protecting Privacy in New South Wales' Report 
No 127, (2010) 
 
Nicol, C.J et al, Farmed Bird Welfare Science Review (Victorian Department of Economic 
Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources 2017) 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 'What Is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?' in Walter Kauffman (ed), On 
the Genealogy of Morals (Vintage Books, 1989)   
 
Nosworthy, Jane, 'The Koko Dilemma: A Challenge to Legal Personality' (1998) 2 Southern 
Cross University Law Review 1 
 
O'Sullivan, Siobhan, 'Advocating for Animals Equally from within a Liberal Paradigm' 
(2007) 16 Environmental Politics 1 
 
O'Sullivan, Siobhan, Animals, Equality and Democracy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 
 
Page 280 of 305 
 
 
O'Sullivan, Siobhan, McCausland, Clare and Brenton, Scott, 'Animal Activists, Civil 
Disobedience and Global Responses to Transnational Justice' (2017) 23 Res Publica 261 
 
Olsen, Frances, 'The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform' (1983) 
96(7) Harvard Law Review 1497 
 
Orwell, George, 'Politics and the English Language' in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angos (eds), 
The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell (1st ed Harcourt, Brace, 
Javanovich, 1968)  127 
 
Otter, Chris, 'Civilising Slaughter: The Development of the British Public Abattoir 1850-
1910' in Paula Young Lee (ed), Meat, Modernity and the Slaughterhouse (University Press of 
New England, 2008)  89 
 
Pachirat, Timothy, Every Twelve Seconds: Industralised Slaughter and the Politics of Sight 
(Yale University Press, 2011) 
 
Penelope, Julia, 'Prescribed Passivity: The Language of Sexism' (1988)  A Feminist Ethic for 
Social Research (Nebraska Sociological Feminist Collective) 119 
 
Pietrzykowski, Thomas, 'The Idea of Non-Personal Subjects of Law' in Thomas 
Pietrzykowski and Visa Kurki (eds), Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and 
the Unborn (Springer, 2017)  49 
 
Posner, Richard, 'Animal Rights (Reviewing Steven M Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward 
Legal Rights for Animals)' (2000) 110 The Yale Law Journal 527 
 
Radin, Margaret, 'The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of 
Takings' (1988) 88 The Columbia Law Review 1667 
 
Raj, A, 'Behaviour of Pigs Exposed to Mixtures of Gases and the Time Required to Stun and 
Kill Them: Welfare Implications' (1999) 144(7) Veterinary Record 165 
 
Raj, A and Gregory, N, 'Welfare Implications of the Gas Stunning of Pigs' (1995) 4(4) 
Animal Welfare 273 
 
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971) 
 
Raz, Joseph, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (2nd ed, Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 




Regan, Tom, The Case for Animal Rights (2nd ed, University of California Press, 2004) 
 
Richards, Bernadette, Ludlow, Karinne and Gibson, Andy, Tort Law in Principle (5th ed, 
Thomson Routers, 2009) 
 
Robinson, Daniel Klein & John, 'Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property 
Symposium' (2011) 8(3) Econ Journal Watch 193 
 
Rowlands, Mark, Animals Like Us (Verso, 2002) 
 
RSPCA Australia, A Survey of the Extent of Compliance with the Requirements of the Code 
of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos (Australian Government Department of 
Environment and Energy, 2002) 
 





RSPCA Australia, The Welfare of Layer Hens in Cage and Cage-Free Housing Systems 
(Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 2016) 
 
Sandem, Agnethe-Irén and Braastad, Bjarne, 'Effects of Cow-Calf Separation on Visbile Eye 
White and Behaviour in Dairy Cows - a Brief Report' (2005) 95(3) Applied Animal 
Behaviour Science 233 
 
Sankoff, Peter, 'Five Years of the "New" Animal Welfare Regime: Lessons Learned from 
New Zealand's Decision to Modernize Its Animal Welfare Legislation' (2005) 11(7) Animal 
Law 7 
 
Sankoff, Peter, 'A Subject in Search of Scholarship' in Peter Sankoff and Steven White (eds), 
Animal Law in Australasia: A New Dialogue (The Federation Press, 2009)  389 
 
Sankoff, Peter, 'The Welfare Paradigm: Making the World a Better Place for Animals?' in 
Peter Sankoff and Steven White (eds), Animal Law in Australia (The Federation Press, 2009) 
7 
 
Sankoff, Peter, 'The Animal Rights Debate and the Expansion of Public Discourse: Is It 
Possible for the Law Protecting Animals to Simultaneously Fail and Succeed?' (2012) 18(2) 
Animal Law 281 




Sankoff, Peter, 'The Failure to Enforce Criminal Law: Does It Impede the Development of 
Social Discourse on Important Policy Issues?' (2013) 46(1) Housei Riron 105 
 
Sankoff, Peter, 'The Protection Paradigm: Making the World a Better Place for Animals?' in 
Peter Sankoff, Steven White and Celeste Black (eds), Animal Law in Australasia: 
Continuning the Dialogue (The Federation Press, 2013)  1 
Schane, Sanford, 'The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction' (1987) 61 
Tulane Law Review 563 
 
Scott, James, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (Yale University 
Press, 1985) 
 
Shapiro, Scott, 'Authority' (2000)  Stanford/Yale Jr Faculty Forum Reserach Paper 00-05; 
Cardozo Law School, Public Law Reserach Paper No. 24 
<https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Faculty/Shapiro_Authority.pdf>  
 
Sharman, Katrina, 'Sentencing under Our Anticruelty Statutes: Why Our Leniency Will 
Come Back to Bite Us' (2002) 13(3) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 333 
 
Sharman, Katrina, 'Farm Animals and Welfare Law: An Unhappy Union' in Peter Sankoff, 
Steven White and Celeste Black (eds), Animal Law in Australasia: Continuing the Dialogue 
(2nd ed The Federation Press, 2013)  61 
 
Sharman, Katrina, 'Farm Animals and Welfare Law: An Unhappy Union' in Steven White 
and Peter Sankoff (eds), Animal Law in Australasia: Continuing the Dialogue (2nd ed The 
Federation Press, 2013)  61 
 
Sherman, Brian, 'Animal Law: Peering over the Gap or Daring to Close It?' (2006) 31(4) 
Alternative Law Journal 226 
 
Shim, M. Y. et al, 'The Effects of Growth Rate on Leg Mophology and Tibia Breaking 
Strength, Mineral Density, Mineral Content, and Bone Ash in Broilers' (2012) 91(8) Poultry 
Science 1790 
 
Simester, A. P et al, Simester and Sullivan's Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (4th ed, 
Hart, 2010) 
 
Simon, Ariel, 'Cows as Chairs: Questioning Categorical Legal Distinctions in a Non-
Categorical World' in Fier Cushman and Matthew Kamen Marc Hauser (ed), People, 
Property, or Pets? (Purdue University Press, 2006)  5 




Singer, Peter, Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford University Press, 1974) 
 
Singer, Peter, Animal Liberation (2nd ed, Pimlico, 1990) 
 
Singer, Peter, 'Disobedience as a Plea for Reconsideration' in Hugo Bedau (ed), Civil 
Disobedience in Focus (Routledge, 1991)  122 
Smith, Verity, 'Hannah Arendt on Civil Disobedience and Constitutional Patriotism' in Roger 
Berkowitz, Jeffrey Katz and Thomas Keenan (eds), Thinking in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt 
on Ethics and Politics (Fordham University Press, 2010)   
 
Smith, Wesley, Rat Is a Pig Is a Dog Is a Boy: The Human Cost of the Animal Rights 
Movement (Encounter Books, 2010) 
 
Steedman, Ian (ed), The Value Controversy (New Left Books,1981) 
 
Stibbe, Arran, 'Language, Power and the Social Construction of Animals' (2001) 9(2) Society 
and Animals 145 
 
Stone, Christopher, 'Should Trees Have Standing? : Towards Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects' (1972) 45(2) Southern California Law Review 450 
 
Sunstein, Cass, 'Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights)' (2000) 47 UCLA Law 
Review 1333 
 
Sunstein, Cass, 'Can Animals Sue?' in Martha Nussbaum and Cass Sunstein (eds), Animal 
Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford University Press, 2004)  251 
 
Sunstein, Cass and Nussbaum, Martha (eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New 
Directions (Oxford University Press,2004) 
 
Sutherland, M, 'Welfare Implications of Invasive Piglet Husbandry Proceedures, Methods of 
Alleviation and Alternatives: A Review' (2015) 63(1) New Zealand Veterinary Journal 52 
 
Tadros, Victor, 'Fair Labelling and Social Solidarity' in Lucia Zedner and Julian Roberts 
(eds), Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 
2012)  67 
 
Page 284 of 305 
 
 
Tim Harding & Associates, Draft Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Prohibition of Glue 
Trapping) Regulations 2005 : Regulatory Impact Statement (State of Victoria, Department of 
Primary Industries, 2005) 
 
Tur, Richard, 'The "Person" in Law' in Arthur Peacocke and Grant Gillett (eds), Persons and 
Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry (Basil Blackwell, 1987)  121 
 
Tyson, Elizabeth, 'For an End to Pinioning: The Case against the Legal Mutilation of Birds in 
Captivity' (2014) 4(1) Journal of Animal Ethics 1 
Vasseur, E et al, 'A Survey of Dairy Calf Management Practices in Canada That Affect 
Animal Welfare' (2010) 93(3) Journal of Dairy Science 1307 
 
Velarde, A et al, 'Aversion to Carbon Dioxide Stunning in Pigs: Effect of Carbon Dioxide 
Concentration and Halothene Genotype' (2007) 16(4) Animal Welfare 513 
 
Waldron, Jeremy, 'Special Ties and Natural Duties' (1993) 22(1) Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 3 
 
Watson, Don, Watson's Dictionary of Weasel Words, Contemporay Cliches, Cant and 
Management Jargon (Radom House Australia, 2005) 
 
Weldon, Ian, 'Why Doesn't Animal Protection Legislation Protect Animals? (and How It's 
Getting Worse)' (2008) 1 Animal Protection Law Journal 9 
 
White, Steven, 'Legislating for Animal Welfare: Making the Interests of Animals Count' 
(2003) 28(6) Alternative Law Journal 277 
 
White, Steven, 'Regulation of Animal Welfare in Australia and the Emergent 
Commonwealth: Entrenching the Traditional Approach of the States and Territories or 
Laying the Ground for Reform?' (2007) 35 Federal Law Review 348 
 
White, Steven, 'Exploring Different Philosophical Approaches to Animal Protection Law' in 
Animal Law in Australasia: Continuing the Dialogue (2nd ed The Federation Press, 2013)  31 
 
White, Steven, 'Into the Void: International Law and the Protection of Animal Welfare' 
(2013) 4(4) Global Policy 391 
 
White, Steven and Sankoff, Peter (eds), Animal Law in Australiasia (The Federation 
Press,2009) 
 
Page 285 of 305 
 
 
Whitehead, Colin et al, 'Skeletal Problems Associated with Selection for Increased 
Production' in W Muir and S Aggrey (eds), Poultry Genetics, Breeding, and Biotechnology 
(CABI Publishing, 2003)   
 
Wise, Steven, Rattling the Cage (Cambridge Press, 2000) 
 
Wise, Steven, Unlocking the Cage (Persues Press, 2002) 
 
Wise, Steven, 'Animal Rights, One Step at a Time' in Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum 
(eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford University Press, 2004)  
19 
 
Wisman, Jon and Smith, James, 'Legitimating Inequality' (2011) 70(4) The American Journal 
of Economics and Sociology 974 
 
Wolff, Robert, In Defense of Anarchism (University of California Press, first published 1970, 
1998 ed) 
Young, Iris Marion, 'Five Faces of Oppression' (1988) 19(4) The philosophical forum 270 
 
Young, Iris Marion, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press, 2011) 
 
B. Cases 
Animal Welfare Authority v Keith William Simpson (Unreported, Darwin Magistrates Court, 
Magistrate Wallace, 4 September 2008) 
 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Limited [2001] HCA 63; 208 
CLR 199 
 
Bond v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (2011) SASC 19 
 
Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1 
 
Department of Local Government and Regional Development v Gregory Keith Dawson 
(Unreported, Fremantle Magistrates Court, Magistrate Musk, 22 July, 2008) 




Department of Regional Government and Local Department v Emmanuel Exports Pty Ltd Et 
Al (Unreported, Perth Magistrates Court, Magistrate Crawford, 8 February 2008) 
 
Ford v Wiley (1889) 23 QB 203 
 
Mckinnon v Treasury (2005) 145 FCR 70 
 
The Nonhuman Rights Project Inc. On Behalf of Tommy v Patrick C Lavery (2014) 518336 




Pierson v Post  (1805) 3 Cai. R. 175; 1805 N.Y. 
 
Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635 
 
R v Menard (1978) 43 Ccc (2d) 458 (Que CA) 
 
RSPCA v Bond (Unreported, Magistrates Court of South Australia, Foley J, 20 December 
2010) 
Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd and Another v Hahnheuser (2007) 169 FCR 583 
 
Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd and Another v Hahnheuser (2009) 177 FCR 398 
 
Rural Export and Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser (2007) 243 ALR 356 
 
Saltoon v Lake [1978] 1 NSWLR 52 
 
TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333 
 
Page 287 of 305 
 
 
Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479 
 
Wilson v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SA) Inc [2016] SASC 107 
 
Young v Hitchens (1844) 6 QB 606 
 
Yanner v Eaton (1999) 166 ALR 258 
 
C. Legislation 
Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA)  
 
Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) 
 
Animal Welfare Act (NT) 
 
Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) 
 
Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) 
 
Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tas) 
 
Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) 
 
Animal Welfare Code of Practice - Commercial Pig Production 2009 (NSW) 
 
Animal Welfare (Greyhound Training) Amendment Bill 2015 
 
Animal Welfare (Miscellaneous) Amendment Bill 2016 (SA) 




Animal Welfare Regulations 2012 (SA) 
 
Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines: Cattle (2016) 
 
Australian Code for the Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes (2013) 
 
Australian Meat and Livestock Industry Act 1997 (Cth) 
 
Australian Standard for the Hygienic Production of Meat for Human Consumption 
 
Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW) 
 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (Cth) 
 
Criminal Code Amendment (Animal Protection) Bill 2015 (Cth) 
 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1976 (SA) 
 
Domestic Animals (Racing Greyhounds) Amendment Bill 2017 (ACT) 
 
Export Control Act 1982 (Cth) 
 
Food Amendment (Recording of Abattoir Operations) Bill 2015 (NSW) 
 
Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) 
 
Model Code for the Welfare of Animals: Pigs (3rd Edition) 
 
Page 289 of 305 
 
 
Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals : Livestock at Slaughtering 
Establishments 
 
Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: Cattle 
 
Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: Domestic Poultry (4th Edition) 
 
Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals: Intensive Husbandry of Rabbits (1991) 
 
National Code of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos and Wallabies for 
Commercial Purposes 
 
New South Wales Guidelines for the Pinioning of Birds 
 
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 
 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Animal Welfare) Amendment Act 2008 (SA) 
 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Amendment Act 2015 (Vic) 
 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Regulation 2012 (NSW) 
 
Proposed Draft Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines for Poultry 
 
Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) 
 
Surveillance Devices (Animal Welfare) Amendment Bill 2016 (SA) 
 
Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA) 
 
Page 290 of 305 
 
 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) 
 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic) 
 
Surveillance Devices Bill 2014 (SA) 
D. Treaties 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Opened for Signature 2nd December 
1946, [1948] ATS18 (Entered into Force 10 November 1948) 
 
E. Other 
ABC Radio, 'the Battle over Animal Welfare and Ag-Gag Laws', Bush Telegraph, 21 July 
2014 (Temple Grandin, Brian Ahmed, Sue Middleton, Katrina Hodgkinson, Emmanuel 




Alison, Genevieve, 'Parliamentary Committee Report Urges RSPCA to Be More 




Animal Health Australia, Animal Health in Australia (2009) 
<http://www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/AHIA-2008.pdf>  
 




Animal Liberation Victoria, RSPCA Betrayal (14 May 2016) 
<https://www.alv.org.au/articles/rspca-betrayal/>. 
 
Page 291 of 305 
 
 
Animal Welfare League Australia, Submission No 45 to Senate Rural and Regional Affairs 
and Transport Legislation Committee, Criminal Code Amendment (Animal Protection) Bill 
2015, March 2015 
 
Animals Australia, 10 Ways You Helped Achieve Justice for Greyhound Racing Victims 
(2015) <http://www.animalsaustralia.org/features/live-baiting-investigation-outcomes.php>  
 
Animals Australia, Frequently Asked Questions About Factory Farming The Facts 
<http://www.makeitpossible.com/facts/frequently-asked-questions.php#faq10>  
 
Animals Australia, Submission to Animal Health Australia, Bobby Calf Time of Feed 
Regulatory Impact Statement, February 2011 
 
Animals Australia, When You Go to the Greyhound Races - What Are You Really Betting On? 
(2015) <http://www.greyhoundcruelty.com/>  
 
Aussie Farms (2014) <https://www.aussiefarms.org.au/>  
 
Australia, Animals, If This Is the 'Best', What Is the 'Worst'? (2014) 
<http://www.animalsaustralia.org/features/not-so-humane-slaughter/>  
 




Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines, About (2017) 
<http://www.animalwelfarestandards.net.au/about-2/>  
 
Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines, Poultry (2017) 
<http://www.animalwelfarestandards.net.au/poultry/>  
 
Australian Animal Welfare Strategy, Development of Australian Standards and Guidelines 
for the Welfare of Livestock - Business Plan (2009)  
<http://www.animalwelfarestandards.net.au/files/2011/01/Animal-Welfare-Standards-and-
Guidelines-Development-Business-Plan.pdf>  




Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 'A Bloody Business', Four Corners, 30 May 2011 
(Sarah Furguson, Michael Doyle) 
 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Allegations of Backroom Deals to Keep Battery Hen 
Eggs on the Market’, 7.30, 21 December 2017 (Ellen Fanning) 
 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Disturbing Footage Prompts Calls for Duck Farming 
Changes', 7.30, 19 June 2012 (Bronwyn Herbert) 
 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Making a Killing', Four Corners, 16 Feburary 2015 
(Caro Meldum-Hanna) 
 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Victorian Abbatoir Accused of Cruel Treatment of 
Unwanted Dairy Calves', Lateline, 1 February 2013 (Hamish Fitzsimmons) 
 
Australian Chicken Growers' Council Limited, Submission No 59 to Senate Standing 
Committees on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport, an Inquiry into the Criminal Code 
Amendment (Animal Protection) Bill 2015, 12 March 2015, 
 
Australian Chicken Meat Federation Inc, General Questions 
<http://www.chicken.org.au/page.php?id=150>  
 
Australian Lot Feeders' Association, Submission No 68 to Senate Rural and Regional Affairs 
and Transport Legislation Committee, Criminal Code Amendment (Animal Protection) Bill 
2015, March 2015 
 
Australian pig farming: the inside story, Finnis Park Piggery 
<http://www.aussiepigs.com/piggeries/finniss-park>  
 
Australian pig farming: the inside story, Walseys Piggery 
<http://www.aussiepigs.com/piggeries/wasleys>  
 
Australian Pork Limited, Housing <http://australianpork.com.au/industry-focus/animal-
welfare/housing/>  




Australian Pork Limited, Submission No 58 to Senate Standing Committees on Rural and 
Regional Affairs and Transport, an Inquiry into the Criminal Code Amendment (Animal 
Protection) Bill 2015, 12 March 2015 
 
Bardon, Jane, 'Egypty Live Cattle Export Ban Lifted', ABC Rural (Online), 9 May 2008, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/site-archive/rural/qld/content/2007/s2240355.htm> 
 
Barnaby Joyce and Niall Blair 'National Focus on Farm Trespass', (Media Release, Doc No 
Unknown, 2 August 2015) 
 
Barristers Animal Welfare Panel, Submission No 240 to Senate Standing Committees on 
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport, an Inquiry into the Criminal Code Amendment 
(Animal Protection) Bill 2015, 15 March 2015  
 
Beilharz, Nikolai, 'Rau Rejects Idea of 'Ag Gag' Laws in South Australia', ABC Rural 
(Online), 2 July 2014, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-02/sach-ag-gag/5566580> 
 
Bembridge, Courtney, 'Greyhound Racing: RSPCA Receieves Reports of Live Baiting in 
WA', ABC News (Online), 27 February 2015, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-
27/rspca-receives-reports-of-live-baiting-in-wa/6270198> 
 




Bittman, Mark, 'Who Protects the Animals?', The New York Times (Online), 26 April 2011, 
<https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/?_r=0> 
 
Braithwaite, Alyssa, 'How Cattle Are Slaughtered in Australia', SBS News (Online), 17 June 
2016, <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2016/06/17/how-cattle-are-slaughtered-australia> 
 
Brief for Petitioners- Appellants, Nonhuman Rights Project Inc on Behalf of Tommy v Patrick 
C Lavery and Ors, [2014] Available Here: 
<https://www.Nonhumanrights.Org/Content/Uploads/8.-Appellate-Brief-Filed-with-Court-
Tommys-Appeal1.Pdf> 




Brito, Sam De, 'Opinion Poll: Greyhound Racing and Live Baiting: Time to Ban the 'Sport of 




Burns, Iain, 'Animal Rights Activist Films Himself Freeing PIG from Farm and Speeding 




Caillard, Peter, Statement from Grv Chair Peter Caillard (2015) Greyhound Racing Victoria 
<http://www.grv.org.au/news/2015/02/23/statement-grv-chair-peter-caillard/>  
 
Carlyon, Peta, 'Tasmanian Abattoir Investigated over Animal Cruelty Claims', ABC News 
(Online), 14 October 2016, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-14/tasmanian-abattoir-
accused-of-animal-cruelty/7924804> 
 
Chris McLennan, ‘Victorian Hunters set their sights on RSPCA’ The Weekly Times (online), 
4 August 2016, <https://www.weeklytimesnow.com.au/news/politics/victorian-hunters-set-
their-sights-on-rspca/news-story/d976588d8bf76deeda5f6d4a20835ca8> 
 
Chris McLennan, ‘Victorian Parliament Launches Probe into RSPCA’, The Weekly Times 
(online), 23 August 2016, <https://www.weeklytimesnow.com.au/news/politics/victorian-
parliament-launches-probe-into-rspca/news-story/533d4f4486fdcd3f4ef94f4daf76d293>. 
 
Chung, Frank, 'Animal Rights Group Releases Undercover Video Showing Baby Chick 





Churchill, Chris, 'Advocate: Rights or Not, Caged Chimp Deserves Better', Times Union 
(Online), 7 December 2013, <http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Advocate-Rights-or-
not-caged-chimp-deserves-5044847.php> 
 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 11 February 2015, (Christopher Back) 




Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 November 2017 
 




Dole, Nick, 'Australia's Meat Sales Plunged 15pc after Indonesian Cattle Cruelty Revelations, 
Court Told', ABC (Online), 20 July 2017, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-20/australia-
meat-sales-plunged-15pc-over-cattle-cruelty-court-told/8729300> 
 
Dorries, Ben and Thomas, Ray, 'Five Greyhound Trainers Banned for Life for Live Baiting, 





Dossor, Rob, Cessation of Animal Welfare Assistance in Destination Countries and 




Economy and Infrastructure Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into the RSPCA 
Victoria (2017) 
 
Everingham, Sara and O'Brien, Kristy, 'Cattle Industry Launches Class Action against 




Explanatory Memorandum, Criminal Code Amendment (Animal Protection) Bill 2015 
 
Francione, Gary, Animal Rights: The Abolitionist Approach 
<http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/faqs/#.WKe8s3dh1Z0> at 17 February 2017 
 
Page 296 of 305 
 
 




Government of South Australia (Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources), 
Animal Welfare Legislation <http://www.environment.sa.gov.au/managing-natural-
resources/plants-and-animals/Animal_welfare/Animal_welfare_legislation>  
 




Government of Victoria, Glue Traps <http://agriculture.vic.gov.au/agriculture/animal-health-
and-welfare/animal-welfare/humane-vertebrate-pest-control/glue-traps>  
 








Goyette, Brayden, '5 Things About Slavery You Probably Didn't Learn in Social Studies: A 
Short Guide to 'the Half Has Never Been Told'', The Huffington Post (Online), 24 October 
2014, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/the-half-has-never-been-told_n_6036840> 
 
Grandin, Temple, The Welfare of Pigs During Transport and Slaughter 
<http://www.grandin.com/references/pig.welfare.during.transport.slaughter.html>  
 
Greenaway, Anne, 'RSPCA Approved Farming Labels Challenged', Daily Liberal (Online), 
24 November 2012, <http://www.dailyliberal.com.au/story/1141797/rspca-approved-
farming-labels-challenged/> 
 
Hadley, Esther, 'Animal Liberation Front Bomber Faces Jail after Admitting Arson Bids', The 
Guardian (Online), 18 August 2006, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/aug/18/animalwelfare.topstories3> 




Han, Esther, 'Egg Industry Wants to Stop Grinding and Gassing Millions of Male Chicks to 




Han, Esther, 'RSPCA Threatens to Quit Poultry Standards Advisory Group, as Integrity of 




Hatty, Suzanne, Invisible Lives: Women, Dependence and the Law (Paper presented at 
Women and the Law, Australian Institute of Crimininology, Canberra, January 1993) 
 
Hegarty, Adam, 'Tip-Off Leads to RSPCA Rural Hills Property and Seizing More Than 100 





Herbert, Lisa and Crawford, Harry, 'RSPCA Calls for More Farmer Commitment for 
Mulesing Alternatives', ABC Rural (Online), 28 August 2014, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2014-08-28/mulesing-awi-update/5699710> 
 
Humane Society Intenational, Submission No 48 to Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and 
Transport Legislation Committee, Criminal Code Amendment (Animal Protection) Bill 2015, 
March 2015 
 
Jed Goodfellow, Animal Welfare Regulation in the Australian Agricultural Sector: A 
Legitimacy Maximising Analysis (Phd Thesis, Macquarie University, 2015) 
 
Josh Bavas, 'Greyhound Live Baiting: Ipswich Trainer Tom Noble Granted Bail on Seven 




Lawrence Tribe, 'in Support of Motion for Leave to Appeal', Submission in Nonhuman Rights 
Project Inc on Behalf of Tommy v Patrick C Lavery, Index Number 518336, 8 May 2015 




Layer Hens: RSPCA Approved Farming Scheme Standards (2015) 
 
Levy, Megan, 'Torture for Fun: Police Given Shocking Abattoir Footage', The Sydney 
Morning Herald (Online), 21 March 2013, <http://www.smh.com.au/national/torture-for-fun-
police-given-shocking-abattoir-footage-20130320-2ggm2.html> 
 
Locke, Sarina, 'Primo Smallgoods Has Declined to Comment, Other Than to Say Its Label Is 




Long, Warwick, 'Trespass Laws Front and Centre at Victorian Electoral Debate on 
Agriculture, and Both Sides of Politics Agree', ABC News (Online), 2 October 2014, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2014-10-02/ag-debate-trespass/5785922> 
 
MacLennan, Leah, 'Ag-Gag Bill Will Make Exposing Animal Cruelty Harder: Law Society', 
ABC News (Online), 3 December 2015, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-12-03/ag-gag-
bill-surveillance-devices-sa-parliament/6994516?pfmredir=sm> 
 
McAloon, Cath and Barbour, Lucy, 'RSPCA Calls for Laws to Make Reporting of Animal 
Abuse Mandatory', ABC News (Online), 25 August 2014, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2014-08-22/nrn-rspca-animal-laws/5689764> 
 








Minister for Primary Industries (New Zealand), Proposed Animal Welfare Regulations (2016) 
<https://www.mpi.govt.nz/document-vault/11905>  
 
Page 299 of 305 
 
 
Minister for Primary Industries (New Zealand), Summary Report on Public Consultation 
(2017) <https://www.mpi.govt.nz/document-vault/18953>  
 
Morris, Steven, Ward, David and Butt, Riazat, 'Jail for Animal Rights Extremists Who Stole 
Body of Elderly Woman from Her Grave', The Guardian (Online), 21 May 2006, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/may/12/animalwelfare.topstories3> 
 
National Farmers' Federation, Submission No 41 to Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and 
Transport Legislation Committee, Criminal Code Amendment (Animal Protection) Bill 2015, 
March 2015 
 
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 13 November 1979 
 
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 14 November 1979 
 
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 7 November 1979 
 
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 20 November 1979 
 
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 26 August 2015 
 
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 18 October 2016  
 
New South Wales, Special Commission of Inquiry into the Greyhound Racing Industry in 
New South Wales (2015) 
 
New Zealand Veterinary Association, Mulesing (2011) 
<http://www.nzva.org.nz/?page=policymulesing>  
 




Page 300 of 305 
 
 
News, ABC, 'Animal Rights Activists 'Akin to Terrorists', Says NSW Minister Katrina 
Hodgkinson', ABC News (Online), 18 July 2013, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-
18/animal-rights-activists-27terrorists272c-says-nsw-minister/4828556> 
 
Nicholls, Sean, 'The $41 Million Bill for Mike Baird's Greyhound Backdown', The Sydney 
Morning Herald (Online), 28 March 2017, <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/the-41-million-bill-
for-mike-bairds-greyhound-backdown-20170328-gv823y.html> 
 
O'Sullivan, Siobhan and Wadiwel, Dinesh, We Have Animal Welfare Laws but They Don't 
Stop the Suffering (2014) <http://theconversation.com/we-have-animal-welfare-laws-but-
they-dont-stop-the-suffering-30703> at 28 August 2014  
 
O'Sullivan, Siobhan, 'New Laws Could Stop Revelations of Animal Abuse', Sydney Morning 
Herald (Online), 2015, <http://www.smh.com.au/comment/new-laws-could-stop-revelations-
of-animal-abuse-20150217-13go4u.html> 
 
Owens, Jared and Cormick, Brenan, 'Barnaby Joyce Criticises Activists in Greyhound Live-








P&M Quality Smallgoods Pty Ltd (trading as Prima Smallgoods), Undertaking to the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Given for the Purposes of Section 87b of 





Pastoral and Grazier's Assocation, Submission No 62 to Senate Standing Committee on Rural 
and Regional Affairs and Transport, an Inquiry into the Criminal Code Amendment (Animal 
Protection) Bill 2015, 6 March 2015 
 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Mulesing by the Wool Industry 
<https://www.peta.org/issues/animals-used-for-clothing/wool-industry/mulesing/>  




People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, There's Nothing Like Australia's Cruelty 
<https://www.peta.org/features/theres-nothing-like-australias-cruelty/>  
 
Petitioners' Memorandum of Law in Support of Order to Show Cause and Writ of Habeas 
Corpus and Order Granting the Immediate Release of Tommy, Nonhuman Rights Project Inc, 




Petrinc, Melanie, 'Greyhound Live-Baiting Scandal: State Wants Tom Noble to Serve Jail 




Potter, Will, 'Australia Risks Copying Us 'Ag-Gag' Laws to Turn Activists into Terrorists', 
The Sydney Morning Herald (Online), 1 May 2014, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/environment/animals/australia-risks-copying-us-aggag-laws-to-
turn-animal-activists-into-terrorists-20140501-37k8i.html> 
Rivalea Australia, Animal Welfare - Humane Processing 
<https://www.rivalea.com.au/AnimalWelfare.aspx#6.>  
Roots, Chris, 'Greyhound Racing NSW Board and Chief Executive Stand Down as Live 




Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Submission No 52 to Senate Rural 
and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee, Criminal Code Amendment 
(Animal Protection) Bill 2015, March 2015 
 
RSPCA Australia, About Us, <https://rspca.org.au/what-we-do/about-us-0> 
 
RSPCA Australia, Approved Farming Scheme <https://rspcaapproved.org.au/>  
 
RSPCA Australia, For All Creatures Great and Small <https://www.rspca.org.au/>  
 
Page 302 of 305 
 
 
RSPCA Australia, Our History <https://www.rspca.org.au/what-we-do/about-us/our-
history>. 
 




RSPCA Australia, What Happens to Bobby Calves? <http://kb.rspca.org.au/what-happens-to-
bobby-calves_87.html>  
 
RSPCA Australia, What Is the Rspca's View on Farming Rabbits for Meat? 
<http://kb.rspca.org.au/what-is-the-rspcas-view-on-farming-rabbits-for-meat_357.html >  
 
RSPCA Australia, Why Is the RSPCA Opposed to the Tail Docking of Dogs? (2014) 
<http://kb.rspca.org.au/why-is-the-rspca-opposed-to-the-tail-docking-of-dogs_135.html>  
 












RSPCA Victoria, Prosecutions <http://rspcavic.org/services/inspectorate/prosecutions>  
 
Schreiner, S, 'Sentencing Animal Cruelty' (Paper presented at the Cruelty to Animals: A 
human problem (RSPCA Scientific Seminar), Canberra, 22 February 2005) 
 
Smithers, Rebecca, 'All Slaughterhouses in England to Have Compulsory Cctv', The 
Guardian (Online), 11 August 2017, 






Sneddon, Joanne, 'How the Wool Industry Has Undercut Itself on Mulesing', The 
Conversation (Online), 3 May 2011, <https://theconversation.com/how-the-wool-industry-
has-undercut-itself-on-mulesing-956> 
South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 4 June 2008 
 
South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 1 July 2014 
 
South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 2 November 2016 
 
South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 September 2014 
 
South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 5 June 2014 
 
Tasmanian Government Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment, 




Tasmanian Government Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment,, 
Animal Welfare Inspections of Intensive Farms <http://dpipwe.tas.gov.au/biosecurity-
tasmania/animal-biosecurity/animal-welfare/animal-welfare-inspections-of-intensive-farms>  
 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Animal Rights Extremism and Ecoterrorism (2004) The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation <https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/animal-
rights-extremism-and-ecoterrorism>  
 
The Law Society of South Australia, Submission in Relation to the Animal Welfare (Jumps 
Racing) Amendment Bill 2011, 2011. 
 
The Law Society of South Australia, Submission to Attorney General, Surveillance Devices 
Bill 2015, 26 November 2015 




Townsend, Mark and Temko, Ned, 'How Animal Rights Groups Destroyed My Family's 
Life', The Guardian (Online), 28 August 2005, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/science/2005/aug/28/businessofresearch.animalrights> 
 
Transcript of Proceedings, Petitioners v Patrick C Lavery (Fulton County Supreme Court, 
New York, Index No 02051, Sise J, 3 December 2013) 
 
Unknown, 'Abattoir Boss Admits Calves Ill-Treated after Animal Liberation Releases Video', 
ABC News (Online), 4 May 2017, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-04/abattoir-owner-
admits-calves-ill-treated/8495952> 
 
Unknown, 'Animal Rights Activist Charged over Sheep Feed Sabotage', Sydney Morning 
Herald (Online), 21 November 2003, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/11/21/1069027296534.html> 
 
Unknown, 'Greyhound Racing to Be Banned in New South Wales, Baird Government 
Announces', ABC News (Online), 7 July 2016, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-
07/greyhound-racing-to-be-banned-in-new-south-wales/7576816> 
 
Unknown, 'Ludwig Defends Live Exports after Fresh Cull Footage', ABC News (Online), 6 
November 2012 2012, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-11-05/ludwig-defends-live-export-
after-sheep-cull-footage/4354720> 
Unknown, 'Mike Baird's Greyhound Racing Industry Ban Backflip: Everything You Need to 
Know', ABC News (Online), 11 October 2016, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-
11/everything-you-need-to-know-about-mike-baird-greyhounds/7921306> 
 
Unknown, 'Racing Queensland Stands Down 23 More Trainers after Live Baiting Scandal', 
ABC News (Online), 17 March 2015, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-17/queensland-
racing-stands-down-23-more-greyhound-trainers/6325130> 
 
Unknown, 'RSPCA Inspectors Overowrked, Reputation Threatened by 'Emotional' Activism: 
Review', ABC News (Online), 6 October 2016, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-
06/rspca-reputation-at-risk-due-to-emotional-activism-report-says/7908344> 
 
Page 305 of 305 
 
 
Unknown, 'Sheep and Wool Industry Agreement Needed on Peta and Animal Activists', 
Sheep Central (Online), 29 June 2015, <https://www.sheepcentral.com/sheep-and-wool-
industry-agreement-needed-on-peta-and-animal-activists/> 
 
Unknown, 'WA Imposes Life Ban, $50k Fine for Greyhound Industry Live Bait Offenders', 
ABC News (Online), 20 February 2015, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-20/wa-
imposes-life-ban,-$50k-fine-for-greyhound-live-bait-offenders/6165436> 
 
Unknown, 'Watch: Shocking Footage inside RSPCA Approved Free-Range Farm', Yahoo7 
(Online), 21 June 2017, <https://au.news.yahoo.com/a/36077880/mt-barker-free-range-
chicken-farm-denies-wrongdoing-after-shocking-footage-emerges/> 
 
Voiceless: The Animal Protection Institute, Animal Law in the Spotlight: Update on the NSW 
Biosecurity Act (2015) <https://www.voiceless.org.au/content/animal-law-spotlight-update-
nsw-biosecurity-act-0>  
 
Voiceless: The Animal Protection Institute, Kangaroos <https://www.voiceless.org.au/the-
issues/kangaroos#footnote20_5p3u2a0>  
 
Woodley, Naomi, 'Government to Suspend Live Cattle Exports', ABC News (Online), 9 June 
2011, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-06-08/government-to-suspend-live-cattle-
exports/2750312> 
 
 
